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This thesis examined the effects of ICT investment, ICT governance mechanisms, 
boards with diverse ICT expertise, and ownership structures on firm performance of 
Malaysian technology sector in the Malaysian Public Listed Companies from 2010 until 
2014. This study employed the balanced panel data for a sample of 33 listed companies, 
with 165 observations. A dynamic model was built and estimation was carried out by 
using the System Generalized Method of Moments (SGMM). As predicted, ICT 
investment incurred in the current year displayed a significantly negative impact upon 
ROE. Even though ICT investment failed to exhibit a significantly positive effect upon 
firm performance during the initial period of spending, the findings portrayed that ICT 
spending in current year had the ability to positively influence Tobin’s Q. In fact, ICT 
investment incurred in the lag of a year showed significantly positive impact on Tobin’s 
Q. In terms of ICT governance mechanisms, the presence of ICT governance committee 
had been found to have a significantly negative effect on ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q, 
whereas the presence of ICT senior management showed significantly positive effect 
upon Tobin’s Q. The boards with ICT industrial experiences displayed a positive effect 
upon ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q, but a significantly negative effect was discovered for 
boards with ICT professional qualifications on Tobin’s Q. As for ownership structures, 
managerial ownership exhibited significantly positive effect on Tobin’s Q, but 
negatively on ROA. Furthermore, the government and foreign ownerships were found 
to have significantly positive effect on ROA. Hence, the findings from this study are 
indeed beneficial not only for all stakeholders, including policymakers, regulators, and 
academics; but also for board of company and management level in ascertaining that 
their ICT implementation is properly governed under appropriate ICT standards.  
 





Tesis ini mengkaji kesan pelaburan ICT, mekanisme tadbir urus ICT, lembaga dengan 
pelbagai kepakaran ICT dan struktur pemilikan terhadap prestasi firma sektor teknologi 
Malaysia di Syarikat Awam Tersenarai Malaysia dari tahun 2010 hingga 2014. Kajian 
ini menggunakan data keseimbangan panel bagi sampel daripada 33 buah syarikat  
tersenarai, dengan 165 pemerhatian. Model dinamik dibina dan anggaran dilakukan 
menggunakan Sistem Kaedah Umum Momen (SGMM). Seperti yang diramalkan, 
pelaburan ICT yang berlaku pada tahun semasa menunjukkan kesan negatif terhadap 
ROE. Walaupun pelaburan ICT gagal menunjukkan kesan positif yang signifikan 
terhadap prestasi firma semasa tempoh awal perbelanjaan, hasil kajian menunjukkan 
bahawa perbelanjaan ICT pada tahun semasa mempunyai keupayaan untuk 
mempengaruhi Tobin’s Q secara positif. Bahkan, pelaburan ICT yang berlaku pada lag 
setahun  menunjukkan kesan positif yang signifikan terhadap Tobin’s Q. Dari segi 
mekanisme tadbir urus ICT, kehadiran jawatankuasa tadbir urus ICT didapati 
mempunyai kesan negatif yang signifikan terhadap ROA, ROE, dan Tobin’s Q, 
sedangkan kehadiran pengurusan senior ICT menunjukkan kesan positif pada Tobin’s 
Q. Lembaga dengan pengalaman industri ICT menunjukkan kesan positif terhadap 
ROA, ROE, dan Tobin’s Q, tetapi kesan negatif yang signifikan ditemui bagi lembaga 
dengan kelayakan profesional ICT pada Tobin’s Q. Bagi struktur pemilikan pula, 
kepemilikan pengurusan mempamerkan kesan positif yang signifikan terhadap Tobin’s 
Q, tetapi negatif terhadap ROA. Selain itu, kerajaan dan kepemilikan asing didapati 
mempunyai kesan positif yang signifikan terhadap ROA. Oleh itu, penemuan kajian ini 
memang bermanfaat bukan sahaja untuk semua pihak yang berkepentingan, termasuk 
penggubal dasar, pengawal selia, dan ahli akademik, tetapi juga untuk lembaga syarikat 
dan peringkat pengurusan dalam memastikan bahawa pelaksanaan ICT mereka disusun 
dengan baik di bawah piawaian ICT yang bersesuaian.       
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1.1 Overview of the Chapter 
This chapter begins with background of the information technology infrastructure 
development in Malaysia. Then, it is followed by the problem statement and 
justification, the purpose of the research and the main objectives and the significance 
of the study. The main questions which are investigated within scope of research are 
introduced. Finally, the contribution and overview of entire thesis are presented. 
1.2 Background of the Study 
The rapid growth of the information technology (IT) industry in Malaysia occurring in 
business environment has been prominent in South East Asia over the last few years 
due to the vast advancement of IT evolution. Convergence and reinforcement of 
information, cloud, mobile and other social elements (Carlton, 2012) are supported by 
a wide range of latest multi facet technological capabilities including seamless 
communication, speed, wireless, the development of technological innovations and 
sophisticated of various software and hardware. This technological advancement has 
been seen as a good opportunity and competitive advantage for the industry to further 
develop the information and communication technology (ICT) usage. In general, the 
advancement in Information Technology (IT) has brought about countless positive 
effects upon the progress of many sectors in Malaysia by shaking up the entire world 
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market structures, landscapes of business, consumer behaviour, and people‘s 
lifestyles.  
In fact, the great massive progress in the area of IT has become more of a necessity 
rather than a facility. This is because; the modern technology is indeed hassle-free for 
everyone worldwide with access to active IT innovations. Hence, it is not surprising if 
countries, including Malaysia, have contributed a lot of funds to the IT development 
primarily to intensify the modern lifestyles of people, indirectly leading to a 
significant increased in demand for ICT products and services to boost economic 
development. Moreover, the penetration of IT into various types of sophisticated 
technologies has accelerated the economic growth in Malaysia. Furthermore, the 
Malaysian government has offered varied incentives to attract more companies, both 
within and outside the country, to generate greater IT investment, mainly to boost the 
economic development in Malaysia. 
ICT is an important component to numerous business organizations. Besides, survival 
and the ability to achieve goals can become difficult if the execution is not supported 
by the extensive use of IT in this present environment. Due to this situation, many 
organizations have decided to invest in ICT for it may give many benefits to these 
companies in the long run (Mohd Noor & Apadore, 2014). This statement, 
nonetheless, is supported by the literature because several reasons have been listed by 
some organizations for investigating in ICT (Ashrafi & Murtaza, 2008; Brynjolfsson, 
1994; Brynjolfsson, 1993). Apart from the need to create wealth for organization, as 
well as to improve output levels in production and service delivery; ICT investments 
also open up opportunities to them to produce quality products and services, besides 
controlling communication activities in order to achieve customer satisfaction.  
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Additionally, business organizations invest in ICT because it is among the many 
necessities of doing business driven by changes in the industry level (i.e. rapid 
changes in information and stiff competition) (Mohd Noor & Apadore, 2014). 
Besides, some stated that investment in ICT assets is also a particularly marked 
contribution to the economic growth across the Group of Seven (G7) economies in the 
late 1990s (Colecchia & Schreyer, 2002; Schreyer, 2000), which enhanced 
productivity, competitiveness, and citizen engagement (Kodakanchi, Abuelyaman, 
Kuofie, & Qaddour, 2006).  
Nevertheless, the issue of whether the level of ICT investments can bring real benefits 
to the firms is still questionable. With that, an economist, Nobel Laureate Robert 
Solow, labelled that the phenomena of ICT productivity paradox occur due to 
weaknesses in IT resources management control, which contribute to the failure of 
achieving target from returns on IT investments. This phenomenon takes place when 
large investments in IT, has apparently failed to enhance the performance exerted by 
firms‘ in the 1980s. Meanwhile, in the early 1990s, the second productivity paradox 
was examined at the firm level and revealed nil correlation between IT investment and 
firms‘ profitability (Strassman, 1990).  
Recent study has proved that ICT investment, by itself, is not strong enough to 
enhance the performance of firm, unless if its implementation is in conjunction with 
other factors that have to be weighed in to influence firm performance. With the 
emergence of ICT today, along with dynamic business environments, greater ICT 
investments have been expected to generate better profitability among firms. As such, 
this particular research, believes that in-depth comprehension can be attained by 
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introducing several significant factors for their exceptional effects, especially within 
the context of corporate governance factors.  
Therefore, the primary aim of this research is to shed more light on the effect of ICT 
investment and several corporate governance factors on firm performance. 
Furthermore, in the light of ICT investment, the related evaluation weighs in time-
lagged effect before the advantages of ICT investment could bring some positive 
effects on firm performance (Yaylacicegi & Menon, 2004). A number of corporate 
governance elements, for instance, ICT governance, boards with diverse of ICT 
expertise, and ownership structures, are introduced and applied in this study so as to 
protect investments made by shareholders and overall firm performance (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). Moreover, the aspects of corporate governance like ICT governance, 
boards with diverse of ICT expertise and ownership structures have been developed 
based on several theories, for instance, Theory of Agency and Theory of Resource  
Dependency.  
The Malaysian technology sector had been selected as the sample for this study, 
mainly because this particular sector has been identified by the National ICT 
Association of Malaysia (PIKOM) as the sector that is closely related to ICT usage, in 
comparison to other industries (PIKOM, 2014; 2013; 2012). Besides, since the nature 
of this sector is highly engaging with ICT equipments, the efficiency of the board 
within the ICT field is seen as one that is crucial, especially for ICT investment 
decision-making and its related governance process. Thus, if the board fails in 
conducting ICT governance in an effective manner, their limitation may potentially 
decrease firm performance due to issues related to agency that arise in the company.  
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As the companies try to improve business strategies through their better conduct of 
ICT governance, the need for ICT expertise among board members is also seen as 
important driver for the company's growth. Beyond the need to support ICT 
development at the management level, companies are facing the need to increase the 
ICT expertise at the board level as well. The role of board members with diverse of 
ICT expertise including ICT educations, ICT professional qualifications, ICT job 
experiences and ICT-related trainings is crucial in order to bring about changes in the 
boardroom culture and to better understand the risks and opportunities the technology 
provides especially in the boardroom discussion. However, past evidences have shown 
that many boards simply do not have adequate expertise to assess the issues and make 
decisions about ICT strategy, investment and how to best allocate ICT resources.  
Once business goals have been established, the business strategies are developed. 
Apart from the important need of the ICT governance implementation and having 
boards with diverse of ICT expertise, the other corporate governance factor such as 
ownership structures would also be considered in this study since they play an 
important role in providing sufficient capital for companies‘ growth. Past researchers 
have also argued that the ownership structures have the ability to enhance the firm 
performance through their important impacts on firm‘s strategies, including 
investment decision, compensation schemes, management successions (Hu & 
Izumida, 2009), financial resources, technology expertise, as well as technical support 
for ICT development (Choi, Park, & Hong, 2012; Uwuigbe & Olusanmi, 2012).  
In this case, the Resource Dependence theory compliments to the Agency theory in 
mitigating the issues associated to agency by taking in boards with diverse expertise, 
especially those in the ICT field, in order to offer beneficial resources to the company 
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in terms of advice, legitimacy, as well as external information (Carter, D‘Souza, 
Simkins, & Simpson, 2010; Hillman, Cannella, & Harris, 2002; Preffer & Salancik, 
1978) that may enhance firm performance (Rose, Munch-Madsen, & Funch, 2013). 
Furthermore, from the insights of Agency theory and Resource Dependence theory, 
this study examined the effect of ICT investment, ICT governance mechanisms, 
boards with diverse ICT expertise, and ownership structures on firm performance in 
the Malaysian technology-based sector. 
1.3 Problem Statement 
Investments in ICT normally reflect high provision (Meliville, Kraemer, & Gurbaxani, 
2004) ICT has been widely acknowledged as a source of competitive advantage 
(Sirirak, Islam, & Khang, 2011). In general, ICT investments are meant to harness 
ICT potentials, as an essential enabler in guiding organizations to boost their business 
productivity and financial performance. In precise, the smart use of ICT enhances the 
performance of firms, besides generating good returns to organizations (Bates, Holton, 
& Seyler, 1996). Moreover, prior studies have displayed significantly positive effect 
between ICT investments and firm performance (Arabyat, 2014; Makinde, 2014; 
Romdhane, 2013; Hung, Yen, & Ou, 2012; Leckson-Leckey, Osei, & Harvey, 2011; 
Gaith, Khalim, & Ismail, 2008; Chari, Devaraj, & David, 2008; Jun, 2008; Shin, 2006; 
Yaylacicegi & Menon, 2004; Anderson, Banker, & Hu, 2003; Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 
2003; Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 1996; Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 1993). Unfortunately, some 
empirical evidence has failed to support the logic behind such expectations, in which 
these gaps have to be filled. 
7 
 
Besides, although numerous empirical studies have proven either significant or 
positive correlation between ICT investments and firm performance, the phenomenon 
of ICT paradox still persists. In addition, from many other on-going and evolving 
researches, Malaysia has proven that although huge ICT investments have been made, 
numerous ICT projects have yet to prove their success (Meng, Samah, & Omar, 
2013). For example, Goh Thean Eu, a journalist from the Digital News Asia (2015) 
and Bernama (2012), reported recent cases of failure in Malaysian ICT projects, which 
involved losses of millions of Ringgit. Besides, recent studies have also revealed 
several cases of ICT failure in other nations with cutting-edge ICT development, such 
as the U.S. (Standish Group, 2013; Flyvbjerg & Budzier, 2011), European countries 
(Standish Group, 2013), the U.K. (Solon, 2015; Flyvbjerg & Budzier, 2011), and 
Australia (Victorian Ombudsman, 2011). For example, the Standish Group ―CHAOS 
Summary 2012‖ carried out a survey and discovered more than half of the ICT 
projects in the ICT sector have failed or challenged. On the other hand, Robert 
Goatham (2009), who is the Principal of Calleam Consulting Ltd; and a leading expert 
in the field of Project Management, stressed the fact that high failure rates of ICT 
projects within the ICT sector had been considerably higher than the other types of 
engineering projects. In fact, some complexities were identified to have inhibited the 
effective implementation of ICT, such as low barriers to enter into the profession, lack 
of governing body, obstacles to develop expertise, as well as the often low levels of 
investment meant for training.  
Furthermore, many empirical studies have highlighted various types of critical factors 
that contribute to the failure of ICT implementation, including, lack of user 
involvement, lack of skills and knowledge in project management, incompetent ICT 
decisions at the top management level, as well as inadequate ICT resources (Standish 
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Group, 2013; Nawi, Rahman, & Ibrahim, 2012; Al-Ahmad, et al., 2009). Besides, 
prior researches have classified the contributing factors to cases of ICT failure into 
several categories, such as project management, top management, technology, 
organization, complexity, and process (Nawi et al., 2012; Al-Ahmad, et al., 2009), 
which are closely related to the role of and actions taken by human factor. On top of 
that, the limitation of human factor in managing ICT leads to failure in implementing 
ICT, hence causing decrease in firm performance. This is because; effective ICT 
management aids firms in enhancing their performance (Bates et al., 1996), thus it is 
vital that its implementation is in line with the best corporate governance practices so 
as to ensure that investment in ICT can indeed lead to better firm performance 
(SALGA, 2012). However, one critical issue that has been highlighted in corporate 
governance dealing at the present time is related to board diversity (Deloitte, 2015; 
Leblanc, 2015). Moreover, issues that revolve around the capabilities of the board in 
handling ICT related matters are often claimed as a major contributing factor to failure 
of ICT implementation (Birmingham, 2015; Cohn & Robson, 2011; Nolan & 
McFarlan, 2005). Furthermore, as boards play a vital role in all decisions linked to 
strategic planning of ICT in firms, undue reliance on management capabilities in 
handling ICT would drag the principal-agent relationship to issues related to agency 
problems. Thus, boards should realize the significance of having board members with 
diverse expertise, especially in ICT, to help firms improve their performance.   
In fact, the notion of corporate governance has been in the limelight when associated 
to the present ICT challenges. Besides, despite of the issue of having boards with 
diverse ICT expertise, the effect of ICT governance on firm performance has yet to be 
explored (Lazic, Groth, Schillinger, & Heinzl, 2011a; Lazic, Heinzl, & Neff, 2011b; 
De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2009) as its adoption is rather low, particularly within 
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the Malaysian practices (Kaur, Mohamed, & Ahlan, 2012; Othman, Chan, & Foo, 
2011; Teo & Tan, 2010). Moreover, firms would face risk without ICT conduct, 
which could eventually affect the performance of firms (U.S. GAO, 2015; Kaur et al., 
2012; Van Grembergen & De Haes, 2010). Another common issues highlighted in the 
corporate governance literature is ownership structure, as studies have proven that 
ownership structure is a serious concern in the field of corporate governance due to its 
impact on firm performance (Srivastava, 2011). In addition, prior studies showed that 
the firm performance could be enhanced by effective control via firm ownership 
structures, especially within the context of investment decisions (Hu & Izumida, 
2009). Moreover, Sulong and Nor (2008) indicated that the benefits derived from firm 
performance could differ across firms as their incentives are varied with respect to 
their type of ownership structure.  
Additionally, prior studies have investigated the impact of some ownership structure 
variables, such as concentrated ownership (Basyith, Fauzi, & Idris, 2015; Lee & Lee, 
2014; Zakaria, Purhanudin, & Palanimally, 2014; Mule, Mukras, & Oginda, 2013; 
Alimehmeti & Paletta, 2012; Darmadi, 2012; Fauzi & Locke, 2012; Wahla, Shah, & 
Hussain, 2012; Garcı´a-Meca & Sa´nchez-Ballesta, 2011; Sulong & Mat Nor, 2010; 
2008; Ganguli & Agrawal, 2009; Tam & Tan, 2007; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; 
Demsetz & Lehn, 1985), managerial ownership (Basyith et al., 2015; Nath, Islam, & 
Saha, 2015; Zakaria et al., 2014; Fauzi & Locke, 2012; Uwuigbe & Olusanmi, 2012; 
Wahla et al., 2012; Din & Javid, 2011; Sulong & Mat Nor, 2010; 2008; Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2006), government ownership (Musallam, 2015a; 2015b; Tran, Nonneman, & 
Jorissen, 2014; Zakaria et al., 2014; Menon & Ng, 2013; Phung & Hoang, 2013; Goh, 
Khan, & Rasli, 2013; Najid & Rahman, 2011; Mohd Ghazali, 2010; Sulong & Mat 
Nor, 2010; 2008; Lau & Tong, 2008; Tam & Tan, 2007), and foreign ownership 
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(Musallam, 2015b; Zakaria et al., 2014; Phung & Hoang, 2013; Darmadi, 2012; 
Uwuigbe & Olusanmi, 2012; Mohd Ghazali, 2010; Sulong & Mat Nor, 2010; 2008; 
Lau & Tong, 2008) on firm performance. Nonetheless, this particular research 
discovered a glaring gap as the effects of ownership structures on firm performance 
have yet to be looked into from the light of technology sector. This study, thus, is 
definitely relevant for it contributes to the existing knowledge pertaining to the area of 
corporate governance. 
Even though numerous empirical studies have contributed to the effect of ICT 
investment on firm performance, the aspects of corporate governance have been 
scarcely examined (e.g. ICT governance mechanisms, boards with diverse ICT 
expertise and ownership structures) although its function is rather essential in 
influencing firm performance, especially for the Malaysian technology sector. With 
that, this study examined the effect of ICT investment and several corporate 
governance aspects, such as ICT governance mechanisms, boards with diverse ICT 
expertise, and ownership structures on firm performance within the context of 
Malaysian study. 
1.4 Research Questions  
The research questions developed for this study are listed in the following: 
1) What is the extent of ICT investment in the Malaysian technology-based sector?  
2) Does ICT investment have a significant effect on firm performance in the 
Malaysian technology-based sector? 
3) Do ICT governance mechanisms (process and structures) have significant effects 
on firm performance in the Malaysian technology-based sector? 
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4) Do boards with diverse ICT expertise (ICT education background, ICT 
professional qualifications, ICT industrial experiences, and ICT-related trainings) 
have significant effects on firm performance in the Malaysian technology-based 
sector? 
5) Do different types of ownership structures (concentrated ownership, managerial 
ownership, government ownership, and foreign ownership) have significant 
effects on firm performance in the Malaysian technology-based sector? 
1.5 Research Objectives 
The objectives of this study are given in the following: 
1) To examine the extent of ICT investment in the Malaysian technology-based 
sector.  
2) To examine the significant effect of ICT investment on firm performance in the 
Malaysian technology-based sector. 
3) To examine the significant effects of ICT governance mechanisms (process and 
structures) on firm performance in the Malaysian technology-based sector. 
4) To examine the significant effects of each board with diverse ICT expertise that is 
comprised of boards with ICT education background, boards with ICT 
professional qualification, boards with ICT industrial experiences, and boards 
with ICT related-trainings on firm performance in the Malaysian technology-
based sector. 
5) To examine the significant effects of different types of ownership structures that 
are comprised of concentrated ownership, managerial ownership, government 




1.6 Research Motivation and Contribution 
Advancement in ICT has been proven to bring many positive changes to firm 
performance. Significantly, as the global information and knowledge economies have 
emerged to be crucial, a majority of businesses, industries, and individuals rely on ICT 
to smoothen business processes towards improvising their business performance. 
Therefore, in order to determine the effect of ICT investments on firm performance, 
the importance of such investments has to be determined if they exhibit a positive 
effect on firm performance. Moreover, the sole purpose of ICT investment is to 
improve firm performance, and on the other hand, failings to achieve the outlined 
investment objectives can affect performance to generate more profitably and 
efficient. 
Even though studies concerning ICT have extensively investigated the effect of ICT 
investment on firm performance in various industries, such as financial institutions, 
manufacturing, mixed industries and others; only one study had been found by the 
researcher to have examined the effect of ICT on the performance of Malaysian 
construction sector (Gaith et al., 2008), while some past studies have looked into the 
effect of ICT investment on firm performance in ICT and telecommunication sector 
(Anderson et al., 2003). In precise, the effect of ICT investment on firm performance 
has yet to be unravelled, especially within the context of Malaysia. Therefore, 
examining the effect of ICT investment on the performance of firms in the Malaysian 
technology-based sector is deemed to iron out issues related to failure of ICT projects 
within the ICT sector (Goatham, 2009), mainly because of its business nature that is 
more attributable to the nature of ICT sector, which is closely linked to ICT 
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components (TRBC1, 2015; PIKOM, 2014; 2013; 2012). As a main precursor in the 
ICT field, companies in the Malaysian technology sector must prove that ICT 
investment does open door to opportunities of greater improvisation for future firm 
performance. Besides, huge investments demand adequate ICT management strategy. 
As such, an investment project could be successful if the execution of complex 
projects is accompanied by other elements from the corporate governance best 
practice mechanisms. In fact, one without the other impairs the probability of 
continuous success. Furthermore, strong mechanisms of corporate governance like 
ownership structures, and other elements related to ICT, do matter, for instance, ICT 
governance mechanisms and boards with diverse ICT expertise that have been 
believed to influence firm performance in a positive manner,  especially within the 
Malaysian context. 
In specific, this paper contributes to the ICT and corporate governance literature in 
certain ways. First, this study adds to the ICT and corporate governance literature as 
its focus is placed in examining the effect of ICT investment, as well as other 
corporate governance elements, such as ICT governance mechanisms, boards with 
diverse ICT expertise, and ownership structures, on firm performance. Furthermore, 
despite of the legislative reforms on corporate governance structure, studies of ICT 
investment, ICT governance, and firm performance have remained unexplored, 
especially among developing nations like Malaysia. Such investigation should offer 
interesting evidence on the aspect of corporate governance area. Moreover, the study 
on the effect of ICT investment and corporate governance elements, especially ICT 
governance best practice in Malaysia is still relatively low and calls for further action 
                                            
1 TRBC refers to the Thomson Reuters Business Classification. 
14 
 
by weighing in its significant effect on firm performance, resulting from ICT 
implementation. 
Second, numerous past studies have examined the effect of ICT investment in various 
industries, the ICT sector has been scarcely looked into. In addition, the usage of ICT 
has been dominantly utilized by ICT or the technology sector for it is closely linked to 
ICT equipment (TRBC, 2015; Paytas & Berglund, 2004). Moreover, due to the varied 
nature of ICT usage among different industries (Van Grembergen & De Haes, 2010; 
De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2004), acknowledging these factors, especially within 
the context of Malaysian technology-based sector, which is identifed as one of the 
main ICT core-based companies in Malaysia, is indeed essential in examining the 
effect of ICT investment on the performance of firms in the sector. With that, this 
study highlights a specific sector study, i.e. firms in the Malaysian technology-based 
sector, to provide better comprehend the effect of ICT investment on technology-
based firm performance. With such specific topic within a particular industry, this 
study offers in-depth understanding towards the examined issues. 
Third, the Resource Dependence theory depicts that the acquisition of ICT resources 
is seen as a mechanism of survival and growth for firms (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), 
while boards of directors play a crucial role to ensure maximum investment returns of 
ICT for company benefits. Nevertheless, the issue of boards‘ capabilities in managing 
ICT has often been disputed, maninly because their lagging ICT competency has been 
ruled out as a contributing factor to failure of ICT implementation. Hence, such notion 
has induced boards to undue depend on management competencies in making ICT-
related decisions. Furthermore, based on the Agency theory, undue reliance of boards 
upon management competencies can potentially lead to agency issues. Meanwhile, the 
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Resource Dependence theory suggests a way to overcome the issue of lack of ICT 
competence among boards by bringing in diverse boards with ICT expertise into being 
board members themselves. Hence, these two theories depict that by having, board 
members with diverse ICT expertise; a firm can gain greater insights due to their 
contribution for better ICT management, which could lead to enhanced performance. 
Fourth, this study also addresses the issue related to corporate governance best 
practices that specifically focus on ICT-related matters within the Malaysian 
technology-based sector. Furthermore, due to the various types of problems faced by 
firms in governing ICT (e.g. lack of knowledge, as well as lack of expertise and 
experiences) on how certain technologies like cloud, analytics, social media, and 
mobile can be beneficial, the best practice of ICT governance had been examined in 
this study. Furthermore, this best practice of ICT governance mainly focuses the 
significance of ICT governance standards adoption, as well as the effect of this 
adoption upon firm performance. Besides, the issue of board diversity in the present 
corporate governance practice has also been highlighted by experts, mainly in 
mitigating problems related to ICT conduct in firm (Deloitte, 2015; Leblanc, 2012). In 
addition, the revised Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 2012 asserts on the 
need among non-executive directors to possess diverse skills and experience so as to 
bring good and independent judgement during boardroom discussion. Besides, other 
factors like, skills, knowledge, expertise, and experience of candidates have to be 
taken into account so that the selected directors could carry out their functions in a 
more effective manner. Besides, researches concerning the adoption of ICT 
governance standards and framework are still scarce (Kaur et al., 2012; Othman et al., 
2011; Teo & Tan, 2010), as well as the composition (diversity) of board of directors, 
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which has been considered as a vital element of corporate governance codes among all 
jurisdictions. 
As such, this paper adds to the literature of ICT governance standards within the 
context of Malaysian study, narrowed to firms in the Malaysian technology-based 
sector. Besides, this study placed its focus on board diversity, which specifically 
addresses criteria for boards with diverse ICT expertise, such as ICT educational 
background, ICT professional qualification, ICT industrial experiences, and ICT-
related trainings. Nonetheless, these various criteria of boards with diverse ICT 
expertise have yet to be examined, thus the contribution of this part of the study, 
hopefully could further elaborate the effect of boards with diverse ICT expertise on 
firm performance in the Malaysian technology-based sector. 
Fifth, despite of the fact that extensive literature has highlighted the role of ownership 
structure in corporate governance worldwide (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 
1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), scarcity is noted in past empirical researches in 
examining the impact of ownership structure on technology-based firm performance, 
especially within the context of Malaysia. Moreover, as the effects of ownership 
structures have never been tested; this study intends to extend the existing literature by 
examining the effects of ownership structures on firm performance, especially within 
the context of Malaysian technology-based sector. Lastly, this particular study 
contributes to a dynamic multiple regression model that is comprised the elements of 
lagged years of ICT investment since ICT investment does not immediately influence 
firm performance and it takes several years to payoff, several corporate governance 
variables, and lagged values of dependent variable as an independent variable. 
Additionally, as ICT alone is inadequate to enhance firm performance, several 
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variables of corporate governance, for instance, ICT governance mechanisms, boards 
with diverse ICT expertise, and ownership structures, have been introduced in this 
study. 
1.7 Scope of the Study 
This study has placed its focus on examining the effect of ICT investment and other 
corporate governance variables, such as ICT governance mechanisms, boards with 
diverse ICT expertise, and ownership structures on firm performance in the Malaysian 
technology-based sector. The particular sector had been selected based on the 
evidence found in prior studies, in which failure of ICT projects has contributed to the 
declining performance in the ICT sector (Goatham, 2009). Nevertheless, there is no 
specific ICT sector is listed in the Bursa Malaysia. To this end, the study, basically, 
covers firms in the Malaysian technology-based sector listed in the Malaysian Public 
Listed Companies (MPLC) as this sector is closely related to the ICT sector (TRBC, 
2015; PIKOM, 2014; 2013; 2012). As such, the study sample is comprised of 33 firms 
in the Malaysian technology-based sector with 165 observations in 5 periods from 
2010 until 2014. Next, secondary data analysis was performed using published annual 
reports retrieved from 2010 to 2014 obtained from the MPLC website. Furthermore, a 
dynamic model had been developed as the element of lagged dependent variable of 
firm performance is introduced in the right equation of the model built in this study. In 
specific, the estimation method of System Generalized Method of Moments (SGMM) 
had been employed as it has been identified as the most appropriate estimation method 
to examine the dynamic model introduced in this study. 
18 
 
1.8 Organization of the Study 
This study is organized into five chapters including the Introduction. Details of the 
remaining chapters are described as follows: The Literature Review of this study will 
be discussed under two chapters that have been classified in accordance with specific 
topics, namely, Chapter Two focuses on a review of Firm Performance and 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Investment literature, Chapter 
Three focuses on a review of Corporate Governance of ICT literature. Meanwhile, 
Chapter Four describes the research framework and hypotheses to answer the research 
questions based on the extensive review of literature and problem statement. 
Overview of sample and data collection as well as measurement used for variables is 
also provided. The remainder of this chapter outlines briefly the regression model and 








LITERATURE REVIEW OF FIRM PERFORMANCE AND INFORMATION 
AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY (ICT) INVESTMENT 
2.1 The Concept of Firm Performance 
The concept of firm performance refers to a very broad concept and many researchers 
in the field of firm performance have exclaimed various views regarding its definition. 
Nonetheless, a definite definition that describes the term ―performance‖ is absent from 
the literature. For instance, Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1986) provided elaborated 
interpretation of performance and success by associating this term to the effectiveness 
of a company. Besides, their definition regarding business performance refers to a 
subset of organizational effectiveness that includes financial and operational (non-
financial) performance indicators, quantified by the introduction of new products, 
assertion of product quality, as well as exceptional marketing effectiveness. Besides, 
Stannack (1996) referred the term ‗firm performance‘ as multi-dimensional 
measurements, for example, transactional, input, and output efficiency. Meanwhile, 
Bourguignon (1998) conceptualized performance into performance result (comparison 
between the result obtained and the objective set), performance action (commitment 
towards achieving results), and performance success. 
In addition, firm performance is also expressed as the ability of firms to deliberately 
use available resources in pursuit of specific business goals (Wade & Ricardo, 2001), 
as well as to enhance competitive advantage (Almajali, Alamro, & Al-Soub, 2012; 
Iswatia & Anshoria, 2007). In fact, the three types of elements emphasized by Cascio 
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(2006) while defining performance can be characterized via setting and assessing 
towards goals, facilitating performance by providing adequate resources, staffing 
effectively, and removing possible blocks that can hinder firms to succeed, whilst an 
encouraging performance provides employees with extrinsic rewards. 
Over time, the notion of firm performance is transformed into a more inclusive 
concept because it emerges as a part of firm‘s strategy (Neely, 2007) to pursue 
growth. Furthermore, in most studies, performance is treated as an aggregate firm-
level outcome or a dependent variable, which could be operationalized in many ways, 
ranging from financial and market-based indicators to dimensions of social 
performance (Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003)2.  
2.2 Determinants of Firm Performance and Justification of Its Measurements 
A large body of past literatures has attempted to investigate various factors that 
ascertain firm performance. This issue has emerged as a central question in strategic 
management studies and have gained significant attention among researchers in the 
area of firm performance. Moreover, the analysis of the determinants of firm 
performance is indeed vital for all stakeholders, especially among investors because a 
well-performing firm will definitely bring good returns on their investments. Other 
than that, several chronological literature studies have revealed completely 
contradicting effects of influential factors in the firm performance research field, 
inclusive of the following issues: firm age, firm size (Hatem, 2014; Almajali et al, 
2012), capital intensity (Shiamwama, Ombayo, & Mukolwe, 2014; Mirza & Javed, 
                                            
2 Firm performance can not only be influenced by the strategies and operations in the market, but also 
through non-market environments, such as reputation that represents an aspect of corporate social 
performance (CSP). It is argued that CSP also can be part of companies‘ strategy for attaining their 
strong corporate financial performance (Orlitzky et al., 2003). 
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2013), human resources (skills) (Shiamwama et al., 2014; Ahmad & Schroeder, 2003), 
firm leverage and liquidity(Almajali et al., 2012), ownership structure (Shiamwama et 
al., 2014; Mirza & Javed, 2013), corporate governance (Shiamwama et al., 2014; Al-
Matari, Al-Swidi, & Fadzil, 2014; Mirza & Javed, 2013; Almajali et al., 2012; 
Ibrahim & Abdul Samad, 2011), and technological factor (Shiamwama et al., 2014), 
to name a few. Meanwhile, as for the influential factors of firm performance, this 
extensive literature study suggests two major streams: the first factor highlights the 
importance of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) that represents 
technological factor, while the second concentrates on corporate governance as an 
important driving force that improves firm performance. However, some attention has 
been given to ICT elements in describing the factors of corporate governance. 
Furthermore, varieties of ways are available to measure firm performance. This 
broader measure of firm performance is continually debated among researchers, thus 
emerging as the subject with best interest among academics.  In fact, both financial 
and non-financial evaluation measures are used to assess the achievement of firm 
performance. Measures of financial performance are derived from or directly related 
to firm‘s audited financial statement, whereas non-financial measures are subjective 
and are usually measured based on the quality of products and satisfaction ratings 
from customers and employees. 
Nonetheless, selecting an appropriate measurement approach is a challenge. Its 
importance is considered to work well as a method of identifying the growth of firms. 
Although conventional (financial) measurement systems of firm performance, such as 
net profits, sales growth, earnings growth, return on investment (ROI), return on asset 
(ROA), and return on equity (ROE) reflect directly the performance of business firms, 
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their function is still a matter of debate to date. This is because; opponents of the 
traditional financial measures often claim that this measurement is particularly 
inadequate to gauge firm performance. In fact, the sole application of this evaluation 
system is inadequate to support firm performance primarily because it cannot cater to 
industrial operation or capture relevant issues pertaining to performance in the present 
challenging business environment (Ghalayini, Noble, & Crowe, 1997).  
Hence, for the purpose of firm performance measurement, conventional financial 
measures alone are inadequate, thus non-financial measure should complement the 
financial indicators (Chow & Van Der Stede, 2006) in order to produce a wholesome 
picture of the firm performance, as well as for longer-term success and viability of 
firms (Georgescu, Budugan, & Cretu, 2010; Kaplan & Norton, 1992; Kaplan, 1984). 
In fact, limited extensive information on the quality aspects within traditional financial 
measures, such as involvement level of employees, timing of production, delivery, and 
client satisfaction (Fullerton & McWatters, 2002), are some reasons for the inclusion 
of non-financial development measures in demonstrating its contribution to firm 
performance.  
Apart from solely financial (short-term) aspects, Goergescu et al., (2010) highlighted 
that the assessment of long-term firm performance should weigh in the full range of 
non-financial aspects. Besides, the abilities and expertise possessed by firms may 
positively influence the short-term performance displayed by a firm, but the extent to 
which firms continuously rely on these two benefits while other many contributing 
factors may affect such performance. On top of that, all non-financial indicators are 
subjective and it is difficult to quantify from the financial point of view. Moreover, 
researchers discovered that non-financial indicators (e.g. quality of products, 
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management capabilities, employee satisfaction, and innovation) exhibited positive 
effect on firm value with market share. This measurement embeds not only financial 
items, such as profits and revenue growth, but also a number of non-financial 
indicators, pointing out the existence of a wide variety of firm performance 
measurements.  
Although these actual measurements are designed by excluding non-financial 
indicators, financially-oriented measures could also be valid and acceptable depending 
on the method of measuring firm performance. Furthermore, it is widely known that 
financial indicators, generally, could only measure short-term effects, instead of long-
term returns based on the decisions made in the present. Besides, in accounting, once 
a cost is incurred, it must be recorded during the accounting period in which it is 
incurred, hence reducing profits within the same year. Nonetheless, the outcomes of 
the research would display good return on investment if market-based measurement is 
adopted (Georgescu et al., 2010). 
In addition, the proponents of financial measures have highlighted that they are indeed 
necessary and important performance indicators due to the primary objectives of a 
firm. Many researchers still adopt the financial measures rather than the non-financial 
measures to the assessment of the firm performance. In fact, some argued that the 
traditional financial performance measures are able to reflect the past or short term 
financial performance, as well as future or long term financial performance. However, 
consensus concerning the relationships between both financial performance measures 
is unavailable, as depicted in several empirical evidences. Moreover, as cited by 
Gentry and Shen (2010), Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1986) suggested that 
accounting-based and market-based measures, over several examples of indicator 
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measures comprised of sales growth, profitability, and earnings per share, are 
unrelated due to the conflicts that exist between achieving economic goals for both 
short and long term performances. Besides, unclear correlation was found between 
accounting- (earnings) and market-based measures (stock prices) in 2003 (Ertimur, 
Livnat, & Martikainen, 2003).  
Besides, according to Ertimur et al., (2003), firms that rely on earnings forecasts for 
future growth, while missing their revenue forecasts, have significantly negative stock 
returns during the earnings announcement period. Besides, Gentry and Shen (2010) 
investigated if any correlation existed between accounting profitability and market 
measures as interchangeable performance indicators. Nevertheless, no evidence was 
found to support the relationship between the four accounting measures; return on 
assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), return on sales (ROS), return on investment 
(ROI), while market-to-book value ratio (MTB) was employed to measure market 
performance. As a result, the study found that both performance measures were not 
interchangeable. In the contrary, a recent study revealed a relationship between 
accounting- and market-based performance measures (Aliabadi, Dorestani, & Balsara, 
2013). The study asserted that both measures were linked to each other although the 
basis used for each measure differed. Moreover, the four-stage model was adopted, 
which had corporate value drivers, financial indicator, intrinsic value, as well as from 
corporate value to stock price to justify both measurements. As a result, the stock of 
entity human capital, knowledge, and reputation were positively affected by the 
accounting measures and justified by the four-stage model.  
Furthermore, from the light of ICT and corporate governance, prior studies showed 
that financial performance measures have still been receiving great attention by 
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researchers mainly to determine the effect of ICT investment and corporate 
governance upon firm financial performance, as presented in Tables 2.1 and 2.2, 
respectively. In fact, various types of accounting and market measures have been used 
as indicators to describe the degree of financial performance in firms. Besides, in 
assessing the effect of ICT investment on firm financial performance, most studies 
applied either accounting- or market-based measures, while some embedded both 
approaches. Although the results were mixed and displayed a negative link between 
ICT investment and some financial measures, these measures remain necessary to 
evaluate the past, the present, and the future of firm performance (Hellstron, 2005).  
Meanwhile, the financial ratios used in past studies, as shown in Table 2.2, also 
demonstrated mixed findings for the effect of corporate governance on firm financial 
performance. Despite of the intuition that good governance leads to good performance 
by firms, lack of conclusive evidence has been noted on this linkage, along with 
mixed results, while other studies found negative relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance. For instance, Omoregie, Adeparubi, and Iboi 
(2014) revealed that financial accounting ratios had been comprised of the following: 
(1) Profit and loss ratio; (2) balance sheet ratio; and (3) combined ratio (information 
from profit and loss accounts, as well as balance sheet), which is in line with the study 
carried out by Adeniji (2004) that evaluated firm performance and found that the 
future trends of ratios had both strengths and weaknesses for firm‘s financial position 
within a certain period (Omoregie et al., 2014; Adeniji, 2004), whether the business 
performance was doing well in the then financial performance than it was within the 




Table 2.1 The Effect of ICT Investment on Firm Financial Performance 
Financial Measures Authors Results 
Accounting-based Market-based 
ROA N/A Ugwuanyi & 
Ugwuanyi (2013) 
Negative 
Anderson et al.(2003) Positive 
ROA & ROE N/A Arabyat (2014), 
Makinde (2014) and 
Jun (2008) 
Positive 
Beccalli (2007) Mixed 
ROA, ROE & Profits  N/A Ekata (2011) Negative 
Shin (2006) Positive 
ROI & ROS Sales growth and Market 
value 
Byrd & Marshall 
(1997) 
Negative 
Growth in revenue and 
sales & Market-to-book 
value 
Mahmood & Mann 
(1993) 
Positive 
ROA, ROE, operating income ratio 
and net income ratio 
N/A Hung et al. (2012) Positive 
ROI, ROA, ROS, Income, Profits, 
Revenue & operational costs 
N/A Liang, You, & Liu 
(2010) 
Mixed 
Profits N/A Thouin, Hoffman, & 
Eric (2008) 
Mixed 
Market value  Kim (2004) Mixed 
N/A Tobin‘s Q Zhang et al. (2012), 
Chari et al. (2008) 
Positive 
ROA, ROE & ROS Tobin's Q, Market value 
& short-window 
abnormal stock returns) 
Lim, Richardson, & 
Roberts (2004) 
Mixed 
Sales & turnover profitability,  
profitability per customer, 
investment profitability, & ROA 
Market growth  Zehir, Muceldili, 
Akyuz, & Celep 
(2010) 
Mixed 
ROA & ROS Sales growth & Market 
value 
Weill (1992) Mixed 
Sales Brynjolfsson & Hitt 
(1996) 
Positive 
ROI, ROS, Income, Revenue & 
Productivity 






Table 2.2 The Effect of Corporate Governance on Firm Financial Performance  
Financial Measures Authors Findings 
Accounting-based Market-based 
ROA Tobin's Q Qasim (2014) and  Haniffa  
& Hudaib (2006) 
Mixed 
Naushad  & Malik (2015) Mixed 
N/A Goh et al. (2013) Negative 
Johl, Kaur, & Cooper 
(2015) and  Zakaria et al. 
(2014) 
Mixed 
ROE Tobin‘s Q Wahba (2015) Negative 
ROA & ROE  Tobin's Q Ibrahim & Abdul Samad 
(2011) and  Sami, Wang, & 
Zhou (2011) 
Positive 
ROA, ROE, & EPS N/A Haider, Khan, & Iqbal 
(2015) 
Positive 
ROE & EPS N/A Yusoff, Mohamed, & Lame 
(2015) and  Wan Yusoff & 
Alhaji (2012) 
Mixed 
ROA, ROE, Return on Capital 
Employed (ROCE) and Profit 
before Tax (PBT) 
N/A Aggarwal (2013a) Positive 
ROA, ROE, ROS, & ROCE N/A Aggarwal (2013b) Positive 
N/A Tobin's Q Al-Matari et al. (2014) Mixed 
 
Additionally, the evidences retrieved from various streams of corporate governance 
and firm performance literatures portray that the most commonly used financial 
accounting ratios had been based on either accounting data or market data, while 
several studies adopted both approaches as their key dependent variables. On the other 
hand, Lubatkin and Shrieves (1986) and Bromiley (1990) introduced market-based 
measures in the strategic management research and further asserted that accounting-
based measures alone are inadequate (Lubatkin & Shrieves, 1986) and hence, market-
based measurement is needed to interpret market performance since the assumptions 
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of market efficiency that reflect firm value (Bromiley, 1990) leads to controversial 
issues (Tobin, 1984; Bettis, 1983). Nonetheless, the trend of performance 
measurement landscape has evolved over time and many researchers have admitted 
that both accounting- and market based measures are interpretable in assessing firm 
financial performance. 
Obviously, this trend can be observed from the application of both measures; not only 
in ICT, but also in other fields like corporate governance, whereby these 
measurements have been commonly used as proxy for firm financial performance. In 
this study, however, the financial measures were employed to advance the field of 
financial performance outcomes, also weighing in some views expressed by several 
empirical researchers as they claimed that accounting performance identified the past 
or short term financial performance, whereas Zhang, Huang, and Xu (2012), as well as 
some others stated that market performance determined the future or long term 
financial performance (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007; Ittner, Larcker, & Randall, 
2003; Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1994; Kaplan, 1984).  
2.3 The Concept of ICT Investment  
ICT refers to technologies, for instance, desktop and laptop computers, software, 
peripherals, and connections to the Internet, which fulfil information processing and 
communication functions (Statistics Canada, 2008). Meanwhile, investment is the 
essence of the process of creating wealth, in which its definition can be used in a 
number of contexts. In a good economic sense, an investment strategy in physical 
capital is important for both growth and development. Besides, several business 
theories have depicted that the transition of a strategy is viewed as the process of 
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utilizing resources; starting with buying a physical or tangible asset, for example, a 
building, technological tools or machinery, with the expectation that this investment 
can help the business to penetrate the production process to reap long term benefits.  
Information and communication technology (ICT) has been the most dynamic of 
investment component in recent years. According to the 1993 System of National 
Accounts, ICT investment covers the acquisition of equipment (hardware) and 
computer software that is used in the production process for more than one year. 
Generally, ICT investments are intended to harness the potential of ICT, as a crucial 
enabler in helping companies to improve their business productivity as well as 
financial performance (Mohd Noor & Apadore, 2014). In other words, the smart use 
of ICT can enhance firm performance. 
2.4 Trends of ICT Investment in Developed and Developing Countries 
2.4.1 Developed and Developing Countries 
Investment in ICT is imminent due to demand of components, especially after the 
global investment boom in ICT assets that began between late 1990s and early 2000s. 
Besides, the growth of ICT adoption has resulted in globalization, while the trends of 
ICT investments have become more important; turning it into a catalyst for the 
development of many nations. As such, this literature highlights on the nature of 
trends that reflect ICT investment practices from the view of developed countries, 
developing countries, and Malaysia in specific. However, before moving further into 




In fact, numerous economic criteria are available in describing developed and 
developing nations. According to the International Monetary Fund (2001), countries 
with high gross domestic product (GDP) per capita are referred as developed 
countries, whereas countries with lower ratings on GDP are described as developing 
countries. Meanwhile, the Human Development Index (HDI) has been claimed to be 
the best statistical method to measure the development of a country. HDI refers to the 
combination of an economic measure, such as national income, with other 
measurement indices like life expectancy and education. Besides, according to the 
United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) (2013), countries with very high 
HDI rating are termed as developed countries, while those with lower HDI rating are 
known as developing countries. 
Back to the purpose of this section, the rapid trends and revolution of ICT have 
improvised a number of aspects in many people‘s lives. This sustainable use of 
science and technology in all aspects of life has turned ICT an important investment 
for many countries. In fact, people make use of technology almost every single 
minute; thus leading towards immense increase in the demand for technology 
components with each passing day that also promotes more innovative technologies. 
Hence, it is not surprising that many nations put their highest priority initiatives in 
ICT investment due to its ability to not only improve tasks at the individual level, but 
also in bringing positive changes to companies, industries, and economics.  
Moreover, modernization and expansion process of technology can be interpreted as 
capacity development for ICT, which could lead to sustained increment of 
productivity growth at various levels of firms, industries, and nations. Thus, ICT 
investment can enhance productivity growth by offering the essential technology 
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infrastructure required for growth and network modernisation. Meanwhile, in the late 
1990s, the ICT has become commercialized and diffused rapidly, thus contributing to 
extraordinary performance in developed countries, especially for the US economy 
(Stiroh, 2002; Oliner & Sichel, 2001; Jorgenson & Stiroh, 2000), besides influencing a 
number of developed nations like Australia, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden (Daveri, 
2002).  
Nonetheless, technological revolution among developing countries has remained 
lagging, except for a few countries like Malaysia, Thailand, Taiwan, Philippines, and 
South Korea, which have benefited from ICT production that has led to significant 
economic growth (IMF, 2001). Moreover, advancement in ICT equipment has 
increased the power levels for all equipment in fulfilling the demands of ICT users. 
The US economy in the late 1990s has experienced this phenomenon where during the 
rapid evolvement of technology resulted in falling prices of existing products with 
widespread uses in the rest of the economy.  
For instance, steep declines in semiconductor prices in the US have allowed the 
highest increment in the production of computer hardware and software, as well as 
telecommunication equipment, leading to price fall in these industries. Such falling 
price is viewed as a potential opportunity for technology users when they start making 
extraordinary investment in these goods, resulting in significant capital deepening. 
Moreover, in the context of ICT, capital deepening occurs when there is an efficiency 
rise in the ICT usage and stimulating labour productivity growth by means of faster 
deepening effect without changing any technological production across the economy 
(O‘Sullivan & Sheffrin, 2003). 
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Furthermore, many past studies found that this capital deepening attempted to 
accelerate productivity growth via better development and deployment of IT 
investment in the US (Oliner, Sichel, & Stiroh, 2007; Jorgenson, Ho, & Stiroh, 2005; 
Jorgenson, 2001) and also in the UK (Oultan, 2002). Other than that, several prior 
studies discovered that the productivity growth of UK economy lagged due to lacking 
ICT-producing industries and low levels of ICT investment activities (Daveri, 2002; 
Colecchia & Schreyer, 2002). In fact, investment in ICT between 1995 and 2000 
exhibited an incredible growth on the global business due to the falling price of ICT 
equipment in the late 1990s, thus causing a further boost in demands for ICT goods. 
While the world economy benefited significantly from ICT investment spending, 
spending on ICT has dropped sharply in 2001 due to the recession in March 2001, and 
recovered in late 2001, then modestly improved in 2003 (U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 2003). 
In addition, over the 2001 to 2003 period, the entire ICT development significantly 
declined due to economic slowdown. Since the US economy depended on offshore 
capital for ICT investment, this declining US economic condition had stifled and 
affected the economic growth in other countries. However, in November 2005, the US 
economy began improving, which regained the trust of the public, thus coaxing 
investors to start investing in ICT. Moreover, according to the Information 
Technology Association of America (ITAA), in early 2005, confidence grew strongly 
among CIO about their health budgets and future spending prospects (ITAA, 2005), 
which moved to bolster ICT investment spending where the US invested $1.8 trillion 
on ICT equipment and infrastructure in 2005 (Lauden & Lauden, 2006; 2005).  
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Next, over the period of 2007 to 2009, the global economic, which the US gave 
tremendous effect not only to developed countries, but also among most developing 
countries. Hence, it had been a crucial period for the ICT sector to redevelop rapidly, 
with almost all first quarter indicators declining, often very sharply. Despite of having 
undergone a massive economic deceleration, many nations began improving better 
practices in order to favour better continuity for ICT development.  
Although the 2009 financial crisis had severe and wide-ranging impact upon many 
nations worldwide, the ICT sector has not stopped revolutionizing and evolving its 
capacity to benefit all areas. Besides, a 2009 study highlighted that the crisis of the 
ICT industry within the economic situation that increased ICT investments did 
improve technology innovation and helped companies to get back on its track to meet 
their goals concerning their short term return (Contreras & Tormo, 2009). Moreover, 
companies need to reduce their expenditures, including ICT, in order to reduce the 
impact of the crisis on their income statement while trying not to curb their revenue, 
i.e. they need to perform the similar or even more, but with less. Thus, in order to be 
able to do more with less, ICT investment reduces the impacts caused by economic 
crisis.  
As we are now incorporating new era of a so-called the ‗Digital-Age‘, moves the 
implementation of ICT to the digital implementation, widely exposed to cloud or 
network centric, two way broadcasting interaction, and the booming phenomenon of 
ICT-enabled web services such as Wikipedia, Facebook, Twitter, Google Map, 
YouTube, and etc. ICT in the 21st century is expected to be more vibrant with various 
sophisticated of ICT development infrastructures, with an enhanced legal and 
regulatory environment, as well as various incentives provided by the government to 
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encourage more investments in high speed broadband Internet access, fourth 
generation (4G) wireless network, multimedia content development packaged 
software, and in technological advancements pertaining to Nanotechnology, Micro-
Electro-Mechanical Systems, Semantic Technology, Wireless Communication, Grid-
Computing, Biometrics, and Biotechnology, which are aimed to spur the global 
economic development (PIKOM, 2014). 
2.4.2 Malaysia 
Advancing into the 21st century, ICT has emerged as the backbone of business 
organizations (Nwabueze & Ozioko, 2011). Virtually, every facet of various industries 
is touched by ICT and depends heavily upon it to support their complex business 
processes, as well as for efficient achievement of their goals. As technology growth 
depends on information management, IT investment is vital. Besides, the Malaysian 
Department of Statistics reported that the Malaysia‘s total population was about 30.27 
million and by year 2040, the total population is projected to reach 38.5 million 
people. Moreover, based on the economic theory, as the total population grows; the 
demand for goods and services increases as well because each member of the 
population has needs to be fulfilled. 
 
In fact, prior studies have revealed a positive link between population number and IT 
use (Puspitaningdyah, 2012; de No-ronha Vaz, Morgan, & Nijkamp, 2006). Such 
results portray stronger evidence to support the fact that increment in the number of 
population may affect IT use. In precise, increment in population density hikes the 
demand for ICT products and services. Besides, Table 2.3 shows that the productivity 
level by key services sector in Malaysia, as reported by the National Information and 
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Communications Technology (ICT) Association of Malaysia (PIKOM, 2013), the ICT 
sector is a rapidly growing sector and it has been considered as one of the high 
performing sector to enhance the overall productivity of the nation. This massive ICT 
progress is seen as an essential resource to foster the competitiveness of the ICT sector 
in accelerating economic growth by bolstering the domestic demand of ICT. 
Table 2.3 Productivity Level by Key Services Sector, 2007 to 2012. 
Key Services Sector Productivity Level by Key Services Sector:  
2007 - 2012 (RM thousands) 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 CAGR3 (1%) 
Logistic 132.5 133.2 123.1 129.6 134.3 140.2 1.14 
ICT  302.6 342.2 350.2 376.4 400.5 423.4 6.95 
Wholesale & Retail Trade  N/A  439.8 419.6 463.7 496.6 550.9 5.79 
Business and Professional  55.25 61.35 69.67 73.79 77.49 84.6 8.89 
Tourism  49.4 53.1 53.2 55.1 57.6 59.2 3.69 
Private Education  43.8 46.1 47.9 50.3 52.4 54.5 4.47 
Health Care  47.86 54.93 61.49 67.04 72.31 79 10.55 
Construction  20.74 21.61 22.85 23.9 24.64 25.8 4.46 
Source: Productivity Report 2011/ 2012, MPC, and PIKOM Estimates (PIKOM, 2013) 
 
Furthermore, according to the 10th Malaysia Plan, the ICT sector accounted for 9.8% 
of GDP in 2009 and once again, it was projected to register a significant growth by 
contributing 10.2% to GDP by 20154. In acknowledging the significance of ICT and 
its potential to transform the development of the nation, the Malaysian government 
has provided various ICT strategic plans to build knowledge-based economy and 
society in the 21st century. In tandem with the strategy, Malaysia is poised to embark 
                                            
3 CAGR refers to the Compound Annual Growth Rate. 
4 http://www.pmo.gov.my/dokumenattached/RMK/RMK10_Eds.pdf  
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upon indigenous inventions and innovations, in which ICT is seen as a key enabler to 
play a significant role in this endeavour.  
Furthermore, the rapid spreading out of ICT services in Malaysia and the need to 
assess them in order to fulfil global needs has triggered a demand for ICT-based 
products and services. Besides, Table 2.4 presents that the distribution of ICT services 
by ICT sector from year 2000 until 2014 was inclusive of ICT value-added services, 
telecommunication services, and computer services, thus enhanced continuous growth 
from 2000 until 2014. 
Additionally, the table shows that ICT products and services grew at a Compound 
Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) at 12.4% by increasing its value-added services from 
RM11.7 billion in 2000 to RM59.8 billion in 2013. Besides, the demand for ICT had 
been poised to reach the mark of RM67.99 billion in 2014 by registering a repeat 
annual growth rate of 12.4%. In tandem, the share of ICT service sector in the national 
GDP increased from 3.3% to 6.4%, almost doubling over the period of 2000-2014 
(PIKOM, 2014).  
Furthermore, the advent of Malaysia Standard Industrial Classification (MSIC) in 
2000 has opened many doors for various innovations in the ICT sector. For instance, 
imperial expansion in the ICT sector to many more ICT services, such as video and 
television programmes, programming and broadcasting, as well as information 
services, began in 2008; whereas other services offered like publishing services and 
motion pictures intensified the contribution of ICT sector to national income. These 
additional and new ICT-based products and services contribute to approximately 
21.3% of the total ICT sector in terms of value-added services. 
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Table 2.4 Distribution of ICT Services by ICT Sector, 2000-2014. 
Source: Department of Statistic and Economic Planning Unit, Various Publications; and Projection for 2013 and 2014 by PIKOM (PIKOM, 2014). 
































2000 11,771,057 3.3 10,335,256 868,758 11,204,014     193,273 373,770 567,043 
2001 12,744,792 3.6 10,815,979 1,257,657 12,073,636     269,319 401,837 671,156 
2002 14,652,306 2.8 12,261,462 1,412,888 13,674,350     254,765 723,191 977,956 
2003 14,922,154 3.6 12,368,517 1,916,304 14,284,821     255,963 451,370 707,333 
2004 1,607,422 3.4 12,773,701 2,056,348 14,830,049     356,714 900,659 1,257,373 
2005 20,187,921 3.9 16,352,349 2,718,059 19,070,408     387,730 729,783 1,117,513 
2006 23,858,012 4.2 19,252,783 3,125,191 22,377,974     419,412 1,060,626 1,480,038 
2007 25,036,393 3.9 19,532,436 3,772,887 23,305,323     427,088 1,303,982 1,731,070 
2008 30,090,354 3.9 22,655,972 5,168,116 27,824,088     447,618 1,818,648 2,266,266 
2009 31,999,469 4.5 22,912,378 6,496,356 29,408,734 271,688   1,483,674 1,839,604 3,594,966 
2010 42,095,951 5.3 27,106,855 9,363,020 36,469,875 503,080 1,056,006 1,565,327 2,001,388 5,125,801 
2011 45,259,877 5.1 29,778,845 9,945,621 39,724,466 590,079 1,065,823 1,690,288 2,189,221 5,535,411 
2012 52,430,520 5.6 33,166,728 11,862,431 45,029,159 719,835 1,405,592 2,150,865 3,125,069 7,401,361 
2013 59,835,527 6.1 36,386,010 12,774,925 49,160,935 1,038,179 2,027,211 3,102,079 4,507,122 10,674,591 
2014 67,991,747 6.4 39,810,610 13,687,420 53,498,030 1,409,616 2,752,501 4,211,933 6,119,667 14,493,717 
Projected 
Sub-Sector 


















CAGR (%):     
2000 - 2014 
12.4 9.4 20.2 11.0  21.1 22.8 20.5 24.1 
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2.5 Factors that Influence ICT Investment 
2.5.1 General Perspectives 
Why do firms invest in ICT? What are the factors that influence firms to make ICT 
investment? As the business environment keeps on changing to keep up with the real 
business nature, many companies rely on the power of IT. In fact, many studies have 
discovered a variety of internal and external factors that drive companies to make ICT 
investment decisions. In the context of business environment, the internal factors are 
generally controllable and have direct effects on the business because firms can 
modify their business mission and objectives, business targets, the style of leadership, 
strategies, culture, activities, as well as employees‘ working attitude and their 
motivation, to suit the environment. Furthermore, the management needs to 
thoroughly and strategically scan the business environment before deciding to adopt 
and invest in ICT, especially in identifying the major factors that may hinder 
companies from reaping potential benefits from their ICT investments. 
Past studies, for example, have suggested that ICT adoption is influenced by several 
internal favourable factors, such as employees‘ attitude (Bruque & Moyano; 2007; 
Caldeira & Ward, 2003), management commitment and support (Irefin, Abdul-Azeez, 
Tijani, 2012; Caldeira & Ward, 2003; Premkumar, 2003; Thong, 2001; Premkumar & 
Roberts, 1999), business growth (Bruque & Moyano, 2007), information system 
planning (Thong, 2001), improving productivity (Premkumar, 2003), anticipated 
profitability (Hollenstein, 2002), cost reduction (Irefin et al., 2012; Hollenstein, 2002), 
survival purposes and attainment of competitive advantage (Premkumar, 2003), 
business size (Irefin et al., 2012; Premkumar, 2003; Hollenstein, 2002; Premkumar & 
39 
 
Roberts, 1999), levels of experience in conducting technology (Alam & Noor, 2009; 
Caldeira & Ward, 2003; Thong, 2001), availability of ICT infrastructures (Irefin et al., 
2012; Chan & Ngai, 2007; Gregor et al., 2004), knowledge capacity (Hollenstein, 
2002), ICT capability (Liu, Lu, & Hu, 2008), and technological improvement 
(Southern & Tilley, 2000). 
On top of that, investment actions are also often influenced by external factors. The 
external factors are indirectly interactive factors that consist of external factors that 
might affect firm performance. Nevertheless, there could also be a slew of factors, like 
customers, political, policies, social, and economic conditions that drive the 
motivation to invest in ICT. If a firm ignores the opportunities from the external 
factors to improve their business capacity, but competition does not, it would be 
challenging for the firm to make proactive changes that can bring vastly varied results 
to its performance. Besides, empirical studies have discovered that investment activity 
in ICT is influenced by external environmental factors, such as competitive pressure 
(Iyanda & Ojo, 2008; Bayo-Moriones & Lera-Lopez, 2007), government support (Pan 
& Jang, 2008; Gregor et al., 2004), cultural issues (Pan & Jang, 2008; Gregor et al., 
2004), key suppliers (Quayle, 2002), as well as external ICT consultants and vendors 
(Pan & Jang, 2008). 
In fact, the adoption of ICT is much influenced by ICT products itself, which are 
characterized by some important factors, including compatibility and security of ICT 
process (Premkumar, 2003; Premkumar & Roberts, 1999), availability of quality 
software in the market (Caldeira & Ward, 2003), user friendliness (Premkumar & 
Roberts, 1999), perceived benefits (Alam & Noor, 2009; Premkumar, 2003; Thong, 
2001; Premkumar & Roberts, 1999) and ICT impacts on company, types of ICT used, 
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and age of ICT implementation in company (Caldeira & Ward, 2003). Besides, the 
rapid change in business dynamics are placing competitive pressure on firms to keep 
pace with market changes and demand; thus forcing them to improve the efficiency of 
their business capacities via ICT adoption (Premkumar, 2003). Therefore, firms must 
fight to remain competitive and innovative by actively devising ways to make their 
business processes more efficient. 
Apart from that, the government also plays an important role in promoting the use of 
ICT in the wider community, especially for business industries. With government 
plans of setting up legal and regulatory to foster ICT adoption, business industries 
could benefit from the opportunities offered by the government (Gregor et al., 2004). 
The various forms of government support to support ICT expansion, for example, 
rules and regulations, ICT policies, financial aids, electronic channels, incentives, and 
grants, may help businesses to become stronger in adapting to the competitive new 
reality in the present business environment. It is, therefore, very significant for 
business industries to become more proactive in aligning their business goals and ICT 
strategies to reap benefits provided by the government. Moreover, previous studies 
reveal that positive correlations could be found between government support and ICT 
adoption (Alam & Noor, 2009; Southern & Tilley, 2000). 
2.5.2 Malaysian Perspective 
In Malaysia, the government has provided various incentives, rights, and privileges to 
encourage the development of the ICT industry. In line with that, the CEO of PIKOM, 
Saifubahrim Salleh, as well as Ramachandran Ramasamy (2013), the Head of Policy, 
Capability & Research at PIKOM; ICT Investment is viewed as a potential new 
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source that can encourage further economic growth in a nation, besides improving 
firm performance to further thrive.  
In fact, the 2014 Budget saw some great opportunities for companies with ICT 
investment. Those who acquire or buy ICT equipment, including software, are eligible 
for Accelerated Capital Allowance (ACA) that offers an initial allowance of 20% and 
an annual allowance of 40%.  This exemption is given until the year of accounting 
(YA) 2016. Based on the budget highlights, the Income Tax is responsible for 
handling the claims of ACAs only until YA 2013. However, the time frame for 
claiming ACAs has been extended due to the Malaysian GST implementation, which 
has been effective since 1st April 2015. 
Meanwhile, under the 10th Malaysia Plan, the development of ICT has become more 
ubiquitous. It is seen as a primary enabler to position Malaysia as a competitive 
knowledge-based economy (Abdul Wahab & Ramacahandran, 2011), as well as a 
global hub of ICT and multimedia. The 10th Malaysia Plan also continues to 
emphasize on the ICT strategic planning by expanding the existing communication 
networks to bridge the digital gap between urban and rural areas, enhancing human 
resource development in ICT fostering via ICT education and trainings, as well as 
encouraging more business and communities to participate actively in their promotion 
via digital commerce. Besides, focus is also given to strengthen the local capabilities 
in developing creative content, as well as soft infrastructure development (EPU, 
2014). 
Furthermore, the present emerging trends of green ICT could transform the industrial 
sector to be more environmental sensitive. This could reduce all energy, economic, 
and pollution issues in the most efficient and effective way. Moreover, the term ‗green 
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ICT‘ has been actively defined by many researchers and industrial players based on 
their insights. According to the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development, green ICT is defined as ―ICT to reduce environmental load and ICT for 
using as a promoter to relieve social environment influence, for instance, energy use, 
water use, land use, toxicity, global warming, non-energy depletion, and ozone layer 
depletion.‖  
Meanwhile, the Malaysian Green Technology Corporation, presented by Ismail (2013) 
in empowering green markets forum, defined the green ICT as ―an approach to energy 
saving efficiency, for instance energy saving of IT equipment (―of IT‖) and entire 
society‘s energy saving by IT (―by IT‖) of IT (energy saving of IT equipment) – 
improving energy efficiency of IT equipment and electronics; IT equipment such as 
PC, server, storage etc., electronics such as TV, DVD, refrigerator etc., data center 
and semiconductor. Besides, in tandem with the evolution of technology 
advancement, many industrial sectors have begun realising the potential benefits of 
green ICT adoption to facilitate the industrial sectors in their operations. In Malaysia, 
investing activities in developing ICT has begun as early as in the 1980s for all 
industrial sectors that generate economy.  
However, Malaysia has only started pursuing aggressively ICT investment in the 
1990s, particularly with the establishment of Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC), 
which seeks to nurture Malaysian industrial sectors towards becoming world class 
businesses, on par with other developed countries. Moreover, many conglomerates 
have adopted green ICT to save energy and to preserve working environment from 
pollution (Murugesan, 2010). Increasing demand for green ICT, in addition, has 
encouraged many industrial sectors to improve their operational processes to operate 
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with environmental efficiency, especially in the Malaysian economic sectors, such as 
energy, waste water, building, transportation, manufacturing, and ICT (Abd Hamid, 
Mohamad Kamar, Ghani, Mohd Zain, & Abdul Rahim, 2011).  
Moreover, increase in green ICT usage leads to the creation of green ICT jobs in 
varied sectors. Besides, instead of increasing green ICT investment, as well as 
research and development (R&D), to improve business efficiency, most companies 
have been expected to increase job employment in R&D and ICT. In line with the 
Malaysian ICT policy guidance, as shown in Figure 2.1, introduced by the Malaysian 
Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation (MOSTI), the policy is also viewed 
as a big factor in influencing and encouraging the use of ICT among communities, 
besides indirectly strengthening ICT investment activities in the Malaysian corridor. 
The strategy of the policy is vital and it is not just a slogan to boost the regional ICT 
development, but also to be able to boost the reputation of Malaysian ICT 








Figure 2.1: Malaysia ICT Policy Guidance. 
Source: Malaysia Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation website. 
Malaysia ICT Policy Guidance 
National ICT Policies (current); 
 Enhancing Position as a global ICT and 
Multimedia Hub 
 Towards Ubiquitous Communication Network 
 Bridging Digital Divide 
 Rollout Designated Cyber-cities and MSC 
Flagship Applications 
 Fostering New Sources of Growth 
 Increasing Development of the ICT Workforce 
 Accelerating e-Learning Acculturation;and 
 Enhancing Information Security 
Malaysia ICT Policy Guidance 
ICT Strategic Programs (Current); 
 ICT Funding (DAGS, Techno Fund, Science 
Fund etc) 
 Development of local content (e-Content) 
 MSC Malaysia Development 
 National Cyber Security Policy 
Implementation 
 ICT for All (Awareness and Outreach) 
 ICT Research and Development 
 National ICT Roadmap 
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2.6 The Effect of ICT Investment on Firm Performance 
Demand for firm output increases as the capacity in producing output increases, which 
results from the productive activities of the firm. This greater demand, in turn, would 
significantly boost sales to a great extent and increase firm profitability. However, risk 
in ICT investment lurks around many firms; questioning if such investment could 
actually contribute in achieving their financial growth targets. Besides, in recent 
decades, ICT development has led many nations, industries, and business firms to 
invest heavily in ICT. Despite of the widespread diffusion investment in ICT, many 
researchers have questioned if such investment adds value to business firms. The use 
of ICT, hence, has been promoted as having tremendous promise in affecting a firm‘s 
structure through its capabilities and in becoming indispensable for firms to improve 
their business planning process.  
For instance, Appendix I presents a sampling of prior studies of the effect of ICT 
investment on firm performance, including the key results. Besides, the positive 
contribution of ICT investment on firm performance has been widely viewed and 
researched in past studies from the light of varied industries, mainly from the financial 
service industry like banking and insurance companies. For example, ICT plays an 
important role in enhancing the development of effective bank operations. Moreover, 
the rapid pace of ICT has transformed the banking sector in a manner that can bring 
tremendous value to the financial landscape. In fact, ICT reforms have exhibited the 
effect of inducing banks to invest in ICT by bringing huge changes into the banking 
system. 
Additionally, a study in the Taiwanese domestic banks financial performance, 
measured using ROA, ROE, operating income ratio, and net income, had improved 
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despite of the investment made by banks in ATM technology (Hung et al., 2012). 
Meanwhile, Romdhane (2013) found that investment in ICT components (software 
and hardware investments, as well as ICT services) play a major role in improving the 
cost efficiency of Tunisian banks. Other than that, Arabyat (2014) tested the effect of 
two ICT investment proxies on ROA and ROE as proxies for bank financial 
performance, which displayed significantly positive impact of ICT investment on both 
financial measures.  
The result retrieved from Arabyat is consistent with findings of another study applied 
to Nigerian banking sector (Makinde, 2014). With similar dependent variables, 
Makinde (2014) found that ICT investment proxies (investment in ICT, investment in 
other assets, and operating costs) positively influenced Nigerian banking performance. 
However, studies in the similar financial area displayed inconsistent results. For 
example, Francalanci and Galal (1998) found negative effects of IT expense, two of 
work compositions (clerical and professional intensity) and combined effects of IT, as 
well as clerical and professional intensity on the productivity among 52 US life 
insurance companies. 
Meanwhile, Beccalli (2007) discovered positive effect of ICT services, such as 
consulting services, implementation services, training and education, as well as 
support services, on 737 banks of Europe from 1993 to 2000, but negative link for the 
effects of ICT hardware and software investments upon firm performance. Moreover, 
Safari and Zhen Yu (2014) determined the benefits of ICT to technical efficiency 
levels among privately- and publicly-owned Iranian banks. By comparing the ICT 
impact on efficiency of both types of banks, the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) 
method was applied to bank-level data over 22 years (from 1995 until 2011). All ICT 
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matters, such as software investment and ICT services, functioned as significant 
indicators that reduced costs, which enhanced the technical efficiency. However, the 
effect of hardware investment was insignificant. 
Furthermore, a review by Ekata (2011) on the relationship between IT expenditures 
and financial performance in Nigerian commercial banks identified nil correlation 
between IT spending and financial performance measures (net profits and ROE). 
Besides, IT budget and IT training costs also had insignificant correlations with net 
profit. Hence, one can conclude that even if the level of ICT investment continues to 
grow at respectable rates, the phenomeon of the so-called ‗ICT paradox‘ still exists in 
this century. Even if ICT investment positively contributed to the performance at the 
industry level, the results were not robust for profitability and productivity measures 
at the firm level. Ugwuanyi and Ugwuanyi (2013) examined the effect of IT 
investment on bank returns among four Nigerian banks. The ordinary least square 
regression was applied to cross sectional data gathered for the analysis from annual 
reports and financial accounts of the sample banks from 2005 until 2011. Three ICT 
investment proxies, the total number of IT branches and ATMs, as well as IT 
expenditures, have been chosen to predict the dependent variable of ROA. The result 
of the tested hypothesis showed that ICT expenditures of the samples did not increase 
ROA.  
Besides, past studies have also shown the positive effect of ICT investment on the 
performance of manufacturing firms. An empirical study of ICT and firm performance 
within the context of Malaysia was conducted by several authors to examine the roles 
of ICT in affecting the performance exerted by Malaysian construction firms. Using a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, the impact of ICT investment has 
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been believed to influence firm performance. Several ICT measurements, namely 
communication investment, ICT specific labour investment, R&D investment, and 
ICT training investment, had been estimated to respond positively to firm 
performance, however, only a weak relationship was captured (Gaith et al., 2008). 
Moreover, in the early 1990s, Weill (1992) looked into the relationship between ICT 
investments and firm performance among 33 small- and medium-sized valve 
manufacturing firms. Based on the data gathered and analysed through 6 years of 
indicators for each firm, the study discovered mixed results for the relationship 
between ICT investment and firm performance. The result of investment in the 
transactional IT displayed a significant effect on performance, while the strategic IT 
investment was associated with lower performance, and insignificant relationship was 
found between informational IT investment and firm performance - the so-called 
productivity paradox. 
Other than that, Kim (2004) determined the effect of ICT investment on IT 
manufacturing Korean firm performance for year 1996. Several dependent variables 
(marginal product of IT capital, profitability, productivity, and market valuation of IT 
capital) were employed to represent firm performance. The findings, as a result, were 
mixed, with some results reported positive effect of marginal product of IT capital, 
productivity, and market valuation of IT capital upon Korean firm performance. 
Although, the sales growth (profitability ratio) was positive, the ICT investment did 
not have any significant effect upon firm profits. Besides, the literature depicts that 
mismeasurement issue of ICT investment may be caused, for instance, due to 
inappropriate methodology, ignorance of the effects of time-lag for ICT investment 
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and returns, which clearly underestimates ICT potential (Weill & Olson, 1989; Stiroh, 
2002).  
In addition, from the perspective of ICT investment in the healthcare industry, Devaraj 
and Kohli (2000) discovered that IT labour and IT capital exemplified positive effects 
on the financial performance, which was measured by net patient revenue per day and 
net patient revenue per admission. However, the quality index of mortality rates had 
been negatively affected by IT labour. Next, Thouin et al., (2008) have also examined 
the impact between the ICT investment proxies and profitability in the health industry. 
Using the profit as their only measure of profitability, performance of the sample 
health industry was estimated using ordinary least square regression model to confirm 
if the ICT investments incurred and performances are positively correlated. Moreover, 
the results showed that increased profitability was dissociated from its increase in IT 
personnel, while positive results were found for IT budget and IT outsourcing linked 
with performance.  
In addition, Spyros and Euripidis (2014) have tested the effects of ICT on product and 
process innovation based on data gathered from 743 European hospitals. With the 
advent of a direct measurement technique, the authors discovered that investment in 
ICT infrastructure (hardware, software, and networks), E-business, and two hospital-
specific ICT applications (Picture Archiving, Communication System, and 
Computerized Physician Order Entry) had been positive to both products and process 
innovation. Meanwhile, the ICT budget spent on operating expenses reflect positively 
on process innovation, but insignificant effect was found among the two independent 
variables used (ICT personnel and website) for both product and process innovation. 
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Besides, past studies on ICT investment and firm performance have tapped into the 
context of all industries (mixed). For instance, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1993) conducted 
a research that involved 380 US large firms from the period between 1987 and 1991, 
which revealed that investment of information system was indeed a significant 
contribution to firm output. Besides, spending on computer capital was identified as 
the main contributor to firm output compared to spending on other non-capital 
expenses. In 1996, they pursue with a study and again, the results were consistent with 
those obtained for their 1993 study, which demonstrated the positive contribution of 
ICT as an important driver of productivity at the firm level (Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 
1996).  
The study examined output data over 1,000 US firms from 1987 to 1991 and found 
that ICT contribution was still higher even if the measurements had weighed in capital 
depreciation linked to ICT capital. Thus, one can conclude that these two studies have 
discovered that investment in ICT has made a significant impact on output at the US 
firm level, thus strongly denying the existence of productivity paradox. Meanwhile, in 
other study, a cross-sectional analysis was carried out to measure the impact of ICT 
investment (ICT spending) upon the future performance measure of a firm (ROA was 
divided into profit margins and asset turnover). Thus, a strong and positive link was 
found between ICT spending and firms‘ future earnings for information, while a weak 
and positive link between the variables in automating role. 
On top of that, a study that investigated the manufacturing and service sector from 
1995 until 1997 conceptualised that financial performance of diversified firms 
improved upon increasing ICT spending, hence proving that the moderating variable 
of strategic direction was the most plausible explanation for the link between ICT 
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spending and firm performance (Shin, 2006). Besides, Chari et al., (2008) also 
revealed that ICT investment had a positive impact on firm performance, especially 
those with greater levels of diversification, among 117 firms from varied sectors like 
manufacturing, retail, wholesale, transportation, communication, and others. 
Nonetheless, some studies presented contradicting results between ICT investment 
and firm performance within mixed industries. Mahmood and Mann (1993), for 
instance, obtained mixed results from their varied Pearson and Canonical analyses. In 
Pearson analysis, the effect of IT investment was weak and negative on firm 
performance, while the Canonical analysis displayed a more significant correlation 
between the variables for various industries from 1991 until 1993. Hence, this study 
suggested that the effect of time lag may exist because several years may pass before 
firms could benefit from their investments. The authors employed multiyear and 
cross-sectional result to measure the performance, thus revealing that those firms that 
consistently invested more in ICT possessed a state-of-the-art ICT infrastructure than 
those that did not invest heavily in ICT. However, the analysis, via combined data 
over several years, failed to prove a link for ICT investment with firm performance 
and productivity.  
Additionally, Zehir et al., (2010) studied the correlations between various ICT 
variables, including level of ICT investment, ICT usage, ICT perception, ICT at 
decision making process, future orientation, technology orientation, and firm 
performance, within a competitive setting. Thus, many hypotheses were tested to 
determine the correlation between ICT variables with several indicators representing 
performance (financial measures, technology orientation, and future orientation). This 
study, nonetheless, displayed mixed findings. The results showed that IT perception, 
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IT at decision making, and technology orientation were insignificant for firm 
performance. IT usage was negatively related to future orientation, while IT 
investment, IT perception, and IT usage were not positive to technology orientation. 
In precise, from the light of ICT investment, ICT variable exhibited a positive 
correlation with firm performance and future orientation. As a conclusion, if ICT 
investment is properly managed, ICT can emerge as an important component in 
enhancing firm performance. 
Other than that, Liang et al., (2010) proposed an integrated model to investigate both 
the direct effect of resources on firm performance and the indirect effect using the 
mediator of organizational capabilities. Firm performance was evaluated via financial 
and efficient performance. The results, in the end, had been mixed. Nil association 
was revealed between technological and organizational resources with firm financial 
performance, while a weak association was found for internal and external capabilities 
with financial performance. This weak association was also found between 
technological and organizational resources and firm efficiency performance, whereas 
internal capability was positively linked with efficiency performance, but not for 
external capability. The results concluded that the mediator of organizational 
capabilities displayed the ability to explain the value of IT, in comparison to the 
direct-effect model without organizational capabilities. 
In addition, Byrd and Marshall (1997) extended the framework developed by 
Mahmood and Mann (1993) by leveraging the methods. With similar data analyses 
technique, structural equation was believed to analyse the hypothesized relationship 
between IT investment and firm performance. Moreover, several variables, which 
were used to measure the extent to which users had access to IT, were found to have 
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significantly positive links with sales by employee; an organizational measure of 
labour productivity. Meanwhile, the values of supercomputers, mainframes, and 
minicomputers, as well as the percentage of IT budget spent on IT staff, had been 
significantly negative for sales by total assets; a traditional measure of capital 
productivity. The other IT variable, the percentage of IT budget spent on IT staff 
training, failed to exhibit any association with any performance variable.  
Furthermore, Jun (2008) analysed the effect of ICT investment on the performances 
exerted by Korean security firms. This study proposed a methodology to analyse 
longitudinal data (over 12 years) through the relationship between ICT investment 
proxies (computer and capital budget ratios) with regard to some performance 
variables (ROA, ROE, and net profit-operating revenue ratio) used to fit continuous 
response indicators. Overall, the results indicated that the capital budget ratio (among 
IT proxies) had a positive impact on ROA. Besides, the capital budget ratio responded 
more strongly to the profitability aspect of security firms, in comparison to computer 
capital budget, which appeared to exert the largest influence upon the profitability of 
Korean security firms. 
2.6.1 The Issue of Time Lag 
Brynjolfsson (1993) has categorised four factors that contribute to IT productivity 
paradox, namely, measurement error, lags, redistribution, and mismanagement. In 
fact, time-lag (delay of several years before reaping benefits of IT investment) 
(Yaylacicegi & Menon, 2004), which has been highlighted as a factor that contributes 
to the intricacies in measuring the effect of IT investment, produced inconsistent 
results in earlier studies (Brynjolfsson, 1993; Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 1993). The 
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researchers asserted that there were time-lag of 2 or 3 years before the effects of IT 
investment can be realized (Brynjolfsson, 1993; Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 1993).  
Moreover, Devaraj and Kohli (2002) claimed that time-lag contributes to IT 
productivity paradox, while the true outcomes observed after an initial period may 
range anywhere from several days to several months or even years, depending on the 
size and the complexity of IT implementation. Hence, the aspect of time-lag has to be 
considered, especially in determining the effect of IT investment upon firm 
performance. In measuring the effect of ICT investment, Kohli and Devaraj (2003) 
highlighted several reasons on why the lagged effect is imminent in measuring ICT 
investment payoff.  
First, lagged effects have been emphasised as a reason for the insignificant impact 
upon ICT productivity due to the use of contemporaneous data (Brynjolfsson, 1993). 
Second, the impact of ICT productivity is indirectly visible in financial measurements 
like Tobin‘s Q (Bharadwaj, Bharadwaj, & Konsynski, 1999). However, improving 
operations by accumulating IT stock has yet to be validated. Third, neglecting asset 
accumulation like ICT can have greater impact on return of activities (e.g. product 
market activities) (Dierickx & Cool, 1989).  
The next reason includes the financial theory of capital investments that suggests 
adjustment costs from capital acquisition are convex (Jorgenson, 2001). This theory 
further implies the delay of positive impact from technology and the negative impact 
of adjustment costs on values during the initial acquisition period. Besides lag length, 
when and for how long ICT investment from a year could sustain a significantly 
positive impact on future output are highlighted; thus leading to the estimation of ICT 
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economic life, which is relevant in accounting intangible assets like hardware and 
software capitalization, as well as amortization (Lev, 2003).  
Next, Brynjolfsson, Malone, and Kambil (1994) discovered that the decline in firm 
size was greater after a lag of 1 to 2 years following IT investment. Meanwhile, 
Francalanci and Galal (1998) predefined sizes of lagged effects in each year, while the 
weight of a firm‘s IT expenditures incurred in a given year, t, was calculated from the 
amortization quotas of IT investments over a five-year period. The results showed that 
the effect of IT investment increased by double after two years IT investment was 
made at year t. Moreover, Devaraj and Kohli (2000) incorporated time-lags into their 
research model and found that the effect of IT on performance was reflected in about 
2 to 3 months‘ time-lag, whereas Anderson et al., (2003) claimed that firms took 1 to 
4 years to reap benefits from IT investment. Besides, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003) 
used various lengths of time-lag (1 to 7 years) to determine the effects of 
computerization on productivity and output growth among US firms.  
Additionally, Byrd and Marshall (1997) looked into the link between IT investment 
and firm performance by using IT investment data over a 3-year period, while 4-year 
period for performance data. As such, the lag of 2 to 4 years was believed to explain 
the correlation between IT investment and firm performance. Besides, Yaylacicegi 
and Menon (2004) employed huge samples of 23 years to investigate at what period 
the positive relationship emerged between IT capitals spending and firm performance. 
The study suggested that firms would reap good returns from IT capital spending after 
a lag of 5 years and over a period of 2 years thereafter. 
Meanwhile, Beccalli (2007) introduced the model 1-lag effect between realization of 
IT investment and potential benefit for firm performance. In another study, Zhang et 
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al., (2012) claimed that the time-lagged effects do play an important role in 
determining the effects of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) implementation on 
firm performance. The researchers found that during the first 3 years after ERP 
implementation, the Tobin‘s Q for firm performance was insignificant; but significant 
increment was noted after four years of its implementation. Surprisingly, Hung et al., 
(2012) proved that the effect of IT investment was positive for firm financial 
performance based on lag-1 and lag-2 period models. 
2.7 Summary of the Chapter  
Many researches pertaining to firm performance and ICT investment have been 
reviewed in this study. From the light of financial measures, prior evidences portray 
that firm financial performance measurements have gained much attention, especially 
in determining the effect of ICT investment and corporate governance on firm 
financial performance. With that, both accounting- and market-based measures have 
been considered to be dependent variables in evaluating firm performance. As for ICT 
investment, this chapter extensively reviews ICT investment trends in developed and 
developing countries, including Malaysia. Besides, this chapter elaborates the 
influential factors of ICT investment based on the insights of general and Malaysian 
practices. In fact, the Malaysian government has been proactive in encouraging ICT 
investment activities to strengthen its development of ICT industry. Next, this chapter 
reviews past studies that evaluated the effect of ICT investment upon firm 
performance, as well as issues concerning measurement effect of ICT investment on 
firm performance. The next chapter taps into the aspect of corporate governance of 





LITERATURE REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF ICT  
3.1 The Concept of Corporate Governance 
In comprehending ICT corporate governance, it is necessary to first understand the 
concept of corporate governance (Leonida & Mulligan, 2005). Basically, corporate 
governance is designed to create an effective corporate culture of fairness, 
transparency, and accountability, so as to ascertain that stakeholders‘ interests are 
protected and to hinder any potential agency issues. Such responsibilities refer to the 
role of board in bringing in value to organization with successful performance 
(Cadbury, 1992). Besides, many nations have issued their Codes of Best Practices in 
Corporate Governance that assist corporations in addressing specific aspects of 
effective governance to promote high standards of corporate discipline, transparency, 
and accountability regarding corporate governance practices. This is because; 
implementation of proper corporate governance practices reduces risk for investors, 
attracts investment capital, and improves corporate performance (Rezaee, 2009).  
Besides, corporate governance is a system that balances the best interests of its 
participants, including board of directors, typically known as the central to corporate 
governance, and other internal participants like executives and employees, while 
external participants are comprised of shareholders, debt holders, trade creditors, 
customers, and suppliers. In fact, it is an essential relationship of group system, which 
ensures that any decision the board makes would not be detrimental to the rest, but to 
move effectively in catering to the needs and interest of its wider stakeholders. 
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Corporate governance, hence, is defined as the manner in which corporations are 
directed, controlled, and held to account with special concern for effective leadership 
of the corporations to ensure that they deliver on their promise as a wealth-creating 
organ of the society in a sustainable manner (Wilson & Howcroft, 2002). In other 
definition, Jayashree (2006) defined the corporate governance as follows:  
Corporate governance when used in the context of business organization is a system 
of making directors accountable to shareholders for effective management of the 
companies in the best interest of the company and the shareholders along with 
concern for ethics and values . It is a management of companies through the board of 
directors that hinges on complete transparency, integrity and accountability of 
management. 
The above definition of corporate governance clearly emphasizes that the importance 
role of board of directors is not only in overseeing the management on behalf of 
shareholders (Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 2010) but also responsible for setting 
the strategic directions and acts as a best counsellor while confronting crisis situations 
(Adams et al., 2010) as well as to communicate the true underlying financial 
information to the shareholders (Ow-Yong & Guan, 2000). The boards are directly 
accountable to the company shareholders and owe fiduciary duties to control and 
monitor company management processes and activities so that the interests of 
shareholders and stakeholders (clients and management) are optimally aligned and 
well-protected. Thus, the effective role of the boards could potentially increase firm 
performance (Abdullah & Mohd Nasir, 2004).  
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3.2 General and Current Issues of Corporate Governance 
Most of the contemporary issues discussed in corporate governance are concerned 
with agency issues that can arise in corporations due to segregation of ownership and 
control (Berle & Means, 1932). The issue of ownership and control segregation was 
initiated by Adam Smith (1776) and followed by Berle and Means (1932), who also 
argued that the segregation of ownership and control in conglomerates could lead to 
potential conflict of interest among its agents (managers) in exploiting the company‘s 
wealth for their own benefits. Hence, the purpose of corporate governance is to 
determine corporate direction and performance through proper control of management 
in the best interest of the company. This corporate governance process has evolved 
from the theory of agency, where the principal owner of a company has to monitor the 
performance of agents (managers) in serving ownership interest (Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 2012; Lipartito & Morii, 2010; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Berle & Means, 
1932). In the agency theory, there is a possibility that agents may confront moral 
hazards by exploiting principal to satisfy personal benefits (Miller & Sardais, 2011; 
Wong, 2011, Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In order to alleviate this agency problem, the 
principal might work in some difficult situations to monitor or to limit action of agents 
that can incur costly correctional behaviour (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), besides 
preventing the controlling owner from exploiting company resources (Abraham, 
2010).  
Meanwhile, another issue of concern related to corporate governance is the ownership 
structure, which is relatively varied across nations worldwide (Chen & Yu, 2012). In 
fact, firm ownership structure is defined based on two varied dimensions. According 
to Iannotta, Nocera, and Sironi (2007), the first nature of ownership focuses on the 
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degree of ownership concentration among shareholders where firms differ from each 
other depending on their level of dispersion. Second, the nature of the owners is based 
on the type of shareholders. Thus, the ownership structure is a vital element in 
corporate governance for its proven ability in mitigating agency problems between 
shareholders (the principal) and managers (the agent) (Fauzi & Locke, 2012). 
However, literature studies depict that the nature of ownership cannot isolate itself 
from being a cause to agency problem in controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999), which is in accordance with the theory of agency. 
Besides Berle and Means (1932) suggested that division of ownership can cause 
potential conflict of interests between principal and agent.  
According to the agency theory, the problem that occurs between these two 
conflicting parties also tends to increase agency costs (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1986), which are internal costs incurred from asymmetric 
information to sustain an effective agency relationship. Normally, the controlling 
shareholders often spend substantial investment in equity to pursue their private 
benefits to fund their boards in managing the company on their behalf (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976), so as to prevent them from acting for the best benefit of themselves. 
This situation vividly shows a complete control over firm in excess of real cash flow 
by controlling shareholders (majority shareholders). Furthermore, the disparities 
between control and ownership rights tend to cause agency problems because 
controlling shareholders may have incentives to abuse their power by appropriating 
firm resources (Abraham, 2010; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Morck et al., 1988) to 
accumulate wealth as private benefits of control. Most importantly, the conflict 
between these two parties can potentially affect firm performance. 
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In addition, the collapse of several high profile companies, such as Enron, WorldCom, 
Goldman Sachs, as well as the issue of the Boeing buyback, illustrates the catastrophic 
prevalence of agency issues. Moreover, many criticisms have been passed in relation 
to the malpractice of corporate governance due to serious deficiencies in governance 
practices. Besides, the corporate governance deficiencies are cantered on several 
factors, including weaknesses in management internal control, lacks of skills and 
capabilities, poor management communication with the board, and conflict of 
interests. With a string of problems found in the management of corporations, the 
effort to strengthen corporate governance mechanisms has become a key priority of 
reforms to enhance governance practices among corporations as a means of 
contributing to higher firm performance. In other words, corporate scandals have 
emphasised the need for broad and deep governance and management changes to 
strengthen firm performance via good governance practices.  
In fact, many countries have issued their Codes of Best Practices in Corporate 
Governance that assist corporations in addressing specific aspects of effective 
governance; the Cadbury Report was produced in the UK, the Sarbanes Oxley in the 
US, the King‘s Report in South Africa, the Olivencia Report in Spain, the Dey Report 
in Canada, the Principles and Guidelines on Corporate Governance in New Zealand, 
and the Cromme Code in Germany, primarily to promote high standards of corporate 
discipline, transparency, and accountability regarding corporate governance practices 
(Bhagat & Bolton, 2009). Likewise other countries, the discovery of several cases of 
corporate misconduct that involved high profile companies in Malaysia, such as 
Perwaja, Renong Berhad, Sime Darby, Technology Resources Industries Berhad, and 
Malaysian Airline Systems, has forced the Malaysian government to empower its 
codes on corporate governance to ensure that good governance practices are served as 
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an integral part of organizations. Although the codes of corporate governance have 
been revised several times to keep pace with the current market practices and to 
enhance the effectiveness of governance practices in organizations, challenges for 
incorporated good governance still do exist. 
Moreover, as highlighted by experts, many organizations face vastly different 
challenges deriving from a wide range of risks. Some confront external challenges of 
geopolitical influence, terrorist threats, cyber-attack, and health risk, which may 
potentially affect the implementation of good governance in organizations. However, 
some of these challenges are seen as an opportunity to better serve the growth and the 
development of the organization. The advances in technology also aid in bringing 
effective changes for an organization to fit with the dynamic nature of strategy and 
competition (Deloitte, 2015). For example, Deloitte (2015) outlined several issues that 
are likely to affect companies and their board of directors, so that the board-
management discussions around the on-going strategy are aligned with the present and 
future challenges. Besides, the Deloitte report also includes useful insights to help 
boards in identifying and seizing new opportunities, while simultaneously adopting a 
risk mitigation strategy to ensure that potential risks can be recognized and mitigated 
efficiently. As for ICT challenges, the report has emphasized the need for boards to be 
well-prepared for cyber-breach or social media attacks by embedding cyber security 
risk in their companies, protecting their reputation through their active role in their 
governance of best practice by overseeing, advising on, and increase monitoring on 
company from inherent cyber risks. 
Moreover, the digital technology revolution is the biggest challenge faced by every 
board and company to date. Its revolution dramatically changes the company business 
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model to a more dynamic way; making it even riskier if not handled properly. Based 
on the Deloitte survey, many traditional companies are still confronted with such 
problems due to lack of knowledge, as well as lack of expertise and experiences on 
how technologies like cloud, analytics, social media, and mobile can benefit them, 
leaving the companies behind to compete with those who are good at managing 
technology. Furthermore, investing in technology incurs large amounts of money and 
boards are at risk of failure if not regulated by proper governance. For example, the 
South African Local Government Association (SALGA) in its comprehensive guide to 
successful ICT governance emphasized that the growing importance of ICT in 
supporting company‘s strategy and the need to provide agility require any company to 
be able to use technology efficiently. As such, many companies have begun adopting 
ICT and its implementation must be well governed and controlled so as to ensure that 
ICT supports the objectives of the company (SALGA, 2012).  
Given the present fast changing globalized operating environment and digital 
disruption, the issues of proper ICT governance practice and board diversity (Leblanc, 
2012) in the corporate governance do matter (Deloitte, 2015). The issue is stressed on 
the need for the board members with diverse competencies, knowledge, and 
experiences to enhance the effectiveness of board discussion. Having a broad range of 
board capabilities, hence, may improve risk management and strategic planning, 
besides leading to good corporate governance practices. Moreover, given the 
implementation of ICT as a controversial issue for corporate governance practices, the 
next section focuses on ICT corporate governance. 
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3.3 The Effect of Corporate Governance on Firm Performance 
Appendix II provides a number of sample studies in relation to the effect of corporate 
governance on firm performance. The results of these studies are inconsistent. 
Although corporate governance is seen as an important system to ensure that the 
management runs the business with the best interest of other stakeholders, the crisis 
associated with corporate governance has remained unresolved. Moreover, some 
recent studies showed mixed (Johl et al., 2015; Naushad, & Malik, 2015; Al-Matari et 
al., 2014; Qasim, 2014; Zakaria et al., 2014; Goh et al., 2013; Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2006), negative (Yusoff et al., 2015; Wahba, 2015; Wan Yusoff & Alhaji, 2012), and 
nil effect (Wan Yusoff & Alhaji, 2012) of corporate governance on firm performance. 
Nonetheless, others have proven that corporate governance is an effective mechanism 
for companies to breakthrough performance improvements (Haider et al., 2015; 
Naushad & Malik, 2015; Aggarwal, 2013a; Aggarwal, 2013b; Sami et al., 2011). 
Putting people to promote best practices and helping the company remain in the 
forefront of organization of good corporate governance is definitely not an easy task. 
This is because; effective corporate governance must be associated with diverse 
people (Deloitte, 2015; Leblanc, 2012), along with a proper mix of skills, experiences, 
background (OECD, 2009), and knowledgeable (Financial Reporting Council, 2012). 
The scope of board governance role has to be extended, not only restricted in 
structuring and attaining the objectives via proper monitoring of firm performance, but 
also that their area of expertise has to be extended in specific ICT knowledge to 
constitute an effective corporate governance team with higher order thinking skills in 
questioning not only about ICT risks and expenses, but also competitive risks (Nolan 
& McFarlan, 2005). 
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3.4 Corporate Governance in Relation to Corporate Governance of ICT 
While corporate governance refers to the combination of processes and structures to 
be implemented by board of directors for they are responsible to protect shareholder‘s 
value through transparency and openness, in which the extremely sophisticated 
pervasive use of ICT has led to critical dependency on ICT that demands more focus 
on ICT corporate governance. Hence, ICT corporate governance specifically focuses 
on board responsibility to ensure better decision-making process for ICT-related 
investments and for operational efficiencies of the company to remain transparent and 
are upheld. This accountability process enables a company to enhance its performance 
through great strategy deployment for return on ICT investment by monitoring and 
optimising benefits at an affordable cost with a reasonable level of risk (SALGA, 
2012).  
Besides, the notion of ICT governance can be divided into two, namely corporate 
governance of ICT and governance of ICT, by weighing in the different roles played 
by various components or groups in a firm. In fact, the corporate governance of ICT 
(CGICT) can be denoted as ―a system by which the current and future use of ICT is 
directed and controlled that involves evaluating, directing plans, as well as monitoring 
the alignment of company ICT strategy and policies in order to achieve plans‖ 
(ISO/IEC 38500: 2008). On the other hand, the concept of governance of ICT reflects 
on the effective and efficient management of ICT resources to facilitate company 
strategic objectives (King III: 2009). As such, CGICT has become an integral part of 
the corporate governance system in a company (Van der Walt, Coetsee, & Von Solms, 
2013; SALGA, 2012; Mueller, Magee, Marounek, & Phillipson, 2008; Carroll, Ridley 
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& Young, 2004; ITGI, 2003), but poorly executed governance could affect company 
performance in a negative manner (Van der Walt et al., 2013).   
In general, the adoption of ICT governance is aimed at ensuring that ICT endeavours 
are in line with company objectives: (1) Alignment of strategic ICT to create business 
value from ICT; (2) ICT enhances company to exploit opportunities and maximise 
benefits; (3) responsible use of ICT resources; and (4) appropriate handling of ICT 
risk management (ITGI, 2003). In attaining ICT governance objectives, a proper 
planning process is a key point that affects a company. A company cannot effectively 
achieve its ICT governance objectives without high level management support. In 
fact, this issue has reached the boards‘ awareness about the importance of having 
strong and effective ICT governance framework to cater to the needs of its stakeholder 
requirements, while achieving its highest business purposes at an acceptable level of 
risk. Nevertheless, no one single proper CGICT model suits all companies (Zhang & 
Chulkov, 2011; Hagen, 2008) due to the varied nature of business (De Haes & Van 
Grembergen, 2004) in terms of business markets, products, channels, and customer 
needs. The board governance itself, hence, must develop in-depth understanding of 
what a company really wants to achieve. In doing so, the board should be able to 
address several critical questions on how the CGICT model should be: What decisions 
must be made to ensure appropriate management and use of ICT? Who is responsible 
for making these decisions? How will these decisions be implemented and monitored? 
Hence, in executing ICT governance, it is a collective responsibility that is shouldered 
by the board of directors and the management executives, which consist of leadership 
strategy, organizational structures, processes, and mechanisms to ascertain that the 
enterprise ICT does sustain and extend the strategies and objectives outlined (ITGI, 
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2003).  However, its execution should have clear governance structures to monitor the 
progress of ICT implementation because varied organizations may have different 
combinations as their structures, processes, and relational mechanisms (De Haes & 
Van Grembergen, 2004). In line with this, De Haes and Van Grembergen (2004) 
proposed a comprehensible framework developed by Peterson (2003), which 
demonstrated the correlations between ICT governance structures, processes, and 
relational mechanisms, as presented in Table 3.1. ICT governance structures describe 
the functions of IT executives and other IT committees.  
Table 3.1 ICT Governance Structures, Processes, and Relational Mechanisms 
Structures, Processes and Relational Mechanisms for IT Governance 
 Structures Processes Relational Mechanisms 

















Shared learning  
Mechanisms - Roles and 
responsibilities 
- IT organization 
structure 
- CIO on board 
- IT strategy 
committee 









- Service level 
agreements 
- COBIT and ITIL 

















of business/ IT 
objectives 
- Active conflict 
resolution (non 
avoidance) 
- Cross functional 
business/IT 
training 
- Cross functional 
business/IT job 
rotation 
Source: Adopted from Peterson (2003), Information Strategies and Tactics for Information Technology 
Governance, in Strategies for Information Technology Governance, Idea Group Publishing, 
Pennsylvania, USA. 
 
Meanwhile, ICT processes refer to strategic decision-making and monitoring, whereas 
relational mechanisms are comprised of business/ IT participation, strategic dialogue, 
shared learning, and proper communication (De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2004; Van 
Grembergen, De Haes, & Guldentops, 2004; Peterson, 2003). The study also 
emphasized the roles of individuals involved in the ICT governance framework. Thus, 
the roles of the boards and ICT management are crucial in assuring ICT governance 
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(De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2004). For example, the Chief of Executive (CEO) is 
responsible for carrying out and implementing strategic direction, goals, and policies 
that have been decided at the board level. The CEO also should ensure that everyone 
within the company (the Chief of Information and other senior management) is aware 
of the objectives of the board so that all can walk in the same direction. In fact, ICT 
expertise at the management level is the main pillar of any company to ensure that 
ICT strategy is implemented in the best interest of company needs. However, 
depending solely on ICT management expertise can potentially put the board of 
directors at risk. As such, boards need to expand their ICT know-how to maximize 
values derived from ICT. Thus, the importance of ICT expertise among boards should 
be seriously considered, or else, they would fall into a difficult situation to regularly 
capture vital knowledge concerning current business models, management techniques, 
technologies, as well as potential benefits and risks, that are closely related to ICT 
management executives. 
The effectiveness of CGICT is highly dependent on the effectiveness of management 
practices via proper governance and management systems in a company. According to 
Hagen (2008), the CGICT, at its best, reaches a balance as an adequate support 
function to approach all company business units with specific emphasis on the unique 
needs of each. Besides, its effectiveness is a crucial success factor that contributes to 
better harmonization and coherence with respect to ICT security levels, ICT project 
management methodologies, and in general, ICT systems, as well as an enabler to 
enhance both effectiveness and efficiency of a company in facilitating change 
management (Zhang & Chulkov, 2011). To this end, the mechanism of CGICT should 
ensure that the decision-making processes, including strategic direction, planning, and 
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investment decisions of ICT, are driven by proper conduct so as to enable close 
alignment of ICT in meeting company needs, as well as those of stakeholders.  
3.5 ICT Issues in Relation to Corporate Governance   
3.5.1 ICT Governance Standards and Best Practices 
3.5.1.1 General Standards of ICT Governance 
A strong focus on building and sustaining transparent ICT governance framework is 
essential in assuring good governance conduct that covers all company support 
mechanisms. The best practices to deal with complex processes, however, with a good 
approach, can help realize the goals outlined. In formulating the ICT governance 
framework, the best practice of continuous integration should embed prevailing 
standards of CGICT best practices. Moreover, as the present development of ICT 
process has become more complex and risky, the CGICT would underscore the need 
for applying elements from a wide variety of local and international best standards of 
ICT governance. 
 
Figure 3.1: ICT Governance Standards and Best Practices 
Sources: The International Electrotechnical Commission (2016); SALGA (2012); The International 
Organization for Standardization (2013; 2008). 
 ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 40 IT Service Management and IT Governance 
 COBIT (Control Objectives for Information and Related Technologies) 
 King III Code of Governance 
 Information Security Techniques (ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27) 
- ISO 27001 Information Security Management System (ISMS) 
- ISO 27002 Information Security Standard 
- ISO/IEC 24762 ICT Disaster Recovery Services 
 
ICT GOVERNANCE STANDARDS                                       
AND BEST PRACTICES 
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Such emergence of the latest ICT governance, in relation to standards and best 
practices illustrated in Figure 3.1, consists of ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 40, COBIT (Control 
Objectives for Information and Related Technologies), King III Code of Governance, 
and Information Security Technique, which can help the board of directors to foster 
good ICT governance culture in the company. The ISO/ IEC JTC 1/SC 40 IT Service 
Management and IT Governance refers to a standardization subcommittee of the Joint 
Technical Committee ISO/ IEC JTC 1 of the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)5.  
Besides, John Sheridan, who is the Chairman of ISO / IEC JTC 1/SC 40 IT Service 
Management and IT Governance, has suggested that the development of ISO/ IEC TC 
1/SC 40 offers good standard of practice to companies, including the areas of ICT 
activities like audit, digital forensics, governance, risk management, outsourcing, 
service operations, and service maintenance.  
In addition, Table 3.2 presents the list of ISO/ IEC JTC 1/SC 40 program standards, 
which are believed to assist companies in achieving ICT benefits through the best 
practice frameworks and standards offered. Furthermore, the implementation of IT 
Service Management (ITSM) is often associated with Information Technology 
Infrastructure Library (ITIL), which exposes a company to strategic approaches with 
the right people, processes, and technology in place so that the company can attain its 
business needs. Nonetheless, ITIL differs from ITSM. ITSM refers to the actions 
taken to manage the services delivered to customers. In fact, ITIL is the best practice 
framework of ITSM, where ITIL helps one to work more efficiently (Rance, 2015). 
                                            
5 The IEC is the world‘s leading organization that prepares and publishes International Standards for all 




Table 3.2 List of ISO/ IEC TC 1/SC 40 Standards 
ISO/IEC Standard Title of Programs 
ISO/IEC 20000 IT Service Management 
ISO/IEC 30105 IT Enabled Services-Business Process Outsourcing 
ISO/IEC 30121 IT Governance of Digital Forensic Risk Framework 
ISO/IEC 38500 IT Governance for Organization 
ISO/IEC TS 38501 IT Governance Implementation Guide 
ISO/IEC TR 38502 IT Governance Framework and Model 
ISO/IEC TR 38503 IT Governance [Guidance on the Audit of the Government of IT] 
ISO/IEC TR 38504 The Structure of Principles-Based Standards in the Government of IT 
ISO/IEC 38505 IT Governance: Part 1: The Application of ISO/IEC 38500 to the Governance 
of Data 
 Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO/IEC_JTC_1/SC_40 
ITSM involves activities like planning and managing changes, fixing things that may 
go wrong, as well as properly managing budget to ensure that companies are running 
their ICT systems efficiently. In order for companies to be more effective, efficient 
and agile at their ICT services, Rance (2015) argued that ITIL provides a best practice 
framework in empowering the ITSM by ensuring the benefits of technology-centric 
and customer-centric design philosophies are realized by the companies. The ISO/IEC 
30121 emerges as the best guide framework for corporate boards to conduct digital 
investigations related to cyber-crime. Moreover, the emergence of the latest revision 
of ISO/IEC 38500:2015 offers guiding principles for corporate boards to deploy good 
ICT governance practices within a firm that emphasizes on the top level management 
responsibility. Meanwhile, the latest version of ISO/IEC TS 38501 provides guidance 




Besides, the ISO/IEC TR 38502 is seen as the best standard because it offers guidance 
on the nature and mechanisms between governance and management level for the 
present and future use of IT. However, ISO/IEC TR 38503, ISO/IEC TR 38504, 
ISO/IEC 38505, and ISO/IEC 30105 standards are still under development6. The 
Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT) is a framework 
developed by the Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) in 
1996, while the present version of COBIT 5 was published in 2012. COBIT 5 is a 
consolidation of COBIT4.1, Val IT, and Risk IT that helps companies in managing 
their IT risk in a manageable and logical structure to enhance their governance and 
management of ICT. The five principles held by COBIT 5, as portrayed in Figure 3.2, 
is a comprehensible framework that benefits all companies, regardless of their size, 
geography, or industry (ISACA, 2012).  
 
Figure 3.2:  COBIT 5 Principles 
Source: COBIT® 5© 2012 ISACA® All rights reserved 
 
The first core principle of COBIT emphasizes on meeting the needs of stakeholders, 
which are important to embed ideas generated by stakeholders to ensure that their 
input can optimize the utilization of resources and minimize complexities in their 
attempt to maximize benefits. The second principle stresses that COBIT 5 is not only 











4. Enabling a 
holistic approach 






applicable to the ICT department, but it also covers the use of information and ICT for 
all parts of business processes, ICT development, and its implementation activities. In 
the application of a single integrated framework, COBIT offers a complete framework 
that includes all aspects of information storage, flow, and processing; hence providing 
a foundation for a more efficient control implementation that could aid companies to 
optimize resources efficiently, maximise benefits, and minimise complexities. The 
fourth principle enables a holistic approach as it is comprised of the following seven 
enablers to support ICT governance and management practices: (1) Principles, 
policies, and framework; (2) Processes; (3) Organizational structure; (4) Culture, 
ethics, and behaviour; (5) Information; (6) Service infrastructure applications; as well 
as (7) People, skills, and competencies. At the governance level, the COBIT 5 
emphasizes on the boards‘ responsibility to ensure that stakeholders‘ needs, setting 
direction, decision-making, and monitoring performance are achieved successfully; 
while at the management level, the executive management ensures that planning, 
building, and monitoring activities are in line with those determined at the governance 
level.  
Next, the King III Code on Governance was released by the Institute of Directors on 
1st September 2009, which came into effect and replaced the then existing King II 
Code on Governance established on 1st March 2010 (SALGA, 2012). The King III 
Code strengthens past requirements of King I and King II by improving the guidelines 
and introducing new recommendations to iron out issues of practices. Hence, this 
Code promotes the best standards of corporate governance practices in companies. 
Nine important key requirements with some new changes that have been addressed in 
the new code are given in the following: (1) Ethical leadership and corporate 
citizenship; (2) Boards and directors; (3) Audit committees; (4) The risk governance; 
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(5) The ICT governance; (6) Compliance with laws, codes, rules, and standards; (7) 
Internal audit; (8) Governing stakeholder relationships; as well as (9) Integrated 
reporting and disclosure. In respect of the new requirements in ICT governance, the 
King III Code on Governance has clearly demonstrates the tasks of the boards and 
management through seven principles that cover several themes of the code, as 
displayed in Table 3.3.  
Table 3.3 King III Code on Governance of ICT 











5.1.1 The board should assume the responsibility for the IT 
governance and place it on the board agenda 
5.1.2 The board should ensure that an IT charter and 
policies are established and implemented. 
5.1.3 The board should ensure the promotion of an ethical 
IT governance culture and awareness on IT language. 
5.1.4 The board should ensure that an IT internal control 
framework is adopted and implemented. 
5.1.5 The board should receive independent assurance on 
the effectiveness of the IT internal controls. 
5.2 IT should be aligned 
with the performance 
and sustainability 
objectives of the 
company  
5.2.1 The board should ensure that the IT strategy is 
integrated with the company‘s strategic and business 
processes. 
5.2.2 The board should ensure that there is a process in 
place to identify and exploit opportunities to improve 
the performance and sustainability of the company 
through the use of IT. 
5.3 The board should 
delegate to 
management the 
responsibility for the 
implementation of an 
IT governance 
framework  
5.3.1 Management should be responsible for the 
implementation of the structures, processes and 
mechanisms for the IT governance framework. 
5.3.2 The board may appoint an IT steering committee of 
similar function to assist with its governance of IT. 
5.3.3 The CEO should appoint a Chief Information Officer 
(CIO) responsible for the management of IT. 
5.3.4 The CIO should be a suitably qualified and 
experienced in accessing and interacting regularly on 
strategic IT matters with the board and/or appropriate 
board committee and Executive management. 
Source: South African Qualifications Authority, SALGA (2012). 
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Table 3.3 King III Code on Governance of ICT (continued) 






5.4 The board should 




5.4.1 The board should oversee the value delivery of IT 
and monitor the return on investment from significant 
IT projects. 
5.4.2 The board should ensure that Intellectual Property 
(IP) contained in information systems is protected. 
5.4.3 The board should obtain independent assurance on 
the IT governance and controls supporting 
outsourced IT services. 
5.5 IT should form an 
integral part of the 
company‘s risk 
management 
5.5.1 Management should regularly demonstrate to the 
Board that the company has adequate business 
resilience arrangements in place for disaster recovery. 
5.6 The board should 
ensure that 
information assets are 
managed effectively 
5.6.1 The board should ensure that there are systems in 
place for the management of information which 
should include information security, information 
management and information privacy. 
5.6.2 The board should ensure that all personal information 
is treated by the company as an important business 
asset and is identified. 
5.6.3 The board should ensure that an Information Security 
Management System is developed and implemented. 
5.6.4 The board should approve the information security 
strategy and delegate and empower management to 
implement the strategy. 
5.7 A risk committee and 
audit committee 
should assist the 
Board in carrying out 
its IT responsibilities 
5.7.1 The risk committee should ensure that IT risks are 
adequately addressed. 
5.7.2 The risk committee should obtain appropriate 
assurance that controls are in place and effective in 
addressing IT risks. 
5.7.3 The audit committee should consider IT as it relates 
to financial reporting and the going concern of the 
company. 
5.7.4 The audit committee should consider the use of 
technology to improve audit coverage and efficiency. 




In fact, a company‘s most valuable strategic asset is its information and if not 
managed properly, it can worsen the process of achieving company‘s desired 
outcome. Meanwhile, the ISO/IEC 27001 of Information Security Management 
System (ISMS) is designed to help companies in ensuring that their information 
resources are effectively managed and remain secure. Thus, the development of 
Information Security Policy ensures that effective documented security control is in 
place that applies to house employees, as well as to suppliers and others with 
businesses related to company.  
Table 3.4 ISO/IEC 27002 Control 
ISO/IEC 27002 Control 
Sections Clauses Sub 
Sections 
Control Objectives 
5 Information Security 
Policies 
5.1 Management direction for information 
security 
6 Organization of Information 
Security 
6.1 Internal organization 
6.2 Mobile devices and teleworking 
7 Human Resource Security 7.1 Prior to employment 
7.2 During employment 
7.3 Termination and change of employment 
8 Asset Management 8.1 Responsibility for assets 
8.2 Information classification 
8.3 Media handling 
9 Access Control 9.1 Business requirements of access control 
9.2 User assess management 
9.3 User responsibilities 
9.4 System and application access control 
Source: ISO/IEC 27002: 20137.  
 




Table 3.4 ISO/IEC 27002 Control (continued) 
ISO/IEC 27002 Control 
Sections Clauses Sub 
Sections 
Control Objectives 
10 Cryptography 10.1 Cryptographic controls 
11 Physical and 
Environmental Security 
11.1 Secure areas 
 Equipment security 
12 Operations Management 12.1 Operational procedures and responsibilities 
12.2 Protection from malware 
12.3 Backup 
12.4 Logging and monitoring 
12.5 Control of operational software 
12.6 Technical vulnerability management 
12.7 Information systems audit considerations 
13 Communications 
Security 
13.1 Network security management 
13.2 Information transfer 
14 System Acquisition, 
Development and 
Maintenance 
14.1 Security requirements of information systems 
14.2 Security in development and support processes 
14.3 Test data 
15 Supplier Relationships 15.1 Information security in supplier relationships 
15.2 Supplier service delivery management 
16 Information Security 
Incident Management 
16.1 Management of information security incidents 
and improvements 
17 Business Continuity 
Management  
17.1 Information security continuity 
17.2 Redundancies  
18 Compliance 18.1 Compliance with legal and contractual 
requirements 
18.2 Information security reviews 




Furthermore, the ISO/IEC 27001 does not mandate specific information security 
controls as it only formally defines the mandatory requirements for ISMS. However, 
ISO/IEC 27002 does indicate suitable information security controls within ISMS, 
whereby companies are free to implement controls as they see fit. The latest revision 
(as of January 2015) of ISO/IEC 27001 was published in 2013, namely ISO/IEC 
27001: 2013, incorporates a section called Annex A that has information security 
control objectives and information security controls, derived from and aligned with 
ISO/IEC 27002: 2013 sections 5 to 18, as depicted in Table 3.4. 
Next, the latest version of ISO/IEC 24762 is developed to offer guidance to firms on 
the provision of ICT Disaster Recovery Services (ICT DR) within the context of 
business continuity management. This standard supports the operation of Information 
Security Management System (ISMS) to helps companies in ICT protection and 
recovery strategy to ensure effective business continuity. Data of a company might be 
at high risk with improper data backup or disaster recovery solution. Loss of data 
arising from the use of ICT resources can cause major losses for companies, hence 
should be avoided wherever possible. 
3.5.1.2 ICT Governance from the Malaysian Perspective  
Furthermore, the advent of ICT has brought about a phenomenal change in business 
environment (Weill, 2004; Weill & Ross, 2004). This cloud phenomenon reinforces 
the need of ICT governance for optimum ICT performance (Milne & Bowles, 2009) 
and to create value for companies (Van Grembergen & De Haes, 2010; Silvius, Waal, 
& Smit, 2009; Guldentops, 2004). Thus, both private and public sector companies 
need good ICT governance (Ali, Green, & Parent, 2009) to ensure that their ICT 
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strategies are aligned, directed, and monitored to support their business goals and 
objectives (Chun, 2005; ITGI, 2003). 
In Malaysia, several ICT frameworks have been developed by the Malaysia 
Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit (MAMPU) as 
baselines for ICT governance, but the MAMPU model did not specifically integrate 
each framework into a single adequate ICT governance practices model (Maidin & 
Arshad, 2010). Besides, past studies also found that the adoption of ICT governance 
practices and its acceptance in Malaysian companies is rather low (Kaur et al., 2012; 
Othman et al., 2011; Teo & Tan, 2010). For instance, prior studies on electronic 
manufacturing companies (Tan, Eze, & Teo, 2008), as well as manufacturing and 
industrial service companies (Teo & Tan, 2010) in Malaysia found that the level of 
awareness for ICT governance framework was discouraging and room for 
improvement is available to familiarise with the technicalities of ICT governance 
framework. Besides, Othman et al., (2011) examined the level of IT governance 
adoption and maturity level among 51 organizations from various sectors in Malaysia. 
The survey results showed that about 50% of the organizations were less matured in 
their IT governance practice and further suggested the low adoption of IT governance 
practices by the sample. 
Next, according to the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) 2012, 
under principle 7.2, the board of directors from listed companies are encouraged to 
effectively leverage ICT in order to empower their shareholders with timely and 
comprehensive dissemination of information via various ICT channels (MCCG, 
2012). The elements of board charter should also be addressed by companies to ensure 
effective ICT use. However, no exemplar standard or framework is available to 
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support such requirement. Hence, in realizing Malaysia‘s Vision 2020, the Malaysian 
Public Sector ICT Strategic Plan, the former Director-General of MAMPU, Dato‘ 
Mohamad Zabidi Zainal (2011), stated that the Malaysian government has fostered 
continuous effort in empowering the Malaysian Public Sector ICT strategic direction 
(ISP). Figure 3.3 shows seven strategic objectives to be achieved in the Malaysian 
Public Sector ISP (2011-2015), where the objectives revolve around ICT governance. 
 
Figure 3.3: The Malaysian Public Sector ICT Strategic Objectives (2011 – 2015) 
Source: The Malaysian Public Sector ICT Strategic Plan (2011 – 2015). 
Apart from the pillar of change management, Figure 3.4 illustrates that ICT 
governance is another important pillar in the Malaysian Public Sector ICT Framework 
in determining a strategic direction at every stage of ICT implementation. This ICT 
Framework identifies several components in an integrated innovation infrastructure 
and information structure to support both short and long term growth, as well as the 
development of the Malaysian Public Sector ICT capability. In addition, the 
Malaysian Public Sector ICT strategic plan (2011-2015) also highlights five important 
areas in ICT governance, as proposed by ITGI (2008) that need to be highlighted in 
order to attain ICT strategic objectives. Each focus area of ICT governance presents a 
distinct value proposition, as demonstrated in Figure 3.5. 
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  Figure 3.4: The Malaysian Public Sector ICT Framework 
  Source: The Malaysian Public Sector ICT Strategic Plan (2011 – 2015). 
As the critical national information infrastructures (CNIIs) have become larger and 
more complex; defending the entire infrastructure is essential to prevent any issue that 
can cause a domino effect and further affect other sectors. Moreover, the mandatory 
imposed in 2010 by the Malaysian government required all public sector CNIIs related 
organizations8 to be ISMS and certified to MS ISO/IEC 27001:2007 by 2013.  
Furthermore, the Malaysian CyberSecurity (2015) asserted that CNIIs are comprised 
of IT assets, systems, and functions vital to the nation, whereby any destructive action 
would result in devastating impacts on national economic strength, defence and 
security, national image, the continuous abilities of the government to function, as 
well as in managing citizen health care system. On top of that, Othman and Chan 
(2013), from their observation regarding CNIIs‘ ISMS compliance, only 14 out of 300 
                                            
8 It refers to all the Malaysian critical sectors including the Government, financial and ICT sectors to 
reduce risks of cyber security incidents (KPMG, 2015; JPM, 2010) under the provisions in the 
Electronic Government Activities Act 2007, the Financial Services Act 2013 as well as the 
Communication and Multimedia Act 1998. 
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listed CNIIs in Malaysia are certified by ISO/IEC 27001. Of that, only 6 public sector 
agencies are certified to ISO/IEC 27001. 
 
          Figure 3.5: Five Areas of Focus for ICT Governance 
          Source: The Malaysian Public Sector ICT Strategic Plan (2011 – 2015). 
 
 
Even with many well-established frameworks, tools, and standards of ICT governance 
available, the Malaysian government agencies are still insufficiently comprehensive in 
serving and managing their own systems in-house (Hamim & Sulaiman, 2015). Due to 
such critical situation, Hamim and Sulaiman (2015) proposed an in-house system 
development governance framework for the Malaysian Public Service Department 
(MPSD), as given in Table 3.5 by adapting some related values from the established 
framework, including IT governance, COBIT® 4.1, and 3P Model frameworks. The 
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Appropriately align ICT available resources with the 





Monitoring results to create assurance that ICT is 









combination of these three general frameworks is believed to offer a proper guideline 
to the Malaysian government agencies to enhance their strategy to help bridge the gap 
communication between IT and business people, so that every participant involved in 
the framework can understand clearly their own roles and responsibilities during each 
stage of information system development. 
Table 3.5 A Proposed In-House System Development Governance Framework 
A Proposed In-House System Development Governance Framework 
IT Governance COBIT® 4.1 3P Model 
Outcomes: 




 Plan and organize 
 Acquire and implement 
 Deliver and support 
 Monitor and evaluate 
Processes  
(Governance mechanisms include maturity 
assessment, strategic alignment, service 









34 IT Control Objectives 
 
People 
(Governance structures include business 
monarchy, IT monarchy, federal, IT duopoly 
and anarchy) 
Metrics Portfolio  
(Governance areas include IT infrastructure, 
IT applications, IT projects and IT services) 
Benchmarking (Capability 
Maturity Model) 
Source: Adapted from Hamim and Sulaiman (2015) 
3.5.2 Issues Associated with ICT Implementation Failure   
Over the years, the acquisition and implementation of ICTs have been faced with 
many challenges. Besides, many recent studies have shown a number of ICT projects 
that have either failed completely or exceeded their budget and deadlines. The 
continuous high failure level of ICT projects, thus, should be a serious concern for 
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businesses at present times because the process of acquiring and implementing ICT 
usually involve large initial capital investments.  
For example, Solon (2015) highlighted the UK government ICT spending, which was 
investigated using a wide range of departments and wasting more than £100 million in 
taxpayers‘ money on failed or cancelled IT projects from 2013 until 2014. For 
instance, about £56.3 million was wasted for in-house system development in the 
Ministry of Justice. The £27.2 million spent on the My Benefits Online (MyBOL) 
project to assist claimants to access their claims via online system was also not 
successfully managed, whereas £4.7 million was wasted on electronic patient records 
development for the North Midlands and East of England. 
Table 3.6 Project Resolution Results from CHAOS Research for years 2004 to 2012. 
 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Successful 29% 35% 32% 37% 39% 
Failed 18% 19% 24% 21% 18% 
Challenged 53% 46% 44% 42% 43% 
Source: The Standish Group Report (2013). 
 
Besides, another surprising project resolution resulted from CHAOS Research 
conducted by the Standish Group (2013) from 2004 until 2012, as depicted in Table 
3.6, revealed disturbing results about the accomplishment of ICT projects in US and 
European firms, while the 2013 survey report, which is based on the 2012 CHAOS 
results, revealed that 39 per cent of ICT projects in all companies of all sizes had been 
successful, which meant they delivered on time, on budget, as well as with required 
features and functions. Unfortunately, the remaining 43 per cent and 18 per cent were 
challenged (ICT projects with exceeding budget, delayed, and failed in meeting the 
required features and functions) and failed (cancelled projects prior to completion or 
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delivery and never used), respectively. Although the 2012 results showed an 
improvement in ICT projects, the success and failure rates for ICT projects were 
insignificant. The 39 per cent of success rate for ICT projects was still low compared 
to 61 per cent that reflected failed or challenged ICT projects. 
Moreover, based on the sample of 1,471 ICT projects in US and UK companies, 
Flyvbjerg and Budzier (2011) discovered that the average cost overrun of projects was 
27%. However, the researchers were more alarmed by the fact that one in six projects 
had cost overruns of 200% on average and almost 70% experienced schedule overrun. 
Meanwhile, another 2011 research was conducted in consultation with the Victorian 
Auditor-General's Office (VAGO) to investigate the ten high risk and complex 
projects, which involved high dollar investment across a range of departments and 
agencies in the Victorian public sector (Victorian Ombudsman, 2011). The study 
depicted that all ten ICT-enabled projects failed in meeting expectations and ran an 
over budget. The original budget for these projects totalled up to $1.3 billion; but 
additional cost of $1.44 billion was added to the projects due to failure in meeting 
delivery schedule. 
Meanwhile, from the Malaysian context, about RM2.59 million of ICT investment 
was wasted via several ICT project software programs (Pharmacy Enforcement 
Management System and Pharmacy Management System) approved by the Malaysian 
Health Ministry. Thus, the Ministry of Health has ended its contract with the company 
that developed the systems due to the failed projects (Bernama, 2012). Moreover, Goh 
Thean Eu, who is a technology business journalist of the Digital News Asia (2015), 
reported a recent case of ICT project failure in Malaysia experienced by YTL 
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Communications Sdn Bhd in 2014. The company received a great deal of attention in 
the press as its ability to reach breakeven target by the end of 2016 was questioned.  
Other than that, the Malaysian Ministry of Education was awarded the 1BestariNet 
project worth about RM663 million to YTL Comms in 2011. However, in 2014, the 
Ministry fined the company with RM2.4 million for failing to provide 10,000 schools 
with the 1BestariNet e-learning solution. In an attempt to prevent a similar disaster 
from happening again, many companies have learnt the lessons from past projects, 
hence putting pressure on them to address the issues or factors that contribute to ICT 
project failures. In fact, prior studies have extensively pinpointed the factors that 
contributed to ICT project failure (Standish Group, 2014; Nawi et al., 2012; Al-
Ahmad, et al., 2009). Al-Ahmad et al., (2009) classified six domain factors that 
contributed to ICT project failure, including project management, top management, 
technology, organizational factors, complexity factors, and processes.  
Additionally, Table 3.7 presents the ICT project failure and the classified failure 
factors developed by Nawi et al., (2012). The researchers analysed over 28 symptoms 
attributed to ICT project failure in the Malaysian public sector and classified the 
symptoms into three major types of project failure, namely project failure (a project 
that fails in meeting the agreed specifications like functional requirements, budgets, or 
completion deadline), system failure (an improperly-working control system where 
the system did not end up being used in the way intended), and user failure (a system 
that fails to solve problem of user due to recalcitrance, lack of training and ability of 




Meanwhile, the Standish Group (2014) listed several factors that contributed to each 
ICT project success, fail, and challenge, as presented in Table 3.8. These factors were 
analysed and ranked by IT executive managers, who were interviewed to respond to 
the survey. Among the many factors that contribute to ICT failure, the most frequently 
cited causes found in past studies were closely related to human failure factors, such 
as lack of user participation, lack of technology competencies, lack of executive 
management support, lack of planning, and lack of ICT management. As a conclusion, 
human factors should be addressed carefully to ensure that ICT projects can 
successfully deliver the required outcomes on time, budget, as well as the overall ICT 
requirements and specifications. 
Although previous studies have highlighted many critical success factors of ICT 
implementation, many projects have continuously failed. By looking at the potential 
of ICT is increasingly in doubt, serious attention must be given to ensure that the 
implementation of ICT is accompanied by proper governance oversight roles in the 
right direction. Since most factors presented in previous studies displayed association 
with human factors, the next section shall focus on how issues surrounding ICT could 
be related to corporate governance practices and how this relationship can lead 




Table 3.7 ICT Project Failure and Classified Failure Factors 
Failure Factors 
Dimensions 
Classified Symptoms from the Field into Failure Types 















1 Lack of user involvement   
2 Mismanagement of project risk 
3 Inadequate estimation of work 
4 Breaching of contract 
5 Lack of project plan 
6 Lack of skills and knowledge  
7 Inadequate ICT background for Project 
Managers 
2 Top management  1 Incompetent in making decision on selecting ICT projects  
3 Technology factors 1  The design and technology used not in line 
with the current technology 
 
2 Low quality of the end products 
3 Low or no compatibility between new 
system and the existing system 





1 Inadequate cost estimation  Lack of ICT manpower in several 
public agencies 
2 Reduction of project cost Resistant to adapt to the new systems  
3 Full of bureaucracy (exm; for decision making)   
4 Process of project payment not smooth 
5 Complexity/ Size 
factors 
1 Project too big and complicated (ambitious) 
2 Unrealistic expectations from project 
champion 
  
6 Process factors 1 No study methodology in place No feasibility study and BPR process are 
conducted 
User requirement not met 
2 No project selection process carried out  
3 End user does not involve in user acceptance process 
4 No systematic and appropriate project evaluation process 
5  Ineffective communication among vendors 
and users 
Source: Nawi et al. (2012). 
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Table 3.8 Factors Associated with the ICT Project Success, Fail and Challenge  
Factors Associated with the ICT Project Success, Fail and Challenge 
Project Success Factors Project Challenged Factors Project Impaired Factors 
1 User involvement Lack of user input Incomplete requirements 
2 Executive management 
support 
Incomplete requirements and 
specifications 
Lack of user involvement 
3 Clear statement of 
requirements 
Changing requirements and 
specifications 
Lack of resources 
4 Proper planning  Lack of executive support Unrealistic expectations 
5 Realistic expectations Technology incompetence Lack of executive support 
6 Smaller project milestones Lack of resources Changing rquirements and 
specifications 
7 Competent staff Unrealistic expectations Lack of planning 
8 Ownership Unclear objectives Didn‘t need it any longer 
9 Clear vision & objectives Unrealistic time frames Lack of IT management 
10 Hard-working, focused staff New technology Technology illiteracy 
Source: The Standish Group (2014) 
3.5.3 Issues Associated with ICT Implementation Failure in Relation to 
Corporate Governance   
It is a fact that many companies have invested heavily in ICT with massive capital. 
Ensuring that ICT investment does meet the objectives and requirements of a 
company, effective ICT investment management and oversight are highly emphasized. 
This requires good cooperation between the board and its management in establishing 
an investment management process to prevent from agency conflict. Based on the ICT 
investment management (ITIM) framework developed by the United States General 
Accounting Office, an organization should, among other things, establish an 
enterprise-wide investment review board to be responsible in defining and 
implementing ICT investment governance policies and procedures (U.S. GAO, 2004). 
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Hence, the role of the board is essential in ensuring that investment decision is swiftly 
aligned with the company‘s strategic plan to accelerate business growth, improve or 
change current operations, as well as to boost company performance. 
Although the US GAO‘s ITIM model (2004) has been widely acknowledged as the 
best solution for investment management (Heino, 2011), the Library of Congress, 
which is the world‘s largest library, failed to meet its investment objectives to provide 
its resources available, as well as being useful to Congress and the American public. 
About $119 million was invested in ICT in 2014 by the Library, but unfortunately, it 
was confronted with several conflicting issues that hindered its effectiveness to 
achieve the investment objectives (U.S. GAO, 2015). The Library had its own policies 
and procedures to manage its ICT resources, but several weaknesses were identified, 
such as strategic planning, poor investment management, lack an integrated approach 
to information security and privacy, overlapping service management system, and 
absence of ICT leadership to focus on ICT management, which contributed to its 
implementation shortcomings (U.S. GAO, 2015). 
Arguably, the increasing ICT projects failure, as discussed in past studies (U.S. GAO, 
2015; Solon, 2015; Standish Group, 2013; Bernama, 2012; Flyvbjerg & Budzier, 
2011; Victorian Ombudsman, 2011), is closely related to human weaknesses in 
managing ICT project. Since all decisions related to achievement of ICT goals and 
strategies are decided by the boards, relying solely on the ICT executive management 
welcomes problems. The boards should also need to diversify their knowledge and 
area of expertise by expanding their understanding about ICT. Besides, the board 
expertise in ICT is crucial in determining the direction of ICT project progress, which 
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will help the management to clearly understand the investment goals, thus aiding the 
company to enhance its operational performance.  
In addition to the issues addressed above, issues related to the boards‘ capabilities, 
particularly when dealing with ICTs, are often disputed. Birmingham (2015), for 
instance, in his article, released the survey results conducted by Roger Sharp, the 
chairman of Asia Pacific Digital specialist Group, that only 10% out of 800 resumes 
of over 800 directors from top 20 companies in Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, 
and Hong Kong claimed to have discernible technology capabilities, either based on 
their level of equivalent education or technology working experience. His discussion 
strongly emphasized the lack of technology capabilities, which appears to be a huge 
part of the problem associated at the board level. Their area of expertise is mostly 
found in accounting and law, while having limited exposure to technology 
development.  
Another recent survey carried out among 204 board members, as conducted by Cohn 
and Robson (2011) under the Oliver Wyman‘s Global Risk Centre and the National 
Association of Corporate Directors (NACD), revealed that about 51% or half of the 
board members did not receive sufficient information to perform their ICT oversight 
duties. In fact, only 16% of the board members had extensive ICT experience as a 
CIO or senior ICT executive in their early career. From this survey, Figure 3.6 
portrays many types of factors that can be considered as stumbling blocks for boards 
in succeeding their ICT management. The nine categories of factors identified 
hindered the board level to perform effectively the ICT governance, in which the 
factor of insufficient IT expertise among boards emerged as the largest factor 







           Figure 3.6: Stumbling Blocks for Boards  












Besides, Nolan and McFarlan (2005) argued that the degree of technology expertise 
and boards‘ competencies were still alarmingly low, hence putting company at high 
risk. More than half of the corporate‘s spending had been invested in corporate 
information assets, but they still fell into default mode of applying good governance 
and practices in the corporation. In fact, only a few understood the full degree of their 
operational dependence on technologies. Various factors have been listed in past 
studies that hinder companies‘ effort to implement effective ICT governance. These 
failure factors can be a good lesson for companies to avoid from potential problems 
that may affect their performance. Moreover, ICT experts have highlighted the need 
for ICT professionals or a special committee to develop an ICT strategic plan and 
structure, aiding companies to deal with sticky situations (Chandhoke, Dreischmeier, 
Rehberg, & Pasini, 2015; Chou, 2014). If companies are to develop their efficiency 
control of ICT and make their necessary contribution to increase firm performance, 
good governance of ICT must also become an integral part of the company‘s 
governance structure.  
3.5.4 The Effect of ICT Governance on Firm Performance 
Studies on ICT effects on firm performance are of interest to many scholars (Kaur et 
al., 2012). The successful application of ICT is characterized by good ICT governance 
(Neff, Hamel, Herz, Uebernickel, & Brenner, 2013; Zhang & Chulkov, 2011; Zhang 
& Chulkov, 2008; Weill, 2004; ITGI, 2003), hence could enhance firm performance 
(Neff et al., 2013; Flores, Sommestad, Holm, & Ekstedt, 2011; Lazic et al., 2011a; 
Lazic et al., 2011b; Boritz & Lim, 2008). Besides, effective ICT governance is a 
critical success factor for a company‘s ICT performance (Zhang & Chulkov, 2008; 
Bates et al., 1996), which is in line with Weill‘s argument (2004) that by ―specifying 
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the framework for decision rights and accountabilities to encourage desirable 
behaviour in the use of ICT.‖ Moreover, ICT governance is a subset of corporate 
governance and hence, should be addressed like any other board‘s strategic agenda 
(ITGI, 2003) to bring in positive effect on firm performance, as proven from past 
studies (Neff et al., 2013; Flores et al., 2011; Lazic et al., 2011a; Lazic et al., 2011b). 
Appendix III presents the literature review of the effect of ICT governance on firm 
performance. Due to the frequent failure of ICT projects identified from prior studies, 
many companies have begun considering the importance of having proper ICT 
governance in place to minimize risks and to maximize returns (Spafford, 2003). 
Moreover, although many organizations realize the significant contribution of ICT 
governance practice on their business performance; past studies have shown that ICT 
governance adoption level has remained low (Kaur et al., 2012; Othman et al., 2011; 
Teo & Tan, 2010; Guldentops, 2007). For instance, some ICT governance factors, 
such as committee structure and corporate collaboration, exhibited significantly 
positive effect on firm performance, however, Kaur et al., (2012) revealed a weak 
effect between ICT governance effectiveness (measured by ICT processes, structures, 
and relational mechanisms) and the performance of Malaysian listed firms. Van 
Grembergen and De Haes (2010) explored the relationship between Enterprise 
Governance of IT (EGIT) practices and business performance from varied worldwide 
regions and varying industries. COBIT and Val IT were used as proxies to measure 
EGIT in this study. The results, however, found little evidence to support a direct link 




On top of that, Guldentops (2007) addressed seven principles of Val IT, which can be 
applied in value management processes and practices. The Val IT principles were 
highlighted to ensure that the value creation potential of ICT investments in a 
company is maximized at an affordable cost and at an acceptable level of risk. 
Besides, face-to-face interview sessions with 15 Chief Information Officers (CIOs) 
were carried out to investigate the adoption level of these principles. Nonetheless, the 
adoption level of Val IT principles has yet to be looked into and the CIOs asserted to 
do so in the future. Nevertheless, past studies revealed that some companies did 
benefit from the implementation of ICT good governance practices. 
Moreover, several researches determined the effect of ICT governance on firm 
performance, but it was found that companies deploying ICT governance methods 
gained greater profits and growth rates than those pursuing similar strategies, but 
without ICT governance support (Weill & Ross, 2004). Besides, good implementation 
of ICT process associated with dissemination of ICT knowledge among top 
management is vital, especially on firm performance (Boritz & Lim, 2007). Boritz and 
Lim (2007) further highlighted the contribution of top management‘s IT knowledge 
and the application of IT governance mechanisms (IT strategy committee and CIO) on 
the performance of 84 US public companies. The results revealed that the 
implementation of IT governance mechanisms and IT knowledge possessed by the top 
management level contributed to higher firm financial performance. Hence, 
involvement of top management is vital in terms of knowledge contribution and 
abilities towards IT implementation, which lead to better firm performance. 
Meanwhile, weaknesses in company ICT control complicate the implementation of IT 
governance mechanisms (IT processes, IT structures, and IT relational mechanisms), 
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thus deteriorating firm performance (Boritz & Lim, 2008). Boritz and Lim (2008) 
further asserted that firm financial performance could deteriorate dramatically due to 
significant IT control weaknesses. However, the existence and effectiveness of IT 
governance mechanisms were associated with highly reducing the likelihood of a firm 
reporting material IT control shortcomings, leading to enhanced firm financial 
performance. As investment in ICT has become more pervasive and has a significant 
impact on firm performance (Zhang & Chulkov, 2008), it needs to be governed via 
proper implementation of ICT governance mechanisms (Samuwai, Prasad, & Heales, 
2011). 
In fact, the area of ICT governance has been widely discussed over the last two 
decades (Balocco, Ciappini, & Rangone, 2013). However, some researchers argued 
that the relationship between ICT governance and firm performance has yet to be 
unexplored (Lazic et al., 2011a; Lazic et al., 2011b; De Haes & Van Grembergen, 
2009). Meanwhile, Lazic et al., (2011a) proposed a theoretical framework that 
elaborated the relationship between IT governance and firm performance, which 
demonstrated a positive relationship between IT governance and firm performance 
with moderating variables of IT relatedness and business process relatedness, where 
the result of this study is in line with that of Neff et al., (2013). In another study, Lazic 
et al., (2011b) again conducted a study on the direct impact of IT governance maturity 
upon business firm performance with several mediating variables (IT relatedness, 
business process relatedness, and resource relatedness) and a moderating variable 
(Absorptive Capacity of IT Department). All variables, as a result, displayed positive 
effects on firm performance, except resource relatedness that showed unconfirmed 
effect on firm performance. 
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Jamba, Tsokota, and Mamboko (2013), in addition, extended the study of IT 
governance mechanisms by introducing outcome metrics (Bowen, Cheung, & Rohde, 
2007) other than IT governance processes and structures by weighing in the influential 
factor of board members on the effectiveness of organizations. In fact, the study 
revealed that involvement of senior management in engaging with ICT governance 
structures, processes, and outcome metrics at the corporate level had been indeed 
essential and positively contributed to organization effectiveness. In other past 
researches, as companies‘ information assets are exposed to varied conceivable 
threats; making decisions concerning investment in information security (IS) is 
essential to mitigate threats, manage incidents, and avoid negative consequences on 
business objectives (Flores et al., 2011; Tsiakis & Pekos, 2008), which all together 
can improve firm performance (Tsiakis & Pekos, 2008). Other than that, Tsiakis and 
Pekos (2008) proposed security mechanisms to help companies in evaluating their 
dimensions security properties via confidentiality, integrity, authentication, 
availability, and accountability for potential risk reduction purposes. Apart from 
focusing on the importance of IS products like antivirus and firewall software to 
protect against unauthorized access, the study also concentrated on how IS investment 
can create business value to the company.  
Furthermore, companies should realize the importance of investing in IS as it helps 
them to avoid losses due to viruses and monetize the loss of security services. Besides, 
Clader and Watkins (2008) argued that IS is indeed essential for every business long 
term success. The authors further proposed the use of IT governance standard of ISO 
27000 as a framework to fulfil general objectives related to IT governance to ensure 
safety, privacy, and confidentiality of information assets. Meanwhile, Flores et al., 
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(2011) suggested a single IT governance framework and asserted that investment 
made on IT governance control objectives (COBIT) could strengthen IS objectives. 
Discussions around ICT governance understandably revolves around its demonstrating 
of ICT governance model in discussing the related standards and implementation, its 
mechanisms, as well as several strategic issues and impact on businesses and 
organizations. However, what is rarely discussed in the context of ICT governance is 
the board of directors. Meanwhile, based on Candor Governance Specialists, with the 
application of King Code III, ICT governance is ultimately the responsibility of board 
of directors in ensuring that their business and ICT strategies are delivered within an 
appropriate internal control system and adequately governed. Since companies have 
invested in ICT and exposed to high risks, involvement of boards is important to 
ensure apt use of resources, management of investment, mitigation of risks, realization 
of benefits, and safe assets (Estrada, 2010; ITGI, 2003). Besides, studies on board of 
directors in ICT governance responsibilities are often too narrowly conceptualized in 
the area of corporate governance research (Estrada, 2010).  
On top of that, Estrada (2010), through his quasi-experimental approach study, 
highlighted the importance of IT structure within company corporate governance 
framework to improve their performance metrics. This study also stressed on the 
important need of ICT skills proficiency among boards of companies to bring good 
effect upon business value. The results of this study, nonetheless, had been expected 
to be biased towards a positive effect on companies incorporating aligned IT 
governance and corporate governance practices to enhance board contributions. 
Meanwhile, from the review of ICT governance studies, one can conclude that the 
involvement of board of directors in engaging ICT issues is crucial instead of relying 
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too much on management involvement and oversight (Coats, 2015). Besides, many 
boards rely on their ICT department, technical advisers, and outsource consultants to 
assess company technology needs. Too often, boards relying on other ICT expertise 
suggest high risks (Bravard, 2015), and thus, raise the question if the boards have 
enough competencies to govern ICT. Given that previous studies have discussed the 
lack of ICT competencies among boards (Birmingham, 2015; Cohn & Robson, 2011; 
Nolan & McFarlan, 2005), Deloitte and Leblanc emphasized the need for boards with 
diverse ICT expertise, especially in ICT governance. Thus, this study focused more on 
boards with diverse ICT expertise. 
3.6 Boards with Diverse ICT Expertise 
The preceding discussion that emphasizes on the performance of the boards in dealing 
with rapid and revolutionary changes in ICT seems very doubtful. The boards are at 
risk in identifying the present and future ICT issues, as well as in making decisions to 
enhance problem-solving performance in potentially affected areas of operations 
(O'Donohue, Pye, & Warren, 2009). With increasingly complex and sophisticated ICT 
systems and components deployed by many companies to date, there is a dire need to 
look for individuals with exceptional inter-personal skills competencies. Although the 
boards, generally, do not get involved in ICT activities and operations, effective ICT 
implementation would not be achieved if the boards have insufficient ICT knowledge 
and skills. Hence, sufficient board oversight and monitoring in place with diverse 
expertise, particularly in the ICT, should facilitate the identification of the problem, 
thus helping the company in deciding how to address the problems.  
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Moreover, according to Alan Castleman, the Chairman of the Board Advisory Group, 
an effective board is composed of diverse capabilities (knowledge, skills, and 
experience), which is appropriate for any board, whether commercial or non-
commercial, depending on the nature of the organisation, its purpose, its shareholding 
or membership, and the nature of the business. Moreover, board of directors refers to 
strategically important role for companies as it strives to remain at the leading edge in 
ICT integration into business operations. As companies become increasingly 
supported by ICT, the ability to draw on a wide range of diverse perspectives in terms 
of knowledge, experience, and skills among board of directors is crucial to company 
success. As board diversity has been accepted as an important aspect for the 
development of effective corporate governance (Plessis, Du, Saenger, & Foster, 
2012), its significance should be seen as opportunities for companies to make best use 
of ICT, thus helping them to boost their performance. Before delving deeper on the 
board diversity literature and its effect on firm performance, it is important to 
comprehend some related concepts of board diversity. 
According to O‘Reilly, Williams, and Barsade (1998), ―diversity is understood as a 
diverse group if it is comprised of individuals with varied characteristics on which 
they base their own social identity.‖ As such, Gardenswartz and Rowe (2008) shaped 
the diversity dimensions into four layers: organizational, external, internal, and 
personality dimensions. Organizational dimensions are concerned about cultural 
aspect found within a work setting, while external dimensions refer to the aspect of 
life where individuals have control over, which might change over time and usually 
form the basis for decisions on careers and work styles. Next, the internal dimensions, 
also known as core dimensions, are attributed to relatively uncontrollable elements 
like race, age, and gender, compared to external dimensions. As for personality, which 
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is a hidden diversity dimension, is encompassed in all individual aspects that can be 
described as personal style with differing personalities. 
In the context of corporate governance, the concept of board diversity refers to board 
composition and the combination of various boards attributes, characteristics, and 
expertise in relation to board process and decision-making (Van der Walt & Ingley, 
2003). Besides, it is vital for companies to have boards with diverse expertise for they 
have been appointed to act on behalf of the company shareholders to make most 
business decisions. Boards with diverse expertise are believed to improve all facets of 
company performance and ultimately to enhance the value of shareholders‘ 
investment via better governance. However, no uniform concept of board diversity 
(ACCA, 2015; Murphy, 2015) is aligned to date so as to conform to the requirement 
of ICT governance board. As board diversity is a crucial issue in the present corporate 
governance practice, particularly with ICT, the concept of board diversity should be 
extended to suit the needs of ICT governance (Deloitte, 2015; Leblanc, 2012). 
The notion of board diversity is further fine-tuned in this study to suit what would 
constitute a board with ideal diversity by weighing in other factors, including business 
model, ethics, policies, and industry specific needs from time-to-time. In an overview 
of diversity in ICT landscape, the original concept of board diversity shall still remain. 
Besides, several types of board diversity of expertise are introduced to cater to the ICT 
needs at the board governance level in assessing its effect upon firm performance. In 
general, past studies have been conducted to assess the effect of board diversity on 
firm performance, but to date, none had determined the effect of boards with diverse 
ICT expertise. Thus, this study generalises the idea from various contexts of related 
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studies, to determine if there are similar side effects that can be used to assess the 
effect of boards with diverse ICT expertise on firm performance. 
As depicted in Appendix IV, recent studies have evaluated the effect of board diversity 
on firm performance and obtained inconclusive results. Some results were positive 
(Thanh Tu, Huu Loi, & Hoang Yen, 2015; Marimuthu, 2008), while negative (Al-
Musali & Ku Ismail, 2015; Eulerich, Velte, & Uum, 2014; Tarus & Aime, 2014) and 
mixed (Cimerova, Dodd, & Frijns, 2015; Abdullah & Ku Ismail, 2013; Galia & 
Zenou, 2013; Darmadi, 2012; Van Ness, Miesing, & Kang, 2010; Marimuthu & 
Kolandaisamy, 2009a; Marimuthu & Kolandaisamy, 2009b) for other studies, 
depending on the level of analysis and diversity type. Although past studies have 
proven the positive effect of ICT on firm performance, its implementation has yet to 
prove success and led to decrease firm performance. Therefore, by putting in place 
appropriate ICT governance mechanism, board governance can help companies via 
proper ICT implementation. In fact, the composition of individual board of directors 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983) itself determines the effectiveness of board governance 
practice, especially from the light of ICT governance. 
Besides, according to Leung (2015), there are several important qualitative ideas that 
companies should comprehensively comprehend about the trades-off of board 
diversity. Moreover, having diverse group of individuals with varied backgrounds and 
experiences offer the best fodder to critical thinking and discussion, which would 
reduce suffering from groupthink; thus generating more creative results and solutions. 
In fact, the benefit of having various characteristics within the board of directors 
would be advantageous for companies to access to various resources that make it 
possible for better connection with other potential individuals to spark growth for the 
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development of companies. For instance, boards with financial industry experience 
could help companies gain access to specific investors, while those with political 
background help companies to deal with regulators or win government contracts. 
Nevertheless, Leung (2015) also argued that having a diverse board could create 
potential conflict among its members, especially when it involves new directors with 
diverse background and expertise, in comparison to the existing board members who 
might be less diverse. This situation would cause them to split into subgroups, thus 
reducing group cohesiveness and impairing trust among its members, which can cause 
reluctance to discuss or share information with the board. Another critical issue that 
involves the appointment of unqualified directors may affect effectiveness, especially 
at the boardroom decision-making processes, as well as lack of capabilities to provide 
adequate oversight of company operations and its management. Besides, researchers 
also highlighted the possibility of conflict of interests and agenda pushing to occur. 
Meanwhile, some tend to push their own personal agenda within their capacity. As 
such, board diversity is exposed to more risks and challenges if it experiences 
prolonged conflict of interest among its members. This situation, therefore, can 
potentially lead to agency problem, resulting from conflict of interest among 
individual board, instead of maximizing the interests of shareholders. Furthermore, the 
board may also potentially ignore the underlying important criteria or attributes of 
successful directors in fulfilling the requirement of board diversity. Hence, in avoiding 
the highlighted risks, the board has to take seriously these costs when implementing 
measures to diversify (Leung, 2015). 
Furthermore, as an alternative to the agency theory perspective, Daily, Dalton, and 
Cannella Jr (2003) proposed resource dependency theory to offer more productive 
103 
 
results for board‘s monitoring role. The proponents of this theory depict that board of 
directors, as important providers of resources to the company, such as connections to 
external stakeholders, including regulators, suppliers, and financiers, as well as to 
advice and counsel (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). As they are considered important, 
diverse boardroom composition should be addressed by companies to enhance their 
board effectiveness (the Financial Reporting Council, 2011). Thus, apart from the 
agency theory, the resource dependence theory was also considered in this study to 
enhance the overall company functions. As the topic of boards with diverse ICT 
expertise has become a spotlight issue within the present corporate governance 
practice, the following discussion focuses on examining this phenomenon. 
The principle 4.2 of the MCCG (2012) has underlined the vital need for board 
expertise in terms of knowledge and skills to aid them to effectively carry out their 
responsibilities. Empirically, the concept of expertise has been viewed based on two 
factors; (1) excellence, referring to years of practice, and (2) professionalism prevailed 
in domains-specificity related to fields of work (Mieg, 2009). In the context of 
technology expert, expertise is described based on several criteria, such as years of 
practice, professional criteria like ―graduates degrees, training experience, publication 
record, membership in professional societies, licensing, etc.‖ and finally, the fact that 
experts ―held-down jobs in operational settings‖ (Hoffman, Shadbolt, Burton, & 
Klein, 1995). Moreover, it has been argued that board members should have an 
appropriate mix of expertise to add value in the execution of governance function 
(Reilly, 2003), especially in enhancing firm performance. 
From the resource dependency perspective, knowledgeable and skilful board members 
are considered as a company‘s strategic resource that offers strategic direction to 
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effectively execute board governance function (Daily et al, 2003). Having boards with 
superior expertise, such as years of practice and professional criteria (graduates 
degrees, training experience, publication record, membership in professional societies, 
licensing, etc.), as described by Hoffman et al., (1995), brings good value to the 
company due to their abilities to effectively respond to challenges that may arise. 
However, only several of the expertise criteria had been deemed as appropriate for this 
study. 
3.6.1 Boards with ICT Educational Background 
Educational background through literature has been viewed as a measure of 
knowledge, skill-based, and cognitive abilities held by individuals (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). The notion of educational background is understood as graduate 
degrees (Hoffman et al., 1995) and formal education an employee has completed 
(Kvålshaugen, 2001). Meanwhile, Schneider (2011) defined educational attainment as 
the highest level of education indicated either by the highest educational qualification 
(vocational or academic) achieved or by the number of years of education or 
schooling an individual successfully completes. Those educated are more informed 
and capable at managing companies than their less-educated counterparts. Moreover, 
according to Sebora and Wakefield (1998), having a slate of directors with good 
educational background is better at handling companies. 
These days, as ICT emerges as a part of execution of company‘s strategic direction, 
boards must understand the strategic level; both opportunities and clouds on the 
horizon that shift to technology. This has led many experts to argue if all board 
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members should indeed have good expertise skills and knowledge in the ICT field or 
otherwise (at least one of the board members).  
Some experts, in the light of board oversight role in technology strategy, emphasized 
the importance of technological knowledge and skills among the board members, 
inclusive of those with non-technological background so as to ensure that any ICT-
related issues can be dealt effectively without placing full responsibility in managing 
executives; thus hindering the consequences of agency problem (Proust, Samuel, Ben-
Meir, & Walduck, 2014). Similar to accounting and legal fields, technology also deals 
heavily with intricate issues, where board knowledge and skills in technology are 
needed to address emerging technology issues. 
Moreover, some experts have argued that the requirements of ICT knowledge and 
skills are critically needed by technology-based companies (Cloyd, 2013). Alan 
Castleman claimed that diverse expertise of boards is definitely required in any type 
of industries, depending on the nature of companies, their purposes and strategic 
objectives, as well as the nature of the business. Since ICT is a great enabler for all 
types of companies to leapfrog its competitors, it must not be longer viewed as a back-
room function (Chou, 2014). In fact, Chou (2014) asserted that it is time for all 
companies (regardless of the type of industry) to have ICT expertise among board 
members to effectively govern their ICT matters, including its strategic decisions, risk 
management, and monitoring ICT implementation as the issue of boards‘ incapability 
to deal with ICT matters has been identified as a contributing factor to ICT failure. 
Moreover, a recent study showed that diverse educational levels of boards led to lower 
firm value (Sitthipongpanich & Polsiri, 2013), whereas other previous studies 
displayed positive effect of boards‘ educational background on firm performance 
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(Francis, Hasan, & Wu, 2014; Gîrbină, Albu, & Albu, 2012; Anderson, Reeb, 
Upadhyay, & Zhao, 2011; Darmadi, 2011; Cheng, Chan, & Leung, 2010). For 
instance, Cheng et al., (2010) found that university degrees held by board chairpersons 
were positively associated with firm financial performance across 5,339 listed Chinese 
firms from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research Database, as well as the 
Taiwan Economic Journal Database, from 1999 until 2005.  
Meanwhile, Darmadi (2011) examined the relationship between boards of 
commissioner (BOC) educational backgrounds and firm financial performance across 
160 Indonesian listed firms. Furthermore, with regard to the educational attainment of 
BOC members, the result of the study revealed that postgraduate degree (a proxy of 
board educational background) positively influenced firm performance, which is in 
line with a study conducted among Romanian companies (Gîrbină et al., 2012). 
Anderson et al., (2011), on the other hand, found that diverse board educational 
backgrounds contribute to higher firm value among 615 industrial firms in the 
Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC) director database from 2003 until 
2005. The researchers further argued that boards with diverse educational background 
would complement each other in advising and monitoring top managers, thus leading 
to increased firm value.  
On top of that, Francis et al., (2014) investigated the effect of directors from the 
academic background on corporate governance and firm performance across 1,500 
S&P firms from 1998 until 2011. The study revealed that the presence of directors 
from academia in the boardroom was associated with higher firm performance. In 
terms of their effect upon corporate governance practices, the roles of academic 
directors in monitoring and advising displayed significantly positive effect upon 
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various company decisions, including acquisition performance, earnings quality, and 
stock price informativeness. From the light of technology, greater educational level 
among employees was positively associated with various types of innovation and 
improvement exhibited in past studies (Barroso, Villegas, & Pérez-Calero, 2011; 
Dalziel, Gentry, & Bowerman, 2011; Lin, Lin, Song & Li, 2011; Talke, Salomo, & 
Rost, 2010; Wincent, Anokhin, & Ortqvist, 2010; Escribá-Esteve, Sánchez-Peinado, 
& Sánchez-Peinado, 2009), which leads to increment in R&D investment (Chen, 
2012).  
As technology becomes more advanced and complicated, studies have shown that 
board of directors with greater educational level possesses greater openness to the 
development of innovation (Chen, 2012; Talke et al., 2010; Barroso et al., 2011), 
being more competent in facilitating the evaluation of research projects that could lead 
to better innovation management (Dalziel et al., 2011) that is likely to understand and 
absorb needs of new technologies (Lin et al., 2011), the ability to analyse information 
appropriately in accordance with knowledge (Wincent et al., 2010), as well as 
developing insights in methods when solving problems related to complex issues of 
technology (Escribá-Esteve et al., 2009). Although the highlighted prior studies of the 
effect of board educational background on firm performance had not been based on 
board ICT educational background, the overall findings can give a real impression of 
boards with diverse educational background for application in this study. 
3.6.2 Boards with ICT Professional Qualification 
The second criterion of boards with diverse areas of expertise refers to ICT 
professional qualification. Professionalism is engagement for a profession, for 
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instance, by setting or defining professional standards of a field or developing 
organizational and educational structures (Mieg, 2009). In fact, the term ‗professional 
qualification‘ has been viewed through domain-specificity of expertise in relation to 
occupational groups and fields of work that consist of writing significant textbooks, 
establishing professional methods, founding or managing professional associations or 
professional schools, or even exhibiting the best professional practice (Mieg, 2008). 
This criterion should be understood as much as possible due to the probability that 
there have been doubts among companies to make a decision whether to obtain an 
academic degree or professional credentials among the board members. The decision 
whether to pursue academics or professional credentials should not be one that is 
intricate. Instead, acknowledging the significant characteristics that sets them apart is 
the most important aspect that needs to be understood in this essential decision-
making process. 
Furthermore, Balthazard (2010) has differentiated the terms ‗academic‘ and 
‗professional qualification‘ from several features, such as warrants of competence, 
best practice analysis, annual renewal fee in maintaining qualified designation, 
professional conduct and accountability, recertification, practice of ethical 
accountability, credentials assessment and recognition, experience requirements, as 
well as jurisdiction and authority of credential verification, as presented in Table 3.9. 
As for the concept of professional qualification, one can conclude that an individual is 
considered as an expert in the field of work when its expertise is recognized by the 
professional and regulatory bodies. Their expertise is recognized via professional 
certification to demonstrate a designation earned by a person to assure his/her 




Table 3.9 Differences between Professional and Academic Qualifications 
   Source: Balthazard (2010) 





The professional credentials‘ 
knowledge and skills have been 
warranted by the professional bodies as 
safe and appropriate practice of the 
trade or profession 
There is no such warrant of 
competent recognized on academic 






The professional credentials‘ 
knowledge and skills have been 
warranted by the professional bodies as 
safe and appropriate practice of the 
trade or profession 
There is no such warrant of 
competent recognized on academic 




The professional designations being 
always accompanied by best practice 
analysis to lead the certified 
professionals on what they have to 
know or be able to do 
Rare formal and systematic practice 




The professional bodies are responsible 
for the conduct of their professional 
members and some requirements, 
standards and assessment protocols 
have been stated for the purpose of 
protecting the public. 
Academic institutions are not 







The professional association or 
regulatory body had imposed annual 
renewal fee for maintaining the tile of 
credential professional designations. 
No payment has been imposed by 
the academic institution on 
academic credentials to maintain 
their academic credential after their 
academic conferment. 
Recertification The professional credentials are 
required to recertification their 
professional designations in order to 
maintain the level of their 
competencies for competent practices. 
The competencies of academic 
credentials are forever maintained 
and no expiry date. 
Recourse A disciplinary action will be imposed 
on a certified member if he or she is 
subjected to the professional 
misconduct. 
Academic institutions do not have 
such mechanisms. 
The practice of 
ethical 
accountability 
Professional associations and 
regulatory bodies are, in fact, offering 
‗warrants of appropriate professional 
behaviour,‘ which includes not only 
competence but professional ethics and 
behaviour as well. 
Educational institutions do not set 
out rules of conduct that graduates 
must abide by after graduation. The 
terms ‗warrant of competence‘ or 





The professional regulatory bodies are 
solely as warrantor of competence of 
their professional members. 
Such educational programs 
developed in the educational 
institutions have to meet the 
educational requirements and 
approved by the certifying bodies.  
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Table 3.9 Differences between Professional and Academic Qualifications (continued) 
Source: Balthazard (2010) 
As some companies operate in a rapidly changing environment and continuously 
embrace cloud technology, due attention should be given to some technical aspects. 
Although the integration of cloud system is a daunting task, its implementation can 
run smoothly if it is accompanied by overseeing their careful planning, execution, and 
monitoring ICT, besides being supported by professional and talented individuals 
(Katz, 2015). Moreover, through the lens of agency theory, the supervisory and 
advisory roles of professionally qualified ICT or technology experts on the board 
serve the interests of shareholders via stewardship and alleviation of asymmetric 
information. Besides, ICT professionals are described as individuals responsible for 
dealing with emerging technologies, developing technology systems to solve business 
problems, and providing technical support to end users (Rutner, Reimenscheinder, 
O'Leary-Kelly & Hargrave, 2011). However, within the context of ICT professional 
among boards, the skills they possessed are not up to expectation, as described by 
Features Professional Qualifications Academic Qualifications 
Experience 
requirements 
Some minimum of educational 
requirement is needed. 
The educational institutions do provide 
various practical experiences to their 
academic credential, however, the 
experience requirements of 
professional and trade designations are 





There is only one professional 
association or regulatory body that will 
issue a given professional credential.  
Academic credentials, such as 
B.Comm., B.A., B.Sc., MBA, Ph.D., 
are granted by a number of different 
academic institutions each accredited 




In respect of the Canada practices, the 
Canada Federal and Provincial 
legislator will be responsible to verify 
and to assure that individuals who 
claimed that have been granted a 
professional designation to be always in 
the form of a signed release. Indeed, 
professional registers are, by law, 




Rutner et al., (2011), since ICT-related activities are implemented at the management 
level. Meanwhile, Norlan and McFarlan (2005) stressed that qualified ICT board is 
crucial as their professional levels of knowledge and skills in ICT to drive decisions, 
to control costly projects, and to carve out competitive advantage. 
Furthermore, only a handful of studies have looked into the effect of boards‘ 
professional qualifications on firm performance. However, Rad, Locke, and Reddy 
(2012) discovered positive effect for professional membership of institute director on 
firm‘s financial performance for all listed companies in the New Zealand stock 
market. Based on the new rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
introduced in December 2009, the rules are concerned with the needs of ICT expertise 
among the company‘s board of directors (Trautman, 2012; Trautman & Altenbaumer-
Price, 2011). The SEC, hence, suggested that every board should have at least two 
qualified finance professionals and qualified ICT professionals in strengthening the 
company's ICT governance to address costly private and regulatory lawsuits related to 
the increasing cyber issues faced by many companies. On top of that, a study 
conducted by Cloyd (2013) showed that about 56 per cent of directors claimed that 
audit committee held the ICT oversight responsibility since the committee is often 
involved in assessing company risk management process. One-quarter of directors 
handed ICT oversight role to the full board, while 7 per cent of directors looked at the 
separation of board-level risk committee. However, Cloyd (2013) argued that 
regardless of whether the full board or a committee is given the oversight 
responsibility, the board should consider if it is necessary to have qualified ICT 
professionals in the boardroom or to hire external ICT experts.  
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Furthermore, various regional and international initiatives have assisted in 
determining the skills needed in upgrading the quality of ICT profession, along with 
global recognition of the profession. Moreover, the Information and Communications 
Technology Council (ICTC) is a non-profit international organization that promotes 
and facilitates informal exchange of ideas, knowledge, and experiences on 
management, inclusive of ICT use worldwide. Moreover, this ICTC offers a variety of 
ICT professional certifications in the form of ICTC Certification program through its 
adopted open process, which is of utmost importance for any candidate contemplating 
a career move in ICT profession. Besides, Information Security Penetration Testing 
Professional (sp²), Computer Information Forensics Investigator (CIFI), as well as 
Intellectual Property Management and Digital (MIP), are some of the certificates 
provided by ICTS. With various professional ICT certifications offered, the board of 
directors are exposed to many opportunities to develop their knowledge and expertise 
to drive and be accountable for the whole company in the light of ICT. Besides, 
having qualified boards in ICT is believed to advise the company on ICT priorities, 
make decisions on strategic issues, and drive compliance with agreed actions. 
3.6.3 Boards with ICT Industrial Experiences 
The industrial experience possessed by the board is another criterion of board 
expertise highlighted by Hoffman et al., (1995) and Mieg (2009) to prove that they are 
really competent and skilled in their respective industries. In precise, it also refers to 
the behaviour of an individual with the skill of field of knowledge gained over the 
years of actual practice; thus portraying an impact on the increased level of 
understanding and mastering for that individual in the field of industrial undertaking 
(Doe, 2014). Moreover, the rapid shift in the corporate ICT landscape requires the 
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board of directors to seriously focus on the need to have a board member with 
extensive experience in ICT among their ranks. Board of directors involved in the 
technology industry is seen as one with extensive insight on the intersection of 
technology contents that can help to strengthen board ICT governance in ICT strategic 
decision-making, besides providing critical views in addressing issues and risks 
associated with ICT. 
Hence, by increasing the proliferation of new technologies, technology leaders have 
begun to realize the importance of investing in technology as it emerges as a key 
profit driver for many firms. Although companies do realize the importance of ICT for 
their business performance, many boards of directors still face issues in 
comprehending ICT (Nash, 2012). The impact of the 2007 and 2008 financial crisis 
increased concern about the lack of industrial experience on corporate boards (Pozen, 
2010), which led to the need of sufficient and relevant industry experience amongst 
board members (Lowe, 2015; Deloitte, 2014; Bertsch, 2011). Moreover, prior studies 
have given much focus on board independence, which has shifted to the need of 
industry experience on the criteria of the board (Bertsch, 2011).  
In fact, the attribute of board with industrial experience is the most significant 
criterion for each individual in the board for subject matter knowledge comes to the 
fore (Deloitte, 2014). In addition, Simon Lowe, who is a partner and the chairman of 
the Governance Institute at Grant Thornton UK LLP, from his interview sessions with 
over 1,800 business leaders (across 36 economies) and 82 in-depth discussions with 
board of directors, discovered that 60 per cent of company management teams agreed 
that the criterion of relevant industry experience is the top attribute that should be 
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possessed by a board member, while 62 per cent of board members themselves have 
recognized the importance of relevant industry experience. 
Next, Leblanc, a Canada‘s leading expert in the field of corporate governance, has 
highlighted issues related to companies‘ failure in achieving high performance due to 
the impact of vulnerable attributes of corporate boards. Leblanc (2012) stressed on 
two major factors that contributed to the failure of a company, which are due to self-
interest and lack of courage (e.g. boards were not truly independent, lack of recent and 
relevant industry experience, and lacked leadership) among the board of directors. 
Meanwhile, based on the RSA Group (leading global Life Sciences Executive Search 
and Interim Management Specialist), a Non-Executive Directors‘ Survey 2014 found 
that 70 per cent out of 153 non-executive directors responded on the need of industry 
experience criteria for newly hired NEDs.  
According to the report issued by Deloitte Centre for Corporate Governance and the 
Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance (2014), the three most sought-after 
board skills are based on related industry experience, c-level experience, and 
international business experience. Based on responses from the surveys conducted, the 
trend displays that boards with industry experience are a priority among many 
companies. Besides, in the context of corporate governance practice, boards with 
industry experience are deemed as important by their expertise in serving two broad 
functions: (1) as a senior management adviser and responsible in setting strategic and 
operational direction of the company, and (2) monitoring senior management 
activities (Brickley & Zimmermann, 2010). In precise, the boards‘ monitoring 
function and their ability to mitigate agency problems have appeared to be the focus of 
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vast empirical literature pertaining to corporate governance (Drobetz, Meyerinck, 
Oesch, & Schmid, 2014).  
Moreover, studies have proven that boards with relevant industry experiences were 
exceptional for monitoring function (Wang, Xie, & Zhu, 2013). Other than that, Wang 
et al., (2013) argued that the presence of boards with relevant industry experience 
curtailed firms‘ earning management and reduced the tendency for firms to commit 
financial fraud, thus increasing the effectiveness of boards‘ role in corporate 
governance practice. Meanwhile, Kang (2014) proposed the independent directorship 
experience to boost the monitoring board measure of board independence, instead of a 
conventional measure commonly used by past studies to determine the aspect of 
effectiveness in board monitoring. The result of the study strongly portrayed that 
increment in firm value was strongly affected by the presence of experienced 
independent directors. Other study has also confirmed that higher proportion of boards 
with experience gained from upstream (supplier) and downstream (customer) 
industries was associated with higher firm values, lower inventories, shorter cash 
conversion cycles, and higher accounts payable (Dass, Kini, Nanda, Onal, & Wang, 
2014).  
In addition, Drobetz et al., (2014) focused on the correlation between boards with 
industry experience and firm value, instead of other risks associated with corporate 
governance issue, such as earnings management and financial fraud. They also found 
a robustly positive link between board director with industry experience and firm 
value, which was measured using financial data of Tobin‘s Q. Next, Von Meyerinck, 
Oesch, and Schmid (2015) revealed that the companies‘ announcement of higher 
returns was significantly related to board of directors with industry experience. Hence, 
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it can be concluded that the criterion of industry experience amongst board members 
could enhance firm performance.  
3.6.4 Boards with ICT-Related Trainings 
Another area of ICT expertise that has to be emphasized for board is ICT training. 
Good corporate governance practice must be sufficiently equipped with adequate 
training or any development program to ensure that the boards do remain qualified 
and effective in guiding their company‘s success. Meanwhile, in the context of human 
resource management, the term ‗training‘ is viewed as a field concerned with 
organizational activity aimed at getting better performance from individuals and 
groups in organizational setting (Peteraf, 1993). Fleagen (2010) viewed training and 
development (T&D) program as two different entities, in which training as a process 
of learning a sequence of programmed behaviour in order to improve the employee‘s 
performance on the current job and to prepare them for an intended job. On the other 
hand, development programs do not only improve job performance, but also develop 
employee‘s personality. 
In fact, individuals do not only become more matured regarding their potential 
capacities, but also become better individuals. Fleagen (2010) also argued that both 
the employees‘ T&D programs are intended to benefit the company, as T&D 
programs produce better trained employees with superior knowledge and skills, which 
are less likely to involve in operational mistakes; thus leading to better performance 
and profits for the company (Nguyen, Truong, & Buyens, 2010). Besides, Mohd Noor 
and Apadore (2014) claimed ICT training as a comprehensive training from basic to 
advanced ICT skills and may include training to master a software system. 
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However, limited evidence was found for the effect of board training on firm 
performance. For instance, Wu (2013) found that board training was positively related 
to some firm financial performance measures9, but the results showed insignificant 
effect of board training on the market-based measures of Tobin‘s Q and stock returns. 
Besides, recent surveys were conducted to determine the most required skills in the 
present job market and found that technology or ICT skills drew the most interest 
from employers to be the most valuable for employees in the present job market 
(Brooks, 2016; Foster, 2015). Through the analysis of skills and employment history 
among 259 LinkedIn members, Brooks revealed that 20 of the top 25 skills, including 
area of expertise in digital and online marketing, retail payment and information 
systems, database management software, information security, software engineering 
management, web programming, data engineering and data warehousing, etc., are 
most in demand by many employers in 2013, which involved technology.  
Furthermore, Foster (2015) emphasized the important need of sophisticated 
technology know-how, especially in cybersecurity amongst board of directors 
regardless of industry type to cater to technology demand in firms. This requirement is 
in line with the recommendations given by panels that consist of a group of leading 
technology experts that the company's boards have to really comprehend the scope of 
ICT, especially cybersecurity. Since most business processes receive significant effect 
of cybersecurity threats, the panels addressed that it was time for the board of 
directors to make changes in their efficiency towards controlling and monitoring ICT, 
especially in dealing with ICT risks. As such, expertise among ICT boards can be 
                                            
9 Board training has shown a significantly positive effect on ROA, ROE, and cash-based measure if 
cash-flow assets, but no effect was found between sales-based measures of the sales-to-equity ratio and 




enhanced via participation in ICT T&D programs to align their skills and knowledge 
with present ICT development.  
Hence, due to limited evidence to support the boards‘ training and its effect on firm 
performance, other related studies with similar effects were also considered in this 
study. For example, the positive quality of employees‘ development was strongly 
supported from past studies by providing a well-conceived training program 
(Muzaffar, 2014; Ameeq & Hanif, 2013; Amin et al., 2013; Iqbal, Ahmad, & Javaid, 
2013; Jagero, Komba, & Mlingi, 2012; Singh & Mohanty, 2012; Sultana, Irum, 
Ahmed, & Mehmood, 2012; Khan, Khan, & Khan, 2011; Appiah, 2010; Tharenou, 
Saks, & Moore, 2007). It is viewed as how well employees perform tasks assigned to 
them against the performance mechanism or standard specified by the company as a 
way to assess quality of work (Salleh, Yaakub & Dzulkifli, 2011). 
Moreover, past studies have argued that firm performance rely on employees‘ 
performance, as human resource capital plays an important role in improving firm 
performance, which can be realized from the provision of adequate training to 
employees (Khan et al., 2011; Appiah, 2010; Tharenou et al., 2007). In fact, Seleim, 
Ashour, and Bontis (2007) found that employee training had a positive relationship 
with firm performance, while other studies found that employee performance was 
unaffected by training programs (Imran, Maqbool, & Shafique, 2014; Kum, Cowden, 
& Karodia, 2014). Next, Kum et al., (2014) discovered that the failure of company in 
providing T&D programs contributed to the non-effectiveness of employees‘ 
performance. This results in lack of employees‘ right skills, attitudes, and capabilities 
that could deteriorate company‘s performance.  
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Moreover, some prior studies have confirmed a positive impact of training programs 
provided to employees on firm performance (Nguyen et al., 2010; Vlachos, 2009; 
Bauernschuster, Falck, & Heblich, 2008; Zulkifli & Duasa, 2008; Forth & Mason, 
2004). Forth and Mason (2004) found that structured ICT training positively and 
significantly affected company‘s sales performance. This evidence was stronger in the 
restricted sub-samples, when compared to the full matched sample of establishments. 
Meanwhile, Zulkifli and Duasa (2008) examined the determinants and the impact of 
training on company performance among Malaysian status companies (MSC). The 
authors found that the MSC trained employees displayed more significant effect on 
the profitability of companies than the amount invested in training programs. 
Furthermore, Bauernschuster et al., (2008) discovered positive effect of training on 
employee creativity and innovation, while Vlachos (2009) found that the company‘s 
T&D was highly correlated to overall firm performance improvement. 
3.7 Ownership Structures  
Ownership structure has become an increasingly important phenomenon in corporate 
governance practice as it has important implications for firm performance (Lee & Lee, 
2014). Theoretically, the concept of ownership of firms originated from Adam Smith 
(1776), which was attributed to inefficiencies of ownership arrangements that resulted 
in separation of owners from managers. Hence, this Smith‘s concept suggests that 
managers, in turn, routinely control assets over which they have no direct ownership 
interests of the company would not make the same decision nor exercise the same care 
as would the company owner. His line of thinking is consistent with the theory of 
agency proposed by Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). Berle 
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and Means (1932) predicted that the separation of ownership that could be observed 
via ownership concentration should either improve or deteriorate firm performance.  
Moreover, Fama and Jensen (1983) and Fama (1980) asserted that agency conflicts 
could be mitigated through separation of management from control aspects during the 
decision-making process. The probability of top management to get involved 
expropriating of shareholders‘ wealth might be reduced and the viability of the board 
as a market-induced mechanism in enhancing their monitoring and oversight control 
can be done by including external board of directors (Fama, 1980). Furthermore, the 
theory of agency depicts that conflict of interest might arise between internal owners 
(managers) and external shareholders when managers begin getting involved in self-
interest activities (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
The ownership structure is often thought as a significant aspect in corporate 
governance to mitigate conflict of interests between shareholders and managers (Hu & 
Izumida, 2009; Sulong & Nor, 2008). Besides, the OECD has raised questions on the 
weaknesses of corporate governance practices dealing with agency-related conflicts, 
especially in nations with concentrated ownership structures and poor protection for 
minority shareholders‘ right in developing countries (Oman & Blume, 2005). Hence, 
there is a need for proper design of corporate governance features that can protect the 
rights of minority shareholders in emerging economies (Oman & Blume, 2005; 
Lemmon & Lins, 2003).  
Other than that, Hu and Izumida (2009) argued that firm performance could be 
enhanced via effective control through firm ownership structure, as the structure has 
essential impacts upon firm strategy, including investment decision, takeover, 
compensation schemes, and management successions. However, Sulong and Nor 
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(2008) stressed that benefits from improved firm performance might not be the same 
for all firms as their incentives vary with respect to the type of ownership structure 
and dividends. As such, the following discussion reviews past studies that cover 
several types of ownership structures, including concentrated, managerial, 
government, and foreign types, as well as their association to firm performance. 
3.7.1 Concentrated Ownership  
According to Gürsoy and Aydoğan (2002), ownership structure is viewed as 
ownership concentration and mix. Ownership concentration denotes the distribution of 
shares owned by a certain number of individuals, institutions or families, whereas 
ownership mix refers to the presence of certain institutions or groups like government 
or foreign partners among the shareholders. Ownership concentration has been widely 
looked into and has resulted in mixed findings in recent studies. La Porta et al., (1999) 
further asserted two different ownership structures; diffused ownership that is highly 
adopted by developed countries like US and UK, whereas other nations like the 
continental and East Asian countries, except Japan, that typically focus on 
concentrated ownership. Besides, prior studies have also raised several issues 
regarding ownership concentration. 
In addition, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) claimed that concentrated ownership has 
become a useful mechanism in good corporate governance practice due to its ability in 
monitoring agents‘ activities via block holders to mitigate any potential agency risk 
between internal and external owners. Besides, researchers also argued that it also able 
to facilitate provision of capital, maximize shareholder value, and thus, lead to better 
productivity performance. Nevertheless, the opponents of this structure argued that 
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ownership concentration could potentially reduce managers‘ incentives to acquire 
information, constitute an expropriation risk that might deprive of ownership rights 
among minority shareholders (Denis & McConnell, 2003; La Porta et al., 2000; La 
Porta et al., 1999) as large shareholders might be costly due to drawbacks of 
diversification and reduction in risk tolerance (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). 
Appendix V presents sample studies of the effect of concentrated ownership upon firm 
performance. In fact, some studies have reported a positive relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm performance (Basyith et al., 2015; Zakaria et al., 
2014; Alimehmeti & Paletta, 2012; Garcı´a-Meca & Sa´nchez-Ballesta, 2011; Sulong 
& Mat Nor, 2010; Ganguli & Agrawal, 2009; Sulong & Mat Nor, 2008; Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2006). Meanwhile, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) indicated that Malaysia 
achieved better accounting performance with concentrated ownership, but it did not 
reflect in market value. The positive result implied that the concentrated ownership 
provides sufficient incentives in line with manager‘s interest, along with those of 
shareholders, thus resulting in enhanced firm performance.  
Next, Garcı´a-Meca and Sa´nchez-Ballesta (2011) discovered that Spanish firms 
experienced positive value due to ownership concentration, but high levels of 
concentration led the controlling owners to misuse their position that destroyed market 
value. Furthermore, Sulong and Mat Nor (2008) found that highly concentrated 
ownership has been commonly practised among Malaysian listed firms, hence 
resulting in the positive but insignificant correlation between ownership concentration 
and firm performance, which is consistent with the initial hypothesis that higher 
practice of ownership concentration would lead to agency problem and increase 
agency costs; subsequently would potentially lower firm value. 
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Besides, Ganguli and Agrawal (2009) established a significantly positive relationship 
between firm performance and concentrated ownership in the mid-cap Indian listed 
companies. The nature of corporate ownership in Indian firms was dominantly 
concentrated on domestic individuals and promoter groups, large family-owned 
companies or the state, in which most companies have become publicly traded 
companies as a result of the Indian government‘s privatisation initiatives 
(Balasubramaniam & Anand, 2013). This type of ownership structure is ultimately 
controlled by a few individuals (e.g. family membership) or also known as ‗controlled 
group,‘ which holds relative incentives to monitor firm performance given their 
substantial portion of their investment in the firms, in contrast to the widely held firms 
with dispersed shareholders. Nonetheless, opponents argued that this entrenchment 
ownership can lead to greater stability through efficient performance monitoring, thus 
ensuring better firm performance.  
In addition, Sulong and Mat Nor (2010) argued that concentrated ownership by block 
holders act is deemed as an essential governance mechanism in protecting 
shareholder‘s interests, besides improving firm valuation. Furthermore, Alimehmeti 
and Paletta (2012) have proven that higher concentration of ownership increased 
shareholder‘s power and control; aligning the interests of managers and shareholder, 
which could increase firm value. Meanwhile, Zakaria et al., (2014) argued that firm 
with high ownership concentration would focus more on monitoring and maintaining 
firm performance in facing unstable economic environment, instead of focusing on 
shareholder‘s interest. Moreover, in the context of firm performance, one can 
conclude that ownership concentration is an internal corporate governance mechanism 
that reduces the likelihood of managerial opportunism involving fraud and 
embezzlement of firm resources for personal interest between internal and external 
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ownerships. As such, Basyith et al., (2015) discovered significantly positive 
relationship between block holder owners and firm performance, suggesting that the 
larger the block holder ownership, the less conflict between majority and minority 
shareholders to occur. 
On the contrary, some studies have displayed negative effect of concentrated 
ownership on firm performance (Lee & Lee, 2014; Mule et al., 2013; Fauzi & Locke, 
2012; Wahla et al., 2012; Tam & Tan, 2007). Tam and Tan (2007), in their 
investigation of the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance from 
1994 until 2000 across 150 listed firms, found that the level of ownership 
concentration had a negative effect on the performance of Malaysian public listed 
firms due to inefficient protection offered to minority shareholders. Moreover, Mule et 
al., (2013) found that the negative effect of ownership concentration on firm 
performance was attributed to the majority power held by large shareholders that 
exposed them to more incentives to extract private benefits at the expense of minority 
shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986).  
Besides, Wahla et al., (2012) found no evidence that firm performance could be 
affected by concentrated ownership, which is in line with Demsetz and Lehn (1985), 
who also found no correlation between ownership concentration and firm 
performance. Meanwhile, studies conducted in other developed countries like Korea 
and New Zealand discovered a negative relationship between ownership concentration 
and firm performance (Lee & Lee, 2014; Fauzi & Locke, 2012). Consistent with 
Darmadi (2012), based on a sample of Indonesian public listed companies, Fauzi and 
Locke (2012) also obtained identical result that showed negative impact of block 
holder ownership on firm performance in New Zealand. They argued that due to the 
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nature of ownership structure that concentrated on the higher level of block holder 
ownership, the more potential New Zealand firms faced agency problem. In another 
study, the result of direct effect showed that ownership concentration had a 
significantly negative effect on Korean firm performance (Lee & Lee, 2014). This 
result is supported by the managerial entrenchment theory, where firm performance 
can be adversely affected by a certain range of highly concentrated ownership due to 
management entrenchment behaviour. 
3.7.2 Managerial Ownership  
Issues related to conflict of interest, inherent in the principal-agent relationship, was 
initiated by Berle and Means (1932), while Jensen and Meckling (1976) later 
proposed an idea to involve managers as part of the team owners to get along in 
making management decisions to create better value for firm performance. However, 
based on the standard of agency theory, division between ownership and control can 
lead to firm inefficiencies (Fama & Jensen, 1983). For instance, Kräkel (2004) 
claimed that these inefficiencies are magnified when the conflict involves managers 
and shareholders for several types of conflicts of interest: First, managers may prefer 
to make decisions that contradicts with the best interests of the shareholders via 
inefficient use of firm resources for their self-benefits; second, when the responsibility 
of making decision is delegated among managers, which is usually accompanied by 
some managerial incentives to constrain the management to act in their best interest in 
ensuring sustainable firm performance through a balance of trade-off between 
managerial incentives and efficient risk sharing. However, inefficiencies of risk 
sharing can lead to increased agency costs as a consequence of separating ownership 
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and management. Lastly, managers are supposed to make inefficient takeover 
decisions.  
Additionally, Jensen and Meckling (1976) asserted that increment in manager‘s 
ownership share in the company has the potential to reduce agency problem in the 
agency relationship in order to align their interest with external shareholders. Through 
the incentives given, the manager is believed to utilize her/his expertise, hence 
increasing the firm value as long as they are still bound by contracts. The positive 
agency relationship is potentially important in promoting good governance practices 
in the firm, which builds confidence among the present and future investors as a good 
indicator in improving firm performance. Although managerial ownership is seen as a 
controversial issue, its overall effect depends on the strength of the incentive 
alignment and entrenchment effects, which could potentially lead to serious agency 
conflicts (Demsetz, 1983; Fama & Jensen, 1983). However, studies on the effect of 
managerial ownership on firm performance in Appendix VI exhibits positive findings 
from several prior studies (Zakaria et al., 2014; Fauzi & Locke, 2012; Uwuigbe & 
Olusanmi, 2012; Din & Javid, 2011).  
Besides, Din and Javid (2011) found positive result between managerial ownership 
and firm values. Managerial ownership was negatively affected by firms‘ leverage, 
hence supporting the argument that lower leverage level led to high profitability when 
firms engaged in low manager ownership program. The result also showed that firms‘ 
managerial ownership concentration was significantly negative in its association with 
firms‘ dividend policy, which supported the prediction of agency theory that firms 
with high managerial ownership might reduce the possibility of asymmetric 
information to occur, thus decreasing the effectiveness of firms‘ dividend policy. 
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Other than that, Uwuigbe and Olusanmi (2012) examined the relationship between 
board ownership (management ownership) and performance at the Nigerian financial 
sector. The result showed that managerial ownership enhanced the Nigerian financial 
sector performance from the managerial incentives provided to motivate managers in 
doubling their efforts to enhance firm performance. Next, Fauzi and Locke (2012) 
asserted that higher managerial ownership is indeed an important mechanism to curtail 
agency problems and hence, increase firm performance among New Zealand and US 
firms, respectively. Meanwhile, Zakaria et al., (2014) found a significantly positive 
influence of managerial ownership on firm performance at the Malaysian Public 
Listed Trading and Services Firms, depicting that increment in manager‘s share 
enhanced firm performance. 
Moreover, past studies have shown the negative effect of managerial shareholdings on 
firm performance, which contradicts the expectation that managerial ownership can 
positively influence firm performance. According to Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), 
managerial ownership, nonetheless, had been observed as unsuitable for sparking 
growth on the Malaysian firm performance due to the possibility of managers who 
hold shares in the existing shareholders to get involved in more risky strategies that 
could detriment firm performance. Besides, Sulong and Mat Nor (2010) claimed that 
significantly negative result of the relationship between managerial ownership and 
firm value was attributed to the onset of managerial entrenchment practice that 
increased managerial ownership level, hence could cause deterioration in firm value. 
Meanwhile, Basyith et al., (2015) and Wahla et al., (2012) revealed a negative 
relationship between those two variables. Wahla et al., (2012) argued that the negative 
finding was because ownership concentration focused more on manager ownership 
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among existing shareholders, exposing them to high probability to involve in 
misappropriating firm resources for their self-interest. Next, Nath et al., (2015) 
examined the link between board ownership (one of the board attributes) and firm‘s 
financial performance in the Bangladeshi pharmaceutical industry. The findings of 
this study, however, showed mixed results, while board ownership was positively 
related to firms‘ ROA, but negative for Tobin‘s Q because all focus was given to 
family ownership, hence the possible lagging in monitoring and transparency of firms.  
3.7.3 Government Ownership  
Apart from ownership and managerial ownerships, the study on government 
ownership has become imminent especially in market capitalization after the Asian 
financial crisis that took place from 1997 until 1998 (La Porta et al., 1999). In fact, 
different countries use different terms for their government-owned firms. Meanwhile, 
government-controlled companies in Malaysia and Singapore are known as 
Government Linked Companies (GLCs), while their investment companies are known 
as Government Linked Investment Companies (GLICs). As for China and Soviet 
Union, these companies are known as State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and 
Government-Owned-Corporations (GOCs).  
Furthermore, OCED (2013) depicted that Malaysian GLCs are referred to companies 
with some primary commercial objectives, where the Malaysian government owns a 
direct controlling stake like the ability to appoint board members and senior 
management to make major decision for GLCs, such as business strategy, contract 
awards, restructuring and financing, acquisitions and divestments; either directly or 
via GLICs. Besides, GLICs allocate some or all funds for GLCs investment. Through 
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GLICs, the Malaysian government has the authority to approve appointments of board 
members and senior management, who are responsible to directly report to the 
government, besides providing funds for operations and/or guaranteeing capital (and 
some income) placed by unit holders.  
In Malaysia, seven GLICs hold a direct control on many listed GLCs, besides having a 
minority stake in several other listed companies, such as Khazanah Nasional Bhd, 
Kumpulan Wang Amanah Pencen (KWAP), Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera, 
Lembaga Tabung Haji, Menteri Kewangan (Diperbadankankan) (MKD), Permodalan 
Nasional Berhad (PNB), and Employee Provident Funds (EPF) (IMF, 2013; OECD, 
2013). Moreover, GLCs are an important instrument in the development of the 
Malaysian economy (OECD, 2013; Lau & Tong, 2008). Although GLCs employed 
only 5 per cent of the national workforce at the firms listed on the Malaysian stock 
market, its contribution was approximately 36 per cent and 54 per cent, respectively of 
the total market capitalization of Bursa Malaysia and the benchmark Kuala Lumpur 
Composite Index (OECD, 2013).  
Moreover, past studies have also asserted that the principal-agent problem could occur 
in the relationship between government ownership and firm performance. According 
to Buchanan and Tullock (1962), the pioneer of the constitutional choice theory, 
government players refer to politicians, public servants (bureaucrats) or other political 
actors, who are tempted to engage in manipulating government ownership to attain 
their own career goals, instead of maximizing social welfare of the general public. 
Besides, there is no assurance that the firm performance will be enhanced as 
ownership rights are practiced under state bureaucrats who lack incentives to perform 
efficiently. As such, Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996), in their analysis of the 
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effects of privatization, claimed that the critical agency problem is a result of 
inefficient public firms, where agency problem has been widely associated with 
political involvement, instead of management.  
Furthermore, employment issue has also been highlighted as the main issue that is 
mismanaged by politicians, particularly for their political reasons, which could halt 
the operations in a firm. Privatization, at first glance, is seen as a strategy that could 
reduce employment issue unless its implementation is not influenced by any political 
interest. However, the government subsidies are commonly used by politicians to 
convince managers in keeping up employment, whilst at the same time, to satisfy their 
political purposes. Hence, one can conclude that the subsidies thrive not because they 
generate good corporate governance, but because they maximize benefits of 
politicians.  
Moreover, Zakaria et al., (2014) stressed that GLCs also hold significant shares in 
Malaysian listed companies. In accordance with the Malaysian government 
requirements, GLCs are seen as a perfect instrument to achieve the redistributive 
objective of the New Economic Policy (NEP), as well as to drive economic growth 
(Menon & Ng, 2013). The influence of GLCs in some sectors is seen as crucial to 
further stimulate private investment activities to improve firm performance. In fact, 
the ten-year Transformation Programme established in May 2004, which was 
introduced by the Malaysian government through its three underlying principles 
emphasized on performance focus, nation building, and good governance; thus 
providing benefits to all stakeholders as this transformation program is believed to 
help both GLICs and GLCs to continuously strive for greater performance.  
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In addition, many studies have been conducted in recent years to examine the effect of 
government ownership on firm performance, as depicted in Appendix VII, which 
produced varying results. Thus, consistent with the goal to achieve the Transformation 
Program, recent studies have discovered the positive effect of government 
intervention on Malaysian firm performance (Najid & Rahman, 2011; Mohd Ghazali, 
2010; Sulong & Mat Nor, 2010; Lau & Tong, 2008). On top of that, it has been argued 
that firms backed by the government supports could be better and efficient in facing 
challenges, besides putting effort to enhance the firm as a basis of equality and 
stability of the economy (Zakaria et al., 2014).  
Furthermore, Goh, Khan, and Rasli (2013) have confirmed the results on two various 
types of state ownership; where the profit-oriented state ownership was positively 
related to firm performance, while insignificant for the non-profit oriented state 
ownership. The researchers also argued that intervention by government offers both 
types of firms with adequate resources and credit financing. However, inefficiency in 
the non-profit state ownership firms was due to the issues associated with free riders, 
bureaucracies, and political intervention in firm management. Another two studies 
conducted in China and Vietnam in 2013 demonstrated result in the form of U shape. 
Phung and Hoang (2013) found that the state ownership might be useful for firms to 
increase their performance by its advantages; but the performance would be severely 
affected if supported by highly concentrated state ownership, which hints involvement 
of political motivations, instead of commercial ones. Other than that, Tran et al., 
(2014) found that increased state ownership in larger firms enhanced firm 
performance for the aspects of profitability and efficient use of labour in Vietnam. 
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Moreover, some evidences from past studies support the arguments highlighted by 
empirical researchers, who view that government ownership has a detrimental effect 
on firm performance (Boycko et al., 1996; Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). Furthermore, 
as GLCs are often viewed to be profit inefficient, as compared to private firms 
(Musallam, 2015a), it was found that the private-controlled funds ownership had a 
significantly positive impact on firm accounting performance, instead of government-
controlled funds (GCFs). The researcher also believed that GCFs holding of shares 
was in the national interest and not as inclusive a goal as that of maximizing the 
wealth of shareholders. However, Musallam (2015b) obtained mixed results in his 
study as only two GLICs (Permodalan Nasional Berhad and Lembaga Tabung 
Angkatan Tentera) exhibited significantly positive effect on market performance, 
while the other five GLICs (Employee Provident Fund, Lembaga Tabung Haji, 
Kumpulan Wang Amanah Pencen, Khazanah Nasional Bhd, and Menteri Kewangan 
(Diperbadankan)) did not display any effect on market performance. 
In fact, the strong dominance of GLC demonstrated a discernible negative effect on 
the performance of Malaysian listed companies (Zakaria et al., 2014; Menon & Ng, 
2013; Tam & Tan, 2007). According to Menon and Ng (2013), private firms were less 
willing to make investments when the share of GLC revenue dominated the industry. 
However, the performance of private investment was not significantly affected if GLC 
dominance is absent. Such concentration should be on divestment strategy to reduce 
intricacy and to improve capital allocation in private firms. Furthermore, according to 
PEMANDU‘s Economic Transformation Program, the purpose of the divestment 
strategy is to reduce the role of GLC in private sectors, as well as to generate more 
opportunities to encourage the private sector to take lead as the key driver of 
Malaysian economic growth. Besides, Zakaria et al., (2014) have supported the 
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previous findings (Menon & Ng, 2013) that poor firm performance was negatively 
affected by the ambiguity of government ownership and control, as well as agency 
issues.  
3.7.4 Foreign Ownership  
Based on the Legal Information Institute (LII) (2011), under section 120.37, foreign 
ownership refers to more than 50 per cent of the outstanding voting securities of the 
firm acquired by one or more foreign persons, who are defined under the LII section 
120.16 as any natural person who is not a lawful permanent resident or not protected. 
In addition, foreign persons also refer to any foreign companies, business association, 
partnership, trust, society or any other entity that is not incorporated or organized to 
run business in that country. In general, foreign ownership involves investment made 
by multinational corporations, which is usually referred as companies that conduct 
economic activities in more than a country to inject long term investments in foreign 
countries in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) or acquisition (Chau, Esther; 
Wu, Jayce, 2013)10.  
As such, a significant effect of FDI on economic growth, particularly in East Asian 
countries, has been remarkably stable during the global financial crisis that took place 
from 1997 until 1998 (Loungani & Razin, 2001), which is often seen as an important 
catalyst for economic growth among developing countries as it stimulates domestic 
investment in host countries. Evidently, Wacker (2011) found that FDI played a 
positive role in boosting the trading capacity of developing countries. In respect of 
FDI in Malaysian companies, the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) 2015 World Investment Report claimed that Malaysia has 
                                            
10 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_ownership  
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been ranked the fifth largest recipient of FDI inflows in East and Southeast Asia, 
which is also known as the most favoured destination for FDI by 15 multinational 
companies from 2015 until 2017. The sectors that have benefited greatly from the FDI 
are manufacturing, finance and insurance, ICT, mining, oil and gas, as well as 
agriculture sectors (Bank Negara, 2014). Moreover, recent evidence reported by the 
Malaysian Department of Statistics (DOS) in 2015 revealed that the FDI significantly 
contributed to the positive investment inflow in Malaysia. The report revealed that the 
FDI increased to 12,488 MYR million in the second quarter of 2015 from 9,888.26 
MYR Million in the first quarter of 2015. 
Most FDI is engaged by firms and multinational corporations (Pettinger, 2012; Zekos, 
2005; Dunning, 1993) capable of providing capital, managerial expertise, and also 
exert monitoring activities on managers to enhance corporate governance and 
efficiency (Sulong & Mat Nor, 2008). In fact, the significant contribution of FDI 
inflows to domestic investment has made it a crucial source for developing countries. 
Besides, developing countries with weak financial institutions, as well as low 
corporate governance and accounting standards, are more inclined to possess 
multinational corporations‘ ownership advantage via acquisition of their patent to 
increase the share of their capital inflows in the form of FDI (Loungani & Razin, 
2001).  
Multinational corporations also have significant ownership interests in their 
subsidiaries listed on the Bursa Malaysia (Sulong & Mat Nor, 2008). Since FDI has 
been identified as an important indicator to boost the Malaysian economic growth 
(Tanggapan, Geetha, Mohidin, & Vincent, 2011) with the joint effort of various 
incentives and policies introduced by the Malaysian government to attract foreign 
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investment, it is indeed an opportunity to foreign multinational corporations to greater 
expand their ownership in Malaysian firms.  
In fact, Appendix VIII presents the effect of foreign ownership on firm performance 
and displayed that the effect of foreign ownership had been accepted as an important 
indicator as it enhanced Malaysian firm performance (Musallam, 2015b; Zakaria et 
al., 2014; Mohd Ghazali, 2010; Sulong & Mat Nor, 2010). Moreover, Musallam 
(2015b) indicated that two Malaysian GLICs‘ performance, namely Permodalan 
Nasional Berhad and Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera, were positively affected by 
foreign ownership due to good quality monitoring control among foreign investors 
(Mohd Ghazali, 2010; Sulong & Mat Nor, 2010). Furthermore, Zakaria et al., (2014) 
found that foreign ownership did not affect firm performance before the subprime 
crisis period from 2005 until 2006; but the result was positive for subprime crisis from 
2009 until 2010. 
Additionally, Zakaria et al., (2014) concluded that firm performance would turn better 
with the association of high levels of foreign ownership as it could provide firms with 
financial support, transfer of technology, and expertise (Uwuigbe & Olusanmi, 2012). 
Besides, some past studies reported a negative effect of foreign ownership on firm 
performance within the context of developing countries (Darmadi, 2012; Lau & Tong, 
2008; Sulong & Mat Nor, 2008). Moreover, firm market performance was found to 
have a significantly negative effect on foreign ownership (Sulong & Mat Nor, 2008), 
but nil association between these two variables in other studies (Lau & Tong, 2008; 
Darmadi, 2012).  
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3.8 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter goes beyond the discussion of several sub-topics that revolves around 
corporate governance of ICT (CGICT) literature. First, the chapter explains the 
concept of corporate governance, some issues related to the present corporate 
governance practices, literature evidences of the effect of corporate governance on 
firm performance, as well as the correlation between corporate governance and 
CGICT. In precise, several issues linked to ICT in the relationship with corporate 
governance are also discussed, including issues related to ICT governance standards, 
ICT implementation failure cases, and ICT failure associated to corporate governance 
practices. Following the discovery in numerous ICT failure cases, corporate 
governance experts have emphasized several important needs to be weighed in for the 
present corporate governance practices so as to ensure proper ICT implementation. 
Apart from paying attention to the discussion of the best practice for ICT governance, 
this chapter also provides a review of boards with diverse ICT expertise and their 
effects on firm performance, as emphasized by corporate governance experts. In 
addition, the literature review on corporate governance, specifically on ownership 
structure from the light of firm performance, is discussed at the end of the chapter. 
The next chapter sheds light on the research framework and the methodology 





RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
Based on the review of literature in the preceding chapter, Section 4.2 presents and 
discusses the research framework of the study. Following the research framework, the 
relevant hypotheses were then developed. Next, Section 4.3 presents the arguments 
behind the development of each hypothesis. Moving on, Section 4.4 explains the 
selection of data samples for this study, while Section 4.5 provides elaboration on 
each measurement used for dependent, independent, and control variables. After that, 
Sections 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8, respectively, look into panel data, model specification, and 
data analysis procedures employed in this study. Lastly, the chapter ends with a 
summary, as depicted in Section 4.9.  
4.2 Research Framework 
Figure 4.1 illustrates a diagrammatic representation of the research framework 
examined in this study. The diagram shows all the variables investigated in the study. 
Based on the framework, the potential variables used to explain the effect on firm 
performance are comprised of ICT investment (ICT spending functions as a proxy), 
ICT governance standards (the adoption of ICT governance processes, the presence of 
ICT governance committee structure, and the presence of ICT senior management), 
boards with diverse ICT expertise (boards with ICT education background, boards 
with ICT professional qualification, boards with ICT industrial experiences, and 
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boards with ICT-related training), as well as ownership structures (concentrated 
ownership, managerial ownership, government ownership, and foreign ownership), 
which are the independent variables, while firm performance as the dependent 
variable.  
Meanwhile, the controlled variables, i.e. board independence, board size, leverage, 
and firm size, are also included in the analysis. Moreover, based on prior studies, these 
variables were embedded for they have been proven to influence firm performance. In 
fact, the research framework was developed based on agency theory and resource 
dependency theory as underpinning theories for this study to determine the effects of 
the potential variables on firm performance. In general, these two theories are further 
elaborated in the following paragraphs.  
In general terms, agency theory suggests that a principal-agent relationship occurs 
between shareholders as principal and board of directors as agents of the company; 
thus responsible in managing the overall operations in the best interest of 
shareholders‘ goals (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Plus, in 
carrying out this responsibility, as the boards are excluded from company‘s daily 
operations; the managing agents are appointed to run the business of the company on a 
daily basis. In this case, boards act as principal, whereas managing agents, such as 
Chief Executive Director (CEO) or Chief Technology Officer (CTO), act as agents.   
The theory further suggests that agency problems may arise due to separation of 
ownership between principal and agents. Hence, the agency problem is a critical issue 
in implementing the best corporate governance practice within a company. Based on 
the agency problem, agents may act in their personal benefits, instead of in the best 
interest of their shareholders. This situation places the principal in a difficult situation 
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to monitor the agents after acquiring more power (e.g. the ability to overrule any 
company decisions), such as knowledge and expertise, in the respective area of 
industry compared to principals.  
      
Figure 4.1: Research Framework 
 
Besides, undue reliance solely of boards on managers for their expertise on certain 
area (e.g. ICT) creates agency problem and hence, lead to bad corporate governance 
practices. Boards are concerned about their lack of competence in that area, thus 
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leading them to become dependent on their managers‘ expertise, while the managers 
are dependent on the boards for promotion and higher incentives; creating 
interdependency on power over each other (Emerson, 1962). Companies in this 
situation have to bring in resources that could alleviate unbalance power rise in the 
principal-agent relationship, which could help them in better practicing their corporate 
governance practice. Furthermore, as highlighted in the preceding discussion, Daily et 
al., (2003) proposed the resource dependency theory (RDT) as an alternative to the 
agency theory.  
From the light of RDT, a company is characterized as an open system, dependent on 
contingencies in the external environment (Preffer & Salancik, 1978). According to 
RDT, a company should have control of its critical resources in order to avoid 
dependence on other parties. For that purpose, board of directors play an important 
role in bringing in external resources to reduce the rise in potential transaction costs in 
the interdependent relationship. The theoretical perspective had been chosen in this 
study after weighing in the view of Preffer and Salancik (1978), in which RDT 
appears to be the strongest theory to support the effect of board diversity on firm 
performance. In short, as this study is comprised of several topics related to ICT 
investment, corporate governance variables like ICT governance mechanisms, boards 
with diverse ICT expertise, and ownership structures; both theories are believed to 
possess the ability to further explain the effects of each variable on firm performance. 
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4.3 Hypotheses Development 
4.3.1 ICT Investment and Firm Performance in the Malaysian Technology-Based 
Sector 
Technology or ICT resources are crucial for technology-based sector as a strategic 
resource to attain sustainable high performance (Straub et al., 2006). Basically, the 
Malaysian technology sector had been selected in this study because the description 
and the nature of the companies within this sector are closely related to ICT 
components (TRBC, 2015; Mohd Noor & Apadore, 2014; PIKOM, 2014; 2013; 2012; 
Paytas & Berglund, 2004). In fact, spending on tangible (e.g. hardware, key data, and 
network) and intangible ICT assets (e.g. licenses, R&D, patents, and computer 
software) should be seen as investment (Haskel & Wallis, 2010), instead of cost. 
Nonetheless, with a well-thought-out strategy, these assets can become highly 
valuable to firm performance. Moreover, the RDT proposes that the key for company 
survival relies on its ability to acquire and maintain resources, such as personnel, 
information, raw materials, and technology. Hence, this study suggests that ICT 
investment has a significant effect on the performance of companies in the Malaysian 
technology-based sector. As such, the following hypothesis is developed: 
H1:   Investment in ICT spending has a significant effect on firm performance in 
the Malaysian technology-based sector. 
ICT is renowned as a project that involves various types of risks with high failure rate 
in its implementation (Pourdarab, Nosratabadi, & Nadali, 2011). However, 
shareholders especially, often prefer to get involved in high-risk investment projects 
that promise high payoffs upon successful implementation although with low 
142 
 
probability (Duran & Lozano-Vivas, 2015). Thus, in accomplishing the desires of 
shareholders to invest in ICT, the board of directors is responsible for all investment 
matters, which are inclusive of monitoring and ensuring that the management actions 
are indeed consistent with their interest to maximize profits. This situation is in 
accordance with the agency theory that suggests a principal-agent correlation, 
especially when the boards (principals) engage managers (agents) to run the business, 
thus raises the need to monitor their performances so as to ensure that they act in the 
interest of the owners (shareholder) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Besides, past studies have investigated the effect of ICT investment on firm 
performance from different perspectives, such as ICT budgets, ICT spending 
(hardware and software, training, and other ICT-related equipment), ICT services, ICT 
outsourcing, and ICT branches. In fact, the hypothesis developed in this study 
assessed the contribution of ICT to firms on the basis of ICT spending by weighing in 
the expenditure incurred on ICT-related equipment like hardware, software, and other 
ICT appliances. However, the results from past studies are inconsistent due to several 
reasons, for instance, varied types of measurements for ICT investment, different 
types of segmentation for industry and nation development (either developing or 
developed countries), as well as ignorance of time-lag effect of ICT investment on 
firm performance.  
Moreover, it has been argued that the initial period of ICT spending lowers the profit 
gained by firms in the same period (Ugwuanyi & Ugwuanyi, 2013; Anderson et al., 
2003) due to substantial amount of investment incurred for ICT acquisition (Anderson 
et al., 2003). Although ICT investment incurred in the initial period (period t) 
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displayed positive effect on firm performance in period t, the result only revealed 
positively small coefficient of ICT investment (Anderson et al., 2003).  
Besides, the investment returns are not immediately apparent to investors (firms 
investing in ICT) because for ICT investment, in general, time lag exists between the 
moment an investment is made and the payback (Yaylacicegi & Menon, 2004; 
Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 2003; Dedrick, Gurbaxani, & Kraemer, 2003; Kohli & Devaraj, 
2003; Devaraj & Kohli, 2000; Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 1993; Brynjolfsson, 1993; 
Brynjolfsson et al., 1989). Consistent with the real effect of ICT investment discussed 
in past studies, despite of exhibiting significant effect of ICT investment on firm 
performance, this study suggests that ICT investment incurred in year t would not 
positively affect firm performance in order to support the first hypothesis (H1) of ICT 
investment. Thus, the following hypothesis is developed: 
H1a:  Investment in ICT spending in year t has a negative effect on firm   
performance in the Malaysian technology-based sector. 
Moreover, some studies have adapted the element of time-lag effect of ICT 
investment on firm performance, which exhibited positive results. For example, some 
studies showed that the best return of ICT investment to companies was only derived 
either after a lag of four (Zhang et al., 2012) or five years (Yaylacicegi & Menon, 
2004) from the date of its implementation. Although a study with the consideration of 
model 1-lag failed to prove the positive effect of ICT investment on firm performance 
(Beccalli, 2007), some studies did find that lag of 1 to 2 years (Hung et al., 2012; 
Brynjolfsson et al., 1989), lag of 2 years (Francalanci & Galal, 1998), lag of 2 to 3 
years (Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 2003; Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 1993), and even 4 years to 
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exemplify the positive effect of ICT investment on firm performance (Anderson et al., 
2003).  
After considering several positive arguments for the time-lag analysis, as well as the 
positive views from both theories pertaining to the effect of ICT investment on firm 
performance, this study believes that ICT investment incurred in year t-1, t-2, and t-3 
would positively affect firm performance in the Malaysian technology-based sector. 
Furthermore, even though past findings have proven that positive effect of ICT 
investment on firm performance took place after a lag of 4 and 5 years of investment 
made, this study proposes ICT investment incurred in lag of one year until three 
years11. In order to further support H1, the next three hypotheses, which consist of ICT 
investment incurred in year t-1, t-2, and t-3, are developed as follows: 
H1b: Investment in ICT in year t-1 has a positive effect on firm performance in 
the Malaysian technology-based sector 
H1c: Investment in ICT in year t-2 has a positive effect on firm performance in 
the Malaysian technology-based sector  
H1d: Investment in ICT in year t-3 has a positive effect on firm performance in 
the Malaysian technology-based sector. 
4.3.2 Corporate Governance in the Malaysian Technology-Based Sector 
This research design classifies the corporate governance issue within the Malaysian 
technology-based sector into several aspects: (1) ICT governance mechanisms; (2) 
                                            
11According to the Malaysian Ministry of Finance (2014), the Accelerated Capital Allowance (ACA) on 
computers and information technology assets are written off within a period of two years while the ICT 




Boards with diverse ICT expertise; and (3) ownership structures. Accordingly, under 
the context of ICT governance, first, the study examined the effects of ICT 
governance, including ICT governance processes and structures, on the performance 
exerted by firms in the Malaysian technology-based sector. Second, this study 
examined the effect of boards with diverse ICT expertise, including boards with ICT 
educational background, boards with ICT professional qualification, boards with ICT 
industrial experiences, as well as boards with ICT-related training on the performance 
of firms in the Malaysian technology-based sector. Third, the study also looked into 
the ownership structures, including concentrated ownership, managerial ownership, 
government ownership, and foreign ownership on the performance of firms in the 
Malaysian technology-based sector, primarily to identify the true nature of practices 
held by corporate entities in the context of Malaysian technology-based sector. 
4.3.2.1 ICT Governance Mechanisms 
4.3.2.1.1 The Adoption of ICT Governance Standards in the Malaysian Technology-
Based Sector (Processes) 
In respect of ICT governance mechanisms, its adoption has been acknowledged as an 
important driver in generating good corporate governance and best practices among 
firms to achieve effective ICT governance (Neff et al., 2013; Zhang & Chulkov, 2011; 
Zhang & Chulkov, 2008; Weill, 2004; ITGI, 2003). Besides, as part of corporate 
governance practices (Van der Walt et al., 2013; SALGA, 2012; Mueller et al., 2008; 
Carroll et al., 2004; ITGI, 2003), poor conduct of ICT governance could lead a firm to 
performance badly (Van der Walt et al., 2013). In fact, at these present times, ICT 
management has become more complex and tougher for business firms to deal with in 
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their business operations. As for the current regulatory and business environment, a 
prudent firm would seek better formalization of ICT governance standards and 
framework to help the company to be aligned with the company‘s decision made for 
ICT planning, policy, and operations; in meeting business objectives, assessing 
effective risk management, as well as effective utilization of management resources.    
As many boards were found to lack in competencies when dealing with ICT-related 
decisions (Birmingham, 2015; Cohn & Robson, 2011; Nolan & McFarlan, 2005), a 
question arises if their role is sufficient to monitor the actions taken by the 
management in line with the best interests of the company in terms of ICT strategy 
(Posthumus & Solms, 2008). Besides, their vulnerability is known as the principal-
agent problem. This problem, however, can be expressed via moral hazard and 
adverse selection, where boards may not be necessarily involved to ensure that ICT 
delivers its value (moral hazard) and may not know the degree of company‘s reliance 
on ICT (adverse selection). As such, this could lead to ineffective management 
decision-making in ICT due to board vulnerability. Moreover, Posthumus and Solms 
(2008) claimed that the adoption of ICT governance standards and framework would 
be the best solutions to mitigate agency problem by empowering the effectiveness of 
the boards' role in monitoring so as to be aligned with the company's strategy. 
In the RDT, Singh, Power, and Sum (2010) viewed that ISO standard as a tool that 
companies can use to deal with conditions in their business environment. Consistent 
with this theory, the adoption of ICT governance standards and framework is essential 
to enhance effective ICT compliance culture within an organization so as to satisfy 
best practice for ICT governance (Ali et al., 2009). For instance, COBIT, ITIL, and 
other ICT standards like IT Service Management and IT Governance (ISO/ IEC TC 
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1/SC 40), as well as Information Security Techniques (ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27), are 
some useful tools that could assist in the design and implementation of ICT 
governance framework that consist of some unique advantages and focuses, 
depending on specific firm needs, as well as the most suitable standard for a firm‘s 
business environment (Leonida & Mulligan, 2005).  
In addition, several studies discovered a positive correlation between the existence of 
ICT compliance culture and the level of ICT governance effectiveness (Simonsson, 
Johnson, & Ekstedt, 2010; Ali et al., 2009; De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2009), while 
others found that the adoption of ICT governance standards and frameworks had a 
positive impact on firm performance (Neff et al., 2013; Flores et al., 2011; Lazic et al., 
2011a; Lazic et al., 2011b; Simonsson et al., 2010). Moreover, as business 
corporations rely heavily on technology, it is inevitable for threats from cyber 
adversaries continue to grow. Moreover, the evolving cyber landscape has the 
potential to create a large scale of cyber-attacks that may have an adverse impact upon 
corporate performance. Apart from the initiatives taken to alleviate cyber-risks by 
other developed countries, such as Australia, US, and UK; Malaysia also has taken 
proactive actions to address cyber issues. 
Other recent studies have also claimed that the adoption of ICT governance is still 
relatively low in Malaysia (Kaur et al., 2012; Othman et al., 2011; Teo & Tan, 2010). 
Despite the low adoption level of ICT governance standards or framework in 
Malaysian practices, this study asserts that the mandatory compliance of ISMS12 
certified by ISO/IEC 27001, which was imposed by the Malaysian government since 
2010 to all critical sectors including the government; both financial and ICT sectors 
                                            
12 ISMS refers to Information Security Management System. 
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have displayed positive effects on the performance of firms in the Malaysian 
technology-based sector. Thus, the next hypothesis developed is as follows: 
H2: The adoption of ICT governance standards or framework (processes) has a 
positive effect on the performance of companies in the Malaysian 
technology-based sector. 
4.3.2.1.2 The Presence of ICT Governance Committee Structures in the Malaysian 
Technology-Based Sector 
The ICT governance committee structure is responsible for ensuring effective ICT 
governance and maximizing value from ICT investments to generate high payoff for 
companies. In fact, the scope of responsibilities shouldered by ICT governance 
committee has to be broadened and not only focus on strengthening ICT strategy 
when assisting the board, but also capable in helping a board in terms of ICT value, 
risks, and performance. In fact, ICT governance committee structure refers to the 
functions belonging to ICT Steering Committee (De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2015; 
Zhang & Chulkov, 2012; Ali et al., 2009; Bowen et al., 2007; Ali & Green, 2005; De 
Haes & Van Grembergen, 2004; Van Grembergen et al., 2004; Peterson, 2003), as 
well as other ICT committees, such as ICT Strategy Committee (De Haes & Van 
Grembergen, 2015; Ali et al., 2009; Boritz & Lim, 2008; Ali & Green, 2007; Boritz & 
Lim, 2007; Ali & Green, 2005; De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2004; Van Grembergen 
et al., 2004; Peterson, 2003) and ICT audit committee (De Haes & Van Grembergen, 
2015), as some common types of committees employed to investigate their influence 
on corporate performance (Boritz & Lim, 2008; Boritz & Lim, 2007) and level of ICT 
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governance effectiveness (Ali et al., 2009; Ali & Green, 2007; Bowen et al., 2007; Ali 
& Green, 2005). 
Furthermore, the ICT Strategy Committee is a more strategic-oriented part of the 
board members (De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2015) to provide insight and advice to 
the board in ensuring that ICT is indeed well-aligned with the business direction and 
the strategic objectives outlined by the company (Ali et al., 2009; ITGI, 2003). 
Meanwhile, the ICT audit committee is an independent committee at the board level 
that is responsible to overview (ICT) assurance activities (De Haes & Van 
Grembergen, 2015). Having these ICT committees at the board level is essential to 
prevent agency problem from occurring between agent (management level) and 
boards so as to maximize the interests of shareholders. Furthermore, the agency 
problem may occur when top managers at the management level seek to maximize 
their own benefits since they have the ability (knowledge and expertise) to operate in 
their own self-interest, instead of in the best interests of the firm due to asymmetric 
information (managers‘ knowledge and expertise in ICT are better than those of 
boards). 
Moreover, past studies found that the presence of ICT committee structure has 
reduced ICT control weaknesses from occurring in a company, thus increasing firm 
financial performance (Boritz & Lim, 2008; Boritz & Lim, 2007). However, the 
adoption of ICT governance structure is still low as far as the Malaysian practice 
(Kaur et al, 2012) is concerned. Nonetheless, although much spending has been 
focused on acquiring ICT assets, many companies are still struggling in their best 
implementation of ICT. Hence, this study believes that the presence of ICT 
governance committee at the board level functions as an internal control mechanism 
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on behalf of the shareholders to better serve in all ICT-related matters, instead of 
solely relying on the management‘s knowledge and expertise in implementing ICT. 
Hence, this study argues that the presence of ICT governance committee structure, 
such as ICT strategy committee or (ICT) audit committee, will help companies in the 
technology sector improve their ICT performance and lead to better firm performance. 
Thus, the hypothesis developed is as follows: 
H3a: The presence of ICT governance committee structure has a positive effect 
on firm performance in the Malaysian technology-based sector. 
On top of that, several experts have suggested that the success of ICT governance 
requires not only participation of board of directors, but also management 
involvement to ensure if the implementation of ICT is sustained and extended in line 
with company‘s strategies and objectives (De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2004; ITGI, 
2003). This is consistent with the agency theory that suggests a positive relationship 
between principal (boards) and agents (management) that could lead to better firm 
performance. On the other hand, Norlan and McFarlan (2005) stressed that lack of 
ICT literacy within the board of directors to ask intelligent questions should not only 
stop at ICT risks and expenses, but also competitive risk, which leads to their 
dependence on Chief Information Officer (CIO) to deal with critical corporate 
information assets. This shows that the involvement of senior management, such as 
ICT steering committee composed of CIO or Head of ICT department (Zhang & 
Chulkov, 2012), plays a significant role in overseeing major projects, managing 
priorities, and allocating resources with guidance from the ICT Strategy Committee. 
Moreover, the ICT steering committee is management-oriented (De Haes & Van 
Grembergen, 2015) that supports information systems planning and management, 
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besides being a responsible team to link ICT strategy with business strategy by setting 
strategic directions for companies, as well as by matching their concerns with 
technological potential and building commitment (De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2015; 
Ali et al., 2009; ITGI, 2003). This steering committee is composed of CIO (De Haes 
& Van Grembergen, 2015) or Head of ICT department (Zhang & Chulkov, 2012), as 
well as other executives like ICT Project Committee, ICT Security Committee, and 
Architecture Steering Committee (De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2015), who are 
responsible in offering administrative and technical support to facilitate the functions 
of ICT governance committee at the board level (Zhang & Chulkov, 2012). 
Moreover, as technology disruption pushes board members to govern their businesses 
in a more strategic direction, the CIO is viewed as an absolutely key contributor in 
guiding them towards the shift in their ICT conduct. Besides, the CIO focuses on 
system and network availability to both enhance and support business objective. 
However, with the current cyber threats in the present business environment, ITGI 
(2006) emphasized on the need of Chief Security Officer (CSO) to strengthen their 
ICT governance focus on security of data, information, and privacy within a company. 
Moreover, past studies highlighted that the involvement of senior management in ICT 
governance issues has contributed immensely to organizational effectiveness (Jamba 
et al., 2013; Ali et al., 2009; Ali & Green, 2005). Consistent with the agency theory, 
this study predicts that the presence of ICT senior managers in guiding the ICT 
governance committee at the board level should bring about a positive effect on firm 
performance (Kaur et al., 2012; Boritz & Lim, 2008; Boritz & Lim, 2007), particularly 
those in the Malaysian technology-based sector. The following hypothesis is 
developed to explain the positive prediction of this part of the study.   
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H3b: The presence of ICT senior manager has a positive effect on firm 
performance in the Malaysian technology-based sector. 
4.3.2.2 Boards with Diverse ICT Expertise 
4.3.2.2.1 Boards with ICT Educational Background 
Sole reliance on management expertise in managing ICT-related matters can also 
potentially lead the managers to act in their personal benefits due to lack of board 
expertise in ICT. Besides, the agency theory has clearly defined the nature of agency 
problem in the relationship between managers and boards, especially in ICT decision-
making if dependency exists just on one hand to manage all ICT matters. This 
phenomenon offers an undesirable impact on firm performance. Hence, it is essential 
to have board members with diverse educational background, especially in ICT 
knowledge, to avoid poor ICT governance practices that can lead to poor business 
performance. 
To date, the role of the board of directors in overseeing company‘s ICT activities has 
become more complex as they have to always cope with fast advancing ICT 
development, together with a complicated subject matter and highly technical 
language used to describe the emerging technologies and the evolving risks in ICT 
environment (Cloyd, 2013). For instance, Cloyd (2013) conducted a survey among 
over 860 public company directors and discovered that many board members faced 
difficulties in comprehending ICT-related risks and opportunities due to limited 
knowledge and skills on the subject matter that hindered them to perform better in 
their ICT oversight role. Besides, Proust et al., (2014) asserted that ICT knowledge 
153 
 
and skills are important determinants for boards to monitor effectiveness as they have 
better understanding on how ICT is managed. If the board is insufficiently competent 
in handling ICT, these factors would continuously lead to failure in company 
performance. In another instance, the positive effect of boards with diverse 
educational backgrounds on firm performance has been proven by many (Francis et 
al., 2014; Gîrbină et al., 2012; Anderson et al., 2011; Darmadi, 2011; Cheng et al., 
2010). Nevertheless, in the context of R&D investment, past studies have shown that 
education levels acquired by boards have contributed to R&D innovation and 
improvement (Barroso et al., 2011; Dalziel et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2011; Talke et al., 
2010; Wincent et al., 2010; Escribá-Esteve et al., 2009), thus suggesting them to 
invest more in R&D (Chen, 2012). Based on the agency theory and RDT, this study 
believes that boards with ICT educational background have adequate competencies to 
ensure if the firm‘s ICT strategy is properly aligned with the firm‘s overall strategic 
plan, so that any ICT-related matters could be implemented in a more effective 
manner, hence leading the firm towards better performance. Thus, the following 
hypothesis is developed: 
H4: Boards with ICT educational background have positive effects on firm 
performance in the Malaysian technology-based sector. 
4.3.2.2.2 Boards with ICT Professional Qualification 
Similar to education background, board of directors with professional qualifications is 
essential for the growth of a firm because these dynamic and professional board 
members are recognized as individual experts with all-around skills, knowledge, and 
understanding in directing and leading companies to best practices, mainly to improve 
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firm performance. Meanwhile, in the context of ICT, as professional qualifications in 
other fields, such as accounting, legal, architectural, and engineering; ICT professional 
qualifications have also been established to develop the ICT professional skills among 
individuals. While the opponents of ICT professional certification have claimed a 
waning interest in certification due to dumping of ICT professional credentials on the 
present market; the continuously emerging new technologies have exhibited a constant 
need for competent individuals who can cope with technological changes (Katz, 
2015).  
Moreover, along with the rapid progress of various types of technology, the 
emergence of various ICT institutions that offer a wide range of professional ICT 
certifications are of no exception. In addition to the initiatives taken by ICTC13, the 
existence of other ICT international institutions, such as the International Information 
Systems Security Certification Consortium (ISC) and the ISACA14, also play an 
important role in offering a warrant of competence to one as a certified professional in 
the field of ICT. For instance, the ISC offers Certified Information Systems Security 
Professional (CISSP), while the ISACA offers five ICT professional certifications; 
Certification of Information Systems Auditor (CISA), Certification of Information 
Security Manager (CISM), Certification of Governance of Enterprise IT (CGEIT), 
Certification of Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT) 
5, as well as Certification of Risk and Information Systems Control (CRISC). 
On top of that, as technologies continue to evolve, the boards face greater ICT 
challenges as they have oversight duties and responsibilities to deal with numerous 
critical issues related to ICT. To achieve the goal of ICT implementation, ICT 
                                            
13 ICTC refers to Information and Communications Technology Council. 
14 ISACA refers to Information Systems Audit and Control Association. 
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governance demands full commitment at the very top. With that, a few studies have 
reported the positive effect of boards with professional qualifications on firm 
performance (Padgett, 2014; Yasser et al., 2014; Letting et al., 2012; Bennedsen et al., 
2007). Despite of these limitations, the theory of agency and RDT add that having 
qualified ICT boards among board members is indeed vital as they hold a professional 
designation of ICT. Their ICT professional qualification clearly portrays their high 
level of ICT competence and should improve their company‘s strategic planning, as 
well as ICT oversight that can bring a positive effect on firm performance. This leads 
to the development of the following hypothesis: 
H5: Boards with ICT professional qualifications have positive effect on firm 
performance in the Malaysian technology-based sector. 
4.3.2.2.3 Boards with ICT Industrial Experiences 
Having a board made up of the right people with extensive experience in ICT is 
critical in this present competitive business environment. In fact, highly effective 
boards include a mix of directors with ICT experiences to fulfil their essential 
oversight roles, which is crucial in ICT corporate governance. Moreover, although 
issues pertaining to the lack of boards‘ experience in ICT are an old issue highlighted 
in prior studies as a contributor to the failure in the technology age (Broadbent, 2003); 
this issue has remained relevant since the failure of ICT implementation has escalated. 
In fact, a study conducted by the Accenture Global Research (2015) found that only 6 
per cent of board of directors and 3 per cent of CEOs at the world‘s leading banks 
possessed professional technology experience.  
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In addition, the results also revealed that more than two-fifth (43 per cent) of the 
banks had no boards, while nearly one-third (30 per cent) had only one board member 
with technology experiences. After the 2008 financial crisis, the main focus of many 
shareholders has shifted from board independence to the significant need of boards 
with industrial experiences (Drobetz et al., 2014). This phenomenon has sparked 
awareness for the need of boards with industrial experiences within organizations in 
these recent times (Lowe, 2015; Drobetz et al., 2014; Deloitte, 2014; Bertsch, 2011; 
Pozen, 2010). Thus, the board of directors must give serious attention to the need of 
skilled and experienced boards in ICT to properly govern the ICT within companies, 
especially to achieve their best business outcomes. Furthermore, these board members 
with ICT industrial experiences are capable to increase their monitoring and oversight 
role in the ICT governance to alleviate the potential agency problems, thus enhancing 
the corporate governance practices and leading to better firm performance. 
Besides, prior studies have proven that companies backed by experienced board 
members had been well-managed to improve their performances (Von Meyerinck et 
al., 2015; Dass et al., 2014; Drobetz et al., 2014). Based on previous studies, one can 
conclude that the contribution of boards with industrial experiences has significantly 
improved firm performance, which is in accordance to the RDT and agency theory. 
Besides, the criterion of boards with ICT industry experiences has the potential to lead 
a firm towards better performance through their prior experience at the firm, where 
they sit on the board or due to prior experience in the industry (at other firms in the 
focal industry). Thus, this study believes that boards with ICT industrial experiences 




H6: Boards with ICT industrial experiences have positive effects on firm 
performance in the Malaysian technology-based sector. 
4.3.2.2.4 Boards with ICT-Related Trainings 
Employee training is a human capital investment incurred by businesses to develop 
employees‘ skills so as to improve business operations. As such, the agency theory 
depicts that the principal (employer) monitors the performance of agents (boards) and 
uses incentives to strengthen the boards‘ development skills aimed at achieving the 
goals outlined in spite of employees‘ self-interest (Levinthal, 1988). With that, the 
continuous ICT training programs provided by the companies would be able to 
improve the knowledge and skills of the board in executing ICT governance 
responsibilities. Besides, shareholders do often look at the development of technology 
as an opportunity to maximize return from the investment for the long term growth of 
the company. Hence, boards play an important role to ascertain that the technology 
investment can generate better returns to fulfil the desires of shareholders. Therefore, 
in order to keep the companies on the right track with technology competition, boards 
should always be aware of the changes in technological development. Meanwhile, for 
the purpose of achieving this business goal, board training is indeed a complementary 
to keep the boards updated with recent technologies.  
Furthermore, from the perspective of RDT, ICT-related training may provide a source 
of competence that is needed by the board of directors in a firm. Board of directors, 
thus, should be adequately trained in the ICT field for lack of proper ICT training can 
bring about poor business operations. Hence, appropriate ICT training for the board 
could improve firm performance due to the ability of the board members in coping 
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with the rapid changes in ICT development, as well as their superior competencies in 
managing ICT-related risks. Furthermore, although some board members might 
already have extensive skills, knowledge, and experience in their particular area of 
expertise (e.g. legal, financial, management, etc.), several questions arise, ‗Why is it 
important to undertake ICT training at the governance level?‘, and ‗Is the company 
unable to rely on at least one or two of the board members who are qualified in the 
ICT field to achieve the objectives of ICT implementation?‘ 
In addition, Yardley (2014) emphasized that gaining new or enhanced learning about 
ICT is a must for every board member regardless of their credentials, intelligence, and 
area of expertise. These T&D programs allow all board members to govern ICT in a 
more effective manner without placing full responsibility on a single individual who is 
expert in ICT to avoid the consequences of agency problem. To date, studies on the 
effect of boards with ICT-related training on firm performance have yet to be 
conducted. However, some studies can be used to support this argument. For instance, 
Mohd Noor and Apadore (2014) revealed positively weak correlation between ICT-
related training and ICT investment within the Malaysian context. Furthermore, prior 
studies have proven that trainings provided to employees could lead to better firm 
performance (Vlachos, 2009; Bauernschuster et al., 2008; Zulkifli & Duasa, 2008; 
Forth & Mason, 2004). Although the listed studies on the relationship between 
training and firm performance is not focused on the board of directors; these studies 
have demonstrated a positive effect on firm performance, regardless of employees‘ 
level. Moreover, since training is an important medium for human capital 
development (Muzaffar, 2014; Ameeq & Hanif, 2013; Amin et al., 2013; Iqbal et al., 
2013; Jagero et al., 2012; Singh & Mohanty, 2012; Sultana et al., 2012; Khan et al., 
2011; Appiah, 2010; Tharenou et al., 2007), in conjunction with the two theories 
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applied, this study predicts that board participation in ICT-related training can produce 
a positive effect on firm performance. Thus, the following hypothesis is developed: 
H7: Boards with ICT-related training have positive effects on firm performance 
in the Malaysian technology-based sector. 
4.3.2.3 Ownership Structures 
4.3.2.3.1 Concentrated Ownership  
The literature suggests that firms with wide ownership diffusion have the tendency to 
underperform (Berle & Means, 1932) due to agency conflicts that arise from the 
divergence of interests between various agents. When a firm is dominated by large 
shareholders, the probability of expropriation among minority shareholders is high. 
The conflicts of interest between those large and minority occur when the large 
shareholders pursue their personal goals, instead of maximizing profit, or if they 
reduce managerial incentives (La Porta et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1999; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997; Demsetz, 1983). This situation leads to the conclusion that the 
domination of large shareholders within a firm may lower the value of the firm, 
instead of improving their monitoring and supervision control. Moreover, past studies 
have shown that the presence of ownership concentration has led to deterioration in 
firm performance (Lee & Lee, 2014; Mule et al., 2013; Fauzi & Locke, 2012; Wahla 
et al., 2012; Tam & Tan, 2007; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985).  
While the proponents of ownership concentration argued that this ownership could 
lead to good corporate governance practices via better monitoring control (Ganguli & 
Agrawal, 2009; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986), besides reducing the potential agency 
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conflicts that may arise in the relationship between controlling and minority 
ownership within a firm (Alimehmeti & Paletta, 2012; Garcı´a-Meca & Sa´nchez-
Ballesta, 2011; Sulong & Mat Nor, 2008; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). This best practice 
is also able to enhance shareholders‘ value (Sulong & Mat Nor, 2010; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986), thus leading to better firm performance (Alimehmeti & Paletta, 2012; 
Sulong & Mat Nor, 2010). In addition, several researchers revealed that the 
contribution of block holder owners in ownership concentration increases the 
effectiveness of management role to work for the best interest of the shareholder, 
which also reduces the occurrence of agency conflict between the majority and 
minority shareholders (Basyith et al., 2015; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). 
Meanwhile, the RDT depicts that concentrated ownership by large shareholders is also 
important for company technology development due to strong incentives and capacity 
to monitor management, which offer strong support for firms to focus on 
technological investment, hence leading to better performance (Choi et al., 2012). 
Meanwhile, from the technology perspective, Choi et al., (2012) asserted that large 
shareholders are also known as focus group and will not simply sell their substantial 
holdings as they seriously consider the long term prospect of technological 
investment. Thus, based on RDT and agency theory, this study predicts that ownership 
concentration can positively affect the performance of firms in the Malaysian 
technology-based sector. The hypothesis developed is as follows: 
H8: Concentrated ownership has a positive effect on firm performance in the 
Malaysian technology-based sector. 
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4.3.2.3.2 Managerial Ownership 
Apart from the ownership concentration, managerial ownership has also been 
identified as a common practice among public listed companies in Malaysia (Zakaria 
et al., 2014; Sulong & Mat Nor, 2008). According to Sulong and Mat Nor (2008), 
studies on the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance have 
been extensively observed since Demsetz and Lehn (1985) found insignificant result 
between managerial ownership and firm‘s return on equity. Meanwhile, according to 
the agency theory, managerial ownership can mitigate issues related to managerial 
myopia in public companies through management incentive alignment so as to induce 
managers to act in the best interest of the owners (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In 
precise, the theory predicts that firms with high managerial ownership levels exhibit 
high performance due to incentive effect (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
In contrast to the assertion made by Jensen and Meckling regarding managerial 
ownership, Morck et al., (1988) claimed that the higher the ownership of internal 
directors, the higher the tendency for occurrence of moral hazard and information 
asymmetry problem between internal and external directors. This is in line with the 
theory of managerial entrenchment, where managers seem to have more power to use 
the firm to benefit their personal wealth, instead of the interest of external 
shareholders. This makes it difficult for external shareholders to adequately monitor 
their management that appears to be less transparent, hence could lead to the potential 
occurrence of principal-agent problem and moral hazard.  
Furthermore, recent studies on the implications of managerial ownership upon firm 
performance have resulted in negative findings (Basyith et al., 2015; Wahla et al., 
2012; Sulong & Mat Nor, 2010; Sulong & Mat Nor, 2008; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006).  
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Increase in managerial ownership led those internal to act based on self-interest 
(Wahla et al., 2012) due to lack of monitoring and transparency of firms (Nath et al., 
2015), hence lower firm performance. Although these studies produced contradictory 
results, others consistent with prior arguments depicted that having ownership of the 
firm via given incentives may encourage internal directors to perform their work in 
line with the interest of other owners (Morck et al., 1988; Fama & Jensen, 1983) and 
reduce agency costs, thus increment in firm performance. The results of these findings 
confirm past findings that higher managerial motivates those insiders to double their 
efforts (Uwuigbe & Olusanmi, 2012) and to reduce the tendency of agency conflicts 
(Fauzi & Locke, 2012; Din & Javid, 2011), hence increment in firm performance 
(Fauzi & Locke, 2012; Uwuigbe & Olusanmi, 2012). This study also believes that the 
interest of both owners and those insiders is aligned with various incentive systems 
given to those insiders. Furthermore, Sulong and Mat Nor (2008) argued that with 
shared interest between both parties, opportunistic behaviour by the large owners or 
insiders can be reduced efficiently. Back to Jensen and Meckling‘s argument, high 
managerial incentives may induce higher managerial effort to maximize the value of 
firm, thus improving firm performance. Thus, the next hypothesis developed is: 
H9: Managerial ownership (insider) has a positive effect on firm performance in 
the Malaysian technology-based sector. 
4.3.2.3.3 Government Ownership  
Issues related to government ownership are frequently controversial, besides reflecting 
conflicting interests and values. Besides, endless discussions have highlighted the 
significant contribution of government ownership as a helping hand in offering 
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financial support in the form of capital subsidies, which is useful for firms to increase 
their performance (Phung & Hoang, 2013). On the other hand, it has been argued that 
government‘s shareholding in companies is a means used by the government to grab 
profits earned by firms to the benefit of politicians and bureaucrats, instead of 
commercial motivations (Phung & Hoang, 2013). Additionally, the opponents of 
government ownership asserted that the purpose of government ownership is political 
motivation, instead of maximizing profits for firm (Najid & Rahman, 2011). This 
resulted in the reduction of firms‘ incentives to exercise proper governance practices, 
consequently leading to poor firm performance. 
Moreover, the Malaysian government has also been acknowledged as a large 
shareholder in the Malaysian public listed companies (Sulong & Mat Nor, 2008). The 
high capitalization of government-controlled institutions‘ shareholdings in the Bursa 
Malaysia stock market indicated that any price movement in these shares would 
significantly affect the index movement. This positive contribution of government 
ownership contributes to positive signals to the growth of the firm‘s profits. In fact, 
Zakaria et al., (2014) have confirmed the positive results for the correlation between 
government ownership and firm performance within the Malaysian context.  
Meanwhile, based on RDT, Choi et al., (2012) asserted that dependency of a company 
on government ownership as a resource-rich external could enhance the stability of a 
firm in controlling its scarce technological and financial resources. Furthermore, the 
internalization effort of valuable resources and company networks provided by the 
government would reduce the external contingencies of a firm (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). Besides, this ownership also opens up more chances for companies to engage 
in national R&D projects, besides giving advantages to both parties the benefits of the 
investments made (Choi et al., 2012). Moreover, based on the RDT and agency 
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theory, this study believes that firm performance within the Malaysian technology-
based sector can be positively improved by the share of government ownership as the 
government has adequate resources and the ability to monitor decisions made by the 
company. Hence, the next hypothesis is as given below: 
H10: Government ownership has a positive effect on firm performance in the 
Malaysian technology-based sector. 
4.3.2.3.4 Foreign Ownership  
From the perspective of agency theory, since foreign ownership holds large 
shareholding, the monitoring role could be performed in a more effective manner over 
domestic companies under such ownership. In precise, foreign-owned company acts 
as a parent company (principal), besides holding large shareholding and dominance 
over the company, as well as its subsidiaries (agents). Thus, agency conflicts occur 
when conflicting interests spark in the relationship between the parent and the 
subsidiary companies. The subsidiary tends to pursue its own interests, instead of the 
interest of parent company, thus creating a potential agency problem between both 
parties. Besides, Chang and Taylor (1999) have reported that the severity of agency 
problem to occur between the parent and subsidiary companies demands monitoring 
control and supervision role from the parent company.   
Meanwhile, the RDT depicts that the resources that belong to the parent company are 
important outsourcing mechanism that aids financing to its subsidiaries (Choi et al., 
2012; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1979; Pfeffer, 1972) when the financial performance is poor. 
Although the opponents of this theory view that the resources provided by the parent 
company are inefficient (Rajan, Servaes, & Zingales, 2000; Scharfstein & Stein, 2000) 
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and as a means used by the parent to exploit the subsidiary capabilities (Mastsusaka, 
2001), Mudambi and Pedersen (2007) argued that the empire of the parent company‘s 
expansion on its subsidiaries abroad is primarily for the purpose of adapting the 
products developed in their home countries to conform to local tastes and customer 
needs, as well as the adaptation of processes to local resource availabilities and 
production conditions. Such situation generates dependency by subsidiaries on the 
expertise of their parent company. Moreover, several studies have proven that the 
integration between subsidiaries and the parent generates a positive impact, where 
some business operations performed by the subsidiaries displayed positive 
improvement through increment in technology innovativeness as an important tool for 
their growth strategy to enter into new markets, to increase its existing market share, 
and to provide the firm with competitive advantage in innovation of the country they 
are located (Pearce, 1999; Zander, 1999).  
Moreover, past studies have exhibited a positive relationship between foreign 
ownership and firm performance (Musallam, 2015b; Zakaria et al., 2014; Phung & 
Hoang, 2013; Choi et al., 2012; Uwuigbe & Olusanmi, 2012; Mohd Ghazali, 2010; 
Sulong & Mat Nor, 2010). Meanwhile, from the context of technology, foreign 
ownership is seen as crucial in funding companies with strong resources, inclusive of 
financial support, technology expertise, and technical collaboration that can encourage 
domestic companies to invest more in technology development (Choi et al., 2012; 
Uwuigbe & Olusanmi, 2012). Hence, this study predicts that foreign ownership, by 
virtue of its resources and capabilities, would be able to bring a positive effect on the 




H11: Foreign ownership has a positive effect on firm performance in the 
Malaysian technology-based sector. 
4.4 Sample and Data Collection 
In this study, the secondary source had been employed to gather data for both 
dependent and independent variables. Data were collected from annual reports 
obtained from the website of Malaysia Exchange (Bursa Malaysia), in adhering prior 
studies (Makinde, 2014; Ugwuanyi & Ugwuanyi, 2013; Hung et al., 2012; Zhang et 
al., 2012; Ekata, 2011; Jun, 2008; Beccalli, 2007; Yaylacicegi & Menon, 2004). 
Besides, using quantitative approach, this study used the balanced panel data that 
covered a five-year period (2010 to 2014). All data were retrieved from the financial 
year end annual reports published by the sample. Moreover, information pertaining to 
ICT governance standards or frameworks, boards with diverse ICT expertise, and 
ownership structures was manually collected by examining the disclosures presented 
in annual reports available on the Malaysia Exchange website.  
Additionally, this study had weighed in some factors regarding the selected period of 
ICT data. The International Accounting Standards (IAS) 38 Intangible Assets was 
issued in 1998 by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). However, its 
implementation is not practised in Malaysia (Jaafar & Halim, 2013). The selected 
periods has also taken into consideration the post period of International Financial 
Reporting Standard (IFRS) implemented in Malaysia on or after 1st January 2006. The 
IFRS requires reporting entities in Malaysia to prepare their financial reports in 
accordance with the adopted new and improved Financial Reporting Standards. 
Furthermore, according to Jaafar and Halim (2013), no specific standard is available, 
primarily for intangible assets within the pre-IFRS period. 
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Meanwhile, the post-IFRS period incorporates both intangible and tangible assets, 
particularly those related to ICT to be treated under FRS 116 Property, Plant, and 
Equipment (PPE) or as an intangible asset under the FRS 138 Intangible Assets, which 
refers to an entity that uses judgement to assess the element that is more significant 
(MASB, 2011)15. Upon effective implementation of IFRS in Malaysia, some 
companies have begun to improve their financial reporting disclosure by voluntarily 
disclosing their ICT disclosure16.  
Besides, apart from the initiatives of the Malaysian government to spur ICT 
development in the 10th Malaysia ICT Plan, which is a continuation from the 9th 
Malaysia Plan through the incentives of Accelerated Capital Allowance (ACA)17 
given to companies that incur expenditures in acquiring ICT facilities, the selected 
periods also included the mandatory compliance of ISO/IEC 27001 of Information 
Security Management System imposed by the Malaysian government in 2010 across 
all critical sectors, including the Government, as well as financial and ICT sectors. 
                                            
15 The Malaysian Accounting Standard Board (2011) classifies intangible ICT assets based on, for 
example, computer software for a computer controlled machine tool that cannot operate without that 
specific software, which turns to be an integral part of the related hardware and it is treated as property, 
plant, and equipment. The same applies to the operating system of a computer. When the software is 
not an integral part of the related hardware, the computer software is treated as an intangible asset. 
 
16 An additional review has been conducted on 74 companies in the Malaysian technology-based sector 
over the periods 2006 to 2009, to see the trend of ICT financial disclosures (especially in the classes of 
Property, Plant and Pquipment as well as Intangible Assets) after the commencement date of IFRS. The 
sample of 74 companies refers to the total companies in the Malaysian technology-based sector with 
complete annual reports from the financial year end 2010 to 2014 as presented in Table 4.1. Out of 74 
companies, 37 companies have been recognized as appropriate sample for this study while another 37 
companies have been rejected due to lack of ICT financial disclosures in their financial reports 
especially in the items of property, plant and equipment as well as in the treatment of intangible assets. 
The company‘s financial report is considered inappropriate and will be rejected from this study if : (1) 
it is either the company that made the ICT investment (ICTI) activities, but the amount related to ICTI 
was not recorded in the annual report, or; (2) the company did the ICTI activities, but the amount 
related to ICTI was not properly recorded in the annual report (e.g. table of Property, Plant, and 
Equipment (PPE) and Intangible Assets did not specifically separate the amounts between ICT and 
other assets, such as office equipment). 
 
17 The Accelerated Capital Allowance (ACA) provides an initial 20% and an annual 40% allowance 
which is effective for the Year of Assessment (YA) 2009 until the exemption period of YA 2016 
(Malaysian Investment Development Authority, 2015). 
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Moreover, by considering that most companies are still within the transitional period 
of improving their financial reporting (Jaafar & Halim, 2013) and ICT disclosure, ICT 
data retrieved from the financial year end from 2010 to 2014 had been looked into. 
Table 4.1 Data Sample of the Malaysian Technology-Based Sector from 2010 to 2014 







The MPLCs with complete annual reports 
from the financial year end 2010 to 2014 700 77 777 3,885 
Companies in the Malaysian technology 
sector from the financial year end 2010 to 
2014 
35 68 103 515 
Companies in the Malaysian technology 
sector with incomplete annual reports 
from the financial year end 2010 to 2014 
8 21 29 145 
Companies in the Malaysian technology 
sector with complete annual reports from 
the financial year end 2010 to 2014  
27 47 74 370 
Companies with improper ICT records  
from the financial year end 2010 to 2013  13 24  37 185 
Companies with proper ICT records  
from the financial year end 2010 to 2014 14 23 37 185 
Total companies discarded (outliers) 1 3 4 20 
Final sample of the Malaysian technology-
based sector  13 20 33 165 
Note: MPLC refers to the Malaysian Public Listed Companies and total observations refer to the 
number of companies multiplied with 5 periods of annual reports). 
 
Table 4.1 presents the data sample of the Malaysian technology-based sector from the 
financial year end of 2010 to 2014 derived from the initial sample population of the 
Malaysian Public Listed Companies (MPLCs) in the Bursa Malaysia. The main 
industries listed on the Bursa Malaysia are close-ends funds, construction, consumer 
products, finance, hotels, industrial products, exchange traded funds, infrastructure 
project companies, mining, plantation, properties, real estate investment trust, special 
purpose acquisition companies, technology, and trading/services. The table also shows 
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that 777 companies with complete annual reports for 2010 until 2014 had been 
selected through the initial sample. Out of these, 700 companies were listed on the 
Main Market, while 77 companies in the ACE Market18. 
Meanwhile, according to Goatham (2009), the ICT sector has been identified as the 
largest contributor to the failure rates of ICT implementation. At present, no specific 
ICT sector is listed in the Bursa Malaysia website, which can be employed as sample 
in this study. Furthermore, due to absence of the ICT sector in the Bursa Malaysia; the 
Malaysian technology-based sector had been selected for further research. According 
to Thomsom Reuters Business Classification (TRBC), firms linked to the technology-
based sector are closely engaged with ICT components, such as those in 
manufacturing of electronics and semiconductors, communications equipment, 
software creation, computer hardware, and technology-related office equipment, as 
well as providers of consultation and ICT services (TRBC, 2015), including ICT 
usage (TRBC, 2015; Mohd Noor & Apadore, 2014; PIKOM, 2014; 2013; 2012; 
Paytas & Berglund, 2004), which can be attributed to the nature of the ICT sector.  
This study began by identifying companies listed under the Main Market and the ACE 
Market in Malaysian technology-based sector from 2010 to 2014, while excluding 
those from the non-technology sector. Besides, it has been reported that a total of 103 
companies in the technology sector had been available during that period. Out of 
these, 35 companies were listed in the Main Market, while the other 68, in the ACE 
Market. From the 103 companies, 74 were identified as companies with complete 
annual reports from 2010 to 2014 after excluding 29 companies that displayed 
                                            
18 The ACE Market, which stands for ‗Access, Certainty, and Efficiency‘, refers to the new name for 




incomplete annual reports. Next, from the total of 74 companies with 370 data 
observations, 37 companies with 185 observations in the technology sector were 
determined as companies with proper ICT records, while 36 companies with 180 
observations were rejected due to the lack of ICT disclosures19 for the period of 2010 
to 2014. As such, four cases20 were detected as outliers, while 20 observations were 
discarded from this study to generate balanced data21. Therefore, the final samples of 
33 companies with 165 observations were identified for analyses in this study. 
4.5 Measurement of Variables 
The following sections describe the methods applied to generate the variables used in 
the analyses. The methods used to construct the variables are described in Section 
4.5.1, whereas ICT investment, ICT governance mechanisms, boards with diverse ICT 
expertise, and ownership structures, as independent variables, are elaborated in 
Section 4.5.2, and Section 4.5.3 discusses the control variables. After that, the 
operationalization of all variables is included in the analyses, as presented in Table 
4.2. Other than that, justifications for the methods used are also provided. 
                                            
19 Several reasons for the lack of ICT disclosure refer to: (1) It is either the company that made the ICT 
investment (ICTI) activities, but the amount related to ICTI was not recorded in the annual report, or; 
(2) the company did the ICTI activities, but the amount related to ICTI was not properly recorded in the 
annual report (e.g. table of Property, Plant, and Equipment (PPE) and Intangible Assets did not 
specifically separate the amounts between ICT and other assets, such as office equipment). 
20 In this study, four cases refer to the four different companies that have been detected as outliers. 
21 Basically, a balanced panel is used in this study after taking into account the IFRS implementation on 
1st January 2006, the Malaysian government‘s initiatives in the 9th and 10th Malaysian Plan, and the 
mandatory compliance of ISO / IEC 27001 imposed by the Malaysian government on the Government, 
financial and ICT sector in 2010 which is dicussed in the sub-section 4.6. Besides that, the purpose of 
remaining a balanced panel dataset is to provide more reliable and stable dataset due to pooling 




4.5.1 Dependent Variable: Firm Financial Performance 
In general, performance measures used by most firms are intended to ascertain the 
attainment of their business objectives through effective operation vital for 
profitability and resilience. The one thing that matters more to firms is the changes 
that take place in their profitability (Al Ehrbar, 2011). In this study, financial 
performance measures had been applied to reflect changes that took place in the firm 
financial condition. The financial performance measures were used to capture the 
economic consequences of business firms upon the decisions made by the 
management of the sample. Basically, employees from all firms make decisions and 
use resources that would eventually influence the financial outcomes of the firm. 
Upon identifying the efficacy of firm, the financial outcomes are the common 
measures used to evaluate firm performance. 
Hence, for the purpose of this study, firm performance measures from the standpoint 
of those internals (management) and externals (investors), as proposed by prior study 
(Black, Love and Rachinsky, 2006), considered two types of financial performance 
measures, namely accounting-based and market-based measures. The accounting-
based measures capture data on ROA and ROE to demonstrate the view of the insiders 
(Marshall, McManus, & Viele, 2014), while the market-based measure employed 
Tobin‘s Q to represent the views of externals concerning the effects of ICT and 
corporate governance mechanisms. Besides, the adoption of these two financial 
performance measures, after considering the views given by empirical researchers, 
accounting-based measures are relevant for past/short term financial performance, 
while market-based measures are meant for future/long-term financial performance 
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(Zhang et al., 2012; Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007; Ittner et al., 2003; Hoskisson et 
al., 1994; Kaplan, 1984). 
Accounting-based measures have been widely used in prior studies to evaluate the 
profitability of firms and generally, represent financial ratios per percentage for past 
financial performance (Gral, 2013). Basically, the profitability ratios like ROA and 
ROE were used to evaluate the ability of firms to generate operational profits from the 
assets invested (Marshall et al., 2014). These two dependent variables are present in 
almost all firm performance analysis. With that, ROA was selected for this study due 
to its ability to provide a better view of the fundamentals of the business, including 
asset utilization. In fact, Milano and Cavasino (2014) suggested that the increasing 
focus on ROA measure has led to higher total shareholder returns, which drives to 
better share-price performance. They also claimed that ROA measures, instead of the 
other measures, such as profits and profit margins; are able to demonstrate firm‘s 
ability to generate greater value for the firm, as well as to its shareholders.  
ROA is measured through earnings before interest expenses and taxes (EBITs), 
divided by the firm‘s average total assets by following the measurement proposed by 
Marshall et al., (2014). The researchers asserted that using total assets is unsuitable 
because it reports on the total at one point in time derived from a single year-end 
balance sheet. Besides, profit is earned during the entire financial year, thus it should 
be related to the average assets for the entire year by averaging the assets reported at 
the beginning and at the end of the year. The researchers also expressed that using the 
profit for the period per se as the amount of return is also unsuitable because the total 
assets could have been financed by a variety of sources; some tax-deductible, while 
others are not. Moreover, ROA has been extensively used to represent firm‘s 
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profitability in past studies of ICT, as well as its effect on firm performance (Arabyat, 
2014; Makinde, 2014; Ugwuanyi & Ugwuanyi, 2013; Hung et al., 2012; Ekata, 2011; 
Liang et al., 2010; Zehir et al., 2010; Jun, 2008; Beccalli, 2007; Shin, 2006; Lim et al., 
2004; Anderson et al., 2003; Weill, 1992). Moreover, the only common rule is that 
higher ROA values indicate the efficiency of a firm in utilizing its assets to serve in 
the interest of the shareholders (Ibrahim & Abdul Samad, 2011), thus giving the firm 
more leeway to reward shareholders in term of profits derived from the invested assets 
(Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). On the other hand, lower ROA values refer to the 
inefficient use of firm‘s assets due to ineffective management and governance 
mechanisms in place. 
Apart from using ROA, this study also focused on Return on Equity (ROE), which 
refers to Earnings after interest expenses and taxes (EAITs) (also refers to profit for 
the year), divided by the average of shareholders‘ equity, as depicted in the 
measurement model proposed by Marshall et al., (2014). Nonetheless, the ROE and 
ROA are not related to each other as one measures after-tax calculation, while the 
other, before-tax calculation. However, Marshall et al., (2014) asserted that the trend 
of each measurement can be compared. The ROE reflects the ability of the 
management to utilize shareholder‘s equity whether to improve the return earning or 
to retain the firm in a good position. Moreover, the ROE functions as a vital reference 
for the present shareholders and prospective investors as it relates to the earnings to 
owners‘ investment, which refers to owners‘ equity in the assets of the entity. Like 
ROA, the higher the value of ROE, the more effective the governance mechanisms 
and management at employing shareholders‘ capital to generate profit. On the other 
hand, the lower the ROE, the less effective the governance mechanisms, thus could 
lead to inefficient management, hence failure in generating profit for shareholders. 
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Therefore, the better the management of shareholder‘s equity, the more profitable the 
firms will generate in term of ROE, which could lead the firm to perform better. The 
ROE has also been used as a standard measure of profitability in other ICT investment 
studies that reflect the past performance of firm (Arabyat, 2014; Makinde, 2014; Hung 
et al., 2012; Ekata, 2011; Jun, 2008; Beccalli, 2007; Shin, 2006; Lim et al., 2004), as 
well as the effect of corporate governance studies on firm performance (Haider et al., 
2015; Johl et al., 2015; Yusoff et al., 2015; Wahba, 2015; Aggarwal, 2013a; 
Aggarwal, 2013b; Wan Yusoff & Alhaji, 2012; Ibrahim & Abdul Samad, 2011; Sami 
et al., 2011). The reliance on accounting-based measure, in addition, has been 
criticized on the grounds that the accounting earnings alone were inadequate to reflect 
market value (Lubatkin & Shrieves, 1986). Besides, in measuring firm performance, 
market-based measure has been accepted as one of the best proxies of financial 
performance measurement, especially in the context of ICT investment. Furthermore, 
since the initial investment costs of ICT incurred are huge and its implementation is 
rather time-consuming, the return value of ICT is only noted after a few years from 
the moment ICT investment is made (Zhang et al., 2012; Yaylacicegi & Menon, 2004; 
Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 2003; Dedrick et al., 2003; Brynjolfsson, 1993). Moreover, 
market measurement can better explain the effect of long-term investment on firm 
performance (Zhang et al., 2012; Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007; Ittner et al., 2003; 
Hoskisson et al., 1994; Kaplan, 1984). 
On top of that, Tobin‘s Q (TQ) refers to a market measure of firm performance for its 
ability to reflect the effect of ICT on firm performance (Zhang et al., 2012; Lin, 2007, 
Shin, 2006). As such, Shin (2006) argued that the TQ has the ability to explain further 
the effect of ICT on firm performance in terms of its intangible value, such as 
improved market orientation, higher product quality, better customer service, as well 
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as support for re-engineering efforts. Since accounting-based measures have the 
tendency to ignore ICT effect on intangible value, the TQ is deemed appropriate to 
measure the effect of ICT investment on firm performance (Lin, 2007). However, in 
another study, the TQ reflected firm performance in terms of both tangible and 
intangible benefits (Zhang et al., 2012). Even though various types of TQ 
measurements have been proposed; the results obtained from various approaches do 
not differ much (Zhang et al., 2012; Chung & Pruitt, 1994). Hence, the measurement 
of this study is in agreement with Zhang et al., (2012) and Lin‘s (2007), which defined 
TQ as (MV + PS + DEBT)/TA, whereby MV refers to the market value of firm, PS is 
the liquidating value of preferred stock, TA denotes the total assets, and the DEBT 
value is derived from the following; (Current Liabilities – Current Assets) + 
Inventory+ Long-term Debt, as proposed by Zhang et al., (2012). 
Moreover, the inclusion of an inventory element in this measurement by considering 
that the proper ICT management is either in the form of tangible (e.g., hardware) or 
intangible (e.g., software) would be advantageous to companies. Besides, the use of 
ICT is not only to generate greater networking, but also to help companies to reduce 
their inventory costs (Zhang et al., 2012; Strassman, 1997), besides raising the 
company‘s productivity with higher product quality control and accurate data analysis 
of sales marketing, which suggest more flexibility and efficiency in terms of 
production and labour control processes. In precise, proper ICT management allows 
companies to move rapidly in response to economic change (Strassman, 1997). In 
addition, all financial data related to the measurements of ROA and ROE proposed by 
Marshall et al., (2014), as well as TQ (Zhang et al., 2012; Lin, 2007), had been 
gathered from annual reports published by firms within the Malaysian technology-
based sector during the period of 2010 to 2014. 
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4.5.2 Independent Variables 
4.5.2.1 ICT Spending 
This study examined the effect of ICT investment on the performance of companies in 
the Malaysian technology-based sector. Therefore, a measure of ICT had been 
definitely necessary. In selecting the ICT investment measurement, several 
measurements from the literature had been weighed in. This study only focused on 
ICT spending (Ugwuanyi & Ugwuanyi, 2013; Ekata, 2011; Liang et al., 2010; Lim et 
al., 2004; Anderson et al., 2003; Byrd & Marshall, 1997) as a proxy of ICT 
investment, while other ICT investment proxies used in past studies, such as ICT 
training costs and ICT staff expenditures, were dismissed due to shortcomings in data 
source. The measurement of ICT spending (ICTSPE) was constructed as ICTSPE, 
which is equivalent to the logarithm for the amount of Net Cash for IT Investing 
Activities (1ogNCITIA) (Mohd Noor & Apadore, 2014). The data of logNCITIA was 
derived from the details provided at the Notes to the Financial Statements in the 
annual reports. Besides, the NCITIA consists of investments in tangible ICT assets 
(e.g. hardware) (Mohd Noor & Apadore, 2014; Safari & Zhen Yu, 2014; Spyros & 
Euripidis, 2014; Romdhane, 2013; Ekata, 2011; Beccalli, 2007) and ICT intangible 
assets (e.g., software and R&D costs) (Mohd Noor & Apadore, 2014; Safari & Zhen 
Yu, 2014; Spyros & Euripidis, 2014; Romdhane, 2013; Ekata, 2011; Beccalli, 2007).  
Based on the preceding discussion, the element of time-lagged effect of ICT spending 
is also seen as an important aspect in determining firm performance, by considering 
that ICT investment does not have an immediate impact on firm performance. Hence, 
instead of measuring ICT spending incurred in year t, this study measured ICT 
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spending incurred in t-1, t-2, and t-3. ICT spending incurred in year t refers to 
ICTSPEt, ICTSPEt-1 refers to ICT spending incurred in year t-1, ICTSPEt-2 refers to 
ICT spending incurred in year t-2, and ICTSPEt-3 refers to ICT spending incurred in 
year t-3. Moreover, the literature suggests that ICT has been interpreted under the 
concept of intellectual capital (IC) (Kavida & Sivakoumar, 2011; Sundac & Krmpotic, 
2009; OECD, 2008; Davenport & Prusak, 1998; IFAC, 1998; Sveiby, 1997). While in 
Malaysia, no accounting standard is available to disclose IC in annual reports (Rahim, 
Atan, & Kamaluddin, 2011). Although ICT is part of IC, there is still no mandatory 
accounting standard that requires Malaysian companies to disclose their ICT 
investment activities in their financial reporting. Thus, the aspects of ICT spending 
data, such as tangible asset (e.g. ICT equipment) and intangible assets (e.g. ICT 
software) were derived from the table of plant, property, and equipment, as well as 
intangible assets, respectively22. 
4.5.2.2 The Adoption of ICT Governance Standards (Processes) 
ICT governance standards and frameworks, such as COBIT, ITIL, and other ISO 
standards for ICT, are categorized under IT governance processes, which are also 
referred to the formalization and institutionalization of strategic IT decision-making or 
IT monitoring procedures (De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2004; Van Grembergen et 
al., 2004; Peterson, 2003). In fact, these standards are designed to offer directions and 
ways of managing ICT within an organization with established engagement between 
governing bodies and their senior executives. The adoption of ICT governance 
standards and frameworks (ADICTG) in a company means the company practises ICT 
                                            




governance. Thus, in order to measure the adoption of ICT governance standards 
among Malaysian technology companies, this study employed the construct of IT 
governance processes, as carried out by Lazic et al., (2011b). 
The ADICTG, in addition, was analysed with the availability of ICT governance 
standards gathered from annual reports, including portfolio management, ICT 
governance frameworks (e.g. COBIT and ITIL), ICT governance standards (e.g. ISO 
standards for ICT), ICT budget management, as well as ICT budget control and 
reporting. To date, no mandatory compliance has been imposed for ICT disclosure in 
companies‘ financial reporting. However, voluntary ICT disclosure is mostly practised 
by companies due to mandatory compliance of their Information System Security 
Management (ISMS) to be certified by ISO/IEC 27001, which has been imposed by 
the Malaysian government in 2010 (KPMG, 2015; JPM, 2010). Therefore, the 
analysis process included any word that expressed the features of ICT standards (e.g. 
ISMS or ISO/IEC 27001) in the annual reports. Moreover, dummy variables were 
applied in this study. If ICT governance standards and frameworks are made available 
in the annual reports, they were coded as 1, while 0 for nil description. 
4.5.2.3 The Presence of ICT Governance Committee Structure 
Based on the construct variables used in past studies; questionnaire, web-survey, and 
interview had been the most used methods. However, this study employed dummy 
variables during the process of collecting data in relation to hypotheses 3(a) and 3(b). 
In answering hypothesis 3(a), the presence of ICT governance committee structure 
(ICTGCOM) was analysed by identifying words that described the features of 
ICTGCOM in companies‘ annual reports. The features of ICTGCOM were 
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determined based on the words that expressed the presence of either the ICT Strategy 
Committee (Ali et al., 2009; Boritz & Lim, 2008; Ali & Green, 2007; Ali & Green, 
2005) or the ICT Audit Committee. 
If ICTGCOM was identified from the annual reports, the variable of ICTGCOM was 
coded as 1, while 0 for absence of ICTGCOM. Meanwhile, as for hypothesis 3(b), the 
presence of ICT senior management (ICTSM) was specifically investigated based on 
the words that expressed the presence of ICT Steering Committee, which also referred 
to the management level that composed of either a Chief Information Officer (CIO), 
ICT Project Steering Committee (IPSC), ICT Security Committee (ICTSC) or 
Architecture Steering Committee (ASC), as proposed by De Haes and Van 
Grembergen (2015). As such, since this study employed dummy variable, coding 1 
was awarded for the presence of CIO, IPSC, ICTSC, and ASC, as stated in the 
company‘s annual report, whilst 0 for absence of the stated committees. After that, the 
outcome of ICTSM was tested to confirm the effect of their presence upon firm 
performance. 
4.5.2.4 Boards with ICT Education Background 
Taking example from prior studies that examined the effect of board‘s education 
background on firm performance, only Gîrbină et al., (2012) focused on examining 
the effect of boards‘ education background (financial area) on firm performance23. 
Thus, in coding data for boards with ICT education background (BICTEDU), this 
study adhered to the suggestion proposed by Gîrbină et al., (2012) by constructing the 
variable in the form of BICTEDU proportion, which was determined by dividing the 
                                            
23 Most previous studies have measured the boards‘ education background by using the indicator of 
boards‘ education level, which defeats the purpose of this study.  
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number of BICTEDU (dummy) with the total number of board members (BSIZE). 
The number of BICTEDU determined using dummy variable was awarded with 1 for 
those with ICT education background, whereas 0 for those who do not. Moreover, the 
BICTEDU was measured at all levels of their ICT education background, regardless 
of the level of degree and study duration.   
4.5.2.5 Boards with ICT Professional Qualification 
The variable of boards with ICT professional qualification (BICTPRO) in this study 
was measured as the total number of BICTPRO (dummy), divided by the total number 
of board members (BSIZE) in a company, adhering to the method suggested by Yunos 
(2011). Those with ICT professional qualifications were denoted as 1, while 0 for 
otherwise. Some instances of ICT professional qualifications, such as the Certified 
Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP), the Certification of Information 
Systems Auditor (CISA), the Certification of Information Security Manager (CISM), 
the Certification of Governance of Enterprise IT (CGEIT), the Certification of Control 
Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT) 5, as well as the 
Certification of Risk and Information Systems Control (CRISC), or others related to 
ICT designations that could be assessed from the annual reports in measuring 
BICTPRO.  
4.5.2.6 Boards with ICT Industrial Experiences 
The variable of boards with ICT industrial experience employed in this study is 
known as BICTIE. According to Drobetz et al., (2014), as experience at a similar firm, 
by definition, also constitutes industry experiences; prior experience at the firm where 
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the director sits on the board was distinguished from prior experience in the industry 
(i.e., at other firms in the focal industry). Hence, in measuring BICTIE, due to 
shortcoming of data, this study only considered prior ICT experience the boards 
gained from other firms in the focal industry (technology industry). Those with prior 
ICT experiences at other technology firms, regardless of their title and job 
designation, were denoted as 1, while 0 for otherwise. As such, the BICTIE was 
measured as the total number of BICTIE (dummy) and divided by the total number of 
board members in the company.  
4.5.2.7 Boards with ICT-Related Training 
The measurement of the effect of training on firm performance varies across many 
studies (Nguyen et al., 2010). In fact, many types of training measurements have been 
introduced in past studies, including ICT training expenditures, ICT budgets, 
establishment of training plan (Forth & Mason, 2004), and the number of employees 
involved in training investments (Patrignani & Conlon, 2012). For instance, Zulkifli 
and Duasa (2008) conducted a training measurement based on both qualitative and 
quantitative techniques. Various types of training proxy measurements were 
introduced in the quantitative techniques: (1) quantified days‘ training; (2) percentage 
of knowledge workers trained in the last 12 months; and (3) intensity of training, 
whilst qualitative techniques included: (1) training expenditures; (2) trainers‘ years of 
experience; and dummy variables used for training policy, informal training, induction 
training, as well as the adoption of multidimensional training evaluation measure.  
Meanwhile, according to the Securities Commission Malaysia (SC) (2007), through 
the revised MCCG in 2007, the Malaysian public listed companies are required, in 
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adhering to the Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia, to disclose details of 
relevant training attended by each board member in their annual reports. Therefore, 
this study included training programs, workshops, seminars, and conferences related 
to ICT attended by the board members as boards with ICT-related training (BICTTR). 
This BICTTR was treated as a dummy variable with 0 for nil BICTTR and 1 for the 
presence of BICTTR in each company. 
4.5.2.8 Ownership Structures 
In determining the effect of concentrated ownership (COWN), the COWN had been 
based on the proportion of shares owned by the five largest shareholders to the total 
shares outstanding in the company (Lee & Lee, 2014; Zakaria et al., 2014; Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2006). Meanwhile, the variable of managerial ownership (MOWN) was 
measured as the proportion of shares held by the executive directors of the company to 
the total number of shares outstanding, by following the prior construct (Zakaria et al., 
2014; Wahla et al., 2012; Kamardin & Haron, 2011; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). Next, 
other variable of government ownership (GOWN) was measured as the proportion of 
shares held by government-linked companies (GLCs) to the total shares outstanding of 
the firm (Kiruri, 2013), whilst foreign ownership (FOWN) was measured as the 
proportion of shares held by foreign shareholders to the total shares outstanding of the 











Table 4.2 The Operationalization of Variables 
Operational Variables 
Variables Acronym  Operationalization 
Return on Assets ROA Earnings before interest expenses and taxes (EBITs) 
divided by firm‘s average total assets 
Return on Equity ROE Earnings after interest expenses and taxes (EAITs) 
divided by the average of shareholders‘ equity 
Tobin‘s Q TQ (Market Value + Liquidating value of preferred stock + 
Debt) divided by Total Assets 
ICT spending  ICTSPE logNet Cash for IT Investing Activities (logNCITIA)  
The adoption of ICT 
governance standards and 
frameworks 
ADICTG 1 if there is ADICTG; 0 otherwise 
The presence of ICT 
governance committee 
structure  
ICTGCOM 1 if there is ICTGCOM; 0 for non-presence of 
ICTGCOM 
The presence of ICT senior 
management  
ICTSM 1 if there is CIO, IPSC, ICTSC and ASC; 0 for non-
presence of CIO, IPSC, ICTSC and ASC 
Boards with ICT educational 
background 
BICTEDU The number of BICTEDU (dummy) is divided by the 
total number of board members (BSIZE) 
Boards with ICT 
professional qualification 
BICTPRO The total number of BICTPRO (dummy) divided by 
the total number of board members (BSIZE) 
Boards with ICT industrial 
experience 
BICTIE The total number of BICTIE (dummy) divided by the 
total number of board members (BSIZE) 
Boards with ICT-related 
trainings 
BICTTR 1 if there is BICTTR; 0 for no BICTTR 
Concentrated ownership COWN The proportion of shares owned by the ten largest 
shareholders 
Managerial ownership MOWN The proportion of shares held by the executive 
directors 
Government ownership GOWN The proportion of shares held by government-linked 
companies (GLCs) 
Foreign ownership FOWN The proportion of shares held foreign shareholders 
Board Independence BINDP The percentage of the number of independent 
executive directors (INEDs) divided by BSIZE 
Board Size BSIZE Number of directors on the board 
Leverage LEV The ratio of total debt to total assets 
Firm Size  FSIZE Firm size is the logarithm of total assets 
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4.5.3 Control Variables 
The variable of board independence (BINDP) was measured as the percentage of the 
number of independent directors (NEDs) and divided by the total number of board 
members in a firm (Kamardin & Haron, 2011; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). The NEDs 
are to perform monitoring and have an oversight role on the management in protecting 
the interest of shareholders. As such, this study believes that the larger the proportion 
of NEDs on the board, the higher their monitoring level is in safeguarding the interest 
of shareholders, especially in making better decisions (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  
Other than that, board size (BSIZE) was measured as the number of directors on the 
board (Kamardin, 2014; Kamardin & Haron, 2011). Nonetheless, it has been argued 
that BSIZE had been positively related to firm performance (Haider et al., 2015; Al-
Matari et al., 2014; Qasim, 2014; Ibrahim & Abdul Samad, 2011; Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2006).. Hence, it is predicted that a larger BSIZE would positively affect firm 
performance (Said, Crowther, & Amran, 2014). Meanwhile, leverage (LEV) was 
measured by the ratio of the total debt to the total assets (Kamardin, 2014; Liu, Tian, 
& Wang, 2011; Boritz & Lim, 2008), whereas firm size (FSIZE) was based on the 
logarithm of total assets (Kamardin, 2014; Kamardin & Haron, 2011; Ho, Wu, & Xu, 
2011). 
4.6 Panel Data 
Panel data analysis was carried out to examine the effect of ICT investment, as well as 
other corporate governance variables, on firm performance. Moreover, panel data was 
selected mainly because it considers variables that cannot be observed or measured or 
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variables that change over time and those that do not across entities, besides 
identifying the sources of possibly mingled effects. The use of panel data offers 
several benefits (Baltagi, 2005). Apart from its ability to control individual 
heterogeneity that can lead to misleading and biased results, it also can reduce 
multicollinearity problems as well as provides more reliable data information due to 
pooling individual and time dimension. Additionally, panel data also provides more 
efficient data, variability and captures a better dynamic adjustment (Jager, 2008).  
In fact, a panel data set maybe either balanced or unbalanced. A balanced data set 
contains all data observed in all timeframes, while unbalanced data refer to a set of 
data from certain years and unobserved. The issue of balanced data set involves 
economic and financial data, which are often unavailable in balanced form because 
some individuals might have dropped out from a multiyear survey (Baum, 2006). 
Nonetheless, in studying the effect of ICT investment and other corporate governance 
variables on firm performance within the Malaysian context, it is unnecessary to have 
balanced panel data for no mandatory requirement is needed for ICT disclosure 
imposed by the Malaysian regulatory body on Malaysian companies‘ annual report. 
Nonetheless, in studying the effect of ICT investment and other corporate governance 
variables on firm performance within the Malaysian context, it is unnecessary to have 
balanced panel data for no mandatory requirement is needed for ICT disclosure 
imposed by the Malaysian regulatory body on Malaysian companies‘ annual report. 
Regarding the implementation of IFRS in Malaysia on or after 1st January 2006, some 
companies have begun to voluntarily expose their ICT disclosure in an effort to 
improve their financial reporting disclosure. Being in a transitional period of 
improving their financial reporting (ICT disclosure), unbalanced panel data had been 
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considered in this study. However, this study employed the balanced panel data set 
(cross-sectional and time series data) after weighing in the following issues; the 
effective date of IFRS implementation on 1st January 2006, the initiatives taken by the 
Malaysian government in the 9th and 10th Malaysia Plan, as well as the mandatory 
compliance of ISO/IEC 27001 imposed by the Malaysian government on the 
Government, including financial and ICT sectors in 2010. Besides, this study also 
excluded some companies after noting several reasons: It is (1) either the company did 
the ICT investment (ICTI) activities, but the amount related to ICTI is unrecorded in 
the annual report, or; (2) the company did the ICTI activities, but the amount related 
to ICTI is not properly recorded in the annual report (e.g. PPE and Intangible Assets 
did not separate amounts for ICT and office equipment spending).  
4.7 Model Specification  
According to Beccalli (2007), no single standard form is available to predict the effect 
of ICT investment on firm financial performance. Despite of large investments made 
in ICT, the IT paradox still occurs. One of the factors that contribute to the IT paradox 
is time-lag effect of ICT investment (Devaraj & Kohli, 2002; Brynjolfsson, 1993). 
Most prior studies have ignored the element of lagged effect of ICT investment in 
their research model, especially within the context of its effect on firm performance. 
Due to the absence of model in examining the effect of lagged variables of ICT 
investment on firm performance in empirical studies, similar treatments of the effect 
of lagged ICT investment variables in the context of other areas were also embedded 
in this study. For instance, Brynjolfsson et al., (1994) looked into the effects of IT 
investment variable (IT) incurred in year t and four-year lag of IT investment (e.g., 
ITt-1, ITt-2, ITt-3, and ITt-4) on firm size, which found that the decline in firm size was 
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greater after a lag of 1 to 2 years following IT investments. Thus, a similar treatment 
of the effect of ICT investment with lagged variables developed by Brynjolfsson et al., 
(1994) was adopted in this study. 
Past studies have proven that investments do exhibit positive effects on firm 
performance after a lag of one to two years (Hung et al., 2012; Brynjolfsson et al., 
1989), a lag of two years (Francalanci & Galal, 1998), and a lag of two to three years 
(Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 2003; Brynjolfsson, Malone, Gurbaxani, & Kambil, 1994; 
Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 1993). Besides, Anderson et al., (2003) asserted that ICT 
spending incurred in year t is incrementally informative about firm performance in the 
subsequent year if the amount spent offers information about future performance, but 
not conveyed by the time series of firm performance in preceding years (Yj, t-1). As 
such, this study estimated a positive coefficient on ICT spending that should reflect 
higher firm performance in subsequent years compared to preceding years24 after 
considering a delayed impact of ICT spending on firm performance. 
Meanwhile, pertaining to the payoff period of ICT investment on firm performance, 
several factors in accordance with the Malaysian practice were included in this study. 
According to the Malaysian Ministry of Finance (2014), the Accelerated Capital 
Allowance (ACA) on computers and IT assets are written off within a period of two 
years, whereas the useful life of ICT assets for three years has become a common 
practice for Malaysian Tax Income purposes. The inclusion of several lagged 
variables of ICTSPE by three time periods (ICTSPE j, t-1, ICTSPE j, t-2, and ICTSPE j, t-3) 
was essential as the value of ICT spending does not immediately affect firm 
performance, but several years before gaining benefit.  
                                            
24 Consistent with Anderson et al. (2003), a positive coefficient on the IT spending variable would 
mean that firm performance in year t + i was higher relative to performance in years t and t-1 for firms 
that spent more on IT in year t. 
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In addition, to the best of the researcher‘s knowledge, no empirical model has tapped 
into the effect of ICT investment, along with some elements of corporate governance 
factors that consist of ICT governance mechanisms (ADICTG, ICTGCOM, and 
ICTSM), boards with diverse ICT expertise (BICTEDU, BICTPRO, BICTIE, and 
BICTTR), ownership structures (COWN, MOWN, GOWN, and FOWN), as well as 
four control variables (BINDP, BSIZE, LEV, and FSIZE), to establish their effects 
upon firm performance. Therefore, the empirical model specification was developed 
due to the integration of multiple independent variables, especially to further examine 
the effect of ICT investment, ICT governance mechanisms, boards with diverse ICT 
expertise, and ownership structures on firm performance in the Malaysian technology-
based sector. The developed regression model is given in the following:  
Y j, t   =  α + (β1 ICTSPE j, t) + (β2 ICTSPE j, t-1) + (β3 ICTSPE j, t-2) + (β4 ICTSPE j, t-3) + 
(β5 ADICTGj, t) + (β6 ICTGCOMj, t) + (β7 ICTSMj, t) + (β8 BICTEDUj, t) +              
(β9 BICTPROj, t) + (β10 BICTIEj, t) + (β11 BICTTRj, t) + (β12 COWNj, t) +                
(β13 MOWNj,t) + (β14 GOWNj, t) + (β15 FOWNj, t) + (β16 BINDPj, t) + (β17 BSIZEj, t) 
+ (β18 LEVj, t) + (β19 FSIZEj, t) + ηj + ɛj, t………...……………………...Equation (1) 
ɛj, t = vj + uj,t ……………………………...……………………………..….Equation (2) 
where the description of each variable is as follows: 
Yj,t represents either annual accounting performance ratios (ROA and 
ROE) or market ratio (TQ) of the Malaysian technology firms j at 
time t.  
ICTSPEj,t represents the logarithm of ICT spending firms j at time t. 
ICTSPE j, t-1 represents the logarithm of ICT spending firms j at time t - 1. 
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ICTSPE j, t-2 represents the logarithm of ICT spending firms j at time t - 2. 
ICTSPE j, t-3   represents the logarithm of ICT spending firms j at time t - 3. 
ADICTGj,t represents the adoption of ICT governance standards or frameworks at 
firms j at time t.   
ICTGCOMj,t represents the presence of ICT governance committee at firms j at 
time  t. 
ICTSMj,t represents the presence of ICT senior management at firms  j at time t. 
BICTEDUj,t     represents boards with ICT education background at firms  j at time t. 
BICTPROj, t represents boards with ICT professional qualification at firms  j at 
time t. 
BICTIEj, t represents boards with ICT industrial experience at firms j at time t. 
BICTTRj, t        represents boards with with ICT-related training at firms j at time t. 
COWNj, t represents concentrated ownership at firms j at time t. 
MOWNj, t represents managerial ownership at firms  j at time t. 
GOWNj, t represents government ownership at firms  j at time t. 
FOWNj, t represents foreign ownership at firms  j at time t. 
BINDPj, t          represents board independence at firms  j at time t. 
BSIZEj, t represents board size at firms  j at time t. 
LEVj, t              represents financial leverage at firms j at time t. 
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FSIZEj, t represents firm size at firms  j at time t. 
ηj represents unobserved firm fixed-effect. 
ɛj, t represents as an error term that includes time invariant effect vj and 
random error term uj,t. 
Theoretically, Equation (1) is based on the static regression model. In fact, many past 
studies have relied on the static approach to measure the effect of ICT investment on 
firm performance (Arabyat, 2014; Makinde, 2014; Ugwuanyi & Ugwuanyi, 2013; 
Hung et al., 2012; Chari et al., 2008; Beccalli, 2007; Shin, 2006; Kim, 2004). 
However, only a few studies in the related area have applied the dynamic approach, 
which incorporates lagged values of dependent variable on the right side of the 
equation of their research model (Kooshki & Ismail, 2011; Jun, 2008; Anderson et al., 
2003). Besides, the inclusion of lagged dependent variables as previous year financial 
performance in the model is indeed useful in estimating the financial performance for 
the following year(s) (Anderson et al., 2003; Abarbanell & Bushee 1997; Brown 
1993; Shroff 1999; Mozes, 1992).  
Equation (1), basically, examined the effect of ICT investment, ICT governance 
mechanisms, boards with diverse ICT expertise, and ownership structures on firm 
performance. Additionally, a fixed effect model is often used to control unobserved 
heterogeneity in panel data (Baltagi, 2005), which cannot be employed for 
endogenous variable in the model (De Minguel, Pindado, & De la Torre, 2003). 
Hence, the instrumental variable estimation could be applied to alleviate the 
endogeneity problem caused by the independent variable. Nonetheless, some 
researchers argued that it is indeed challenging to identify the most appropriate 
instrumental variables (Guo, 2015; Nakano & Nguyen, 2010)  in order to cater to the 
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needs of a valid instrumental variable, including no correlation with error term and 
correlation with endogenous variable (Baser, 2009). Moreover, firm performance 
might be treated as dynamic in nature (Mishra, 2014), thus suggesting a potential for 
the fixed effect approach to produce biased and inconsistent estimation (Wooldridge, 
2013).  
The time invariant effect of vi is eliminated by the within transformation of fixed 
effect approach, but the transformed lagged dependent variable25  is correlated with 
the transformed error term (  - j), while Yj, t-1 is correlated with uj, t-1 (Baltagi, 
2005); leading to inconsistent estimate of the within transformation estimation method 
(Bond, 2002). Hence, in order to hinder endogeneity problems, the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) was applied for the dynamic panel data model (DPM) in 
this study. Upon including lagged dependent variable of firm financial performance as 
independent variable (regressor), the develop model is given in the following: 
Y j, t   =   α + (β1 ICTSPE j, t) + (β2 ICTSPE j, t-1) + (β3 ICTSPE j, t-2) + (β4 ICTSPE j, t-3) + 
(β5 ADICTGj, t) + (β6 ICTGCOMj, t) + (β7 ICTSMj, t) + (β8 BICTEDUj, t) +                    
(β9 BICTPROj, t) + (β10 BICTIEj, t) + (β11 BICTTRj, t) + (β12 COWNj, t) +                      
(β13 MOWNj,t) + (β14 GOWNj, t) + (β15 FOWNj, t) + (β16 BINDPj, t) + (β17 BSIZEj, t) 
+ (β18 LEVj, t) + (β19 FSIZEj, t) + (β20 Yj, t-1) + ɛj, t ………………...…....Equation (3) 
ɛj,t = vi + uj,t  …………………..……………………...…………..………..Equation (4) 
E(vi) = E(uj,t) = E(vi uj,t) = 0 ……………………...…………………...…. Equation (5) 
                                            




where additional variables like Yj, t-1 refers to financial performance of firm j at time  
t-1, while ɛj,t  refers to error term that includes the time invariant effect vi and random 
error term uj,t. 
In examining the dynamic model of firm performance, this study adhered to several 
dynamic approaches from past studies (Nayan, Kadir, Ahmad, & Abdullah, 2013; Jun, 
2008). As such, Jun (2008) examined the effect of ICT investment in the context of 
Korean security firms. Some elements of lagged dependent variables (e.g., ROA, 
ROE, and profits) were applied to the dynamic model as regressors, hence displayed 
significantly positive coefficient estimates for all tested models. The researcher 
claimed that the lagged values of returns displayed significant explanatory power for 
returns. Besides, as mentioned before, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) is 
an appropriate estimation method for this study. According to Roodman (2009), the 
GMM is useful for the following reasons: (1) the panel data have large individual 
observations (large N) and smaller time periods (small T); (2) the model is dynamic 
which contains lagged dependent variable; (3) the explanatory variables are not 
required to be strictly exogenous; and (4) it controls heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation. Besides, unobserved heterogeneity that appears in the fixed effect 
model is also controlled by the GMM dynamic panel model that allows for a dynamic 
relation of the dependent variable and may not require external instruments (Wintoki, 
Linck, & Netter, 2012). 
Other than that, Anderson and Hsio (1982) proposed first differences as the methods 
of Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Fixed Effect (FE) or Random Effect (RE) are 
inappropriate for dynamic panel data (Wooldridge, 2013). Under the first differences 
estimation, the time invariant effect of individuals was excluded and substituted with 
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instrumental variable estimation. The instrumental variables for the lagged dependent 
variable were developed from the second and third lags of the dependent variable (yj,t-2 
and yj,t-3 or yj,t-2 and yj,t-3). Although these instrumental variables are highly 
correlated with lagged dependent variable, they do not correlate with error disturbance 
(Roodman, 2009). Besides, even though the estimation method proposed by Anderson 
and Hsio (1982) is consistent, other experts argued that the method dismissed 
potential orthogonality conditions (Arellano & Bond, 1991).  
Meanwhile, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggested a more efficient estimation 
procedure known as difference GMM estimator to deal with dynamic panel data. This 
difference GMM (DGMM) model is defined as a system of equation and uses lagged 
values of endogenous and exogenous variables as its instrumental variables. While 
DGMM corrects endogeneity bias, the method suffers from efficiency loss by omitting 
informative moment conditions. Hence, it was argued that the DGMM has a weakness 
where the lagged levels, sometimes, become poor instruments for the first differenced 
variables, which could be biased for finite sample usually associated with a highly 
persistent pattern of the dependent variable (Blundell, Bond, & Windmeijer, 2000). 
Moreover, subjected to the short time period of the panel data set used in this study    
(T = 5 years), the finite-sample might lead to downward bias, while weak instruments 
might invalidate the estimations (Bond et al., 2001; Blundell & Bond, 1998). Thus, 
these DGMM weaknesses suggest the inclusion of more moment conditions to 
increase the efficiency of estimations. 
After that, the system GMM (SGMM) was then developed by Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), where this method is considered to be more 
superior than DGMM (Roodman, 2009). Furthermore, Bond, Hoeffler, and Temple 
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(2001) asserted that this method has the ability to correct unobserved heterogeneity, 
besides omitting variable bias, measurement error, and potential endogeneity that 
frequently affect estimation. In fact, SGMM amalgamates a system of two equations, 
including a level equation and differencing transform equation to generate a more 
efficient estimation. In fact, SGMM amalgamates a system of two equations, 
including a level equation and differencing transform equation to generate a more 
efficient estimation (Blundell & Bond, 1998; Arellano & Bover, 1995). This method, 
nevertheless, requires the assumption that first differences of instrumental variables 
for level variables are not correlated with unobserved individual effects, which means 
that the difference of predetermined variables can be used as instruments for level 
equations.  
As for the SGMM estimation method, several rules of thumb regarding sample size in 
the dynamic approach were considered in this study. According to Bhattarai (2011), a 
large sample size (the number of observations over individuals and time) generates 
more accurate estimations and asymptotically consistent in dynamic approach.  
Besides, Soto (2009) claimed that a small sample size26 would not permit a researcher 
to limit the number of instruments used for estimation. Hence, small sample size with 
unlimited number of instruments may cause an increase in the number of 
instruments27, which could also lead to inconsistent and weak results for dynamic 
diagnostic tests (Mileva, 2007). In addition, the number of instruments must not 
exceed the number of groups (e.g., the companies selected in this case of study) 
(Roodman, 2009; Mileva, 2007). If the number of instruments does exceed the 
                                            
26 In the dynamic approach, sample sizes (N) of 100, 50, and 35 (Soto, 2009), as well as sample sizes at 
around 50 to 75 (Tauchen, 1986), are considered small. 
27 The general rule of thumb for dynamic GMM estimation method is to keep the number of 
instruments less than or equivalent to the number of individual sample size (Roodman, 2009; Mileva, 
2007), or else, one- and two-step estimators of GMM cannot be computed (Soto, 2009). 
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number of groups, the value can still be considered under GMM estimation. Hence, in 
order to make estimation possible, Soto (2009) asserted that only the most relevant 
instruments should be used in each period28.  
4.7.1 Model Estimation Methods  
This study applied the Yj, t-1 variable, which refers to a dynamic element that 
represents the previous financial performance measures (e.g. ROA, ROE, and TQ) 
among companies in the Malaysian technology-based sector. First, the inclusion of 
lagged firm performance measures would suggest a prediction on future firm 
performance (Anderson et al., 2003; Abarbanell & Bushee 1997; Brown 1993; Shroff 
1999; Mozes, 1992). For instance, the dynamic effect of Yj, t-1 (previous year financial 
performance) used in this study had been examined to determine its impact on Yj, t 
(financial performance for the current year). Second, the formulation of lagged 
dependent financial measures was employed as a tool to correct endogeneity bias in 
the model (Kooshki & Ismail, 2011; Jun, 2008; Ho & Mallick 2006). 
A natural starting point for estimating Equation (1) is pooled OLS, but one 
shortcoming posed by this conventional OLS is that the inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable, Yj, t-1, on the right makes the exogeneity assumption volatile 
(Wooldridge, 2002). Yj, t-1 raises the dynamic panel bias (Nickell, 1981) as it ignores 
the joint endogeneity of the explanatory variables. Furthermore, Bond (2002) and 
Roodman (2006) indicated that although OLS and FE estimations for dynamic panel 
are biased, both researchers proved the validity of GMM estimation by providing both 
upper and lower bound, respectively. Moreover, according to Hsio (1986), the OLS 
                                            
28 The relevant instruments here refer to the only levels of lagged two periods used for the equation in 
differences, which is extended from the differences lagged for one period used in the first level of 
equation (Soto, 2009). 
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overestimated the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable because it positively 
correlated with errors, whereas Nickell (1981) argued that the FE estimation 
underestimated the coefficient in the short panel. Hence, in addition to the static 
version of the OLS and fixed effects model, this study also estimated a dynamic 
specification, thus abandoning the assumption that ɛi is not serially correlated for the 
present level of firm performance (Yj, t) may rely on the previous firm performance 
levels (Yj, t-1). With that, this study incorporates a lagged dependent variable on the 
right side; highlighting preference for dynamic panel estimation. Thus, this study 
estimated the parameters of the following equation:  
 -  +  ………………………………………...…….Equation (6) 
For j = (1,…..,N) and t = (1,……,T), and data sets with large n and small t were used. 
Upon construction, yjt – 1 is correlated with the unobserved individual-level effects, . 
Removing  by the within transformation (removing the panel-level means) produces 
inconsistent and biased estimator with T fixed.  
With that, the difference of the Generalized Method Moments (DGMM) proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) appears as an option to deal with endogeneity bias. 
However, it is argued that the lagged levels of the regressors are poor instruments for 
the first-differenced regressors (Mileva, 2007; Blundell & Bond, 1998), which could 
be biased for finite sample properties when the series are persistent because these 
instruments turn into weak predictors upon changes in endogenous (Blundell & Bond, 
1998). After that, the system GMM (SGMM) was proposed by combining moment 
conditions of both difference and level equations (Blundell & Bond, 1998; Arellano & 
Bover, 1995) to generate better estimation of GMM (Roodman, 2009). Therefore, the 
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SGMM was employed in this study to determine the effect of ICT investment, ICT 
governance mechanisms, boards with diverse ICT expertise, and ownership structures 
on firm performance. 
Basically, the regression model employed in this study is based on the dynamic panel 
model (DPM) (refer to Equation 3) that embeds the element of ‗dynamic‘ effects, 
including lagged dependent variables (Yj,t-1) as an independent variable on the right 
equation of the model. In fact, the DPM is applied to examine the effect of ICT 
investment, ICT governance mechanisms, boards with diverse ICT expertise, and 
ownership structures on firm performance within the context of Malaysian 
technology-based sector from 2010 until 2014. Nonetheless, the System Generalized 
Method of Moments (SGMM) estimation method, which has been considered as more 
efficient than the Difference Generalized Method of Moments (DGMM), was applied 
in this study to solve bias and inefficient results in the Pooled OLS and Fixed effect 
model. 
As for the small sample size used in this study, the small number of companies (33 
companies for this study), as highlighted in prior studies, did not seem to have any 
significant effect on the estimation of System GMM (Santos & Barrios, 2011; Soto, 
2009). Moreover, when time series are moderately or highly persistent, the SGMM 
estimator presents the lowest bias and the highest precision29. Furthermore, Soto 
(2009) also argued that the SGMM emerged as the best estimator or a powerful 
econometric tool for small sample bias and precision. Meanwhile, for additional 
robustness check, as far as the results are concerned, apart from the SGMM estimation 
                                            
29 For instance, Santos and Barrios used small time dimensions (T) from T=3 to T=50 with a number of 
individuals (N) from N=10 to N=50 in their intensive simulations to investigate both small and large 
samples of the dynamic panel data estimators, namely the within-groups and first-difference 
generalized method of moments. The results were of satisfactory under the estimations of the smallest 
sample size, i.e., N=10 and T=3, while the extreme sample size was N=50 and T=3. 
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method used for Equation (3); DGMM, Pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS), and 
panel fixed effect (FE) estimation methods were also applied in this study. 
4.8 Data Analysis Procedures  
OLS estimator has been frequently used in many multiple regression cases to examine 
the relationship between a single dependent variable and several independent variables 
(predictors). Since this study also relies on the estimation of OLS and FE model; 
several diagnostic tests were performed for verification so that assumptions of 
multiple regressions are met, as well as to avoid misleading results (Gujarati, 2003; 
Hair et al., 2010). These tests began with normality, linearity, multicollinearity, 
homoscedasticity, and autocorrelation tests. In fact, each of these diagnostic tests was 
tested by using various statistical analyses and the details for each test are described in 
the following sub-sections. 
4.8.1 Normality  
An important assumption related to OLS regression is that the residuals can be 
identical and independently distributed with nil assumption or requirement that the 
predictor variables are normally distributed (Chen, Ender, Mitchell, & Wells, 2003). 
Following the example of checking normality of residuals by statistical experts (Park, 
2008; Chen et al., 2003), as demonstrated in Stata Web Books, several methods, 
including graphical and numerical tests30, were carried out in this study to test 
normality and to detect the presence of outliers. Some commonly used graphical 
methods for normality test include Kernel density estimate, P-P plot (probability-
                                            
30 Numerical test is the test that expressed in or counted by numbers. 
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probability plot), and Q-Q plot (quantile-quantile plot); whilst for numerical test, 
statistical tests like Shapiro-Wilk test (swilk test), skewness and kurtosis test (sketest), 
as well as Inter-quartile range test (Iqr test), can be employed to verify assumptions. 
With that, the Swilk test had been selected for it has been acknowledged as the most 
powerful normality test available due to its ability in detecting a small departure from 
normality (Chen et al., 2003; Thode, 2002). 
The histogram that plots the observed values against their frequency offers visual 
judgment if the distribution of data is bell-shaped, as well as insights about gaps in the 
data and outliers outlying values (Peat & Barton, 2005). Hence, histogram can be a 
poor method to determine the shape of data distribution because it is strongly affected 
by the number of bins used (Kabacoff, 2014). As such, the Kernel density plots have 
been suggested to be more effective to view the distribution of a variable (Kabacoff, 
2014). Consistent with Chen et al., (2003), the Kernel density estimate was employed 
in this study.  
According to Field (2009), the P-P plot plots the cumulative probability of a variable 
against the cumulative probability of a particular distribution (e.g., normal 
distribution). After data are sorted, the corresponding z-score is calculated and the 
score value is expected to reflect normal distribution. The score, then, is converted to 
the actual z-score, which is later plotted against the expected z-score. The result of the 
plot would reflect a straight diagonal line if the data are normally distributed. Besides, 
the Q-Q plot plots the quantiles (values that split a dataset into equal portions) of the 
dataset instead of every individual score in the data. Moreover, the Q-Q plots are 




Moreover, based on past studies, graphical tests that were used to visualize data 
distribution may be useful to assess normality, while the assumption of data that are 
presented visually can be interpreted by researchers using their own judgment 
(Altman & Bland, 1996), although some claimed that the methods are usually 
unreliable and do not guarantee the normality of data distribution (Field, 2009; 
Oztuna, Elhan, & Tucar, 2006; Altman & Bland, 1995). On top of that, several 
numerical normality tests have been conducted as supplementary to the graphical 
methods, hence, used to assess the normality of data (Elliott & Woodward, 2007), 
such as skewness and kurtosis (sktest), Shapiro-Wilk test (swilk test), and Inter-
quartile range test (Iqr test). These numerical tests compare the scores in the sample to 
a normally distributed set of scores with similar mean and standard deviation values; 
where the null hypothesis suggests ―data is normally distributed‖. If the test results in 
significant p-value, it means that the data do not fit the normal distribution.  
4.8.2 Linearity 
The assumption of linearity reveals if the correlation between the dependent variable 
and the predictors is a straight line or linear (Hair et al., 2006). In the case of multiple 
regressions, checking for linearity assumption is not a straightforward process31. In 
this study, an augmented partial residual plot graph against each independent variable 
in the regression model was applied to determine if a linear pattern exists between the 
variables. 
 
                                            
31 The straightforward process to determine the linearity assumption can be done by plotting the 
standardized residuals against each of the predictor variable in the regression model. The existence of 
nonlinear pattern indicates a problem of nonlinearity (Chen et al., 2003). 
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4.8.3 Multicollinearity  
An important assumption underlying multiple regression analysis is that no 
collinearity should exist between two independent variables, which is referred as 
multicollinearity (Cheng, Hossain, & Law, 2001). High multicollinearity causes the 
estimated regression coefficient to be unreliable and unstable, because it might change 
drastically if small changes occur in the sample or model (Hamilton, 2003). As such, 
this problem may affect the result of the model tested for it is difficult to accurately 
estimate the coefficient of the true model (Cheng et al., 2001). Hence, the data 
gathered must be checked for any possible existence of multicollinearity and further 
cause the researcher to obtain wrong signs for regression coefficient, insight t-ratios, 
and high R-squared, but a few insignificant t-ratios and high pair-wise correlation 
among the regressors (Green, 2003; Gujarati, 2003; Cheng et al., 2001). 
Furthermore, the existence of many independent variables could cause 
multicollinearity problem. In fact, two ways are available to test multicollinearity. Out 
of the two, the simplest way is by employing the Pearson32 or Spearman correlation 
matrix33 (r) for a bivariate analysis between the independent variables. The issue of 
multicollinearity arises when the correlation value of independent variables exceeds 
the cut off level of 0.9 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007; Hair et al., 2006). Meanwhile, the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test indicates how the variance of an estimator is 
inflated by the presence of multicollinearity. In fact, Hamilton (2009) asserted that it 
can also be used to show how the variance of coefficients and standard errors of other 
variables increase due to the inclusion of the variable (Hamilton, 2009). As a rule of 
                                            
32 The Pearson correlation matrix is a parametric test that measures the strength of the linear 
relationship between normally distributed variables. 




thumb, a variable with greater VIF value or exceeding 10 is said to be highly 
correlated (Hair et al., 2006; Ho, 2006; Gujarati, 2003). Hence, this study weighs in 
the fact that if the correlation coefficient between two variables exceeds 0.90 and 10 
for VIF; then multicollinearity could be a critical issue.  
4.8.4 Homoscedasticity  
Homoscedasticity refers to the assumption that a dependent variable has an equal level 
of variance across a range of independent variables. This is desirable mainly because 
the variance of the dependent variable should not be concentrated within a limited 
range of the independent values. The presence of an unequal variance of the residual 
can be said to have heteroscedasticity, which refers to the common violations in 
multivariate analysis (Hair et al., 2006). In fact, heteroscedasticity occurs when the 
variance of errors is not constant over the sample observation; making the coefficient 
estimate to be underestimated, and sometimes, making insignificant variables appear 
statistically significant (Hair et al., 2006).  
This may also result in higher t and F values, which indicate that the null hypotheses 
may be rejected when they should not be rejected (Cheng et al., 2001).  The presence 
of outliers and skewness in the distribution of one or more regressors included in the 
model is a source of heteroscedasticity. However, this heteroscedasticity issue could 
be detected by using scatter plots, White General Heteroscedasticity Test, and Breuch-
Pagan Godfrey Test, as recommended by experts (Baum, 2006; Chen et al., 2003; 
Green, 2003). Null hypothesis, in which the variance of the residual is homogenous, 
was tested in this study, where p-value greater than 0.05 indicates that the hypothesis 
cannot be rejected and indicates that there is no problem of heteroscedasticity. 
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4.8.5 Autocorrelation  
Another important OLS assumption is that error terms are independent and 
uncorrelated, while the size and the direction of a term have no bearing on the size and 
direction of the other. This condition is known as autocorrelation (serial correlation), 
where correlation between error terms of dataset of one period (t) and previous period 
(t-1) exists. In this situation, the error terms are not independent and hence, could 
offer incorrect t values and confidence intervals in regression. Besides, autocorrelation 
can be associated with the cross-sectional data, which is also known as spatial 
autocorrelation, which has been commonly associated with time series data. Time 
series data is, by definition, ordered in time and usually notes the difference by 
indexing by t. The past is the best predictor of the future. Thus, it is claimed that what 
occurs in time t is the best predictor of what will occur in the subsequent time (t+1). 
As a result, observations are usually dependent. As for the error term, this means that 
the differences between the predicted and the actual error in one time period are 
probably related (positively) to the error in the next. Hence, if a series is ‗mean-
reverting‘, then the errors may be negatively correlated. Moreover, the problem of 
autocorrelation may also be due to model misspecification and data manipulation. 
Therefore, a time series is generated by aggregating the data and introducing a certain 
amount of smoothing by creating a quarterly data set by summing or by averaging 
over months (or months from days, or quarters to years). Hence, some of the 
randomness of disaggregated data is lost, thus leading to systematic patterns in the 




This study applied several tests to determine the presence of autocorrelation in the 
model, including Durbin-Watson (D-W) and Prais-Winsten tests. As a rule of thumb, 
if the value for Durbin-Watson, d statistic, approaches 0, positive autocorrelation 
occurs that implies no autocorrelation among the error terms, while d closer to 4 
means negative autocorrelation. Besides, confirming how close to 0 or 4 is sufficient 
to determine if the model has either positive or negative autocorrelation, based on 
upper (dU) and lower (dL) critical values for d, which rely on the number of 
observations (N) and the number of explanatory variables (k). As for accuracy, the 
exact acceptable values of dU and dL are derived from the Durbin and Watson‘s 
(1951) original paper. Moreover, as a very conservative rule of thumb, Field (2009) 
suggested that values less than 1 or greater than 3 are definitely a cause for concern. If 
the problem of autocorrelation still exists, the Prais-Winsten transformation is used in 
this study. 
In addition to the dynamic model, which is introduced in this study, several dynamic 
diagnostic tests were conducted to assure the validity of the GMM estimation 
methods. Furthermore, as the presence of dynamic element of lagged dependent 
variable is correlated with the error term, the estimators would be biased. In order to 
deal with this problem, this study employed instrumental variables and estimated the 
equation by using the GMM, by adhering to the suggestion given by Arellano and 
Bond (1991). With GMM, the variables to be instrumented must be strongly corrected 
with the related independent variables and the instrument must be valid in the sense 
that they are uncorrelated with the error term or the variable is exogenous. The 
validity of the difference of GMM estimations hinges on two types of specification 
tests: (i) Testing the validity of surplus instruments, and (ii) Testing the presence of 
serial correlation in the differenced residuals. 
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The validity test of the surplus or over identifying instrument can be tested via Sargan 
test. The Sargan test is a statistical test performed to check for over identifying 
restrictions in a statistical model. This test is also known as the Hansen test or the J-
Test for over identified restrictions. The Sargan test is based on the observation that 
the residuals should be uncorrelated with the set of exogenous variables if the 
instruments are truly exogenous. Additionally, the Sargan test statistics can be 
calculated as TR^2, which refers to the number of observations and multiplied by the 
coefficient of determination from the OLS regression of the residuals (from the 
instrumental variable estimation) onto the set of exogenous variables.  
This statistics is asymptotically chi-squared with m – k (where m is the number of 
instruments, while k is the number of endogenous variables) degrees of freedom under 
null hypothesis, where the instruments are valid because they are not correlated with 
the errors in the first differenced equation. Besides, the null hypothesis under this test 
assumes that instruments are exogenous, which means that there is no correlation 
between instruments and the error term. If the Sargan test rejects the null of no 
correlation, the IV (instrument variable) estimator is deemed as inconsistent and 
biased. 
However, if there are priori reasons to expect autoregressive error in a panel 
regression model, or if the dynamics of the model are incorrectly specified, there is a 
strong possibility for autocorrelation to exist in the residuals. Technically, the 
Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation has a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation and 
is applied to the differenced residuals. The test for the first-order serial correlation, 
which is also known as AR(1) process in the first differences, usually rejects the null 
hypothesis. Meanwhile, the test of the second-order serial correlation, also known as 
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AR(2) in first differences is more important, because it will detect autocorrelation in 
levels. On top of that, the use of panel data in this research is supported by the 
econometric software called Stata. 
4.9 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter is consistent with the aim of this study to determine the effect of ICT 
investment, ICT governance mechanisms, boards with diverse ICT expertise, and 
ownership structures on the performance of firms within the Malaysian technology-
based sector. Besides, this chapter highlights several significant elements, including 
the research framework developed in this study, hypotheses development, collection 
of data sample, measurements used for each variable, discussion on panel data, model 





RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to report and discuss the findings retrieved from this 
study. Specifically, this chapter is divided into several sections. Section 5.2 discusses 
the pre-test for data variables that involved the initial dataset of 185 observations34, 
which was conducted in the initial process to determine the normality and the linearity 
assumptions of data, as discussed in sub-sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, respectively. 
Besides, any potential outliers identified in the initial dataset and the results of outliers 
are further discussed in sub-section 5.2.3. Next, Section 5.3 presents the post-test for 
the data variables35 and two assumption tests, which were again tested with normality 
and linearity tests, as discussed in sub-sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, respectively. 
Section 5.4 explains the descriptive statistics for all data variables. This is later 
followed by the univariate analyses of T-Tests and correlation matrix discussed in 
Section 5.5. In ascertaining the credibility of the initial analysis, the results of several 
additional diagnostic tests for panel data are presented to determine the sensitivity and 
the robustness of the regression analysis in Section 5.6. Meanwhile, Section 5.7 
reports the results obtained from the regression analyses for all models and lastly, the 
chapter ends with a summary of the overall findings of the study, as given in Section 
5.8. 
                                            
34 The initial dataset of 185 observations (also referred as the original data) contains data that have not 
undergone the tests of normality, linearity, and outlier. 
35 Data variables that have undergone the process of post-test refer to the new dataset without outliers. 
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5.2 Pre-Test for Data Variables 
Basically, the initial sample of this study was comprised of 37 (185 observations for 
five years) companies in the Malaysian technology-based sector. Besides, this study 
employed the balanced panel data as it is a more sensitive measurement of the changes 
that could have taken place between points in time (Cavana, Delahaye, & Sekaran, 
2001). Furthermore, the results produced have been more robust, consistent, and 
stable to make generalization to the population so as to be more representative and 
meaningful. The Statistical software of STATA version 13 was applied to run the 
statistical analysis, especially to measure the effects exerted by the independent 
variables upon those dependent. Before discussing the findings of this study, it is 
beneficial to undertake normality, linearity, and outlier tests to explain the quality of 
the initial data variables. The following sub-sections present all the tests in detail.  
5.2.1 Test of Normality 
First, the raw data were screened by examining the basic statistics for the descriptive 
data, including mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values of the 
variables primarily to detect any mistake or missing values in the data entry before the 
normality test was performed. In fact, several normality tests were conducted to 
determine the data normality before identifying potential outliers in the data set, which 
incorporated some graphical methods like Kernel density, probability-probability (P-
P) plot, and quantile-quantile (Q-Q) plot. Besides, some numerical methods, for 
instance, test of Inter-quartile range (Iqr), was applied to assure the distribution of data 
normality, while the Shapiro-Wilk (Swilk test) was performed to confirm the 
existence of potential outliers in the data sample. Furthermore, in determining data 
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normality, results of the graphical tests for each model (e.g., ROA, ROE, and TQ), 
such as the Kernel density estimate, the P-P plot, and the Q-Q plot, are illustrated in 
Figure 5.1. As for the Kernel density estimate test, the normal density line should be 
overlaid on the kernel plot as an indication of data normality. As shown in the Figure 
5.1, the Kernel density test, P-P and Q-Q plots showed that the TQ model adhered to a 
normal distribution, while ROA and ROE models did not. The results also showed a 
serious deviation from normal distribution and indicated that the residuals in both 
ROA and ROE models were not normally distributed.  
Table 5.1 The Inter-quartile Range (IQR) Test  
Variables IQR Results 
ROA    mean= -1.4e-09                                         std.dev.=  .7148          (n= 185) 
 median=  .0608                        pseudo std.dev.=  .3074        (IQR=  .4147) 
10 trim=  .0614 
                                                                                              low         high 
                                                                                            -------------------- 
                                                     inner fences                   -.7808       .8781 
                                                  # mild outliers                        7              5 
                                                 % mild outliers                   3.78%     2.70% 
 
                                                     outer fences                   -1.403         1.5 
                                               # severe outliers                       2              0 
                                              % severe outliers                   1.08%     0.00% 
ROE    mean= -6.9e-10                                         std.dev.=  1.041          (n= 185) 
 median=  .0929                        pseudo std.dev.=  .4479        (IQR=  .6042) 
10 trim=  .0833 
                                                                                              low         high 
                                                                                            -------------------- 
                                                     inner fences                    -1.117         1.3 
                                                  # mild outliers                        3               3 
                                                 % mild outliers                   1.62%     1.62% 
 
                                                     outer fences                    -2.023       2.206 
                                               # severe outliers                        2               0 
                                              % severe outliers                   1.08%     0.00% 
TQ    mean=  3.8e-10                                          std.dev.=   .228          (n= 185) 
 median=   .003                         pseudo std.dev.=  .1815        (IQR=  .2449) 
10 trim= -.0012 
                                                                                              low         high 
                                                                                             ------------------- 
                                                     inner fences                   -.4878       .4918 
                                                  # mild outliers                        2              2 
                                                 % mild outliers                    1.08%    1.08% 
 
                                                     outer fences                   -.8552       .8592 
                                               # severe outliers                        0              1 




The first numerical test involved the Inter-quartile range (IQR) test used to determine 
the normality of data in this study. In fact, severe outliers that consisted of those 
points were either 3 inter-quartile ranges below the first quartile or 3 inter-quartile 
ranges above the third quartile. Hence, the presence of any severe outliers should be 
sufficient evidence to reject the normality of data at a 5% significance level. 
Moreover, the results of IQR presented in Table 5.1 exhibit that the data set of this 
study contained severe outliers from ROA, ROE, and TQ models, and thus, the 
assumption of data normality was not fulfilled. Meanwhile, in the second numerical 
test, the Shapiro-Wilk test had been performed to test the normality of data, besides 
proving the existence of outliers. This test has been recommended as the best 
numerical test to determine the normality of data due to its ability to detect if a sample 
comes from a non-normal distribution (Bruin, 2006; Thode, 2002). This test is based 
on the correlation between the data and the corresponding normal scores (Peat & 
Barton, 2005). 
Table 5.2 Shapiro-Wilk Test of Pre-Dataset 
Variables Obs w V z Prob>z 
ROA 185 0.55032 62.693 9.484 0.00000 
ROE 185 0.50460 69.066 9.706 0.00000 
TQ 185 0.96807 4.452 3.422 0.00031 
 
Moreover, the null hypothesis of the Swilk test assumes that the residuals are normally 
distributed. If the p-value is significant, then the null hypothesis would be rejected, 
suggesting non-independently distributed residuals. The results retrieved from the 
Shapiro-Wilk test for the pre-dataset, as presented in Table 5.2, show that the 
normality of residuals for ROA, ROE, and TQ were not fulfilled as the p-values were 
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significant at .05. Hence, the residual values of ROA, ROE, and TQ were not 
normally distributed in the initial sample of study. 
5.2.2 Test of Linearity 
The graphs of augmented partial residual plot (acprplot) were generated for several 
independent variables, such as ICTSPEt, BICTEDU, COWN, as well as one control 
variable, BINDP. Basically, the acprplot graph was used to verify the linearity 
assumption against the predicted value of some examples from the independent 
variables36, simply to eyeball the model developed in this study. The acprplot graphs 
for ICTSPEt, BICTEDU, COWN, and BINDP are presented in Figure 5.2. The 
acprplot graphs of ICTSPEt, BICTEDU, COWN and BINDP for ROA and ROE 
column showed that the smooth line was almost close to the ordinary regression line, 
while the entire pattern for each independent variable tested displayed good uniform 
although each plot was interrupted by some potential influential points.  
Nonetheless, the acprplot graphs under the TQ column showed that the data points for 
ICTSPEt, BICTEDU, COWN, and BINDP were asymmetrically scattered from the 
ordinary regression line in the plot with critical outliers. Furthermore, the entire 
pattern of the graphs was not uniform, thus confirmed the non-linear relationship 
between these variables. As such, this study suggests that the assumption of a linear 
relationship between response variables and predictors as unfulfilled. 
 
 
                                            
36 Several variables, such as ADICTG, ICTGCOM, ICTSM, and BICTTR, were identified as no longer 
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               Figure 5.2: Augmented Partial Residual Plot for Independent Variables  
                Note: ICTSPEt is ICT spending at time t; BICTEDU is boards‘ ICT educational background; COWN is concentrated ownership and BINDP is board independence.
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5.2.3 Dealing with Outliers 
It was noticed that outliers did exist in the data set and were identified through the pre-
test of data variables. In dealing with potential outliers that exist in the model, several 
outlier treatment techniques were performed for further inspection. A careful analysis 
of the potential outliers that might exist in the inspection process is important to 
minimize the effect of extreme case scores, which could have a significant effect on 
the results; either too high or too low (Hair et al., 2010). Besides, the outlier 
treatments were based on high studentized residual, Cook‘s Distance (Cook‘s D), and 
high leverage, which were performed in this study using the STATA software.  
Basically, observations with high standardized residual, normally above +3 or -3, 
could reflect influential outliers (Chen et al., 2003). Next, observation with Cook‘s D 
was applied to the dataset of this study. In fact, the higher the Cook‘s D; the more 
influential is the observation. According to the rule of thumb, observations with the 
value of Cook‘s D that exceeding a cut-off point of 4/n, where n refers to the number 
of observations, are indeed relevant (Chen et al., 2003; Hamilton, 2003). Lastly, 
observations with high leverage value greater than (2k+2)/n was conducted. Here, k 
refers to the number of predictors, while n is the number of observations (Chen et al., 
2003).  
During the initial process of outlier treatment, five extreme outliers were detected that 
represented four different companies. Hence, unbalanced panel dataset would be 
generated if the removal process of outliers from each group is only based on the 
number of extreme outliers. Nevertheless, this study decided to retain the balanced 
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panel by dropping all companies with potential outliers37. The initial dataset was 185 
observations (37 companies), but, a new dataset was generated after the deduction of 
20 observations (four outlier companies) found during the outlier tests. Thus, the final 
dataset was comprised of 165 observations (33 companies). The details of the sample 
analysis are presented in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 Analysis of the Sample 
Particulars  Main Market ACE 
Market 
Total 
A) The MPLCs with complete annual reports from 
the financial year end 2010 to 2014 
700 77 777 
B) Total companies in the Malaysian technology-
based sector from the financial year end 2010 to 
2014 
35 68 103 
C) Total companies in the Malaysian technology-
based sector with incomplete annual reports 
from the financial year end 2010 to 2014 
8 21 29 
D) Total companies in the Malaysian technology-
based sector with complete annual reports from 
the financial year end 2010 to 2014 (5 periods) 
27 47 74 
E) Total annual reports to be analysed in the initial 
process (E=D* 5 periods) 
135 235 370 
F) Total companies in the Malaysian technology-
based sector with proper ICT records  from the 
financial year end 2010 to 2014 
14 23 37 
G) Total companies' annual reports (G=F* 5 periods) 70 115 185 
H) Total companies discarded (outliers) 1 3 4 
I) Total observations discarded (I=H* 5 periods) 5 15 20 
J) Final sample of companies in the Malaysian 
technology-based sector (J = F - H) 
13 20 33 
K) Final observations (New dataset)                       
(K=J* 5 periods)  
65 100 165 
 
                                            
37 The purpose of remaining a balanced panel dataset is to provide more reliable and stable dataset due 





5.3 Post-Test for New Dataset 
5.3.1 Test of Normality 
In this section, several graphical tests of normality, such as Kernel density, P-P plot, 
and Q-Q plot, were again performed to determine the new dataset for normality. In 
addition, the numerical test of Shapiro-Wilk was also carried out to confirm data 
normality. As such, Figure 5.3 presents the post-test normality graphs of the new 
dataset. The purpose of conducting the normality test for the new dataset was to verify 
if the new dataset was normally distributed, so as to ensure that the requirements for 
using the statistical procedures, such as correlation, t-test, and regression, were met 
(Ghasemi & Zahediasl, 2012; Field, 2009; Pallant, 2007).  
As a result, the kernel density graph, especially the post-test graphs, displayed that the 
data of ROA and ROE had normal distributions, while the graph of TQ showed that 
the data distribution was biased towards the left, in comparison to the data of pre-test, 
which had been normally distributed. In the same table, the post-test of P-P plots 
exhibited that data distribution of ROA and ROE did not differ much, when compared 
to the pre-test data. However, both data appeared to deviate less from the fitted line 
than the pre-test of P-P plots for ROA and ROE. The post-test P-P plot for TQ, on the 
other hand, seemed to deviate more from the fitted line than that for pre-test P-P plot, 
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             Figure 5.3: Post-Test Graphs of Kernel Density, P-Plot and Q-Plot for ROA, ROE and TQ models. 
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Meanwhile, the Q-Q plots for both ROA and ROE showed that both data points 
deviated more from the normal plot, indicating that both data points were not normally 
distributed either during the pre- or post-test of dataset. Additionally, the TQ plot 
showed that the data point was normally distributed during the pre-test of dataset, but 
no normal distribution for the post-test of dataset. Besides, the result of Shapiro-Wilk 
test for the post-dataset, as shown in Table 6.4, confirmed the non-normality of data 
distribution. The result showed that the normality of residuals for all models was not 
fulfilled since all the p-values were less than the chosen significance level of .05. 
Table 6.4 Shapiro-Wilk Test of Post-Dataset 
Variables Obs w V z Prob>z 
ROA 165 0.78301      27.402      7.543 0.00000 
ROE 165 0.74810 31.811 7.883 0.00000 
TQ 165 0.96020 5.027 3.679 0.00012 
Note: ROA is return on assets; ROE is return on equities; TQ is Tobin’s Q; post- dataset refers to the 
new dataset after the exclusion of outliers. 
 
 
The normality tests for the post-test of dataset, nevertheless, do confirm the non-
normality of data distribution; but violation of the normality assumption should not 
emerge as a major cause for dismissing the parametric procedures. Having a large 
sample size of more than 30 or 40 tends to lead the data to normal distribution, 
regardless of the data shape (Field, 2009; Elliot, 2007), while the distribution of the 
data can be ignored when a sample reaches hundreds of observations (Altman, 1995). 
Consistent with past researchers, the existence of non-normal data distribution in this 
study had been ignored, but the parametric procedures were conducted for the purpose 
of next statistical tests38. 
                                            
38 The statistical tests here refer to t-test, correlation test and regression. 
219 
 
5.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.5 Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variables Obs Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
ROA 165 -0.0482 -0.0078 0.2876 -1.6158 0.8784 
ROE 165 -0.0805 -0.0078 0.4140 -2.7251 0.9188 
TQ 165 -0.2334 -0.2628 0.3848 -0.9220 1.4314 
ROAt-1 165 -0.0349 0.0000 0.2679 -1.6158 0.8784 
ROEt-1 165 -0.0588 0.0000 0.3846 -2.7251 0.9188 
TQt-1 165 -0.1869 -0.1810 0.3499 -0.7379 1.4314 
ICTSPEt 165 9.1659 10.634 5.1696 0.0000 16.226 
ICTSPEt-1 165 7.4102 9.5764 5.8628 0.0000 16.226 
ICTSPEt-2 165 5.5548 0.0000 6.0826 0.0000 16.226 
ICTSPEt-3 165 3.8162 0.0000 5.6268 0.0000 15.639 
ADICTG 165 0.8606 1.0000 0.3474 0.0000 1.0000 
ICTGCOM 165 0.8364 1.0000 0.3711 0.0000 1.0000 
ICTSM 165 0.9030 1.0000 0.2968 0.0000 1.0000 
BICTEDU 165 0.2551 0.2500 0.2121 0.0000 1.0000 
BICTPRO 165 0.1113 0.0000 0.1514 0.0000 0.6000 
BICTIE 165 0.4942 0.5000 0.2326 0.0000 1.0000 
BICTTR 165 0.3333 0.0000 0.4728 0.0000 1.0000 
COWN 165 44.202 46.176 18.491 0.0000 76.358 
MOWN 165 23.801 20.181 18.551 0.0000 70.509 
GOWN 165 3.3334 0.0000 12.996 0.0000 68.705 
FOWN 165 9.0324 1.7125 14.237 0.0000 73.440 
BINDP 165 0.5135 0.5000 0.1485 0.2222 0.8333 
BSIZE 165 6.7636 6.0000 1.7492 4.0000 13.000 
LEV 165 0.1968 0.1134 0.2604 0.0021 1.4509 
FSIZE 165 17.537 17.578 0.9706 15.296 20.236 
Note: ROA is return on assets; ROE is return on equity; TQ is Tobin‘s Q; ROAt-1 is return on assets at 
time t-1; ROEt-1 is return on equity at time t-1; TQt-1 is Tobin‘s Q at time t-1; ICTSPE is logarithm ICT 
spending at time t; ICTSPEt-1 is ICT spending at time t-1; ICTSPEt-2  is ICT spending at time t-2; 
ICTSPEt-3 is ICT spending at time t-3; ADICTG is the adoption of ICT governance standards and 
frameworks; ICTGCOM is the presence of ICT governance committee; ICTSM is the presence of ICT 
senior management; BICTEDU is boards‘ ICT educational background; BICTPRO is boards‘ ICT 
professional qualification; BICTIE is boards‘ ICT industrial experience; BICTTR is boards‘ ICT-
related trainings; COWN is concentrated ownership; MOWN is managerial ownership; GOWN is 
government ownership; FOWN is foreign ownership; BINDP is board independence; BSIZE is board 




Table 5.5 presents the descriptive results of all related variables employed to examine 
the effect of ICT investment, ICT governance mechanisms, boards with diverse ICT 
expertise, and ownership structures on firm performance over the period of 2010 to 
2014 within the context of Malaysian technology-based sector. Descriptive statistics 
describes the basic feature of the data employed in a study. The purpose of providing 
descriptive information is to offer a clear picture about the dependent and independent 
variables, specifically within the Malaysian technology-based sector. The statistics 
merely summarizes the dataset, instead for testing hypotheses. The descriptive table, 
therefore, consists of mean, median, standard deviation, maximum and minimum 
values; as well as skewness and kurtosis of dependent, independent, and control 
variables.  
The first sub-section (Section 5.4.1) of this part of analysis describes the statistics of 
dependent variables that consists of ROA, ROE, and TQ, whereas the descriptive 
statistics in sub-section 5.4.2 focuses on all the independent variables of ICT 
investment (e.g., ICTSPEt,  ICTSPEt-1, ICTSPEt-2, and ICTSPEt-3), ICT governance 
mechanisms (e.g., ADICTG, ICTGCOM, and ICTSM), boards with diverse ICT 
expertise (e.g., BICTEDU, BICTPRO, BICTIE, and BICTTR), ownership structures 
(e.g., COWN, MOWN, GOWN, and FOWN), as well as control variables (e.g., 
BINDP, BSIZE, LEV, and FSIZE), which are described in detail in sub-section 5.4.3. 
5.4.1 Dependent Variables 
It was noted that the mean values of ROA, -0.0482, and the median of -0.0078 ranged 
between the minimum value of -1.6158 and maximum at 0.8784, which implied that 
the sampled companies from the technology sector did not generate profits from their 
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assets utilization. The mean and median values for ROE were -0.0805 and -0.0078 
respectively; between the minimum -2.7251 and the maximum 0.9188. Similar to 
ROA, the descriptive results of ROE showed that the companies‘ shareholder equities 
had been in negative for over the five years under review.  
Besides, the interval value of TQ ranged from -0.9220 to 1.4314 with a mean value of 
-0.2334 and the median of -0.2628. Meanwhile, the negative mean value indicates that 
the stock market for the companies was undervalued from 2010 to 2014. In precise, 
this study included the elements of one year lagged dependent variables on the right 
equation of the regression model as independent variables, namely one year lagged of 
ROA (ROAt-1), one year lagged of ROE (ROEt-1), and one year lagged of Tobin‘s Q 
(TQt-1). The mean value of ROAt-1 was -0.0349, which is between the minimum          
-1.6158 and the maximum 0.8784. Other than that, the interval values for ROEt-1 were 
between -2.7251 as minimum value and the maximum of 0.9188, with mean and 
median values of -0.0588 and 0.0000, respectively. Besides, the mean value of TQt-1 
was -0.1869 and ranged between -0.7379 and 1.4314. 
In addition, since ROA, ROE, and TQ have negative mean and median values, there 
might be a reason of global financial crisis that took place from 2007 to 2009. During 
the analysis, it was obviously seen that companies within the Malaysian technology 
sector were still in a transitional period to adapt the then significant business 
environment challenges due to the significant impact of the crisis. Although the 
growth momentum was negative, the performance of yearly average value for all 
financial measures showed that the Malaysian technology sector had improved over 
the period of 2010 to 2014. In addition, Figure 5.4 portrays a clear picture of firm 
performance trends for yearly average value for all dependent variables from 2010 to 
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2014 in the Malaysian technology-based sector. From the observed average value, the 
trends of ROA showed an improvement in 2011, but a significant drop was noted in 
2012 and 2013. After facing significant decrease in profits for two years, a little 
increase in ROA in 2014 showed that the technology companies were getting back on 
track by improving their assets utilization.  
 
 Figure 5.4: Trends of ROA, ROE and TQ in the Malaysian Technology-Based Sector (2010 to 2014). 
 
In contrast, the trend of ROE fluctuated over the five years. Increment in ROA in 
2011 showed that the companies had been effective in enhancing the value of their 
companies, which led the shareholders to gain benefits from the amount that they had 
invested in the companies. Besides, the percentage of ROE dropped significantly in 
2012, followed by a slight increase in 2013 and again, a little drop in 2014. Basically, 
a steadily increase in ROE, due to improved profitability and efficiency, is desirable, 
but this cannot endure forever due to varied reasons like slow and fluctuating trends of 
ROE. Moreover, faced with significant business challenges due to financial crisis 
demand, companies are more careful in planning their strategies in conducting 
business, especially to reduce financial crisis effects upon profits, as well as to 
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preserve confidence among shareholders towards the companies. Regarding TQ 
performance, it was clear that during the first two periods, there was a slight decline of 
stock market from -0.2290 to -0.2757. Although a slight decrease was noted in the 
Malaysian technology sector in its stock markets from 2010 until 2011, the 
performance of TQ displayed some continuity signs of growth from -0.2171 in 2012 
to -0.2128 in 2013. The stock market, however, dropped to -0.2323 in 2014. The 
negative average value of TQ implied that the stock market for the technology 
companies had been, unfortunately, undervalued. 
5.4.2 Independent Variables 
5.4.2.1 ICT Investment  
The descriptive statistics of ICT investment variables, as tabulated in Table 5.3, did 
not only focus on the variable of ICT spending incurred in year t (ICTSPEt), but also 
included several lagged variables of ICT spending by three periods, namely ICT 
spending incurred in year t-1 (ICTSPEt-1), ICT spending incurred in year t-2 
(ICTSPEt-2), and ICT spending incurred in year t-3 (ICTSPEt-3). As such, it was 
observed that the mean value for ICT spending spent in year t was 9.1659 with a 
median value of 10.634, which ranged between the minimum 0.0000 and the 
maximum 16.226, followed by ICT spending incurred in year t-1 (7.4102), 5.5548 
incurred in year t-2, and 3.8162 in year t-3. The minimum value of zero for ICT 
spending meant nil amount invested for ICT by the companies, whilst the maximum 
value of 16.226 indicated the highest amount of ICT investment made by the 
companies for the period of 2010 to 2014. 
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In order to precisely conclude the ICT investment trends in the Malaysian technology-
based sector, an additional bar chart of the trend is illustrated in Figure 5.5, which is 
based on yearly average value of ICT investment made by the companies for the 
period of 2010 to 2014. As open economy is highly integrated with international 
markets in terms of trade and investment (Mei, 2010); many countries, including 
Malaysia, had been hit hard by the global economic downturn that took place from 
2008 to 2009. Furthermore, the bar graph displays the trend of ICT spending that 
fluctuated over the periods of 2010 to 2014. This trend, however, proves that 
companies in the Malaysian technology-based sector have not stopped 
revolutionizing, but kept developing their technology capacity to consistently benefit 
in all areas for their short term sustainability achievement (Contreras & Tormo, 2009), 
besides reducing the impacts caused by financial crisis. 
 
 
 Figure 5.5: Trends of ICT Investment in the Malaysian Technology-Based Sector (2010 to 2014). 




5.4.2.2 ICT Governance Mechanisms 
The element of ICT governance is comprised of two mechanisms; ICT governance 
processes measured by ADICTG, and ICT governance structures measured by 
ICTGCOM and ICTSM39. The findings revealed that 86.1 per cent of the sampled 
companies did adopt the ICT governance standards or frameworks (ADICTG). On the 
other hand, the minimum value of ‗0‘ indicates that some companies did not adopt any 
ICT standard or framework in their business operation, whereas the maximum value 
of 1 denotes the adoption of ICT standards or frameworks by companies. 
Additionally, the results also exhibited that the presence of ICT governance committee 
(ICTGCOM) and ICT senior management (ICTSM) had been 83.64 per cent and 90.3 
per cent, respectively. The results indicated that the number of ICTSM was higher 
than the number of ICTGCOM in the Malaysian technology-based sector. Moreover, 
the minimum value of ‗0‘ indicated the absence of ICTGCOM and ICTSM at a certain 
period of time, while the maximum value of ‗1‘ denoted otherwise.  
In overall, this study concludes that more than 50 per cent of the ICT governance 
standards or frameworks had been adopted as guideline and basic structures of ICT 
implementation, as well as supported with the presence of ICTGCOM and ICTSM 
which has also exceeded 50 per cent in the Malaysian technology-based sector from 
2010 until 2014. In addition, Figure 5.6 illustrates the trends of yearly average 
percentage value for ADICTG, ICTGCOM, and ICTSM in the Malaysian technology-
based sector from 2010 until 2014. As for the adoption of ICT governance standards 
or frameworks (ADICTG), the bar graph shows that this aspect remained unchanged 
for its percentage appeared between 2010 and 2011. This could be due to the fact that 
                                            
39 ADICTG refers to the adoption of ICT governance standards or frameworks; ICTGCOM refers to the 
presence of ICT governance committee; and ICTSM refers to the presence of ICT senior management. 
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many companies were still in the initial process of adopting the mandatory compliance 
of ICT governance standards imposed by the Malaysian government in 2010. 
Furthermore, the percentage of adoption displayed an increase to 87.9 per cent in 
2012, and continued to exhibit good progressive number of adoption to 93.94 per cent 
in 2014. Thus, the mandatory compliance of ICT governance standards in 2010 is 
viewed as an essential mechanism in assisting the technology sector to improve the 
quality of their ICT management after suffering from the 2008-2009 financial crises. 
 
Figure 5.6: Trends of ICT Governance Mechanisms in the Malaysian Technology-Based Sector (2010 
to 2014). 
 
Furthermore, the percentage of the ICTGCOM presence remained unchanged between 
2010 and 2011, but declined to 81.8 per cent in 2012, and again, the percentage 
retained until 2013. However, ICTGCOM displayed an increment up to 84.9 per cent 
in 2014. As for ICTSM, its percentages remained unchanged for 2010 and 2011. 
Nonetheless, the percentage of ICTSM began to decline from 90.9 per cent in 2012 to 
84.9 per cent in 2014. However, it is remarkable that although the presence of ICTSM 
was inconsistent, this study found that the percentage of ICTSM exceeded that of 
ICTGCOM annually.  
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5.4.2.3 Boards with Diverse ICT Expertise 
From the descriptive statistics of boards with diverse ICT expertise in the Malaysian 
technology-based sector from 2010 until 2014, boards with ICT industrial experiences 
(BICTIE) held the highest percentage of 49.42, in comparison to boards with ICT-
related training (BICTTR) at 33.33 per cent, followed by the third highest; boards 
with ICT education background (BICTEDU) at 25.51 per cent, and the least at 11.13 
per cent for boards with ICT professional qualifications (BICTPRO). The results 
indicated that the aspect of expertise in ICT industrial experiences was indeed 
possessed by most of the board members in the Malaysian technology sector from 
2010 until 2014. From the findings, this study concludes that the levels of all types of 
ICT expertise possessed by the board of directors had been low as the percentage of 
boards with ICT expertise had been less than 50 per cent within the firms from the 
Malaysian technology sector. In fact, the overall minimum value of zero for each 
variable proved that a number of firms still did not rely on the capabilities of the board 
members with diverse ICT expertise, especially in carrying out their business 
operation.  
Meanwhile, Figure 5.7 illustrates a clear trend of boards with diverse ICT expertise, 
such as BICTIE, BICTEDU, BICTTR, and BICTPRO in the Malaysian technology-
based sector from 2010 until 2014, which had been based on yearly average 
percentage value for each variable. As described earlier, ICT industrial experiences 
have been indicated as the largest ICT expertise possessed by the majority of directors 
within the Malaysian technology-based sector. Although the bar graph of the BICTIE 
exhibited a downward trend from 2010 to 2014; the flow remained stable due to low 




Figure 5.7: Trends of Boards with Diverse ICT Expertise in the Malaysian Technology-Based Sector 
(2010 to 2014). 
 
Likewise, the percentage of BICTEDU also displayed a gradual decline by varying 
degrees over the five years. Moreover, regarding the performance of boards with ICT-
related training (BICTTR) in the Malaysian technology-based sector, this study 
suggests that the bar graph had been unstable from 2010 until 2014. From the previous 
discussion, boards with ICT professional qualifications (BICTPRO) had been 
identified as the lowest ICT expertise held by the boards of directors in the Malaysian 
technology-based sector for the period of 2010 to 2014. In fact, the bar graph of 
BICTPRO showed that the percentage had steadily fluctuated with a slight change in 
the percentage along the periods under observation. 
5.4.2.4 Ownership Structures 
The descriptive statistics of ownership structures in the Malaysian technology-based 
sector from 2010 until 2014 is presented in Table 5.5. The table shows that the largest 
ownership structure in the Malaysian technology-based sector was dominated by the 
concentrated ownership (COWN) that held about 44.2 per cent of companies‘ shares 
for the period of 2010 to 2014. Next, the second largest was managerial ownership 
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(MOWN) that held 23.8 per cent of companies‘ shares, and followed by 9.03 per cent 
of foreign ownership (FOWN), while only 3.33 per cent by the government (GOWN).  
 
Figure 5.8: Trends of Ownership Structures in the Malaysian Technology-Based Sector (2010 to 2014). 
 
Furthermore, based on the yearly average value of ownership structures presented in 
Figure 5.8; the trend of COWN in the Malaysian technology sector displayed a decline 
in its percentage from 47.2 per cent in 2010 to 41.9 per cent in 2012. However, the 
percentage improved in 2013 and continued to grow until 2014 with 43.7 per cent and 
44.05 per cent, respectively. On the other hand, the percentage of MOWN showed a 
steady decline from 2010 to 2014. Meanwhile, foreign investors began to show much 
interest in investing in the Malaysian technology sector in 2012. As such, the figure 
shows the FOWN graph moved up from 4.57 per cent in 2011 to 14.02 per cent in 
2014. However, the percentage of GOWN remained steady, although a slight decrease 
was noted in its percentage for 2013 and 2014. 
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5.4.3 Control Variables 
 
Figure 5.9: Trends of Board Independence (BINDP) and Leverage (LEV) in the Malaysian Technology-
Based Sector (2010 to 2014). 
 
Table 5.5 presents the descriptive statistics for control variables, such as board 
independence (BINDP), board size (BSIZE), leverage (LEV), and firm size (FSIZE) 
for the period of 2010 to 2014 in the Malaysian technology-based sector. This study 
found that the percentage value of 51.4 per cent for BINDP showed that the 
companies in the Malaysian technology sector did implement good corporate practice 
as this percentage value exceeded the 33.3 per cent cut-off point of the minimum level 
of board independence, as suggested by the Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance. Turning to BSIZE, the result showed that the companies had 6.76 board 
members on average with a median value of 6 that ranged from the minimum 4 to the 
maximum 13 board members. Besides, the mean and median values for financial 
leverage (LEV) were 0.1968 and 0.1134, respectively, which ranged between the 
minimum value of 0.0021 and the maximum 1.4509. This study also examined the 
variable of firm size, which was measured using the logarithm of companies‘ total 
assets. The mean value of firm size, as a result, for those in the Malaysian technology-
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based sector was 17.54, while its median of 17.58 ranged between the minimum of 
15.29 and the maximum of 20.24. 
 
Figure 5.10: Trends of Board Size (BSIZE) in the Malaysian Technology-Based Sector (2010 to 2014). 
 
 
Figure 5.9, in addition, depicts a clear trend of yearly average values for board 
independence (BINDP) and leverage (LEV) in the Malaysian technology-based sector 
for the period of 2010 to 2014. The bar graph of BINDP showed that the percentage 
had a slight decrease from 51.3 per cent in 2010 to 49.8 per cent in 2013, while the 
number of independent boards showed continuous increment from 2013 with 53.5 per 
cent to 54.2 per cent in 2014. In the overall view of financial leverage (LEV), the bar 
graph shows that the LEV rose in 2011 with the leverage at 15.2 per cent to 22.4 per 
cent in 2013, while a slight decrease was noted in 2014 with 21.8 per cent. 
Meanwhile, the trends of board size (BSIZE) in the Malaysian technology sectors as 
illustrated in figure 5.10, shows that the size of board members did not significantly 
change and it remained stable from 2010 to 2014.  As for firm size (FSIZE), Figure 
5.11 depicts the trend of FSIZE in the Malaysian technology-based sector for the 
period of 2010 to 2014. The figure shows that the bar graph was relatively stable 





  Figure 5.11: Trends of Firm Size (FSIZE) in the Malaysian Technology-Based Sector (2010 to 2014). 
5.5 Univariate Analysis 
In this study the t-test and Pairwise correlation matrix were conducted for all sampled 
companies in the Malaysian technology-based sector to test the key variables. 
5.5.1 T-test for All Sampled Companies in the Malaysian Technology Sector 
The first objective outlined in this study is to examine the extent of ICT investment 
among firms in the Malaysian technology-based sector. As such, inferential statistics 
was performed using t-test to examine the extent of ICT investment in the Malaysian 
technology-based sector. With that, this section provides several inter-temporal 
comparisons of ICT investment, which was measured by ICT spending (ICTSPE) 
mean value using the Independent Sample Test for Equality of Means. This 
Independent Sample Test for Equality of Means was employed in this inter-temporal 
analysis to examine the difference in the mean values of ICT spending (ICTSPE) 
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between group populations, such as (1) inter-ICT components40; (2) inter-Bursa 
markets41; (3) inter-ICT governance mechanisms; (4) inter-board characteristics; (5) 
inter-ownership structures; and (6) inter-company characteristics. Hence, Table 5.6 to 
Table 5.12 illustrate the findings retrieved from results of t-test for all compared 
variables measured using dichotomous and continuous values, as well as coded using 
dummy (1, 0). 
5.5.1.1 Inter-ICT Components 
Three group categories that were represented by their own indicators had been 
established in order to examine if the difference in the mean value of ICT investment 
existed between the compared indicators. As for the first group, the t-test was carried 
out to verify the difference in the means of ICT investment between the frequencies of 
companies that did invest in ICT and the frequencies of companies that did not do so. 
Hence, for this purpose of examination, ICT spending (ICTSPE) was used to measure 
ICT investment. Table 5.6 presents the analysis findings of inter-ICT component 
group statistics and t-test. The results in the group statistics showed that 131 (79 per 
cent) total frequencies of companies made ICT investment, in comparison to 34 (21 
per cent) total frequencies of companies that did not invest in ICT.  
From the total frequencies (131) of investment made in ICT, approximately 76 
frequencies of ICT investment were made by companies from the ACE Market. 
However, the frequencies of ICT investment made by companies from the Main 
Market were only recorded at 55, which is lower than those of ACE Market. Other 
                                            
40 Inter-ICT components refer to the comparison between ICT tangible assets (e.g., hardware) and ICT 
intangible assets (e.g., software, R&D, copyrights, pattern, etc.). 
41 Inter-Bursa Markets refer to the comparison between Main Market (MM) and ACE Market (ACE). 
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than that, the mean value was also found higher which was at 11.6 in the frequencies 
of companies that did invest in ICT compared to the mean value of 0 6 in the 
frequencies of companies that did not invest in ICT. Furthermore, the t-test results 
exemplified a statistically significant difference between the frequencies of companies 
that did invest and those that did not invest in ICT investment at a significant level of 
1 per cent. In precise, most companies in the Malaysian technology sector were 
significantly involved in making ICT investment over the period of 2010 to 2014. 
Table 5.6 Inter-ICT Components: Analysis of Group Statistics and T-Test  
Group Statistics 
Test Variable: ICTSPE 
t-test 








1     Invested  55 76 131 79 11.6 51.8 0.000 
*** 0     Not invested  10 24 34 21 0.00 
Total 65 85 165 100 
Invested in 
ICTTA and 
not invested  
1     Invested  48 70 118 72 10.6 56.5 0.000 
*** 0     Not invested  17 30 47 28 0.00 




1     Invested  30 37 67 41 12.4 40.1 0.000 
*** 0     Not invested  35 63 98 59 0.00 
Total 65 85 165 100 
Note: ICTSPE refers to ICT spending which is the measurement of ICT investment; ICTTA refers to 
ICT tangible assets; ICTTN refers to ICT intangible assets; MM refers to Main Market; ACE refers to 
the ACE Market; Fq. refers to the frequencies; and TFq. refers to the total frequencies. *, ** and *** 
represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
Next, in order to examine the extent the companies in the Malaysian technology sector 
had been involved in ICT investment, two group categories were established, namely 
ICT tangible assets (ICTTA) and ICT intangible assets (ICTTN). The comparison for 
ICTTA was performed using two indicators; (1) the frequencies of companies that did 
invest in ICTTA were recorded as 1; while (2) the value ‗0‘ denoted the frequencies of 
companies that did not invest in ICTTA. Likewise, the ICTTN was compared between 
235 
 
two indicators; (1) the frequencies of companies that did invest in ICTTN were 
recorded as 1; while (2) the value ‗0‘ was meant for frequencies of companies that did 
not invest in ICTTN. 
The results in the group statistics showed that 118 (72 per cent) total frequencies of 
companies did invest in ICTTA, whereas only 47 (28 per cent) frequencies of 
companies did not invest in ICTTA. From the total frequencies (118) of making 
investment in ICTTA, approximately 70 frequencies of companies in the ACE Market 
invested in ICTTA. The frequencies of companies from the Main Market did invest in 
ICTTA, but only 48 were recorded; which is lower than the frequencies of ACE 
Market. Besides, the statistics results revealed that the total frequencies of companies 
in ICTTN investment had been 67 (41 per cent). Unfortunately, the results disclosed 
that 98 (59 per cent) total frequencies of companies in the Malaysian technology 
sector did not invest in ICTTN for the period of 2010 to 2014. From the total 
frequencies (67) of making investment in ICTTN, only 37 frequencies of companies 
from the ACE Market invested in ICTTN, which recorded a higher number when 
compared to those from the Main Market, which were only 30. Both t-test results of 
ICTTA and ICTTN, as presented in Table 5.6, exhibited statistically significant 
differences at a significant level of 1 per cent between the indicators. 
Since it had been confirmed that the companies in the technology sector were indeed 
significantly involved in ICT investment, Table 5.7 offers the answer to the question 
of ‗which did the Malaysian technology sector spent most in ICT investment; either 
ICT tangible assets (ICTTA) or ICT intangible assets (ICTTN)?‘. The total investment 
for ICTTA was about RM 31,513,060 (28 per cent), which is lower than the total 
investment for ICTTN; RM 79,744,531 (72 per cent). The overall total ICT 
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investment made by companies in the Malaysian technology-based sector from 2010 
until 2014 was RM 111,257,591, where companies from the Main Market (RM 
71,757,392) emerged as the main contributor to the total ICT investment, when 
compared to those from the ACE Market (RM 39,500,199). Besides, from the overall 
total of ICT investment, it was found that the sector had invested mostly in ICTTN (72 
per cent), instead of only 28 per cent in ICTTA. 
Table 5.7 Total of ICT Investment in the Malaysian Technology-based Sector (2010 to 2014) 
















 Investment amount 
of  ICTTA 
21,647,259 
 
30 9,865,801 25 31,513,060 28 
 Investment amount 
of  ICTTN 
50,110,133 70 29,634,398 75 79,744,531 72 
Total Amount of ICT 
Investment 
71,757,392 100 39,500,199 100 111,257,591 100 
Note: ICTTA refers to ICT tangible assets; ICTTN refers to ICT intangible assets; MM refers to Main 
Market; and ACE refers to the ACE Market. 
 
 
5.5.1.2 Inter-Bursa Markets 
Basically, two types of Bursa Markets exist in the Malaysian technology-based sector, 
namely Main Market and ACE Market. The Inter-Bursa Markets comparison was 
performed to determine the extent of ICT investment (ICTSPE) in the Malaysian 
technology-based sector. For that purpose, ICT investment was compared between the 
Main Market and the ACE Market. The initial prediction of this comparison was that 
differences may appear between the Main Market and the ACE Market in terms of 
their ICT investments in the Malaysian technology-based sector from 2010 to 2014, 
since the Main Market is comprised of more established companies that held strong 
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financial records42 compared to the ACE Market, which is characterized by emerging 
companies. 
Table 5.8 Inter-Bursa Markets: Analysis of Group Statistics and T-Test  
Group Statistics 




Dummy Codes TFq % Mean t p  
MKTYPE 1     MM  65 39 9.98 1.67 0.097* 
0     ACE 100 61 8.63 
Total 165 100 
Note: MKTYPE refers to Market Type; MM refers to Main Market; ACE refers to the ACE Market; 
and TFq. refers to the total frequencies. *, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
 
Additionally, Table 5.8 demonstrates the difference of ICT investment had been 
relatively small between the Main Market and the ACE Market. Besides, the mean 
value of ICT investment was higher among companies from the Main Market, when 
compared to those from the ACE Market, which were 9.98 and 8.63, respectively. 
Hence, the null hypothesis is rejected at a 10 per cent significant level. Although the 
results displayed slight difference for ICT investment between these two Bursa 
Markets, the stronger financial wealth derived from the Main Market has aided the 
market to spend more in ICT investment, in comparison to the ACE Market. 
5.5.1.3 Inter-ICT Governance Mechanisms 
The three criteria of ICT governance mechanisms were established to examine the 
difference, if any, in the mean values of ICT investment between: (1) companies with 
and without ICT governance standards or frameworks (ADICTG); (2) companies with 
the presence and absence of ICT governance committee (ICTGCOM); as well as (3) 
companies with the presence and absence of ICT senior management (ICTSM). The 
                                            
42 Having strong financial record helps the company to invest in ICT as ICT investment itself requires a 
huge amount of funds. 
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results of group statistics and t-test for inter-ICT governance mechanisms, as given in 
Table 5.9, portray insignificant difference between ADICTG, ICTGCOM, and 
ICTSM, as this study failed to reject the null hypotheses at any significant levels; 
indicating nil difference in the means of ICT investment between companies with and 
without ADICTG, as well as between companies with the presence and absence of 
ICTGCOM and ICTSM.  
 
Table 5.9 Inter-ICT Governance Mechanisms: Analysis of Group Statistics and T-Test  
Group Statistics 








TFq % Mean t p  
ADICTG 1     with    63 79 142 86 9.24 0.44 0.664 
 0     without 2 21 23 14 8.73 
Total 65 100 165 100 
ICTGCOM 1     presence    59 79 138 84 9.35 1.02 0.311 
 0     absence 6 21 27 16 8.24 
Total 65 100 165 100 
ICTSM 1     presence    59 90 149 90 9.19 0.18 0.856 
0     absence 6 10 16 10 8.94 
Total 65 100 165 100 
Note: ADICTG is the adoption of ICT governance standards and frameworks; ICTGCOM is the 
presence of ICT governance committee; ICTSM is the presence of ICT senior management; MM refers 
to Main Market; ACE refers to the ACE Market; Fq. refers to the frequencies; and TFq. refers to the 
total frequencies. *, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
5.5.1.4 Inter-Board Characteristics 
The inter-board characteristics were also formulated to examine the extent of ICT 
investment in the Malaysian technology-based sector by assessing each criterion of 
board characteristic indicator variables, which were coded using dummy variables in 
this study. Table 5.10 presents the results of group statistics and t-test for inter-board 
characteristics. As for the variable of boards with ICT education background 
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(BICTEDU), both criteria of dichotomous and continuous values were applied to 
verify the difference, if any, between the mean values of two populations on ICT 
investment; between presence and absence of BICTEDU, by using dichotomous 
values. Besides, a comparison of ICT investment was also performed to examine the 
existence of difference between mean values for companies with frequencies more 
than the median value of BICTEDU, which was 0.25, by using continuous values.  
From the group statistics, the total frequencies of the presence of BICTEDU had been 
129, while absence of BICTEDU was 36. The mean value of ICT investment was 
higher at 9.57 for those with BICTEDU, as compared to the mean value of those 
without BICTEDU, which was at 7.73. Meanwhile, the t-test results displayed a 
significant difference between the presence and the absence of BICTEDU in ICT 
investment.  As such, the null hypothesis is rejected at a 10 per cent significance level. 
This indicated that the presence of BICTEDU aided in fostering companies‘ ICT 
development that led them to invest in ICT. However, the findings showed 
insignificant difference for the mean values of ICT investment between companies‘ 
frequencies with more and less than the median value of BICTEDU as this study has 
failed to reject the null hypothesis at any significant level.  
As for boards with ICT professional qualifications (BICTPRO), a comparison was 
performed to ascertain if a difference existed between the presence and the absence of 
BICTPRO in fostering companies‘ ICT investment43. As depicted in the table, a 
significant difference in the mean values of ICT investment between the presence and 
                                            
43 However, the comparison to examine the difference, if any, between mean values of ICT investment 
for companies‘ frequencies exceeding the median value of BICTPRO could not be conducted in this 
study as the median value for BICTPRO was found 0 from the descriptive table, and the outcome of 
this treatment turned out exactly similar to the ones tested (the comparison between presence and 




absence of BICTPRO had been discovered as the mean value of ICT investment was 
found higher for those with BICTPRO at 9.94, compared to 8.47 for those without 
BICTPRO. Thus, this study rejects the null hypothesis at 10 per cent significance 
level.  
Table 5.10 Inter-Board Characteristics: Analysis of Group Statistics and T-Test  
Group Statistics 








TFq % Mean t p  
BICTEDU 1     presence    57 72 129 78 9.57 1.90 0.06 
* 0     absence 8 28 36 22 7.73 
Total 65 100 165 100 
1     > median of BICTEDU 29 54 83 50 9.71 1.36 0.18 
0     < median of BICTEDU 36 46 82 50 8.62 
Total 65 100 165 100 
BICTPRO 1     presence    43 35 78 47 9.94 1.84 0.07 
* 0     absence 22 65 87 53 8.47 
Total 65 100 165 100 
BICTIE 1     presence    63 99 162 98 9.23 1.19 0.24 
0     absence 2 1 3 2 5.67 
Total 65 100 165 100 
1     > median of BICTIE 36 55 91 55 9.85 1.90 0.06 
* 0     < median of BICTIE 29 45 74 45 8.32 
Total 65 100 165 100 
BICTTR 1     presence    28 27 55 33 10.3 2.03 0.04 
** 0     absence 37 73 110 67 8.59 
Total 65 100 165 100 
BINDP 1    ≥ 1/3 of INED 39 67 106 63 8.74 -1.41 0.16 
0    < 1/3 of INED 26 33 59 37 9.93 
Total 65 100 165 100 
BSIZE 1     presence    48 82 130 79 9.24 0.34 0.74 
0     absence 17 18 35 21 8.90 
Total 65 100 165 100 
Note: BICTEDU is boards‘ ICT educational background; BICTPRO is boards‘ ICT professional 
qualification; BICTIE is boards‘ ICT industrial experience; BICTTR is boards‘ ICT-related trainings; 
BINDP is board independence; BSIZE is board size; MM refers to Main Market; ACE refers to the 
ACE Market; Fq. refers to the frequencies; and TFq. refers to the total frequencies. *, ** and *** 
represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Likewise, the ICT investment was also compared between the presence and absence 
of boards with ICT industrial experiences (BICTIE), as well as to examine the 
difference in the mean values of ICT investment between companies‘ frequencies with 
more and less than the median value of BICTIE (0.544). In fact, the results of BICTIE 
exhibited insignificant difference between the presence and absence of BICTIE as the 
null hypothesis could not be rejected at any significant level. Meanwhile, the mean 
values of ICT investment differed significantly between companies‘ frequencies with 
more and less than the median value of BICTIE at a significance level of 5 per cent. 
The mean value of ICT investment was found higher at 9.85 for companies‘ 
frequencies with more than the median value of BICTIE, when compared to the mean 
value of those with less than the median value of BICTIE, which was at 8.32. The 
results indicated that ICT investment was better served with the presence of 
companies‘ frequencies with more than the median value of BICTIE, compared to 
those less. 
In addition, ICT related-training has been deemed as essential for boards as a base to 
build new knowledge of cutting-edge changes in technological development, as well 
as to develop skills for innovation of future products and services. With t-test, the ICT 
investment was also compared between presence and absence of boards with ICT-
related training (BICTTR). The results displayed a significant difference for the mean 
values of ICT investment for the comparison between the presence and absence of 
BICTTR. The mean value for those with BICTTR had been higher at 10.3, when 
compared to those without BICTTR; 8.59. Hence, the null hypothesis is rejected at 5 
per cent significance level. The results further indicated that the presence of BICTTR 
helped to boost the companies‘ ICT investment during the period of 2010 to 2014.  
                                            
44 Refer to Table 5.5 Descriptive Statistics of Variables. 
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The comparison of ICT investment was also performed between two indicator 
variables of board independence (BINDP), namely (1) independent executive directors 
(INEDs), which is more than or equivalent to one third of the board size and recorded 
as ‗1‘; as well as (2) INEDs with less than one third of the board size and recorded as 
‗0‘. The results of the t-test showed insignificant variance between the mean values of 
ICT investment with more than or equivalent to one third of INEDs and less than one 
third of INEDs among companies, as the null hypothesis could not be rejected at any 
significant level. Likewise, the results of the comparison for ICT investment between 
two indicator variables of board size (BSIZE) also exhibited insignificant difference 
between having more than 6 board members and less than 6 board members in the 
companies45, since the null hypothesis could not be rejected at any significant level. 
5.5.1.5 Inter-Ownership Structures 
Inter-ownership structures were also formulated under t-test to examine the extent of 
ICT investment in the Malaysian technology sector. In fact, four main ownership 
structure variables were employed for this t-test investigation. First, comparisons of 
ICT investment from ownership variables, such as COWN, MOWN, and FOWN, 
were conducted to ascertain the difference, if any, between mean values of ICT 
investment for companies‘ frequencies with more or less than the median value from 
each ownership variable. Besides, the comparison of ICT investment was also 
performed between companies with and without government and foreign ownerships. 
Table 5.11 presents the results of group statistics and t-test for the ownership 
structures. The results showed a significant difference at 5 per cent significant level 
for mean values of ICT investment between companies‘ frequencies with exceeding 
                                            
45 The determined number of 6 board members refers to the mean value of board size (BSIZE) found 
from the descriptive analysis in Table 5.5. 
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value than the median value of COWN, which was 46.17646, in comparison to those 
with lower than the COWN median value. Likewise, a significant difference at 5 per 
cent significance level was revealed for mean values of ICT investment between 
companies‘ frequencies with more than the median value of FOWN, which was 
1.712547, compared to those with lower than the FOWN median value. However, the 
results revealed insignificant difference for the means of ICT investment between 
companies‘ frequencies with more and less than the median value of MOWN as the 
null hypothesis could not be rejected at any significance level. 
Table 5.11 Inter-Ownership Structures: Analysis of Group Statistics and T-Test  
Group Statistics 








TFq % Mean t p  
COWN 1     > median of 46.176 41 43 84 51 10.07 2.32 0.02 
** 0     < median of 46.176 24 57 81 49 8.23 
Total 65 100 165 100 
MOWN 1     > median of 20.181 37 46 83 50 8.57 -1.49 0.14 
0     < median of 20.181 28 54 82 50 9.77 
Total 65 100 165 100 
GOWN 1     with    16 4 20 12 11.26 2.49 0.02 
** 0     without  49 96 145 88 8.88 
Total 65 100 165 100 
FOWN 1     with    48 65 113 68 9.63 1.70 0.09 
* 0     without  17 35 52 32 8.16 
Total 65 100 165 100 
1     > median of 1.7125 33 51 84 51 9.94 1.97 0.05 
** 0     < median of 1.7125 32 49 81 49 8.36 
Total 65 100 165 100 
Note: COWN is concentrated ownership; MOWN is managerial ownership; GOWN is government 
ownership; FOWN is foreign ownership; MM refers to Main Market; ACE refers to the ACE Market; 
Fq. refers to the frequencies; and TFq. refers to the total frequencies. *, ** and *** represent 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
                                            
46 Refer to Table 5.5 Descriptive Statistics of Variables. 
47 Refer to Table 5.5 Descriptive Statistics of Variables. 
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Besides, the dichotomous values used to differentiate the mean value of ICT 
investment between companies with and without GOWN and FOWN also 
demonstrates significant results as the null hypothesis could be rejected at 5 per cent 
and 10 per cent significant levels, respectively. Hence, the findings indicated a 
significant difference for the mean values of ICT investment, which was found higher 
for companies‘ frequencies with GOWN (11.26), compared to the mean value for 
companies‘ frequencies without GOWN, which was at 8.88. Other than that, a 
significant difference was also found higher for companies with FOWN at 9.63, when 
compared to those without FOWN at 8.16. Hence, it is concluded that the companies 
in the Malaysian technology sector were better served with GOWN and FOWN, as 
well as companies‘ frequencies with more than the median value of COWN, in 
boosting ICT investment for the period of 2010 to 2014. 
5.5.1.6 Inter-Company Characteristics 
Inter-company characteristics were also examined to examine the extent of ICT 
investment in the Malaysian technology-based sector by assessing two criteria of 
company characteristics: leverage (LEV) and firm size (FSIZE). Meanwhile, the 
results of group statistics and t-test for company characteristics are shown in Table 
5.12. The two indicator variables used to differentiate leverage (LEV) in the t-test are: 
(1) frequencies of companies with more than the median value of leverage, which was 
0.113448; and (2) frequencies of companies with less than the median value of 
leverage. The t-test was conducted to examine a difference between the mean values 
of ICT investment among companies‘ frequencies with more than the median value of 
leverage and those with less than the median value of leverage.  
                                            
48 Refer to Table 5.5 Descriptive Statistics of Variables. 
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Table 5.12 Inter-Company Characteristics: Analysis of Group Statistics and T-Test  
Group Statistics 








TFq % Mean t p  
LEV 1     > median of 0.1134 35 46 81 49 9.40 0.58 0.56 
0     < median of 0.1134 30 54 84 51 8.94 
Total 65 100 165 100 
FSIZE 1     > median of 17.578 48 35 83 50 10.23 2.71 0.01 
** 0     < median of 17.578 17 65 82 50 8.09 
Total 65 100 165 100 
Note: LEV is leverage; FSIZE is firm size; MM refers to Main Market; ACE refers to the ACE Market; 
Fq. refers to the frequencies; and TFq. refers to the total frequencies. *, ** and *** represent 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
The results showed insignificant difference between the frequencies of companies 
with more than the median value of leverage and the frequencies of companies with 
less than the median value of leverage, since the null hypothesis could not be rejected 
at any significant level. Besides, the comparison of ICT investment was also 
conducted between two indicators of firm size (FSIZE), namely (1) the frequencies of 
companies with total assets more than the median value of FSIZE (17.57849), which 
was recorded as ‗1‘; and those with total assets less than the median value of FSIZE, 
which was recorded as ‗0‘. The results displayed a significant difference at 5 per cent 
significance level for the mean value of ICT investment between these two indicators, 




                                            
49 Refer to Table 5.5 Descriptive Statistics of Variables. 
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5.5.2 Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
The Pairwise Pearson‘s correlation matrix was employed to examine the existence of 
multicollinearity among the independent variables. Table 5.13 shows that the 
correlation coefficients absolute values between the variables were lower than the 0.9 
threshold value for potential multicollinearity (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007; Hair et al., 
2006); therefore all variables were included in the regression estimation. In the case of 
inconsistent findings, the result of multicollinearity is solved by using the panel data 
analysis method.  
5.6 Testing for Panel Data 
Basically, some elements of lagged dependent variables were applied to the equation 
model used in this study (refer to Equation (3)). In order to offer the robustness check 
for the validity of SGMM estimation method, the estimation results of DGMM, 
Pooled OLS, and panel fixed effect (FE) were also considered in this study. In 
addition, several common diagnostic tests like tests of multicollinearity, 
heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and F-test, were performed to examine if the data 
violate the underlying statistical assumptions. Besides, the results of two dynamic 
diagnostic tests; Sargan test50 and Arellano-Bond test51, were also applied to confirm 
the validity of GMM estimation methods. Next, regression analyses were used after 
the data met all diagnostic tests. 
                                            
50 The Sargan test was performed to determine if a correlation exists between the instruments and the 
error term in this study. 
51 Two tests were discovered under the Arellano-Bond (AR), namely first-order serial correlation test, 
AR(1); and second-order serial correlation test, AR(2). Under the rule of thumb of this assumption test, 
the test should reject the null of no first-order serial correlation, but it should not reject the null that 
there is no second-order serial correlation.  
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            Table 5.13 Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
Variables ROA ROAt-1 ROE ROEt-1 TQ TQt-1 ICTSPEt ICTSPEt-1 ICTSPEt-2 ICTSPEt-3 
ROA  1.0000          
ROAt-1  0.1190  1.0000 
ROE    1.0000 
ROEt-1    0.0824  1.0000 
TQ      1.0000 
TQt-1      0.6445***  1.0000 
ICTSPEt -0.0227  0.1045 -0.0452  0.1155 -0.0727 -0.1551**  1.0000 
ICTSPEt-1  0.0478 -0.0575  0.0075 -0.0829 -0.0122 -0.2145***  0.4134***  1.0000 
ICTSPEt-2 -0.0496  0.0105 -0.0542 -0.0254  0.0204 -0.1122  0.1931**  0.5754***  1.0000 
ICTSPEt-3 -0.0505 -0.0921 -0.0233 -0.1161  0.0213 -0.0572  0.1219  0.3315***  0.6330***  1.0000 
ADICTG -0.0584 -0.0342 -0.0078  0.0187 -0.1997** -0.1928**  0.0341  0.0941  0.1086  0.1052 
ICTGCOM -0.0297  0.1070  0.0156  0.1143 -0.2347** -0.0825  0.0794  0.0316  0.0426  0.0663 
ICTSM  0.1425*  0.0921  0.1118  0.0667  0.0925  0.0790  0.0143 -0.0493 -0.1440* -0.1433* 
BICTEDU  0.1415  0.0898  0.1351*  0.0795 -0.0718 -0.0384  0.0543 -0.0361 -0.0617 -0.0553 
BICTPRO  0.1081  0.0422  0.1193  0.0541 -0.1618** -0.1062  0.1371*  0.0251 -0.0197 -0.0260 
BICTIE  0.0715  0.0320  0.0783  0.0273 -0.0807 -0.0296  0.2372***  0.1023 -0.0117 -0.0904 
BICTTR  0.0275  0.0769  0.0286  0.0735 -0.0237 -0.0747  0.1567**  0.1006  0.0833 -0.0025 
COWN  0.2665***  0.2226***  0.2041***  0.1765** -0.0116 -0.0140  0.2180***  0.0744  0.0091  0.0043 
MOWN -0.0040 -0.0451 -0.0330 -0.0762  0.3144***  0.2217*** -0.0782 -0.1361* -0.1952** -0.1700** 
GOWN -0.0084  0.0054  0.0078  0.0172  0.0677  0.0684  0.0857  0.0424  0.0428  0.0246 
FOWN -0.1031 -0.1651** -0.0767 -0.1559** -0.1758** -0.0851  0.0940  0.1756**  0.2653***  0.2355*** 
BINDP -0.0804  0.0439 -0.0472  0.0820 -0.1223 -0.0933 -0.1239 -0.0209  0.0615  0.0941 
BSIZE  0.0920 -0.0062  0.0691 -0.0405  0.2814***  0.2108***  0.1365*  0.1485*  0.1458*  0.1053 
LEV -0.2290*** -0.1257 -0.3191*** -0.2196***  0.5882***  0.4738*** -0.0220 -0.0092  0.0887  0.0721 
FSIZE  0.2845***  0.2526***  0.2550***  0.2293***  0.1025  0.0534  0.1913**  0.1332*  0.0961  0.0865 
               Note: ROA is return on assets; ROE is return on equity; TQ is Tobin‘s Q; ROAt-1 is return on assets at time t-1; ROEt-1 is return on equity at time t-1; TQt-1 is Tobin‘s Q at time              
t-1; ICTSPE is ICT spending at time t; ICTSPEt-1 is ICT spending at time t-1; ICTSPEt-2  is ICT spending at time t-2; ICTSPEt-3 is ICT spending at time t-3; ADICTG is the 
adoption of ICT governance standards and frameworks; ICTGCOM is the presence of ICT governance committee; ICTSM is the presence of ICT senior management; 
BICTEDU is boards‘ ICT educational background; BICTPRO is boards‘ ICT professional qualification; BICTIE is boards‘ ICT industrial experience; BICTTR is boards‘ ICT  
related trainings; COWN is concentrated ownership; MOWN is managerial ownership; GOWN is government ownership; FOWN is foreign ownership; BINDP is board 





       Table 5.13 Pairwise Correlation Matrix (continued)  
Variables ADICTG ICTGCOM ICTSM BICTEDU BICTPRO BICTIE BICTTR COWN MOWN GOWN FOWN 
ADICTG  1.0000           
ICTGCOM  0.0585  1.0000 
ICTSM -0.1319*  0.0211  1.0000 
BICTEDU -0.2517***  0.1950**  0.2767***  1.0000 
BICTPRO -0.0019  0.2873***  0.2053***  0.4277***  1.0000 
BICTIE -0.0933  0.4126***  0.4626***  0.4765***  0.4958***  1.0000 
BICTTR  0.0990  0.1390* -0.0290 -0.2358***  0.0499  0.1057  1.0000 
COWN -0.1362* -0.1049  0.0969 -0.0490 -0.0472 -0.0481  0.1117  1.0000 
MOWN -0.1904**  0.1004  0.0643  0.0979  0.0808  0.1969** -0.0256  0.1503*  1.0000 
GOWN  0.1035  0.0732 -0.0214 -0.0720  0.1200 -0.0827  0.0972  0.2371*** -0.2685***  1.0000 
FOWN  0.0474 -0.0809 -0.0790  0.0262 -0.1049 -0.0129 -0.0703  0.0130 -0.2504*** -0.1562**  1.0000 
BINDP  0.3220*** -0.1813* -0.3630*** -0.2484*** -0.2322*** -0.3878*** -0.0264 -0.1581 -0.3045*** -0.0833 -0.0155 
BSIZE -0.2051***  0.0246  0.1670** -0.0178 -0.1662**  0.0327  0.0147  0.3253***  0.0491  0.1793**  0.0512 
LEV -0.1926** -0.2393*** -0.0666 -0.0983 -0.1018 -0.1438* -0.0850 -0.0457  0.1466* -0.0496 -0.0485 
FSIZE  0.0541  0.0973  0.1934**  0.0681  0.1962**  0.0208  0.0769    0.4205***  0.0323  0.2454** -0.1124 
Note: ADICTG is the adoption of ICT governance standards and frameworks; ICTGCOM is the presence of ICT governance committee; ICTSM is the presence of ICT senior 
management; BICTEDU is boards‘ ICT educational background; BICTPRO is boards‘ ICT professional qualification; BICTIE is boards‘ ICT industrial experience; BICTTR is 
boards‘ ICT  related trainings; COWN is concentrated ownership; MOWN is managerial ownership; GOWN is government ownership; FOWN is foreign ownership; BINDP is 




        Table 5.13 Pairwise Correlation Matrix (continued)  
Variables BINDP BSIZE LEV FSIZE 
BINDP  1.0000    
BSIZE -0.4243***  1.0000 
LEV -0.1325  0.1427 1.0000 
FSIZE -0.0551  0.2545*** 0.0420 1.0000 
         Note: BINDP is board independence; BSIZE is board size; LEV is leverage and FSIZE is firm size.  
         *, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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5.6.1 Results of Multicollinearity 
Table 5.14 Results of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
Variables ROA ROE TQ 
VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF 
ROAt-1 1.28 0.781752     
ROEt-1   1.29 0.773783 
TQ-1   1.60 0.624819 
ICTSPEt 1.43 0.701008 1.44     0.695150 1.42 0.704125 
ICTSPEt-1 1.82 0.548832 1.84 0.544468 1.82 0.548798 
ICTSPEt-2 2.43 0.411206 2.42 0.413594 2.36 0.422994 
ICTSPEt-3 1.80 0.556758 1.80 0.555590 1.76 0.569482 
ADICTG 1.33 0.749304 1.33 0.750241 1.35 0.742656 
ICTGCOM 1.52 0.655933 1.52 0.659072 1.50     0.665749 
ICTSM 1.68 0.596525 1.67 0.597426 1.69    0.592296 
BICTEDU 1.72 0.582498 1.71 0.583917 1.71     0.586438 
BICTPRO 1.77 0.566328 1.76 0.566988 1.77 0.564674 
BICTIE 2.56 0.390658 2.56 0.390687 2.57 0.389213 
BICTTR 1.21 0.823536 1.21 0.824043 1.21 0.824356 
COWN 1.70 0.587067 1.67 0.598072 1.66 0.602615 
MOWN 1.64 0.608996 1.64 0.609570 1.68 0.593771 
GOWN 1.48 0.673980 1.48 0.677179 1.51 0.660069 
FOWN 1.38 0.724525 1.37 0.728422 1.34 0.749045 
BINDP 1.97 0.506535 1.97   0.506350 2.03 0.493154 
BSIZE 1.67 0.598593 1.67 0.599579 1.72 0.581209 
LEV 1.30 0.771274 1.33 0.751925 1.60 0.626610 
FSIZE 1.65 0.606826 1.65 0.605551 1.61 0.622445 
Mean VIF 1.67  1.67  1.70  
Note: ROA is return on assets; ROE is return on equity; TQ is Tobin‘s Q; ROAt-1 is return on assets at time t-
1; ROEt-1 is return on equity at time t-1; TQt-1 is Tobin‘s Q at time t-1; ICTSPE is ICT spending at time t; 
ICTSPEt-1 is ICT spending at time t-1; ICTSPEt-2  is ICT spending at time t-2; ICTSPEt-3 is ICT 
spending at time t-3; ADICTG is the adoption of ICT governance standards and frameworks; 
ICTGCOM is the presence of ICT governance committee; ICTSM is the presence of ICT senior 
management; BICTEDU is boards‘ ICT educational background; BICTPRO is boards‘ ICT 
professional qualification; BICTIE is boards‘ ICT industrial experience; BICTTR is boards‘ ICT-
related trainings; COWN is concentrated ownership; MOWN is managerial ownership; GOWN is 
government ownership; FOWN is foreign ownership; BINDP is board independence; BSIZE is board 
size; LEV is leverage and FSIZE is firm size. 
 
The Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) of the variables for all models were examined. 
Table 5.14 demonstrates that VIF for the ROA model ranged from 1.21 to 2.56. As for 
the ROE model, the VIF values also ranged from 1.21 to 2.56, while 1.21 to 2.57 for 
TQ model. Therefore, the VIF for all three models used in this study were found to be 
around 1.21 to 2.57, which are below than the threshold value 10 (Hair et al., 2006; 
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Ho, 2006; Gujarati, 2003). Therefore, multicollinearity is not likely to affect 
regression analysis, which allows for the standard interpretation of regression 
coefficients. 
5.6.2 Selection of the Appropriate Model 
Apart from the two dynamic models applied in this study, the most appropriate 
statistical model was also chosen to describe the effect of ICT investment, ICT 
governance mechanisms, boards with diverse ICT expertise, and ownership structures 
on firm performance. Moreover, due to the panel data used in this study, the models of 
the study were also subjected to other regression models (Fixed and Random Effects), 
in addition to Pooled OLS, because of the uncertainty in conjunction to the conformity 
with the OLS regression model assumptions, as indicated by the normality test, as 
discussed in sub-section 5.3. As such, several statistical tests were carried out and the 
results are demonstrated in Table 5.15.  
Table 5.15 Results of Statistical Tests (Hausman, Lagrange Multiplier (LM) and F-Test) 
Types of Tests Statisitics ROA ROE TQ 
 Hausman Test Chi2 


















 F-Test F-value 







Note: ROA is return on assets; ROE is return on equity; and TQ is Tobin‘s Q.  
The first test refers to the Hausman test, which compared the FE and RE models. 
Second, the Breusch-Pagan LM test was conducted to select the most suitable model 
between the RE and OLS models, and lastly, ended with the F-test. The Hausman 
specification test was conducted to examine if the individual effects were uncorrelated 
with other predictors in the model. Hence, it may result in inconsistency with the 
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presence of such correlation. Moreover, the fixed effects (FE) model considers the 
presence of correlation between independent variables and error term, while the 
random effects (RE) model does not. The null hypothesis (H0) assumes that 
unobserved effect is uncorrelated with explanatory variables, while the alternative 
hypothesis (H1) determines that the unobserved effect is correlated with explanatory 
variables. Besides, the Hausman test determines the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients estimated by the efficient RE estimator are similar to the ones estimated 
by the consistent FE estimator. 
If a significant p value is generated (prob>chi2 is smaller than the 5 per cent 
significance level), the null hypothesis is rejected, while the FE model is preferred 
than the RE model. If the result shows a non-significant p value (prob>chi2 is larger 
than the 5 per cent significance level); it is suggested that the RE is more appropriate 
than the FE model (Stock & Watson, 2007; Greene, 2003). As such, the Hausman test 
was performed for all financial performance models of ROA, ROE, and TQ. 
Moreover, as shown in Table 5.15, the Hausman test results showed that the p values 
of ROA, ROE, and TQ were significant since the null hypotheses could be rejected at 
the significance level of 5 per cent. The results indicated that the FE model was the 
most appropriate among all models. The next step involved the test of Breush-Pagan 
LM, in order to compare between OLS and RE models. This involved testing for the 
presence of time and individual effects based on the OLS residuals. The null 
hypothesis in the LM test is that there is no time or individual effects to indicate that 
the OLS estimator is consistent, thus suggesting that the OLS is the most appropriate 
method. Meanwhile, the null hypothesis is rejected if the test result hints the presence 
of time upon individual effects, hence suggesting that the RE is the most appropriate 
method to use.  
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Based on Table 5.15, the results of the LM test showed that the null hypothesis for 
ROA, ROE and TQ is rejected at the significance level of 5 per cent; indicating no 
time or individual effect in the models. Hence, the pooled OLS method is the most 
appropriate for use. The last step involved the restricted F-test to compare the pooled 
OLS and FE models since the OLS was found to be the most appropriate model in the 
second test (LM test). Moreover, the restricted F-test was conducted for pooled OLS 
and FE models because the primary distinction between them lies in the premise of the 
individual effects. The null hypothesis is rejected at the significance level of 5 per cent 
if the model contains individual heterogeneity associated with a single or more 
predictors. The rejection of null hypothesis indicates that the p value is significant, 
thus suggesting the FE estimator as more appropriate than the pooled OLS.  
Other than that, Andale (2016) suggested two ways to make decision; whether to 
reject the null hypothesis of F-test, either through (1) the p value of F-test, where a 
significant p value (p value is smaller than 5 per cent significant level) can reject the 
null hypothesis, indicating that the FE is more appropriate than the OLS, while a non-
significant p value (p value is larger than 5 per cent significant level) cannot reject the 
null hypothesis, thus indicating that the OLS is better than the FE model; or (2) 
comparing the F-value with the F-critical value, where if the F-critical value is smaller 
than the F-value, then the null hypothesis can be rejected at a 5 per cent significant 
level; depicting the better use of FE model than OLS model. If the F-critical value is 
larger than the F-value, thus the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at 5 per cent 
significant levels, suggesting that the OLS model is the best model compared to the 
FE model. Moreover, Table 5.15 displays the results from the F-test, which show that 
significant p values were generated from the models of ROA, ROE, and TQ, thus the 
null hypotheses are rejected at 5 per cent significant level. Besides, the FE was opted 
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instead of the pooled OLS as the null of no individual effect is rejected. However, the 
pooled OLS results for all models are also presented for the purpose of comparison, as 
well as to determine the robustness of the results. 
5.6.3 Results of Heteroscedasticity 
Table 5.16 Results of Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation 
Types of Tests Statisitics ROA ROE TQ 











 White Test Chi2 







Autocorrelation Tests:  
 Durbin-Watson (D-W) 
   (original) 
D-W value 1.939318 1.939592 2.020245 
 Prais-Winston    (P-W) 
   (transformed) 
D-W value 2.005764 2.000150 1.997077 
Note: ROA is return on assets; ROE is return on equity; and TQ is Tobin‘s Q.  
Table 5.16 shows the results of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation tests. In fact, 
two heteroscedasticity tests were conducted in this study, namely the Breusch-
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg Test and confirmed by the White Test. As for the Breusch-
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg Test, the results of ROA, ROE, and TQ showed that all p 
values were less than the significant level of 5 per cent. Therefore, the null hypotheses 
of ROA, ROE, and TQ are rejected due to the existence of heteroscedasticity issue in 
each model. Both results showed that the variances were not constant and another test 
was required to rectify the identified heteroscedasticity problem. The results of the 
White Test, finally, confirmed the non-existence of heteroscedasticity issue among the 
three models of ROA, ROE, and TQ.  
The results showed that the p values of ROA, ROE, and TQ were greater than the 
significant level of 5 per cent. Thus, all the null hypotheses are not rejected and free 
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from any heteroscedasticity issue in each model. Both results showed that the 
variances were not constant and another test was needed to rectify the identified 
heteroscedasticity problem. The results of the White Test finally have confirmed the 
non-existence of heteroscedasticity problem in the three models of ROA, ROE TQ. 
The results showed that the p values of ROA, ROE and TQ were greater than the 
significance level of 5 per cent. Thus, all the null hypotheses were not rejected and 
indicated that there was no hetereoscedasticity problem in each model. 
5.6.4 Results of Autocorrelation 
First, the autocorrelation test was carried out to identify any first-order serial 
correlation in the disturbances when all the predictors had been strictly exogenous by 
using the Durbin-Watson (D-W) statistics test. The lower bound (dL) and the upper 
bound (dU) were identified at 1.462 and 1.896, respectively52. As presented in Table 
5.16, the results of D-W original value of ROA (1.939318), ROE (1.939592), and TQ 
(2.020245) exemplified no serial correlation in the model. Later, the Prais-Winsten 
transformation was applied to confirm the autocorrelation problem in ROA, ROE, and 
TQ models. The autocorrelation results, as shown in Table 5.16, confirmed that there 
was no serial correlation in ROA, ROE, and TQ models as the transformed values of 
D-W for each model had been 2.005764, 2.000150, and 1.997077, respectively. In 
conclusion, the results of the transformed D-W showed that ROA, ROE, and TQ 
models were free from autocorrelation problem; indicating the absence of 
autocorrelation in the data. 
                                            
52 The values of dL and dU are derived from the chi-square table at the significant level of 1 per cent, 
whereas the sample size and the number of regressors used were 165 and 20, respectively.  
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5.7 Regression Analysis  
This section unfolds the effect of ICT investment, ICT governance mechanisms, 
boards with diverse ICT expertise, and ownership structures on firm performance. 
Generally, this study employed a dynamic model, which was estimated by using the 
System Generalized Method of Moments (SGMM). The SGMM was selected because 
it has been acknowledged as the most superior estimation method for the dynamic 
model (Nayan et al., 2013; Roodman, 2009). Apart from the SGMM estimation result, 
the estimation results of Pooled OLS, fixed effect (FE) model, and Difference GMM 
were also applied in this study to generate more accurate and robust results, besides 
observing the changes in the results under varied estimation methods.  
The OLS regression results were calculated with robust standard errors clustered by 
firm-specific effects. Meanwhile, the FE estimations were calculated with controlling 
for firm-specific effects, while the dynamic estimation methods presented the 
Difference GMM (DGMM) and System GMM (SGMM) estimation results by treating 
Yj,t-1 as an endogenous variable. Moreover, one should note that the inclusion of 
lagged dependent variables is highly correlated with error term, thus leading to results 
in biased estimates for the regression parameters. As for the potential of endogeneity 
problem, several instrumental variables were used and estimated by means of the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) (Arellano & Bond, 1991).  
Besides, some validity checks were performed in order to ascertain that the variables 
to be instrumented are uncorrelated with the error term or the variable is exogenous. 
As such, several dynamic diagnostic tests like Sargan test and two tests of Arellano-
Bond; the first-order serial correlation; AR(1), and the second-order serial correlation; 
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AR(2), had been conducted in this study. The findings retrieved from Sargan test and 
two tests of AR(1) and AR(2) are presented in Table 5.17. 
Table 5.17 Results of Dynamic Diagnostic Tests 
Types of Tests Statistics ROA  ROE TQ 
Difference Generalized Method of Moments (DGMM) 
 Sargan Test Chi2 







 AR(1) Test z-value 







 AR(2) Test 
 
z-value 











System Generalized Method of Moments (SGMM) 
 Sargan Test Chi2 







 AR(1) Test z-value 







 AR(2) Test z-value 







Note: ROA is return on assets; ROE is return on equity; TQ is Tobin‘s Q; AR(1) is the Arellano-Bond 
first-order serial correlation; and AR(2) is the Arellano-Bond second-order serial correlation.  
 
The dynamic diagnostic tests were tested to both dynamic regression models; the 
Difference GMM (DGMM) and System GMM (SGMM), which were applied in this 
study. Basically, in the general rule of thumb for Sargan test, the null hypothesis is 
rejected at 5 per cent significant level, which indicates that instruments are exogenous 
if the p value is insignificant (p value is larger than the 5 per cent significant level). 
Meanwhile, the null hypothesis will not be rejected at the significant level of 5 per 
cent if the p value is significant (p value is smaller than the 5 per cent significant 
level); indicating that the instruments are not consistent and bias. 
On the other hand, under the rule of thumb of Arellano-Bond tests; the AR(1) and 
AR(2), the differenced error term is probably serially correlated at the AR(1), but not 
at the AR(2). These two Arellano-Bond tests results for autocorrelation in the first 
difference of residuals at AR(1) and AR(2) are also illustrated in Table 5.17. The 
257 
 
results indicated that the serial correlations in the Difference GMM (DGMM) and the 
System GMM (SGMM) were absent from ROA, ROE, and TQ models as the null 
hypotheses could not be rejected at the 5 per cent significant level. Thus, both 
Arellano-Bond tests were correctly specified under the ROA, ROE, and TQ models. 
The failure to reject the Sargan test confirmed the overall validity of the surplus 
instruments; hence, the additional instruments were indeed informative. Overall, this 
study concludes that the SGMM estimation has passed all the tests, suggesting that the 
estimation method was valid and the models were correctly specified. 
Next, the analysis of the effect of ICT investment, ICT governance mechanisms, 
boards with diverse ICT expertise, and ownership structures on firm performance had 
been based on the benchmark specification; system GMM (SGMM). However, for the 
purpose of providing additional robustness check, as far as the results are concerned, 
apart from the SGMM results, the DGMM, the Pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS), 
and the panel fixed effect (FE) results were also embedded in the table of regression 
results. Therefore, the regression results for OLS, FE, DGMM, and SGMM for the 
model of ROA are presented in Table 5.18, whilst Tables 5.19 and 5.20 for ROE and 
TQ models, respectively. The analyses were classified into five sub-sections: Sub-
section 5.7.1 discusses the effects of ICT investment on firm performance (H1(a) to 
H1(d)); sub-section 5.7.2 highlights the effects of ICT governance mechanisms on firm 
performance (H2, H3(a) to H3(b)); sub-section 5.7.3 explains the effects of boards with 
diverse ICT expertise on firm performance (H4 to H7); sub-section 5.7.4 focuses on 
the effects of ownership structures on firm performance (H8 to H11); and the effects of 
control variables, including board independence, financial leverage, board size, and 
firm size on firm performance reported in sub-section 5.7.5. 
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Table 5.18 Regression Results of ROA 
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FSIZE 0.0748***  















No. of obs 165 165 99 132 
R-Sq 0.2467 0.6276 N/A N/A Adj. R-Sq 0.1421 0.4547 
No. of groups 
N/A N/A 
33 33 
No. of instruments 26 29 
Sargan test 0.2613 0.5342 
AR(1)  AR(2)    0.0091 0.6412 0.0132 0.5336 
Note: ROA is return on assets; ROAt-1 refers to ROA in year t-1; ICTSPE is ICT spending at time t; ICTSPEt-1 is ICT spending at 
time t-1; ICTSPEt-2  is ICT spending at time t-2; ICTSPEt-3 is ICT spending at time t-3; ADICTG is the adoption of ICT 
governance standards and frameworks; ICTGCOM is the presence of ICT governance committee; ICTSM is the presence of ICT 
senior management; BICTEDU is boards‘ ICT educational background; BICTPRO is boards‘ ICT professional qualification; 
BICTIE is boards‘ ICT industrial experience; BICTTR is boards‘ ICT-related trainings; COWN is concentrated ownership; 
MOWN is managerial ownership; GOWN is government ownership; FOWN is foreign ownership; BINDP is board 
independence; BSIZE is board size; LEV is leverage; FSIZE is firm size; AR(1) is the Arellano-Bond first-order serial 
correlation; and AR(2) is the Arellano-Bond second-order serial correlation. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 5.19 Regression Results of ROE 









































































































































































No. of obs 165 165 99 132 
R-Sq 0.2510 0.5941 N/A N/A Adj. R-Sq 0.1469 0.4056 
No. of groups 
N/A N/A 
33 33 
No. of instruments 26 29 
Sargan test 0.4219 0.6158 
AR(1)  AR(2)    0.0370 0.5715 0.0194 0.5490 
Note: ROE is return on equity; ROEt-1 refers to ROE in year t-1; ICTSPE is ICT spending at time t; ICTSPEt-1 is ICT spending at 
time t-1; ICTSPEt-2  is ICT spending at time t-2; ICTSPEt-3 is ICT spending at time t-3; ADICTG is the adoption of ICT 
governance standards and frameworks; ICTGCOM is the presence of ICT governance committee; ICTSM is the presence of ICT 
senior management; BICTEDU is boards‘ ICT educational background; BICTPRO is boards‘ ICT professional qualification; 
BICTIE is boards‘ ICT industrial experience; BICTTR is boards‘ ICT-related trainings; COWN is concentrated ownership; 
MOWN is managerial ownership; GOWN is government ownership; FOWN is foreign ownership; BINDP is board 
independence; BSIZE is board size; LEV is leverage; FSIZE is firm size; AR(1) is the Arellano-Bond first-order serial 
correlation; and AR(2) is the Arellano-Bond second-order serial correlation. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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No. of obs 165 165 99 132 
R-Sq 0.6479 0.7820 N/A N/A Adj. R-Sq 0.5990 0.6808 
No. of groups 
N/A N/A 
33 33 
No. of instruments 26 29 
Sargan test 0.6406 0.3894 
AR(1)  AR(2)    0.0359 0.7048 0.0119 0.9227 
Note: TQ is Tobin‘s Q; TQt-1 refers to TQ in year t-1; ICTSPE is ICT spending at time t; ICTSPEt-1 is ICT spending at time t-1; 
ICTSPEt-2  is ICT spending at time t-2; ICTSPEt-3 is ICT spending at time t-3; ADICTG is the adoption of ICT governance 
standards and frameworks; ICTGCOM is the presence of ICT governance committee; ICTSM is the presence of ICT senior 
management; BICTEDU is boards‘ ICT educational background; BICTPRO is boards‘ ICT professional qualification; BICTIE is 
boards‘ ICT industrial experience; BICTTR is boards‘ ICT-related trainings; COWN is concentrated ownership; MOWN is 
managerial ownership; GOWN is government ownership; FOWN is foreign ownership; BINDP is board independence; BSIZE is 
board size; LEV is leverage; FSIZE is firm size; AR(1) is the Arellano-Bond first-order serial correlation; and AR(2) is the 
Arellano-Bond second-order serial correlation. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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5.7.1 The Effects of ICT Investment on Firm Performance (H1, H1a to H1d) 
This sub-section explains the effects of ICT investment on firm performance in the 
Malaysian technology-based sector. Several hypotheses were developed in order to 
describe the significant effect of ICT investment on firm performance in the 
Malaysian technology-based sector (H1) variables, namely ICT spending incurred in 
year t (ICTSPEt) (H1a), ICT spending incurred in year t-1 (ICTSPEt-1) (H1b), ICT 
spending incurred in year t-2 (ICTSPEt-2) (H1c), and ICT spending incurred in year t-3 
(ICTSPEt-3) (H1d) on firm performance, as measured by ROA, ROE, and TQ. 
Basically, results from H1a to H1d describe the results of H1 in overall. The regression 
results are comprised of four estimation methods; Pooled OLS, fixed effect (FE), 
Difference GMM (DGMM), and System GMM (SGMM).  
As for hypothesis 1(a), the ICTSPEt was expected to negatively affect firm 
performance. The results showed that ROA was significantly and negatively affected 
by ICTSPEt under the estimations of OLS and FE at the significant levels of 10 per 
cent and 5 per cent, respectively. However, the results revealed insignificant effect of 
ICTSPEt on ROA under the estimations of DGMM and SGMM. The ICTSPEt was 
also found to have significantly negative effect on ROE at the significant level of 10 
per cent under the estimation of OLS, while the significant level was stronger at 1 per 
cent, as estimated by the FE method. Under the estimation method of dynamic 
models, the effect of ICTSPEt was significantly negative on ROE at 10 per cent 
significant level by the SGMM, but insignificant effect was found by the DGMM. 
Surprisingly, a significantly positive effect of ICTSPEt was found for TQ at the 
significant level of 10 per cent by the FE method, which had been strongly affected by 
DGMM and SGMM at 1 per cent significant level. 
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In respect of the SGMM results, the negative coefficient value of ROE (-0.0181) 
indicated that increase of a unit in ICTSPEt caused a 0.0181 decrease in ROE. This 
negative effect of ICTSPEt on firm performance (ROE) supports the hypothesis in this 
study. Generally, when a significant amount is invested for ICTs in the initial period, 
it takes time for companies to derive back the returns from the investment made to 
enable them to roll the returns to generate more profits for the shareholders. 
Furthermore, Figure 5.4 clearly illustrates the trend of yearly negative performance of 
ROA and ROE in the Malaysian technology sector that often fluctuated from 2010 to 
2014. The technology sector was considered at high risk if investment in ICT was 
continued with significant amount during these periods as the returns on investment 
does not immediately reflect on firm performance. Meanwhile, the positive coefficient 
value of 0.0166 in the SGMM indicated that increase in a unit in ICTSPEt led to a 
0.0166 unit increase in TQ. Moreover, the positive effect of ICTSPEt on TQ proved 
that the ICTSPEt has the ability to positively enhance the companies‘ stock markets. 
The finding supports Anderson‘s et al., (2003) that ICT investment in period t has a 
positive effect on firm performance. 
Meanwhile, in the initial hypothesis, ICTSPEt-1 (H1b), ICTSPEt-2 (H1c), and ICTSPEt-3 
(H1d) were expected to positively affect firm performance. As revealed by the OLS 
and FE results, insignificant effect of ICTSPEt-1 on ROA, ROE, and TQ was found in 
this study. Meanwhile, the results showed that the ROA was significantly and 
negatively affected by the ICTSPEt-1 under the estimations of DGMM and SGMM at 
10 and 5 per cent significant levels, respectively. Likewise, the negative and 
significant effect of ICTSPEt-1 was also found on ROE, estimated by DGMM and 
SGMM, both at the significant level of 5 per cent. Conversely, the results from 
SGMM revealed that the TQ was significantly and positively affected by the         
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ICTSPEt-1 at the significant level of 1 per cent. In terms of ICTSPEt-2 and ICTSPEt-3, 
however, no estimation method displayed any significant effect on ROA and ROE. 
While there was also no significant effect of ICTSPEt-3 on TQ for all estimation 
methods, a positive and significant effect of ICTSPEt-2 on TQ was detected by the 
DGMM method at 10 per cent significant level, but insignificant effect from the 
SGMM result. 
Based on the SGMM results, the negative coefficient value of ROA (-0.0064) and 
ROE (-0.0117) indicated that the increase in a unit in ICTSPEt-1 caused a 0.0064 
decrease in ROA, while 0.0117 decrease in ROE. Malaysia has emerged as a large 
exporter of high- and medium-technology equipment (Natasya, 2009). The continuous 
negative performance of ROA and ROE was due to the economic downturn occurred 
in 2009, which led to unstable growth in the performance of Malaysian technology 
sector, primarily due to the weakening demand for ICT products53. This imperfect 
market demand of ICT affects the way of many technology manufacturers in 
strategizing their business plans since the economy is still faced with a variety of 
significant challenges during these periods, hence too risky when their investment 
returns are unsure.  
Moreover, economists have argued that the volatility of ICT investment spending is an 
important mechanism in explaining business cycles. As the demand for ICT products 
and services declined, the slow recovery from the 2009 financial crisis had 
destabilized ICT investment, which led to the decrease in firm performance. Besides, 
the trend of ICT investment in the Malaysian technology sector was declining since 
2010 and became worse until 2014, as illustrated in Figure 5.5. Since the technology 
sector is often embedded with new ICT equipment, the slowdown of investment 
                                            
53 As reported by the IHS Global Insight World Industry Service (WIS). 
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activity in ICT reduced the adoption of new technology innovations; worsening firm 
performance. 
Nevertheless, the significantly positive effect of ICTSPEt-1 on TQ with coefficient 
value of 0.0070 implied that a unit increase in ICTSPEt-1 led to a 0.0070 unit increase 
in TQ. Besides, the positive effect on TQ could be seen clearly in its trend that begun 
to increase in 2011 until 2013, but a slight slump in 2014. As demonstrated in Table 
5.7, the amount of investment for ICT in the Malaysian technology sector was 
significantly invested in ICT intangible assets (ICTTN), compared to ICT tangible 
assets (ICTTA). The nature of ICT investment in the Malaysian technology sector, 
moreover, has changed over the periods due to the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. 
In order to keep pace with the latest technological development, innovation and 
creativity were needed to produce high quality products, although the companies were 
challenging conditions due to the crises. Experts argued that investment in ICT 
intangible assets recovered and grew after the recession period, compared to 
investment in ICT tangible assets (Goodridge, Wallis, & Haskel, 2014). For long term 
planning, investment in intangible assets is encouraged to help companies for their on-
going development. For instance, Davenport (1998) revealed that investment in 
Enterprise Resource Planning software (ERP) constituted with proper implementation 
of software led to increase in company productivity. Since the initial investment costs 
in ICT intangible assets are huge and their implementation is time-consuming, it was 
not expected that the investment returns would immediately affect firm performance.  
Some researchers suggested that market value-based (measured by Tobin‘s Q) is more 
appropriate to reflect the effect of ICT investment lag effects on firm performance. 
For instance, Zhang et al., (2012) found that investment in ICT was insignificant for 
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TQ after three years of ERP implementation, but surprisingly the result showed that 
the effect of ICT investment significantly increased after four years ERP was 
implemented. Back to the findings of this study, the effect of ICT investment was not 
only found to have significantly positive effect on TQ for ICT spending incurred in 
year t-1, but also for ICT spending incurred in year t. Although the effect of ICTSPEt-2 
on TQ was found insignificant by SGMM, a significantly positive effect of ICTSPEt-2 
on TQ was detected by DGMM. As such, based on the overall results of TQ, this 
study found that the TQ did not only significantly and positively affected by ICT 
investment incurred in years t-1 and t-2, but also spending in ICT incurred in year t.  
Based on the results of the SGMM estimation, this study concludes that the H1a is 
supported since the result found significantly negative effect of ICTSPEt on ROE. 
Although the negative effect of ICTSPEt was expected in the initial hypothesis of H1a, 
the result revealed that the effect of ICTSPEt was significantly positive on TQ. Other 
than that, the H1b is supported by the TQ, but not by ROA and ROE as both measures 
had significantly negative effect by ICTSPEt-1. Finally, the results showed that 
ICTSPEt-2 and ICTSPEt-3 were not supported since both variables had insignificant 
effects on ROA, ROE, and TQ. Therefore, the study concludes that the H1 is supported 
by H1a since the result revealed significantly negative effect of ICTSPEt on ROE, but 
significantly positive effect on TQ. Besides, H1 is also supported by H1b due to the 
significantly positive effect of ICTSPEt-1 on TQ, whereas significantly negative effect 
on ROA and ROE. However, the H1 is not supported under the effects of ICTSPEt-2 
and ICTSPEt-3 on all financial performance measures. 
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5.7.2 The Effects of ICT Governance Mechanisms on Firm Performance (H2, H3a, 
and H3b) 
In the preceding discussion, the role of ICT governance has been highlighted as an 
important mechanism that can help to improve the performance of companies via ICT 
investment. In terms of adoption of ICT governance standards or frameworks 
(ADICTG), unfortunately, the variable failed to display any significant effect on 
ROA, ROE, and TQ in all estimation methods. This insignificant result does not 
support prior studies that found a positive effect for the adoption of ICT governance 
standards and frameworks on firm performance (Neff et al., 2013; Flores et al., 2011; 
Lazic et al., 2011a; Lazic et al., 2011b; Simonsson et al., 2010). Hence, hypothesis H2 
is not supported in this study. 
Successful governance of ICT needs both participation of management level and ICT 
governance committee (ICTGCOM). The results showed that the effect of ICTGCOM 
was statistically significant and negative on ROA, as estimated by the FE at 10 per 
cent significant level, while 1 per cent significant level by DGMM and SGMM. 
Likewise, the ROE was also significantly and negatively affected by ICTGCOM 
under the FE estimation at 10 per cent significant level, while 5 and 1 per cent by 
DGMM and SGMM, respectively. As for the TQ model, all the estimation methods 
showed significantly negative effect of ICTGCOM on the TQ at the significant level 
of 10 per cent by the FE method, while significant at 1 per cent by OLS, DGMM, and 
SGMM. 
Based on the findings of SGMM, the negative coefficients of -0.1757, -0.2553, and            
-0.2121 indicated that increase in one unit for ICTGCOM caused 0.1757, 0.2553, and 
0.2121 decreases in ROA, ROE, and TQ, respectively. Basically, the negative effect 
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of ICTGCOM on firm performance might be due to the smaller number of ICTGCOM 
with expertise in ICT area. Table 5.21 presented the number of ICTGCOM with and 
without ICT expertise in the Malaysian technology-based sector from 2010 until 2014. 
As such, only 197 ICTGCOM with ICT expertise (37 per cent) were available in the 
Malaysian technology sector, compared to the 342 ICTGCOM without ICT expertise 
(63 per cent) for the period of 2010 to 2014. This smaller number of ICTGCOM with 
ICT expertise supports the finding obtained by Kaur et al., (2012), which indicated 
that the adoption of ICT governance structure is still low in the Malaysian practice. 
The result of this study, however, is inconsistent with the previous studies that found 
positive effect in the presence of ICT committee structure on firm performance (Boritz 
& Lim, 2008; Boritz & Lim, 2007).  
Table 5.21 ICT Governance Committee With and Without ICT Expertise 
Particular With ICT 
Expertise 
% Without ICT 
Expertise 
% Total 
Number of  ICT Governance 
Committee (ICTGCOM) 
197 37 342 63 539 
 
The results also showed insignificant effect of ICTSM on ROA and ROE in all 
estimation methods. However, the ICTSM displayed a significantly positive effect on 
TQ at the significant level of 10 per cent in OLS method and SGMM, but insignificant 
effect of ICTSM on TQ via FE and DGMM methods. In respect of the SGMM result, 
the positive coefficient value of 0.1486 indicated that increase in one unit in ICTSM 
resulted in a 0.1486 unit increase in TQ. Thus, the result of the ICTSM found in this 
study supports the previous findings that found the positive effect of ICTSM presence 
on firm performance (Jamba et al., 2013; Kaur et al., 2012; Boritz & Lim, 2008; 
Boritz & Lim, 2007). 
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The overall results of ICT governance structure imply that companies in the 
Malaysian technology sector had positively performed under the presence of ICT 
senior managers rather than their ICT governance committee. From the initial 
assumption, it was expected that the ICT governance committee would positively 
affect firm performance through their effective ICT oversight duty. However, due to 
the existence of many ICTGCOM with no ICT expertise was most likely the reason 
for poor performance exerted by the committee potentially exposed to inappropriate 
ICT conduct in the companies. Although the presence of ICTSM has brought about 
positive value to firm performance, undue reliance of ICTGCOM upon ICTSM 
capabilities in conducting ICT could potentially lead to agency problem. Therefore, 
based on the findings of SGMM estimation method, this study concludes that, overall, 
H2 and H3a do not support the initial hypothesis since the results found insignificant 
effect of ADICTG and significantly negative effect of ICTGCOM on ROA, ROE, and 
TQ. Nonetheless, the H3b is supported by TQ, but not supported by ROA and ROE as 
both measures exhibited insignificant effects on TQ. 
5.7.3 The Effects of Boards with Diverse ICT Expertise on Firm Performance              
(H4 to H7) 
This sub-section highlights the effects of several variables of boards with diverse ICT 
expertise; boards with ICT education background (BICTEDU, H4), boards with ICT 
professional qualifications (BICTPRO, H5), boards with ICT industrial experiences 
(BICTIE, H6), and boards with ICT-related training (BICTTR, H7). As for the 
BICTEDU, all the estimation methods did not find any significant effect of BICTEDU 
on ROA and ROE. However, the negative effect of BICTEDU on TQ was identified 
under the estimation of DGMM at the significant level of 5 per cent. Likewise, the 
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effect of BICTPRO was also insignificant on ROA and ROE, while significantly 
negative on TQ was discovered by FE, DGMM, and SGMM. Moreover, the FE result 
revealed significantly positive effect of BICTIE on ROA and ROE, while both 
dynamic estimations (DGMM and SGMM), showed significantly positive effect of 
BICTIE on all firm performance measures. The BICTTR, however, appeared 
insignificant on ROA, ROE, and TQ through all the estimation methods. 
As for the SGMM findings, the negative coefficient value of -1.3549 indicated that an 
increase in one unit in BICTPRO caused a 1.3549 decrease in TQ. Although the result 
revealed a negative effect of BICTPRO on TQ, the positive coefficient values of 
0.6756, 0.9169, and 0.5066 indicated that increase in one unit of BICTIE led to 
0.6756, 0.9169, and 0.5066 unit increments in ROA, ROE, and TQ, respectively. This 
study also found that the performance of Malaysian technology sector was positively 
affected by the boards with ICT industrial experiences (BICTIE). As digital 
transforms virtually at a rapid pace, technology companies have begun realising that 
without greater technology experiences among board of directors to guide business 
strategy and operations, these companies would probably face difficulties to improve 
firm performance.  
Due to the nature of the industry sector itself, the ICT strategies adopted by all 
companies must be governed by boards with extensive experiences in handling ICT 
because they were the pioneers of ICT or technology tasks in the area of marketing, 
sales, product management, and technical roles before moving to top level position 
that dealt with more complicated ICT tasks and responsibilities. Besides, these 
experienced directors would be well-versed in dealing with not only cutting-edge 
technology development, but also on how to compete with contenders, how to re-
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strategize their ICT strategies so as to ascertain effective succession planning of ICT 
in companies. Thus, this study concludes that H4 and H7 are not supported by all the 
performance measures because the effects of BICTEDU and BICTTR were 
insignificant. Likewise, H5 is also not supported by the performance measures due to 
insignificant effect of BICTPRO on ROA and ROE, while significantly negative 
effect on TQ. However, H6 is positively supported by ROA, ROE, and TQ. 
5.7.4 The Effects of Ownership Structures on Firm Performance (H8 to H11) 
As for ownership structures, concentrated ownership (COWN) was found to have a 
positive effect on ROA and ROE, but negative on TQ, as revealed by the OLS. The 
managerial ownership (MOWN) displayed significantly negative effect on ROA, as 
discovered by the DGMM at the significant level of 10 per cent, while 1 per cent 
under FE and SGMM.  Besides, the FE found that the ROE was negatively affected by 
MOWN at 5 per cent significant level. As expected, the MOWN exhibited a 
significantly positive effect on TQ, as estimated by the OLS, which is at 1 per cent 
significant level, while 5 per cent significant level with FE and SGMM.  
Meanwhile, as for the government ownership (GOWN), the OLS exhibited a 
significantly negative effect on ROA. Surprisingly, both DGMM and SGMM revealed 
better result of positive effect of GOWN on ROA. Besides, the OLS result showed 
that the effect of GOWN was significantly negative on ROE at the significant level of 
10 per cent, but significantly positive on TQ at 5 per cent of significant level. As for 
foreign ownership (FOWN), its effect was insignificant on ROE and TQ. 
Nevertheless, the negative effect of FOWN was found on ROA at the significant level 
of 10 per cent, as revealed by the OLS. Moreover, result from the SGMM discovered 
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more efficient effect of FOWN on ROA, which was significantly positive at 10 per 
cent of significant level. 
In respect of the SGMM findings, although the MOWN displayed a negative effect on 
ROA, the positive coefficient value of 0.0044 indicated that increase in one unit in 
MOWN led to 0.0044 increases in TQ. Meanwhile, the positive coefficient value of 
GOWN, which was 0.0034, and FOWN at 0.0046, indicated that increase in one unit 
in GOWN and FOWN led to 0.0034 and 0.0046 unit increase in ROA. Furthermore, 
as portrayed from the t-test result depicted in sub-section 5.5.1.5, ICT investment 
activities were better served by companies with government and foreign ownerships 
for the period of 2010 to 2014, compared to those without government and foreign 
involvement. 
The positive effects of GOWN and FOWN indicated that the increment in shares held 
by government and the additional capital injection provided by foreign investors have 
enhanced the ability among companies in the technology sector, especially in 
controlling their scarce technological and financial resources. Besides, the Malaysian 
government has been actively promoting the inward foreign direct investment (FDI) 
by offering several financial incentives to hasten the growth of firm performance via 
technology spill over effects in the Malaysian technology companies (Solomon, Islam, 
& Bakar, 2015). Hence, in order to attract inward FDI, Malaysian government has 
provided several financial incentives to foreign investors, including exemption from 
company tax and duty on imported inputs, investment in tax credits, and accelerated 
depreciation allowance on investment (Solomon et al., 2015). Moreover, the inward 
FDI stocks have been considered as important due to numerous capabilities possessed 
by foreign investors in providing non-tangible productive assets, such as technological 
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know-how, marketing and managing skills, export contacts, better coordination 
supplier, as well as customer relationship and reputation (Aitken & Harrison, 1999). 
Moreover, it is not uncommon for major business ICT projects to be approved by the 
board, where the government and foreign shareholders often have representation. It 
seems that the decline in the percentage of MOWN involvement from 2010 to 2014, 
while increasing the percentage of GOWN and FOWN involvement after 2011, 
conveyed the message that the impact of external parties has led the managerial 
strategic decision to be more inclined towards the implementation of normal practices. 
In fact, the increase in ROA in 2014 was seen as a positive sign to the Malaysian 
technology sector that has re-spurred its economic growth through ICT development. 
A slight increase due to government support and continuance involvement of foreign 
investors in providing their capital resources were not only able to enhance the ICT 
development in the Malaysian technology sector, but also reduced the likelihood of 
expropriation of corporate assets by managers. 
Meanwhile, the managerial ownership was recognized as the second highest in the 
Malaysian technology sector then. The positive effect of MOWN on TQ indicated that 
managers did reflect positively on profit that can be generated from the stock market. 
Besides, past researchers have argued that managers were entrenched when they held 
a sufficient amount of company shares (Beyer, Czarnitzki, & Kraft, 2012). In respect 
of their response towards generating profits from the stock market, Beyer et al., (2012) 
revealed an inverse U-shaped relationship between the degree of MOWN and 
investment in ICT intangible assets (e.g., R&D costs) since managers became 
entrenched to pursue their own interests. Moreover, as investment in ICT intangible 
assets can foster growth (Aghion & Howit, 2009), a significant amount invested in 
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R&D, for instance, might positively affect a manager‘s remuneration, power, and 
prestige (Beyer et al., 2012).  
Besides, a common incentive, such as providing managers an option to buy stock at a 
fixed price as part of their compensation, can lead them to gain benefits directly from 
a higher stock price while making decisions to enhance the value of the company. 
Thus, based on the overall result of the effect of ownership structures on firm 
performance in respect of the findings of SGMM, this study concludes that H8 
(COWN) is not supported by all performance measures. Meanwhile, as for H9 
(MOWN), this study found positive support by TQ, but not by ROA and ROE. Other 
than that, H10 (GOWN) was positively supported by ROA, while insignificant and not 
supported by ROE and TQ. Finally, the SGMM result revealed that H11 (FOWN) also 
showed positive support by ROA, but not by ROE and TQ.  
5.7.5 The Effects of Control Variables and Lagged Dependent Variable (Yj, t-1) on 
Firm Performance  
Next, this sub-section presents the results of the effects of several control variables; 
board independence (BINDP), board size (BSIZE), leverage (LEV), firm size 
(FSIZE), and lagged dependent variables (Yj, t-1). The effect of each control variable is 
discussed in detail in sub-sections 5.7.5.1 to 5.7.5.5. 
5.7.5.1 Board Independence (BINDP)  
The finding for the effect of BINDP had been insignificant on ROA, as disclosed via 
all estimation methods. Through the estimation of DGMM, the result revealed a 
significantly negative effect of BINDP on ROE at the significant level of 10 per cent. 
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As expected, a statistically significant and positive effect of BINDP was found on TQ 
in DGMM and SGMM at the significant levels of 1 per cent and 5 per cent, 
respectively. In respect of the SGMM result, a positive coefficient value of BINDP in 
TQ was 0.2933, which indicated that the presence of independent executive directors 
(INEDs) with more than or equivalent to one-third of the total number of board 
members had significantly influenced the firm performance. It was also argued that 
companies that had performed well under the guidance and monitoring control by a 
large number of INEDs had been due to diversification of opinions effect that 
increased the tendency of making good decision (Sah & Stiglitz, 1991). During this 
recovery period, INEDs positively reflected the stock market, which gave more focus 
on re-strategizing the long term succession planning of a company.  
5.7.5.2 Board Size (BSIZE)  
As for board size (BSIZE), the effect of BSIZE was insignificant on ROA and ROE, 
as revealed by all estimation methods. However, the results showed that TQ was 
significantly and positively affected by BSIZE at the significant level of 5 per cent 
from the OLS and SGMM, while significant at 10 per cent from DGMM. Based on 
the SGMM result, a positive coefficient value of 0.0619 implied that increase in one 
unit in BSIZE led to increase of 0.0619 in TQ. Besides, Table 5.22 of the board size 
shows that 79 per cent of companies in the Malaysian technology sector had more 
board of directors than the median value of 6. 
Table 5.22 Board Size  
Particular With less than 
median value of 
BSIZE 
< 6 
% With equal or 
more than median 
value of BSIZE 
> 6 
% Total 
Number of  Board 
Size (BSIZE) 
35 21 130 79 165 
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The finding is consistent with that of past studies, where positive effect was found for 
larger board size on firm performance (Said et al., 2014) with varied expertise among 
its board members, including their experiences, information, and skills (Haynes & 
Hillman, 2010). Moreover, having a large number of board members would expose 
these companies to be more efficient, especially in dealing with high information-
processing demands, better operation of complex and competitive ICT environment, 
as well as in developing more alternative solutions (Ruigrok, Peck, & Kell, 2006); 
thus improving the quality of ICT investment strategic decision, and ultimately, 
towards better firm performance.  
5.7.5.3 Leverage (LEV) 
The results showed that the effect of LEV was significantly negative on ROA and 
ROE for all estimation methods. In respect of the SGMM result, negative coefficient 
values of -0.6528 and -1.0998 indicated that increase in one unit in LEV caused 
0.6528 and 1.0998 decrease in ROA and ROE, respectively. In fact, the results imply 
that companies in the Malaysian technology sector were likely be involved in making 
large amounts of investments or issue large amounts of debt to fund their product 
development, since the nature of these companies are highly associated to technology 
R&D, manufacturing electronics, building software, as well as selling computers and 
other ICT products. During these transitional periods, especially after the 2009 crisis, 
the trend of ICT investment in the Malaysian technology sector had been inconsistent 
from 2010 until 2014. This phenomenon might be due to the fact that most companies 
were confronted with financial constraints, especially ICT investment.  
Hence, for the purpose of ICT investment, Jain (2015) argued that the leverage in the 
technology sector was high due to huge capital expenditure for investment in tangible 
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and intangible ICT assets to grow the business. As such, financial leverage is usually 
employed to generate greater returns on their assets. However, past studies have 
suggested that the companies are commonly uninterested to presume large debts to 
finance, especially on ICT assets. This is because; debt, especially in the rapidly 
changing world of ICT, is closely associated with high risks as the rapid development 
of new ICT could make a product to become obsolete within a short time. 
For instance, investment in ICT intangible assets is considered to be very challenging 
(Basu & Saha, 2011) as the assets could not serve as effective collateral to support 
high level of debt (Ou & Haynes, 2006). Therefore, generally, when companies take 
on debt; it becomes a liability on which the companies must pay interest. Increase in 
financial leverage occurs when companies‘ ROA does not exceed the interest on the 
loan, which also diminishes the companies‘ ROE and profitability. Thus, highly 
levered companies would not be able to deliver higher returns (Milano & Theriault, 
2012), thus brings in a negative impact on firm performance (Ou & Haynes, 2006). 
In contrast, both dynamic measures showed that the effect of LEV was statistically 
significant and positive on TQ, but its significant effect was more efficient at 1 per 
cent, as portrayed by the SGMM, when compared to the 5 per cent by the DGMM. 
From the perspective of SGMM, a positive coefficient value of 0.6883 indicated that 
increase in one unit in LEV led to 0.6883 unit increment in TQ. This finding, 
nonetheless, contradicts the findings retrieved from ROA and ROE. However, prior 
studies have suggested that technology companies were commonly uninterested to 
presume large debts to finance, especially on the investment of ICT intangibles (e.g., 
R&D, brand enhancement, copyright, patents, employee training, and system 
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development) since its investment is highly associated with huge capital of 
expenditure. 
Furthermore, managers often deal with the most difficult situations on how to generate 
returns to the shareholders at the best way, since a huge amount of capital is needed 
either for their present operational processes or investment in new R&D. Hence, for 
the purpose of investment, the company‘s management is more likely to use internal 
funds rather than resorting to external financing. This action could lead to information 
asymmetry between managers and other investors, who might assume that the 
company lacks the capital to finance investment effectively, which would eventually 
lead the company to retain their earnings rather than taking debt. This is likely to have 
a negative impact on the company‘s market performance (Nwaolisa & Chijindu, 
2016).  
Hence, it has been suggested that the usage of internal financing has been considered 
as the best tool, rather than debt for financing investment, as well as for the solution of 
the information asymmetries (Myers, 1984). Moreover, the growing capital injection 
by investors is seen as an opportunity for these companies to induce more investment, 
especially in ICT. Managers‘ commitment, especially through their contribution in 
effectively managing ICT54, has been found to have a positive effect on generating 
company‘s profits. Managers who perform well through their competencies by 
balancing the interests of multiple stakeholders, and ignore the reality of their self-
interest in maximizing shareholder‘s wealth increase the market value of the company. 
                                            
54 The sentence refers to the positive effect of ICT senior managers (ICTSM) on Tobin‘s Q. 
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5.7.5.4 Firm Size (FSIZE)  
The results showed that ROA and ROE were strongly positive and significantly 
affected by the firm size (FSIZE) at 1 per cent significant level from all estimation 
methods. The effect of FSIZE was identified as insignificant on TQ, as revealed by the 
OLS, but significantly positive on TQ at 10 per cent significant level under the FE 
method, but more efficient at 1 per cent by DGMM and SGMM. In the SGMM, the 
positive coefficient of FSIZE on ROA was 0.2549, while 0.3179 and 0.1585 on ROE 
and TQ, respectively. The coefficient values indicated that increase in one unit in 
FSIZE would increase the ability of companies to improve 0.2549 units in ROA, as 
well as 0.3179 in ROE and 0.1585 in TQ. Furthermore, as presented in Table 5.12, 
large firm size55  has invested more in ICT investment compared those smaller56. This 
implies that the better the firm size of companies, the better the companies access to 
ICT investment opportunities, and the more likely the companies to improve firm 
performance. In precise, larger firm size allowed companies to utilize their ICT 
investment assets in a more effective manner that would deliver better returns to the 
companies in the future. 
5.7.5.5 Lagged Dependent Variable (Yj, t-1) 
As for the lagged variable of firm financial performance, the results of FE, DGMM, 
and SGMM showed that the effect of ROAt-1 on ROA was significantly negative at 1 
per cent significant level with coefficient equivalent to -0.2366. Likewise, the effect of 
ROEt-1 was also found to have a significantly negative effect on ROE at 1 per cent 
significant level with coefficient value at -0.1697. Hence, a unit increase in ROAt-1 led 
                                            
55 Larger FSIZE is characterized by companies‘ total assets which is more than the median value of 
FSIZE. 




to a decrease of 0.2366 unit in ROA, whilst increase in ROEt-1 led to a decrease of 
0.1697 unit in ROE. 
Besides, the negative coefficient results of ROAt-1 and ROEt-1 showed that the ability 
of the company to generate profit in past years would be on the contrary effect on the 
level of profitability in the present year. Meanwhile, the effect of TQt-1 was found to 
have a significantly positive effect on TQ at 1 per cent significant level, as revealed by 
the OLS, 5 per cent significant level by FE, as well as 10 per cent significant level 
under the estimation of DGMM. However, the SGMM result showed insignificant 
effect of TQt-1 on TQ.Nevertheless, the results of the negative effects of ROAt-1 on 
ROA and ROEt-1 on ROE are in accordance with prior studies, which have examined 
and discovered the negative effect of lagged dependent variable of firm performance 
to the firm performance in current year (Margaretha & Supartika, 2016; Yazdanfar, 
2013; Salman & Yazdanfar, 2012), however, against the past findings in ICT-related 
studies that found significantly positive effect of lagged firm performance measures 
on current performance measures (Jun, 2008; Anderson et al., 2003).  
Moreover, as illustrated in Figure 5.4, the trend of Malaysian technology sector 
performance of ROA and ROE was negatively unstable over the period of 2010 to 
2014. The decrease in the performance might be due to the fact that the Malaysian 
technology sector was still managing their transition from crisis to recovery after the 
2009 financial crisis. Although some improvements were noted in the financial 




5.8 Summary of the Chapter  
This chapter starts with the results of several assumption tests divided into two 
processes: pre-test and post-test for data variables. The pre-test employed the original 
data by determining the normality and linearity of the gathered data, besides 
identifying the existence of potential outliers in the dataset. The exclusion of outliers 
produced a new dataset, which was then retested to confirm data normality in the post-
test. Next, descriptive statistics and results of univariate tests are presented, which is 
then followed by the discussion of diagnostic tests for panel data, including the results 
of multicollinearity and the appropriate model from among three models; pooled OLS, 
fixed-effect, and random effect.  
On top of that, the discussion concerning diagnostic tests also covers the results of 
heteroscedasticity, as well as autocorrelation, for the dataset. In addition to the 
dynamic diagnostic tests, results of the Sargan and Arellano-Bond tests are also 
depicted in this chapter. This is followed by the discussion of the regression analysis 
of pooled OLS, fixed effect (FE), as well as the two dynamic estimation methods, 
known as the Difference Generalized Method of Moments (DGMM) and the System 
Generalized Method of Moments (SGMM). Moreover, all the tests were performed to 
test the findings for three dependent variables of financial performance measures, 
which are comprised of return on assets (ROA), return on equities (ROE), and Tobin‘s 
Q (TQ). Finally, the next chapter discusses the overall conclusion, implications, 





CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the main findings from the results presented in the previous 
chapter, along with some recommendations for appropriate regulatory bodies, relevant 
agencies and industries, as well as those interested parties, all presented in six 
sections. Section 6.2 summarizes the findings of each hypothesis from the three 
financial performance measures (ROA, ROE, and TQ) based on the main equation; 
Equation (3), presented in sub-section 4.7. In addition, the implications of the study 
are highlighted in Section 6.3, while Section 6.4 reports the limitations of the study 
and several recommendations for future research. Lastly, Section 6.5 concludes the 
entire study of this thesis. 
6.2 Summary of the Study 
This study was motivated by several alarming issues since many ICT investments 
made have yet to prove success, but cases of ICT failure have been recorded in a 
number of prior studies. Besides, several issues related to corporate governance 
practices in dealing with the present ICT challenges have also been highlighted in this 
study as these issues have been identified as the main contributors to the failure of 
ICT investment, which may influence firm performance. Furthermore, due to lack of 
evidence found in past studies in relation to the effect of ICT investment and other 
corporate governance factors on firm performance, hence, apart from ICT investment, 
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several important elements of corporate governance in ICT, such as ICT governance 
mechanisms and boards with diverse ICT expertise, as well as common issues of 
corporate governance practices related to ownership structures, are recommended in 
this study.  
For instance, several sub-elements have been proposed to portray the ICT governance 
mechanisms in this study, which is comprised of adoption ICT governance standards 
or frameworks, the presence of ICT governance committee, and ICT senior 
management. Moreover, four types of boards with diverse ICT expertise have been 
introduced in this study, which are boards with ICT educational background, boards 
with ICT professional qualifications, boards with ICT industrial experiences, and 
boards with ICT-related training. Meanwhile, the elements of concentrated ownership, 
managerial ownership, government ownership, and foreign ownership have also been 
embedded in this study. In terms of ICT investment, the lagged effects of ICT 
investment was established as any ICT investment made would not immediately affect 
the performance of a firm. 
Furthermore, this study has outlined some research objectives. The first objective is to 
examine the extent of ICT investments in the Malaysian technology-based sector. 
Hence, inter-temporal comparisons were made using t-test to determine any difference 
in ICT investment between inter-population groups, namely inter-ICT components, 
inter-Bursa markets, inter-board characteristics, inter-ICT governance mechanisms, 
inter-board characteristics, inter-ownership structures, and inter-company 
characteristics.  
As a result, the t-test revealed a statistically significant difference in the means of ICT 
investment between companies that invested in ICT and those that did not. The mean 
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values had been higher among firms that invested in ICT, hence indicating that the 
Malaysian technology sector has been actively involved in making ICT investment 
during the period of 2010 to 2014. Besides, it has been revealed that the Malaysian 
technology sector has spent more substantial amount in acquiring ICT intangible 
assets compared to ICT tangible assets. Besides, to further identify the extent the 
Malaysian technology sector has been investing in ICT tangible and intangible assets, 
extended t-test was performed by comparing two inter-population groups: (1) ICT 
tangible assets (ICTTA), and (2) ICT intangible assets (ICTTN). 
The t-test results exhibited a statistically significant difference at 1 per cent significant 
level in the means of ICTTA between the frequencies of firms that invested in ICTTA, 
compared to the frequencies of firms that did not invest in ICTTA. Besides, a 
statistically significant difference has also been discovered by the compared indicators 
of ICTTN, in which the means had been higher for the frequencies of firms that did 
not invest in ICTTN, when compared to the frequencies of firms that did invest in 
ICTTN. 
As for the inter-Bursa markets, the findings of t-test displayed a significant difference 
in the mean values of ICT investment between the Main Market and the ACE Market 
in the Bursa. In fact, the mean of Main Market was higher than that for ACE Market. 
Meanwhile, as for inter-population groups of ICT governance mechanisms, the results 
showed insignificant difference for ICT investment between firms that adopted ICT 
governance and those that did not. Likewise, an insignificant difference was also 
revealed for the correlation between ICT investment and ICT governance structures 
(ICT governance committee and ICT senior management). 
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Moreover, the inter-board characteristics for the population groups displayed 
significant differences that existed between the presence and non-presence of boards 
with ICT educational background (BICTEDU), boards with ICT professional 
qualifications (BICTPRO), and boards with ICT-related training (BICTTR). Besides, 
a significant difference in the means of ICT investment was also higher among firms 
with the frequencies of more than the median value of boards with ICT industrial 
experiences (BICTIE). 
Next, as for inter-ownership structures, a significant difference for ICT investment 
had been found between the frequencies of firms that had involvement with 
government (GOWN) and foreign ownership (FOWN). The results revealed that the 
means of ICT investment had been higher for firms with both government and foreign 
ownerships, in comparison to those with no involvement of both ownerships. In 
addition, significant differences in the means of ICT investment were also 
demonstrated through the comparison between the frequencies of firms with more 
than the median value for concentrated ownership (COWN) & foreign ownership 
(FOWN) and those less than the median value of both ownerships. 
In terms of inter-company characteristics, only firm size (FSIZE) displayed a 
significant difference for ICT investment between the frequencies of firms with more 
and less than the median value of FSIZE. Furthermore, the results indicated that ICT 
investment was better served under firms with more than the median value of FSIZE 
compared to those with less than the median value of FSIZE. In contrast, the t-test 
results for financial leverage exhibited an insignificant difference between the 
frequencies of firms with more and less than the median value for financial leverage. 
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On top of that, regression analyses were conducted to fulfil the examination from the 
second to the fifth research objectives outlined in this study. Basically, the main 
regression model applied in this study had been based on the dynamic panel model 
(DPM), which refers to Equation 3 as the model embedded the element of ―dynamic‖ 
effects, including lagged dependent variables (Yj,t-1) as an independent variable on the 
right equation of the model. Besides, the System Generalized Method of Moments 
(SGMM) was selected as the most efficient estimation method for the dynamic model 
built in this study. 
Thus, the regression results, as discussed in this part, are in accordance with the 
results of System GMM (SGMM). For further robustness check, apart from the main 
method employed to estimate the model of this study, several estimation methods, 
such as Pooled OLS (OLS), Fixed Effect (FE), and Difference Generalized Method of 
Moments (DGMM), were performed. Moreover, Table 5.24 presents the summary of 
the regression results generated from the System GMM.  
Next, the second research objectives have been established to examine a significant 
effect of ICT investment on the performance of firms in the Malaysian technology-
based sector. In fact, the findings from the System GMM support hypothesis H1 due to 
the significant effect of ICT investment on firm performance in the Malaysian 
technology-based sector. Besides, the result of hypothesis H1 is supported by a 
significant and negative effect of ICT spending in year t (H1a) on ROE. Although ICT 
investment was not expected to exhibit significantly positive effect on firm 
performance during the initial period of spending, the result showed that ICT spending 
in year t had the ability to positively influence Tobin‘s Q. Other than that, the 
hypothesis H1 is also supported by a significant and positive effect of ICT spending 
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incurred in year t-1 (H1b) on Tobin‘s Q, while significant and negative effects of ICT 
spending incurred in year t-1 on ROA and ROE. Meanwhile, hypotheses H1c and H1d 
of ICT spending incurred in year t-2 (ICTSPEt-2) and year t-3 (ICTSPEt-3) are not 
supported the hypothesis H1 as the effects of both variables had been insignificant for 
all financial performance. 
Next, the third research objective focused on examining the significant effect of ICT 
governance mechanisms, which comprised of processes and structures, on the 
performance of firms in the Malaysian technology-based sector. ICT governance 
processes refer to the adoption of ICT governance standards or frameworks 
(ADICTG), whereas ICT governance structure is comprised of ICT governance 
committee (ICTGCOM) and ICT senior management (ICTSM). The ADICTG, 
nevertheless, did not have any significant effect on all firm performance measures, 
thus fails to support hypothesis H2. In addition, the result of ICTGCOM also does not 
support hypothesis H3a as statistically significant and negative effect of ICTGCOM 
was found upon ROA, ROE, and Tobin‘s Q. Surprisingly, the results for ICTSM 
support hypothesis H3b mainly because its effect had been statistically significant and 
positive upon Tobin‘s Q, but insignificant on ROA and ROE. 
Meanwhile, Research Objective 4 focused on the examination of significant effects of 
boards with diverse ICT expertise, such as boards with ICT educational background 
(BICTEDU), boards with ICT professional qualifications (BICTPRO), boards with 
ICT industrial experiences (BICTIE), and boards with ICT-related training (BICTTR) 
on the performance of firms in the Malaysian technology-based sector. From the 
findings, hypothesis H6 is fully supported in this study due to significantly positive 
effect of BICTIE on all performance measures, whereas H5 is not supported due to the 
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significantly negative effect of BICTPRO on Tobin‘s Q. As the effects of BICTEDU 
and BICTTR had been insignificant on all performance measures, thus H4 and H7 are 
not supported in this study. 
Moving on, the fifth research objective examined the significant effects of 
concentrated ownership (COWN), managerial ownership (MOWN), government 
ownership (GOWN), and foreign ownership (FOWN) on firm performance in the 
Malaysian technology-based sector. Besides, hypothesis H8 for COWN is not 
supported in this study because all financial performance measures were not 
significantly affected by COWN. Meanwhile, the results for MOWN revealed that 
hypothesis H9 is positively supported by Tobin‘s Q, but this is not the case for ROA as 
the effect of MOWN on ROA was significantly negative, while insignificant for ROE. 
Other than that, hypothesis H10 for GOWN is supported by ROA due to the 
statistically significant and positive effect of GOWN on ROA. Nevertheless, the 
results showed that H10 is not supported by ROE and Tobin‘s Q due to insignificants 
effects of GOWN on both ROE and Tobin‘s Q. Lastly, the results do support 
hypothesis H11 for FOWN mainly because its effect had been significantly positive on 
ROA, but not supported by ROE and Tobin‘s Q because of insignificant effects of 
FOWN on ROE and Tobin‘s Q, as depicted in this study.  
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              Table 5.24 Summary of the Results 
Variables  Hypotheses Dependent 
Variables 
Results from the SGMM 
ICTSPE H1 Investment in ICT spending has a significant effect on the firm 
performance in the Malaysian technology-based sector. 
 Supported by the H1(a) under the effect on ROE and TQ 
Supported by the H1(b) under the effect on ROA, ROE 
and TQ 
ICTSPEt H1a Investment in ICT spending in year t has a negative effect on 
the firm performance in the Malaysian technology-based sector. 
ROA Insignificant and not supported  
ROE Supported with negative and significant effect 
TQ Not supported but positive and significant effect 
ICTSPEt-1 H1b Investment in ICT in year t-1 has a positive effect on the firm 
performance in the Malaysian technology-based sector 
ROA Not supported with negative and significant effect 
ROE Not supported with negative and significant effect 
TQ Supported with positive and significant effect 
ICTSPEt-2 H1c Investment in ICT in year t-2 has a positive effect on the firm 
performance in the Malaysian technology-based sector  
ROA Insignificant and not supported  
ROE Insignificant and not supported  
TQ Insignificant and not supported  
ICTSPEt-3 H1d Investment in ICT in year t-3 has a positive effect on the firm 
performance in the Malaysian technology-based sector  
ROA Insignificant and not supported  
ROE Insignificant and not supported  
TQ Insignificant and not supported  
ADICTG H2 The adoption of ICT governance standards or framework 
(processes) has a positive effect on the performance of 
companies in the Malaysian technology-based sector. 
ROA Insignificant and not supported  
ROE Insignificant and not supported  
TQ Insignificant and not supported  
ICTGCOM H3a The presence of ICT governance committee structure has a 
positive effect on the performance of companies in the 
Malaysian technology-based sector. 
ROA Not supported with negative and significant effect 
ROE Not supported with negative and significant effect 
TQ Not supported with negative and significant effect 
ICTSM H3b The presence of ICT senior manager has a positive effect on the 
performance of companies in the Malaysian technology-based 
sector. 
ROA Insignificant and not supported  
ROE Insignificant and not supported  




            Table 5.24 Summary of the Results (continued) 
Variables  Hypotheses Dependent 
Variables 
Results from the SGMM 
BICTEDU H4 Boards with ICT educational background have positive effects 
on the performance of companies in the Malaysian technology-
based sector. 
ROA Insignificant and not supported  
ROE Insignificant and not supported  
TQ Insignificant and not supported  
BICTPRO H5 Boards with ICT professional qualifications have positive 
effects on the performance of companies in the Malaysian 
technology-based sector. 
ROA Insignificant and not supported  
ROE Insignificant and not supported  
TQ Not supported with negative and significant effect 
BICTIE H6 Boards with ICT industrial experiences have positive effects on 
the performance of companies in the Malaysian technology-
based sector. 
ROA Supported with positive and significant effect 
ROE Supported with positive and significant effect 
TQ Supported with positive and significant effect 
BICTTR H7 Boards with ICT-related trainings have positive effects on the 
performance of companies in the Malaysian technology-based 
sector. 
ROA Insignificant and not supported  
ROE Insignificant and not supported  
TQ Insignificant and not supported  
COWN H8 Concentrated ownership has a positive effect on the 
performance of companies in the Malaysian technology-based 
sector. 
ROA Insignificant and not supported  
ROE Insignificant and not supported  
TQ Insignificant and not supported  
MOWN H9 Managerial ownership (insider) has a positive effect on the 
performance of companies in the Malaysian technology-based 
sector. 
ROA Not supported with negative and significant effect 
ROE Insignificant and not supported  
TQ Supported with positive and significant effect 
GOWN H10 Government ownership has a positive effect on the performance 
of companies in the Malaysian technology-based sector. 
ROA Supported with positive and significant effect 
ROE Insignificant and not supported  
TQ Insignificant and not supported  
FOWN H11 Foreign ownership has a positive effect on the performance of 
companies in the Malaysian technology-based sector. 
ROA Supported with positive and significant effect 
ROE Insignificant and not supported  
TQ Insignificant and not supported  
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6.3 Implications of the Study 
Both theoretical and practical implications of the study are discussed in the following 
sub-sections. 
6.3.1 Theoretical Implications 
This present study explicitly examined the effect of ICT investment, ICT governance 
mechanisms, boards with diverse ICT expertise, and ownership structures on firm 
performance in the Malaysian technology-based sector. Moreover, issues related to 
ICT governance mechanisms and boards with diverse ICT expertise had been found to 
be rather scarce in past studies, specifically in the context of the effect of ICT 
investment and corporate governance in ICT on firm performance. 
To further examine the effect of ICT investment and corporate governance in ICT on 
firm performance, several new variables, especially those related to corporate 
governance practices in ICT, had been proposed in conjunction with several lagged 
year effects of ICT investment. For instance, three predictors have been introduced 
under the context of ICT governance mechanisms; adoption of ICT governance 
standards or frameworks, presence of ICT governance committee, and ICT senior 
management. Besides, the elements of boards with diverse ICT expertise were 
comprised of boards with ICT educational background, boards with ICT professional 
qualifications, boards with ICT industrial experiences, and boards with ICT-related 
training. 
Moreover, issues related to concentrated, managerial, government, and foreign 
ownerships, which have been commonly highlighted in the field of corporate 
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governance studies, have also been embedded in this study. In addition, this study 
contributes to the extant literature by providing more evidence concerning firms in the 
Malaysian technology sector.  
On top of that, this study covers a wider range of theoretical perspectives, for 
example, the resource dependency theory (RDT) and the agency theory. Basically, 
RDT suggests that investment in acquiring resources is the key element for company 
survival (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Meanwhile, in the context of ICT investment, 
acquisition of ICT is essential as strategic resources to sustain high performance, 
especially in the technology sector (Straub et al., 2006). However, in this present 
study, ICT investment in the Malaysian technology sector has yet to be encouraged as 
the trend of investment fluctuated inconsistently, which also resulted in mixed 
findings for firm performance over the period of 2010 to 2014. 
The mixed findings found in this study are generally described by the significantly 
negative effect on ROE, which is in line with the prediction of RDT, as investment in 
ICT assets spent in year t would also reduce the performance of firm in year t. 
Besides, the statistically significant and positive result on Tobin‘s Q was not only 
affected by the lagged one-year ICT investment, as predicted in hypothesis, but it was 
affected since the year of investment incurred, which refers to year t. Moreover, the 
effect of adopting ICT governance standards or frameworks (ADICTG) appeared 
insignificant upon firm performance, which was also against the prediction of RDT, 
which depicted that ADICTG could enhance the performance of firm through the 
effectiveness of ICT compliance culture in the company to satisfy ICT governance 




Meanwhile, in terms of the presence of ICT governance committee (ICTGCOM), its 
effect had been statistically significant and negative on ROA, ROE, and Tobin‘s Q. In 
contrast, the result of ICT senior management (ICTSM) was significantly positive on 
firm performance when measured with Tobin‘s Q. These two results of variables 
implied that the potential of the agency problem to occur as the management level 
appeared to be the top contributor in improving firm performance, especially through 
their important role in overseeing major ICT projects, compared to the role of 
ICTCGOM. 
Besides, the results showed that the boards with ICT professional qualifications 
(BICTPRO) had an effect on Tobin‘s Q, which was statistically significant and 
negative. The result also showed statistically significant and positive effect of boards 
with ICT industrial experience (BICTIE) on ROA, ROE, and Tobin‘s Q. These results 
have supported RDT and suggest the role of BICTIE as a resource provider that can 
aid in improving companies‘ ICT strategies and planning with their ICT expertise.  
Meanwhile, in terms of ownership structures, the result of managerial ownership 
(MOWN) was significantly negative for ROA, but statistically significant and positive 
on Tobin‘s Q, which implies that the MOWN seems to support RDT under the 
measure of Tobin‘s Q, but not ROA. Besides, the significantly positive effect of 
government ownership (GOWN) and foreign ownership (FOWN) on ROA exhibited 
that both variables do support RDT. Moreover, the results suggest that compared to 
the involvement of MOWN; GOWN and FOWN appeared as better resource 
providers to the Malaysian technology sector, especially not only in providing 
adequate financial support, but also technology expertise in order to spur ICT 
investment growth in this sector (Choi et al., 2012; Uwuigbe & Olusanmi, 2012). 
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In conjunction with the result of ICTSM, ICT senior managers seemed to shoulder the 
responsibilities of company ICT strategy, in comparison to the ICT governance 
committee, which leads to the tendency of agency problem. However, the inward flow 
of GOWN and FOWN in the Malaysian technology sector emerged as the best 
supporter not only because of their strong financial support and expertise, but also as 
the best solution to solve agency problem in the sector. 
6.3.2 Practical Implications 
In order to establish the effect of ICT investment, ICT governance mechanisms, 
boards with diverse ICT expertise, and ownership structures on firm performance; 
additional evaluation by specific proxies to represent each main independent variable 
had been performed. Thus, this study is essential for companies and potential 
shareholders, especially in the Malaysian technology sector, in several ways. Since 
failure to manage ICT investment effectively is usually associated to poor firm 
performance and lack of ICT corporate governance, it is important for companies, 
especially in the Malaysian technology sector, to ensure that any ICT investment 
made must be accompanied by proper conduct of ICT corporate governance.  
For example, as highlighted in this study, several vital elements of ICT investment, 
ICT governance mechanisms, boards with diverse ICT expertise, and ownership 
structures have been introduced so as to ensure the successful implementation of 
investment that can improve the worth of a company. The results obtained from this 
study provide valuable information not only for potential investors, stakeholders, and 
the public in general, but also for the company‘s board of directors and the top 
management level. In addition, the results may also offer guidance to companies so as 
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to ensure that their ICT implementation is properly governed under appropriate ICT 
standards and handled by the right person. 
Meanwhile, in terms of evaluating ICT investment, this study adhered to the 
measurement of ICT investment, as proposed by past studies, by taking into account 
the elements of lagged year effect of investment. In this present study, lagged one-
year to lagged third-year effects of ICT investment was introduced to determine the 
best return towards firm performance. Moreover, based on the established theory, the 
effect of ICT investment, which is incurred in the present year, usually will not 
immediately influence firm performance. However, it is not impossible for a company 
to receive immediate returns from ICT investment if its implementation is supported 
by strong ICT corporate governance practices. 
Next, concerning the adoption of ICT governance standards or frameworks, most 
firms in the Malaysian technology-based sector were found to be in compliance with 
the ICT governance standards or ICT frameworks. However, the effect of ICT 
governance committee (ICTGCOM) had been statistically significant and negative on 
firm performance. Surprisingly, the result displayed that the presence of ICT senior 
management (ICTSM) in technology companies had a significantly positive effect 
upon firm performance. Thus, the overall results of ICT governance mechanisms 
implied that companies in the Malaysian technology sector were seen to have better 
served under the guidance of ICTSM, instead of ICTGCOM. 
Although it was expected that companies would better achieve their performance 
goals via good ICT governance practices by ICTGCOM, there might be a reason why 
firm performance had been affected negatively by ICTGCOM. Furthermore, firms in 
the technology sector should note that the lack of ICT expertise among ICTGCOM, as 
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determined in the present study, was likely to be a reason for the poor performance 
exerted by companies in the Malaysian technology sector for the period of 2010 to 
2014. In addition, although ICTSM displayed a positive impact on firm performance, 
undue reliance of ICTGCOM on ICTSM capabilities in handling ICT-related matters 
should be highly emphasized. Otherwise, the reliance solely on ICTSM competencies 
may also potentially lead the ICT managers to misconduct ICT resources against the 
company‘s ICT investment objectives.  
Regarding the boards with diverse ICT expertise, firms in the Malaysian technology 
sector are suggested to acquire more diverse ICT expertise among their board 
members to reduce ICT gaps among boards, as well as to facilitate their ICT-related 
decisions in the boardroom discussion. The elements of boards with diverse ICT 
expertise emerged as an important element in the Malaysian technology companies in 
driving successful ICT development through innovation processes. At present, this 
study found that companies in the Malaysian technology sector perform better when 
they have boards with ICT industrial experiences. The findings further indicated that 
companies in the Malaysian technology sector strived to spur their ICT development 
through diverse ICT expertise among their boards, especially through their extensive 
experience and wide range of knowledge in the ICT fieldwork. 
Turning to the boards with ICT educational background, ICT professional 
qualifications, and ICT-related training; the findings lend some insights to the 
companies to enhance their board effectiveness with diverse expertise in ICTs as these 
three variables did not support in improving firm performance in the Malaysian 
technology sector. However, it should create awareness for these companies regarding 
the importance of having boards with ICT educational background and ICT 
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professional qualifications because they are well-equipped and trained professionals 
with ICT knowledge, especially when dealing with ICT strategic issues. Besides, 
companies should also realize on the important needs of providing adequate ICT 
training programs to their board members. This is because; sufficient training 
programs in ICT can enhance the understanding among the board members with the 
latest ICT development, besides exposing them to more opportunities, especially in 
ICT investment activities. 
The results of the ownership structures showed that involvement of managerial, 
government, and foreign ownerships had a positive effect on firm performance in the 
Malaysian technology sector for the duration of 2010 to 2014. During the post-crisis 
period, many sectors, including the technology sector, have tried to revive their ICT 
strategy development, which would help to re-stimulate their economic growth. 
Moreover, it has been observed that the Malaysian technology sector enjoys the 
increment in ICT investment growth rate after getting involved with government and 
foreign ownerships.  
Moreover, various investment incentives introduced by the Malaysian government 
have induced continuance in foreign capital inflows, thus facilitating the development 
of ICT in the Malaysian technology sector. Although the managerial ownership has 
been identified as the second largest shareholder in the Malaysian technology sector, 
the decreasing trends of ownership over these observed periods convey a message that 
the influences of foreign investors have led to prevent from the likelihood of 
expropriation of company resources at the management level or any tendency of 
agency problem from occurring. Furthermore, companies should be aware on the 
important needs of proper governance conduct in order to prevent agency problem 
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from occurring so as to ensure that the actions taken by managers are in line with the 
interest of other company‘s shareholders. For example, appropriate incentives 
(compensation, bonus, promotion, etc.) for managers have to be considered to 
ascertain that the focus of managers is on maximizing the company‘s value rather than 
their respective value. 
6.4 Limitations of the Study and Area for Future Research 
The findings of this present study are, however, subject to several shortcomings. First, 
data related to financial performance, ICT investment, and other corporate governance 
variables are particularly observed only during the post-crisis period (from financial 
year (FY) 2010 until FY 2014). Hence, data related to financial performance, ICT 
investment, and other corporate governance variables during the crisis and pre-crisis 
period may also be weighed in for future research to further describe the effect of ICT 
investment, as well as other corporate governance variables, on firm performance 
based on three different phases: periods of pre-crisis, during crisis, and post-crisis. 
Second, this paper collected data from annual reports based on the availability of 
companies in the Malaysian technology sector listed on the Bursa Malaysia website. 
Furthermore, due to some requirements concerning the date of International Financial 
Reporting Standard (IFRS) implementation and the year that imposed ICT mandatory 
standards as well as the incentives given by the Malaysian Government to businesses 
in the acquisition of ICT resources; some companies were excluded from this study. 
As such, this study is comprised of balanced panel data, but it is unnecessary to have 
balanced data for this study as there is no mandatory requirement for ICT disclosure 
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imposed by the Malaysian regulatory body depicted in the annual reports gathered 
from Malaysian companies. 
Moreover, future studies may also consider questionnaire and interview approaches to 
explore from a different standpoint. Third, while data on the Malaysian technology 
sector provide richer understanding to this research, the context of this study should 
also consider generalizing the results to other sectors as well because ICT rules and 
regulations, as well as standards of ICT adoption, has been imposed by the Malaysian 
government to all critical sectors, such as the Government and the financial sector. 
Other than that, this study also can be generalized to other sectors in the Malaysian 
Public Listed Companies in order to observe the extent of their practices, especially in 
ICT investment, ICT governance mechanisms, and boards with diverse ICT expertise 
because varying nature of business has different needs of ICTs. 
Next, the other types of ownership, for example, family and non-family managerial 
ownerships may also be considered in the future research to further describe the types 
of dominated ownership that might affect firm performance, for example, those within 
the Malaysian technology sector. Lastly, pertaining to the theories of agency and 
resource dependence employed in this study, future studies could extensively examine 
the effect of ICT investment and other corporate governance variables on firm 
performance in the light of other theories, such as stewardship theory, institutional 




6.5 Conclusion of the Study  
The present study was pursued with the attempt to examine the effect of ICT 
investment, ICT governance mechanisms, boards with diverse ICT expertise, and 
ownership structures on firm performance in the Malaysian technology sector. In 
general, this study suggests that ICT investment, ICT governance mechanisms, boards 
with diverse ICT expertise, and ownership structures do matter in the context of 
companies in the Malaysian technology sector. In fact, this study enhances the 
existing literature of ICT investment and corporate governance by providing rather 
comprehensive understanding on the real effects of implementation of ICT investment 
and corporate governance best practices in the Malaysian technology sector. In 
precise, this study has introduced some important aspects of ICT corporate 
governance, such as ICT governance mechanisms and boards with diverse ICT 
expertise, in the context of general corporate governance best practices. Furthermore, 
the findings of this study have some implications for policy makers, practitioners, and 
investors. Thus, future studies should extend the elements of these recommendations 
in order to further elaborate the real practices of ICT investment, as well as other 
corporate governance factors, not only from the light and nature of business 
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Sample Studies of the Effect of ICT Investment on Firm Performance 
Author(s) Sample Method(s) Independent Variables Dependent Variables Results 
ICT Measures Firm Performance Measures 




Panel least squares 
regression 
Computer budget ratio and the capital 
budget ratio 
ROA and ROE 
  
Positive and 
significant on both 
measures 
Makinde (2014) 4 mega banks in 
Nigeria 
Pooled multiple least 
square and panel multiple 
regression model 
ICT investment , investments in other 
assets and operating costs 
(investments in non ICT, labor, 
overheads) 




Safari & Zhen Yu 
(2014) 
11 privately-
owned banks and 
6 publicly-owned 
banks over 1990 
to 2011 
Stochastic frontier analysis 
(SFA) methods 
Hardware and software investment, 
IT services and ownership 
Efficiency (Total Costs) 
Personnel expenses, interest 
expenses paid to term 
deposits, fixed assets 
depreciation Expenses, 







Econometric analysis R&D, ICT personnel, ICT 
investment, ICT budget, Website and 
E-business 
Product innovation and  
process innovation  
Mixed 
Romdhane (2013) 15 Tunisian banks 
over the period 
1998–2009 
Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) method 
and the Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis (SFA) method 
Investments in tangible assets 
(hardware), intangible assets 
(software) and investments in training 
and maintenance 
Cost Efficiency 
1. The price of labour  
2. The price of financial 
capital  





4 banks in Nigeria 
for a seven year 
period (2005 to 
2011) 
OLS - Multiple regression IT expenditures, total number of IT 






Hung et al. (2012) Banking Two-stage least squares 
method 
ATM investment ROA, ROE, operating income 
ratio and net income ratio 
Positive 





firms from 1999 
to 2007 
Multiple regression model Capital structure, capital intensity and 
time-lagged effects 
Tobin‘s Q Tobin‘s Q was  not 
significant in the first 
3 years but began to 
rise in the fourth year  
Ekata (2011) Banking  IT Expenditures (IT hardware cost, 
IT software cost, IT service cost, IT 
training cost, IT outsourcing cost), IT 
budget and IT employee 










between 1990 and 
2009 
Integrated model (direct 
and indirect model) 
Technology resources: IT 
investment, IT infrastructure, IT 
assets, and Software system 
application 
Organization resources:      
Knowledge resource and human 
resource 
Mediator:  
Capability (Internal and external) 
Productivity:       
Production manufacturing 
effectiveness, e-Business 
effectiveness     
Efficiency:                      
Operational (production) cost 
reduce, COGS/S, SGA/S                            
Profitability:                        
ROI, ROA, ROS, income, 
profits, sales revenue & 
operational costs 
Mixed 
Zehir et al. (2010) 81 national and 
multinational 
companies, which 





IT decision making, IT level, IT 
perception and IT usage 
Technology orientation, 
Future orientation, & Firm 
Performance (Sales 
profitability, market growth, 
profitability per customer, 
turnover profitability, 
investment profitability, 
growth of profitability & 
ROA) 
Mixed 
Gaith et al. (2008) 68 Malaysian 
construction firms 
Regression analysis, 
Pearson‘s 2- tailed test 
Investment in equipment, 
communication, IT specific labour, 
R&D and IT training   
Firm performance  Positive 
341 
 
Chari et al. (2008) 117 firms and 
data obtained 
from obtained IT 
investment data 
from annual IT 
surveys 




Regression analysis The ratio of dollar investment in IT to 
sales 
 





Jun (2008) 22 Korean 
securities firm 
Fixed and random effects 
models and panel GMM 
(generalized method of 
moments) techniques 
The computer budget ratio and the 
capital budget ratio 
ROA, ROE, and profits 
  
Positive 
Thouin et al. 
(2008) 
Data obtained 
from the annual 
survey of IT 
usage in the U.S 
healthcare 






Education (for the 
year 2003) 





Beccalli (2007) 737 European 
banks over the 
period 1993-2000  
Ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions, and 
two-stage least squares 
(2SLS)  
Spending in hardware, software and 
IT 
Total costs, cost efficiency, 
and profit efficiency, ROA 
and ROE 
Mixed 
Shin (2006) A data set of IS 
budgets from 
1995 to 1997 
Ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression  
 
Data obtained from the 
IS budget 
 
Moderator: Strategic direction 
 










Data was taken 
from the 
Computerworld‘s 
list of ―The 
Premier 100‖ 
organizations for 
the years 1991, 
1992, and 1993 
Multidimensional cluster 
analysis and multivariate 
analysis 
IT budget as a percentage of revenue,  
percentage of IT budget for staff, 
percentage of IT budget for training, 
market value of IT as a percentage of 
revenue & percentage of employees 
provided with PCs and terminals 
ROI, ROS, Income, Revenue, 
Market value, Leverage, 
productivity measures (sales 
by total assets and sales by 
employees) 
Mixed 
Kim (2004)  Data on firm-level 
IT spending is a 






Regression analysis IT capital stock Marginal product of IT 
capital, profitability, 
productivity, and market 




48 hospitals for 
each year with a 
total of 1088 
observations for 
the 23-years span 
(1979 to 2001)  
Ordinary Least Squares 
regression (OLS) and the 
Polynomial Distributed 
Lagged (PDL) regression 
model 
 
Data was obtained from 
the Washington State 






IT Capital (data processing, 
communications, and patient records 
accounts) and Medical IT Capital 
(equipment used for diagnosis and 
therapeutic purposes, e.g., magnetic 
resonance imaging) 
Productivity The positive impact 
from IT spending is 
felt at the sixth year 
after the spending, 
and only for the next 
two years (8 year 
above not significant) 
343 
 







informative firms  
 
Data on firm 
performance:1987 
to 2000  
Data on IT 




Data of IT spending was 
obtained from 
InformationWeek surveys 






527 firms in all 
industries for 
1987 to 1994 
 
Cobb Douglass function 
and regression analysis 
 
Data was obtained from 
Computer Intelligence 
InfoCorp (CII), Compustat 
Database 
Computer capital, non-computer 
capital, IS staff and non-IS labor and 
expense 
Total sales and value added Positive 
Devaraj & Kohli 
(2000) 
8 hospitals in 
healthcare 
industry for 36 
monthly periods 
 
Regression analysis IT labor, IT support and IT capital 
 
Financial performance:  
 Net patient revenue per day: 
the ratio of the total revenue 
realized by the hospital to 
the total number of days 
 Net patient revenue per 
admission: the ratio of the 
total revenue realized by the 
hospital to the total number 
of patient admissions 
Quality index: 
 Mortality rates: the 
percentage of mortalities 
within 30 days of an 




by the total number of 
operative procedures 
 Customer satisfaction: the 




52 U.S life 
insurance 
companies from 
1982 to 1995 
 
Generalized estimating 
extension (GEE) of the 
Generalized Linear Models 
(GLM) random estimator 
Data was obtained from 
Life Office Management 
Association database, 
Annual and 10k reports, 
Best Insurance reports, 
Compustat database 
IT expense, work composition 
(clerical, managerial, professional 
intensity) and combined effects 




 Premium income per 
employee and  




* Used of predefined 
lag effects 
 
Byrd & Marshall 
(1997) 
350 companies 
for the 3 years, 





Data was obtained from 
the IDG's ComputerWorld 
 The value of supercomputers, 
mainframes, and minicomputers 
 The percentage of IT budget spent 
on IT staff 
 The IT budget as a percentage of 
revenue 
 The percentage of IT budget spent 
on IT staff training 
ROI, ROS, market value, sales 





367 firms in all 
industries for 
1987 to 1991 
Cobb Douglas function, 
regression analysis: OLS 
and 2SLS 
Data was obtained from 
International Data Group 




Computer Capital, non- computer 
capital, IT staff and non-IT staff and 
expenses 





380 firms from all 
industries for 
1987 to 1991 
Cobb Douglas function, 
Iterated Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressions 
(ISUR) and 3SLS 
 
Data was obtained from 
International Data Group 
(IDG) survey, Computer 
Database 
Computer capital, non- computer 
capital, IT staff and non IT staff 
expenses 
Productivity Output Positive 
Mahmood & 
Mann (1993) 
100 firms in all 
industries for 
1989 
Pearson correlation and 
Canonical correlation 
analysis 
Data was obtained from 
Computerworld premier 
100, Compact Disclosure 
database 
 The annual IT budget as a 
percentage of the organization‘s 
revenue 
 Value of the organization's IT as a 
percentage of its revenue 
 Percentage of the IT budget spent 
on IT staff 
 Percentage of the IT budget spent 
on training IT staff 
 PCs and terminal per employees 
Growth in revenue, sales by 
total assets, ROS, ROI, sales 
by employees and market-to-
book value 
 






Weill (1992) 33 valve 
manufacturing 
firms (6 years 




From survey and interview 
IT investment (ratio of IT 
expenditures to total annual sales) 
was categorized into strategic, 
informational and transactional 
Moderator: 
Conversion effectiveness              
Sales growth, ROA, Non-
production labor per million 
dollars sales (LABOUR) and 
percent change in LABOUR 
Mixed 
Brynjolfsson et al. 
(1989) 
Mixed sectors for 
the year 1975 to 
1985  
Data was obtained from 
Compustat   
Total capital stock, IT stock capital  
and IT investment 
 
 
Firm size Increased IT 
investment was 
associated with 
decreasing firm size 
* Introduced the 




Sample Studies of the Effect of Corporate Governance on Firm Performance 
Author(s) Sample Method Dependent variables Independent variables Results Details 
Financial Performance 
Measures 
Corporate Governance Measures 
Haider et al. 
(2015)  
Islamic banks in 
Punjab, Pakistan 
(2008-2012) 
Correlation and linear 
regression 
ROA, ROE, & EPS Board size Positive 
Number or meeting 
Audit committee size 
Johl et al. (2015) 700 public listed 
firms in Malaysia for 




ROA Board independence and board meeting Negative and 
insignificant 
 
Board size and accounting expertise Positive 
 
Naushad, & 
Malik (2015)  
24 GCC banks based 
on the criteria of total 
assets for the 
financial year 2012 to 
2013 
Multiple regression Tobin's Q & Return on Total 
Assets (ROTA) 
Board size Negative: ROTA & 
Tobin 
 
CEO Duality Positive: ROTA & 
Tobin 
 
Agency costs (Block Ownership GCC) Mixed 
 
Yusoff et al.  
(2015) 
60 financial 
companies in the 








ROE & EPS Board size Negative 
Board independence and CEO duality Have not influenced 
Wahba (2015) 40 Egyptian listed 
firms during the 
The generalized least 
squares method  





period from 2008 to 
2010 
Al-Matari et al. 
(2014) 
162 non-financial 




Tobin's Q Board size, board meeting, audit and 
executive committee  independence 
Significant positive 
Board independence, legal counsel Significant negative 
CEO tenure, CEO compensation, audit 
committee size 
Insignificant positive 
Board change, role of secretary, 
executive committee size, audit 
committee meeting, executive committee 
meeting 
Insignificant negative 
Qasim (2014) 281 firm/year 
observations in the 
Abu Dhabi exchange 
Shareholding 
Company‘s guide for 
years 2007-2011 
Pooled OLS 
regression models  
ROA & Tobin's Q Institutional ownership, governmental 
ownership and board size 
Significant positive 
Audit quality Insignificant positive 
Zakaria et al.  
(2014) 
73 Malaysian listed 
Trading and Services 
sector (2005 to 2010) 
Panel random effects 
model 
ROA Concentrated ownership Positive effect on 
firm performance but 
not significant for 
pre-crisis period 
Managerial ownership Positive and 
significant effect on 
firm performance 
Government ownership Negative effect on 
firm performance 
Foreign ownership Positive effect on 










20 Indian companies, 
which are non-
financial companies; 
listed on the NSE 
(during 1st April, 
2010 to 31st March, 
2012) 
Multiple regression ROA, ROE, Return on 
Capital Employed (ROCE) 
and Profit before Tax (PBT) 
Board Size The governance 
rating of company 
has a significant 
positive impact on its 
financial 
performance. 
Independence of Board from 
Management 
Separation of CEO and Chairman 
Financial Expertise of Directors 
Number of Board Meetings 
Role of External Auditors 
Committees of the Board 
Aggarwal 
(2013b) 
50 Indian companies 
listed on S&P CNX 
Nifty 50 Index (2010-
11 to FY 2012-13) 
Multiple regression ROA, ROE, ROS, & ROCE Governance rating Positive, but not 
significant 
Goh et al. (2013) 132 firm-year 
observations based on 
32 plantation firms 
(annual report from 
2003-2006) 
Partial least squares 
(PLS) regression 
ROA Ownership concentration: High level 
ownership concentration 
Negative 
Low level ownership concentration Positive 
Moderator: Board independence & 
Separation of CEO-chairs  
Negative 
Wan Yusoff & 
Alhaji (2012) 
813 listed companies 
representing nine 
sectors of the main 
board of Bursa 




ROE & EPS Non-executive directors and board size Inconsistence 
relationship 
Board leadership structure No relationship 
Sami et al. (2011) 1236 firm-year 
observations (2001 to 
2003 )           





2030 observations for 
290 companies across 
seven years from 
1999 to 2005 
Descriptive and 
correlation 




and duality for family 
and non-family 
ownership has a 
strong significant 





Haniffa  & 
Hudaib (2006) 
347 companies listed 
on the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange 
(KLSE) between 
1996 and 2000 
Cross-sectional OLS 
regression model  
ROA & Tobin's Q Board size ROA: Positive & 
significant                                
TQ: Positive & 
significant    
Board composition ROA: No significant                                             
TQ: No significant     
Role duality ROA: Negative & 
significant                                             
TQ: No significant     
Multiple directorships ROA: No significant                                                  
TQ: Positive & 
significant    
Top five largest shareholders ROA: Positive & 
significant                                                 
TQ: Positive & 
significant    
Managerial shareholdings ROA: Negative & 
significant                                                        





Sample Studies of the Effect of ICT Governance on Firm Performance 

















: Addressed on how proper IT 
governance practices impact on 
organization effectiveness and 
how these are influenced by 
enterprise leadership at 
boardroom level 
Effectiveness: IT decision 
making, active 
participation, challenges of 
IT decision making 




and outcome metrics 
: The results can be 
concluded that senior 
management 
involvement in IT 
governance issues 
contribute immensely to 
organization 
effectiveness.  
Neff et al. 
(2013) 
: Case studies : 5 exploratory 
case studies in 
global multi-
business firms  
: Addressed on how IT 
governance, resource 
relatedness and business 
performance are related.                        
: To determine which IT 
governance levers in 
organizations that will increase 
business performance. 
Business performance: 
Operational efficiency of 
specific business 
processes, measures of 
which include customer 
service, flexibility, 










: The study revealed that 
IT governance maturity 
was positively associated 
with business process 
performance with the 
consolidation initiatives 
in IT and business 
processes relatedness.  
Kaur et al. 
(2012) 
: Model 
development           
: Survey                    






: 144 surveys of 
Malaysian listed 
companies were 
relevant to the 
study 
Analyzed the impact of IT 
governance effectiveness in 
private sector organizations in a 












: The result found that 





performance while others 







al.  (2011) 
: Survey                    
: 3 tools were 
utilized to 
analyze the 
results of the 
survey: box 







survey (15 IT 




Examined how COBIT 
associated with IT governance 
support information security and 
generate future value in terms of 
reducing negative consequences 
from security incidents. 
Future value of 
Investment:        Net 
Present Value (NPV) 
COBIT: comprises 19 
control objectives 
under Plan and 
Organize,  Acquire and 
Implement, Deliver and 
Support, and Monitor 
and Evaluate  
: Study result showed 
that investments in IT 
governance control 
objectives strengthen 
security objectives and 




: Case studies               
: Theoretical 
framework 
development    
11 multinational 
corporations  
Considered how IT governance 
and business performance is 
related and how this relationship 
is moderated  
Business Performance:                    
(1) reputation among 
major customer segments,  
(2) frequency of new 
product or service 
introduction,         
(3) return on investment,                       
(4) net profits,      
(5) technological 
developments and/or other 
innovations in business 
operations,                 (6) 
product quality,  
(7) market share gains 

















: A theoretical based 
framework is proposed to 
further explain the 
relationship between IT 
governance and firm 
performance.                                             
: The result found that IT 
governance is positively 
related business 
performance through the 
increase of IT relatedness 
and business process 





Case studies       CIOs of the 100 







To analyse the impact of the 
governance of IT on the 
business performance of the 
firm 
Business Performance: 
Cost savings, customer 
satisfaction, development 
of new business fields / 
products, time to market, 
agility in economic turmoil 
IT Governance 
Maturity:  IT 
governance processes, 
IT governance 
structures and IT 
governance relational 
mechanisms 
The higher the maturity 
of IT governance 
processes, structures and 
relational mechanisms, 
the higher the business 
process relatedness 




Resource relatedness   
IT relatedness: Positive 
relationship has been 
indicated                                                                
Business process 
relatedness: Strongly 
supported the original 
hypothesis                       
Resouce relatedness: 
The results could not be 
confirmed 
Moderator:                             
Absorptive Capacity of 
IT Department 
Strongly supported the 



















those listed on 
the Mexican 
stock exchange, 
as well as 
unlisted firms. 
Highlighted the importance of 
companies to have a board with 
sufficient IT proficiency to 
capitalize on the benefits of 
presently available technologies. 
Value creation (or higher 








The result of this study is 
expected the positive 
impact on companies 
incorporating aligned IT 
governance and 
corporate governance 
practices to enhance 









Case studies 35 case studies 
at various types 
of organiations 




ons and public 
service 
Considered the relationship 
between the maturity of IT 





Maturity: Based on 
COBIT domains and 
processes (Plan and 
Organize, Acquire and 
Implement, Deliver and 
Support, and Monitor 
and Evaluate   
: The result found that IT 
governance maturity 
levels were positively 
correlated to IT 
governance performance.                                        
: Organizational structure 
and relationship, mature 
quality management and 
cost allocation were most 
















out of total 572. 
Explored the relationship 
between Enterprise Governance 
of IT practices and business 
performance 
Business performance Enterprise 
governance of IT 
(EGIT): COBIT and 
Val IT frameworks                                            
Mediator: Business/ 
IT alignment 
: Little support to 
identify a direct link 








method    : one 
in-depth case 
and five mini-








22 experts out 
of 29 continued 
to be involved 





Explored on how IT governance 
is implemented in companies 
and analyzed the relationship 
between the IT governance 
implementations and companies' 
business/IT alignment. 





The highly aligned 
companies did indeed 
leverage more mature IT 
governance practices 
compared to companies 




Boritz  & 
Lim 
(2008) 
: Regression 937 companies 
(474 companies 









: Documented the impact of IT 
governance on the likelihood of 
reducing reporting material IT 
control weaknesses and its 
impact on firm financial 
performance.                       : 
Documented the relationship 
between IT governance 
effectiveness, IT controls 
effectiveness and firm financial 
performance.       
Financial performance:        
Growth (measured as the 
percent change in sales 
from one year to the next 
calculated by dividing net 
sales by the inventory, 
accounts receivable, and 
total assets.) and 
Profitability (measured by 
Return on Assets and 
Return on Sales) 
IT Control 
Weaknesses  IT 
Governance                        
(IT knowledge at top 
executives and boards, 
IT governance 
mechanisms-IT 
strategy committee and 
CIO's tenure) 
The results showed that 
strengths (weaknesses) in 
these proxies (IT 
governance mechanisms 
and IT knowledge) are 
associated with the 
likelihood of a company 
reporting fewer (more) 
material IT control 
weaknesses. 
Boritz  & 
Lim 
(2007) 









: Discussed on the contribution 
of top management's IT 
knowledge and the firm's use of 
IT governance mechanisms on 
firm's financial performance. 
Financial performance:        
Growth (measured as the 
percent change in sales 
from one year to the next 
calculated by dividing net 
sales by the inventory, 
accounts receivable, and 
total assets.) and 
Profitability (measured by 
Return on Assets and 
Return on Sales). 
IT Governance 
mechanisms: IT 
strategy committee and 
the CIO                                           
IT knowledge: IT 
knowledge of board of 
directors Board and IT 
knowledge of top 
executives 
: The results found that 


















: Discussed the seven principles 
of the Val IT framework 
N/A N/A : The study found that 
adoption of these seven 





Sample Studies of the Effect of Board Diversity on Firm Performance 








128 Kuwaiti listed 
banks in the GCC 
countries during the 
period 2008 to 2010 
Proposed that the 
effectiveness of 
board meetings 
(measured by the 
frequency of board 
meetings) would 











diversity  and 
nationality 
diversity (local 
and foreigners)                                             
Not related to IC performance 
Moderator:                    
Board meeting 
effectiveness     
Significant negative on IC 
performance 
Cimerova et al. 
(2015) 
OLS regressions UK firms that 
represent more than 
95% of the market 
capitalization of the 
London Stock 
Exchange between 
2002 and 2012 
Examined the 
impact of cultural 
diversity in boards 
of directors on firm 
performance.  
Tobin‘s Q and ROA Cultural diversity TQ: Negative                                              
ROA: Negative 
Board 
characteristics:                   
Gender diversity 




TQ: Negative                                              
ROA: Negative 




TQ: Positive                                             
ROA: Negative 




















diversity, in terms 
of gender diversity 
and members' age, 
and the firm 
performance 
Tobin‘s Q and ROA 1) Average age                
2) Gender 
1) Youngers directors are expected to 
carry out risky strategies to improve 
future firm performance                            
2) Women directors are expected to 
enhance firm performance 




70 largest banks in 
the ASEAN 
banking system in 
period from 2009 to 
2013 
1) To study the 
level of gender 
diversity in board 
of directors and top 
executive of 
ASEAN banking 
sector.                  2) 
To assess the 
impact of gender 
diversity on bank‘s 
performance, in 
case of ASEAN 
banking system. 
ROA & ROE Gender diversity 
in the board of 
managements 
(BOM)                      
Significant positive impact on firm 
performance                                                   
Gender diversity 
in the board of 
directors (BOD) 
Neutral effect on firm performance 





: Annual financial 
statement based on 
2009, 2010 and 
2011.  : 149 
publicly traded 
German companies, 




























Negative impact on firm performance 
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Lenard et al.  
(2014) 
cross-sectional 
time series panel 
regressions 
: Contained of 
boards' information 
which derived from 
Risk Metrics 
database from 2007 
to 2011       : 
Compustat database 
and CRSP database 
for the years 2005-
2011 
To study gender 
diversity on the 
board of directors 




measured by the 
variability of stock 
market return. 
Firm risk: the 
variability of stock 
market return 
Gender diversity The higher the percentage of female 
directors on the board, the lower the 
variability of corporate performance 
Tarus & Aime 
(2014) 
: Fixed effects 
regression 




: 55 firms listed in 
Nairobi Stock 
Exchange (NSE) 
(2009) at the end of 
2010                              
: Secondary data 
based on annual 
report from 2002 to 
2010 
Examined the effect 
of boards‘ 
demographic 
diversity on firms‘ 
strategic change 
and the interaction 
effect of firm 
performance 
Strategic change: 
composed of six 
dimensions :                     
1) advertising 
intensity (advertising 
expenses/sales);                   
2) plant and 
equipment newness 
(net plant and 
equipment/gross 





expenses/sales);             
4) inventory level 
(inventories/sales);          
5) financial leverage 
(debt/equity).                     
1) Age                         
2) Educational             





                       
Moderator:                        
Firm Performance 
(ROA) 
1) Age diversity produced less 
strategic change                                                           
2) Functional diversity was 
associated with greater levels of 
strategic change                                                             
3) The moderated regression results 
did not support hypothesis that high 
firm performance enhances board 
demographic diversity–strategic 
change relationship                                                     
4) High level of firm performance, 
board demographic diversity 
produced less strategic change 




: Data based on 
2007 annual report 
of 100 non-
financial firms 




issues related to 
gender, age and 
ethnicity at 
directory level. 
Tobin‘s Q and ROA Director's gender                                Negatively associated with Tobin‘s q 
and ROA.                                                        
Ethnicity  Positively associated with ROA 




Galia & Zenou 
(2013) 
: Conceptual 
paper                              
: Longitudinal 









and gender) and 
the probability 
to innovate in 
four types of 
innovation 
176 French firms 
based on data from 
French Community 
Innovation Survey 




the link between 
board diversity and 
innovation, by 
considering various 
patterns of diversity 
as well as various 
types of innovation. 
Innovation:                      
1) Product innovation                    
2) Process innovation    
3) Organizational 
innovation                       
4) Marketing 
innovation 
Board gender 1) Significant evidence of a positive 
relationship between gender diversity 
on boards and marketing innovation                          
2) Negative relationship between 
gender diversity and product 
innovation.               
Board age Age diversity showed a positive 
relationship with product innovation 







Annual report  
based on 2008 
based on 169 listed 






of board members 
and financial 
performance of the 
firms listed on the 
Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) 
Tobin‘s Q and ROA Gender                          Both accounting and market 
performance have significant 
negative associations with gender 
diversity.                           
 Nationality   Nationality diversity was found to 
have no influence on firm 
performance     
Age The proportion of young members 










: Data from 
Standard and Poor‘s 
(S&P) 500 
companies (2006 
and 2007)                                 
: Involved by 188 
companies in the 
non-regulated 
industries 
Focused on the 
contribution to the 
literature through 
examination of the 
influence of 
corporate boards 




performance:                 
1) Revenue                    
2) ROA                          
3) Financial leverage     
4) Market Price to 
Book Ratio                              
5) Free Cash Flow to 
Net Income 
1) Occupational 
experience               
2) Board size            
3) Tenure             
4) Age                               
5) Gender                      
6) Proportion of 
Outside Directors          
7) CEO/ COB 
Duality 
1) Board size and heterogeneity of 
director expertise were positively 
related to revenue growth           
2) The ratio of directors with 
education expertise and the ratio of 
directors of finance expertise have a 
negative effect on this performance 
measure                        
3) The results showed that both 
CEO/COB duality and average tenure 
of board of directors have a positive 
effect on return on asset growth.                                            
4) Board size was negatively related 
to the debt to asset ratio but 
negatively related to free cash flow-
to-net income          5) No significant 
impact of outside directors, gender, 










approach            






companies over the 
period 2000 to 2006 
Explored on how 
demographic 




performance.            
: Top level 
management refers 
to both top 
management team 
(TMT) and board 
of directors (BOD) 
ROE Ethnic and gender 
diversity of top 
management 
levels 
1) Demographic diversity in TMTs 
had no impact on firm financial 
performance                                 2) 
Demographic diversity in BOD had a 
partial impact on firm financial 
performance                                                    
: gender effect did not contribute 
significantly toward firm financial 
performance                                              
: ethnic diversity was significantly, 
positively and consistently correlated 






using on the 
cross-sectional 
data are 
Secondary data of 
non-financial listed 
companies over the 
period 2000 to 2006 
Examined the effect 
of demographic 
diversity on boards 
of directors with 
regard to firm 
financial 
performance 
ROA & ROE 1) Gender                          
2) Ethnicity 
ROA:                                                                 
: Ethnic diversity was significantly 
(positively) correlated with 
performance                                                               
: Gender diversity was not correlated 
with performance                                                 
ROE:                                                                  
: Gender effect did not have any 
impact on firm financial performance 
throughout the years except in year 
2005                               : Ethnic 
diversity had significant impact on 
financial performance in the second 








from the top 100 
non-financial 
companies listed on 
the Main Board 
over a period of 




diversity on boards 
of directors with 
firm financial 
performance 
ROA & ROE Ethnic diversity is 




Increased ethnic diversity (board 
diversity) on boards of directors 





Sample Studies of the Effect of Concentrated Ownership on Firm Performance 
Author(s) Method(s) Sample Firm Performance Variables Results 
Basyith et al. 
(2015) 
Tobit regression 45 listed firm in the Indonesian 
Stock Exchange,  secondary data 
(2010- 2014) 
ROA Block holder ownership was positively 
significant associated 




1827 observations listed on the 
Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) 
2010 to 2012 
Tobin's Q Ownership concentration has a significant 
negative effect on firm performance 
Zakaria et al. 
(2014) 
1) Regression based on 
panel fixed effect model                                              
2) Regression of 3 stage 
crisis periods (panel 
random effect model) 
Secondary data from 2005 to 
2010 at 73 Malaysia Public 
Listed Trading and Services 
Firms  
ROA Ownership concentration was positively related 
to firm performance        




Employed secondary data on 53 
firms listed on the Nairobi 
Securities Exchange over a 
period of five years that is 2007 
to 2011  
ROA, ROE & Tobin's Q Ownership concentration was found to be 
negatively related to all the three measures of 
performance in firms  
Alimehmeti & 
Paletta (2012) 
OLS regression 203 listed firms in Italy. The 
sample data are collected from 
Amadeus for two periods: pre 
and post crisis (2006-2007 and 
2008-2009) 







169 firms, the total number of 
public firms listed on the IDX as 
at 31 December 2007 
ROA & Tobin's Q Concentrated ownership (largest shareholders) 
was found significantly associated with 
accounting performance but has no significant 
impacts on Tobin‘s q. Block holder ownership 
was negatively influence the accounting 
measure 
Fauzi & Locke 
(2012) 
OLS regression 79 New Zealand listed firms for 
the period of 2007–2011 








138 firms of 7 non-financial 
companies of Karachi stock 
exchange (2008 to 2010) 




Panel data Spanish non-financial firms 
listed on the Madrid Stock 
Exchange that it was 254 firms -
year observation for the period 
from 1999 to 2002. 
Tobin's Q Ownership concentration was positively effect 
on firm value, however at high levels of 
ownership concentration was negatively effect 
on market valuation. 
Sulong & Mat 
Nor (2010) 
Panel data analysis, 
hierarchical regression 
(generalized least square 
(GLS) estimation 
technique)  
403 firms listed on the Bursa 
Malaysia over a four-year period 
from years 2002 to 2005. 
Tobin's Q & Dividend Positive 
Ganguli & 
Agrawal (2009) 
OLS & SLS regression 100 Indian firms which were 
listed in Indian Stock Exchange 
based on 2007 
Tobin's Q Positive 
Sulong & Mat 
Nor (2008) 
Regression  406 listed firms on the Main 
Board of Bursa Malaysia. A 
cross-sectional analysis, annual 
reports (2002 and 2005) 
Tobin‘s Q Ratio (Q-Ratio) There was insignificant relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm value.    




The KLSE Annual Companies 
Handbook from 1994 to 2000 
(Malaysia‘s top 150 publicly 
listed firm) 
ROA & Tobin's Q Negative impact of ownership concentration 
levels on firm performance 
Haniffa & 
Hudaib (2006) 
OLS regression 348 Malaysian listed companies 
on the main board of the KLSE 
between 1996 and 2000 
Tobin's Q Positive 
Demsetz & 
Lehn (1985) 
2-SLS Cross-section sample over 511 
U.S. companies, average of 
variables for 1976-1980 
Accounting profit rates: Book 
value of assets, sales of capital 
expenditures, advertising 
expenses and R&D expenses 
No relationship between ownership 






  Sample Studies of the Effect of Managerial Ownership on Firm Performance 
Author(s) Method(s) Sample Firm Performance Variables Results 
Basyith et al.  
(2015) 
Tobit regression 45 listed firm in the Indonesian Stock Exchange,  
secondary data from 2010 to 2014 
ROA Negative and significant 
Nath et al. (2015) Regression 9 pharmaceutical companies listed on the Dhaka 
Stock Exchange (DSE), 10 years (2005-2014) 
ROA Positive but insignificant 
impact on ROA while 
negative insignificant impact 
on Tobin‘s Q. 
Zakaria et al.  
(2014) 
1) Regression based on 
panel fixed effect model                         
2) Regression of three 
stage crisis periods based 
on panel random effect 
model 
Secondary data from 2005 to 2010 at 73 Malaysia 
Public Listed Trading and Services Firms  
ROA Positive and significant 
Fauzi & Locke 
(2012) 
OLS regression 79 New Zealand listed firms for the period of 
2007–2011 





31 firms of all Nigerian firms in financial sector 
during 2006-2010. 
ROA Positive 
Wahla et al. (2012) Multiple regression 7 non-financial sectors of Karachi stock 
exchange. Total number of companies under these 
sectors is 138. 
Tobin's Q Negative 
Din & Javid 
(2011) 
2SLS regression 60 firm non-financial firms of manufacturing 
firms in Pakistan during 2000-2007. 
ROA, ROE & Tobin's Q Positive  
Sulong & Mat Nor 
(2010) 
Panel data analysis, 
hierarchical regression 
(generalized least square 
(GLS) estimation 
technique)  
403 firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia over a 
four-year period from years 2002 to 2005. 
Tobin's Q & Dividend Negative and significant 
364 
 
Sulong & Mat Nor 
(2008) 
Regression 406 listed firms on the Main Board of Bursa 
Malaysia. A cross-sectional analysis through 
annual reports for the years 2002 and 2005 
Tobin‘s Q Ratio (Q-Ratio) Negative 
Haniffa & Hudaib 
(2006) 
OLS 347 Malaysian companies listed on the main 
board of the KLSE between 1996 and 2000 
ROA Negative but insignificant 
APPENDIX VII 
Sample Studies of the Effect Government Ownership on Firm Performance 
Author(s) Method(s) Sample Firm Performance Variables Results 
Musallam (2015a) Generalized Least 
Square (GLS) & OLS 
Regression 
190 non-financial listed companies on Bursa 
Malaysia from 2009 to 2014 
ROE Negative and significant 
Musallam (2015b) Generalized Least 
Square (GLS) method 
Companies that are listed on Bursa Malaysia 
during the period of 2000 to 2009 
Total Investment Return of 
company 
From 7 GLICs, only 2 
GLICs showed positive and 
significant impact on market 
performance while other 5 
GLICs did not affect market 
performance. 
Tran et al. (2014) Regression 38,143 Vietnamese firms-year observations for 
the period 2004-2012 
ROA, ROE, Turnaround & 
Value added per employee 
Negative effect on firm 
profitability 
Zakaria et al. 
(2014) 
1) Regression based on 
panel fixed effect model                         
2) Regression of three 
stage crisis periods 
(panel random effect 
model) 
Secondary data from 2005 to 2010 at 73 Malaysia 
Public Listed Trading and Services Firms  
ROA Negative related to firm 
performance 
Menon & Ng 
(2013) 
Regression 28 non-financial GLCs from the Putrajaya 
Committee list from 16 industries (2007-2011 
secondary data) 
Tobin's Q Negative and significant 
impacted on private firms 
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Phung & Hoang 
(2013) 
Regression Using data from Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange 
and Hanoi Stock Exchange during the period of 
2007 and 2012 
Tobin's Q & ROA A nonlinear relationship (U-
shaped) 
Goh, Khan, & 
Rasli (2013) 
Ordinary least squares 
and two-stage least 
squares regressions 
192 firms over the three-year sample period (2004 
to 2006). 
Tobin's Q  Positive 
Najid & Rahman 
(2011) 
Regression  47 GLCs and 47 non-GLCs companies listed on 
Bursa Malaysia over a 6-year period of 2001-
2006 
ROA, ROE, Expense to 
Assets, Cash to Assets, Sales to 





Regression 2001 annual reports of 87 non-financial 
Malaysian listed companies 
Tobin's Q Positive and significant 
Sulong & Mat Nor 
(2010) 
Panel data analysis, 
hierarchical regression 
(generalized least square 
(GLS) estimation 
technique)  
403 firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia over a 
four-year period from years 2002 to 2005. 
Tobin's Q & Dividend Positive and significant 
Lau & Tong 
(2008) 
Linear regression 15 Malaysian GLCs over six years—i.e. 2000 to 
2005 
Tobin's Q Positive relationship 
between the degree of 
government ownership and 
firm value 
Sulong & Mat Nor 
(2008) 
Regression 406 listed firms on the Main Board of Bursa 
Malaysia. A cross-sectional analysis through 
annual reports for the years 2002 and 2005 
Tobin‘s Q Ratio (Q-Ratio) Positive and significant in 
2002 and insignificant in 
2005 
Tam & Tan (2007) : Regression                                
: Structural equation 
modelling (SEM) 
The KLSE Annual Companies Handbook from 
1994 to 2000 (Malaysia‘s top 150 publicly listed 
firm) 





Sample Studies of the Effect of Foreign Ownership on Firm Performance 
Author(s) Method(s) Sample Firm Performance Variables Results 
Musallam (2015b) Generalized Least 
Square (GLS) method 
Companies that are listed on Bursa Malaysia 
(2000 to 2009) 
Total Investment Return of 
company 
Positive impact on market 
performance 
Zakaria et al.  
(2014) 
1) Regression based on 
panel fixed effect model                         
2) Regression of three 
stage crisis periods based 
on panel random effect 
model 
Secondary data from 2005 to 2010 at 73 Malaysia 
Public Listed Trading and Services Firms  
ROA Positive impact on firm 
performance 
Phung & Hoang 
(2013) 
Regression Using data from Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange 
and Hanoi Stock Exchange during the period of 
2007 and 2012 
Tobin's Q & ROA Positive impact on both firm 
performance measurement 
Darmadi (2012) Cross-sectional 
regression models 
169 firms, the total number of public firms listed 
on the IDX as at 31 December 2007 
ROA & Tobin's Q No significant association 





31 firms of all Nigerian firms in financial sector 
during 2006-2010. 
ROA Positive and significant  
Mohd Ghazali 
(2010) 
Regression 2001 annual reports of 87 non-financial 
Malaysian listed companies 
Tobin's Q Positive and significant  
Sulong & Mat Nor 
(2010) 
Panel data analysis, 
hierarchical regression 
(generalized least square 
(GLS) estimation 
technique)  
403 firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia over a 
four-year period from years 2002 to 2005. 
Tobin's Q & Dividend Positive and significant  
Lau & Tong 
(2008) 
Linear regression 15 Malaysian GLCs over six years—i.e. 2000 to 
2005 
Tobin's Q Negative 
Sulong & Mat Nor 
(2008) 
Regression  406 listed firms on the Main Board of Bursa 
Malaysia. A cross-sectional analysis through 
annual reports (2002 and 2005) 
Tobin‘s Q Ratio (Q-Ratio) Negative and significant 
 
